COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN HAITI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002400350001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 27, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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No. 1370/67
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 July 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist Capabilities in Haiti
Introduction
1. The Communist movement in Haiti is divided
and weak and has only a limited capability for spon-
soring anti-Duvalier activities at the present time.
We do not believe the Haitian Communists will play
a significant role in a post-Duvalier situation un-
less near anarchy develops in the country. Communist
opportunities after Duvalier will be greatly af-
fected by the manner of his demise. More than likely,
some kind of "palace coup" will occur which would
present the Communists with a fait accompli. They
would have little room for maneuver unless wide-
spread opposition developed against the new ruler
or rulers. If the new government could not soon
establish its authority, the Communists' capability
for exploiting the situation would markedly increase.
12. Haitian Communists inside and outside Haiti
may number as'many as 650. Only 125.of them can be
considered dedicated, hard-core Communists; many
are in exile. Nevertheless, Communist leaders, wit-
nesging the erosion of the Duvalier regime during
the past nine months, have embarked on a program to
train cadres, hoping that they will be able to take
advantage of any disorganization which might follow
Duvalier's demise.
Note: T is memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office. of National Es-
timates and the Clandestine Services.
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3. Until about a year ago the two Communist
parties in Haiti were the Party of Popular Accord
(PEP), a Moscow-oriented party, and the Popular
Party of National Liberation (PPLN), a nationalist
and essentially Castroist party. The PPLN has been
in disarray since a government crack-down in mid-
1965, when its leadership was arrested or driven
into exile. Nevertheless, the party continued to
exist until it was succeeded in mid-1966 by a more
militant Communist party referred to by its Creole
initials as PUDA (United Haitian Democratic Party).
Recent information suggests that the PEP and the
PUDA are collaborating to some degree in a "united
front," both inside and outside of Haiti.
Current Situation
4. The total membership of the PEP is.believed
to range from 200 to 500. The identities of current
Central Committee members are unknown, but Gerald
Brisson and Raymond Jean-Francois appear to be lead-
ing PEP members. The PEP's strategy is to follow a
united front policy, seeking alliances with other
"progressive" groups inside and outside of Haiti such
as PUDA. PEP and its front activities are coordinated
by its representative in Mexico, Gerard Pierre-Charles.
Most of the PEP's funds come from the USSR, but'it has
also received financial. support from the French and
Italian parties as well as the Cubans and a Communist
faction in the Dominican Republic.
5. In an attempt to re-establish itself after
the regime's repressive actions in mid-1965, the
PPLN changed its name to the Haitian United Democratic
Party (PUDA). Its leaders are believed to be Roger
Gaillard, Yves Barbot, Lionel Loubeau, and Frank Nau.
The PUDA may have.. been involved in the antiregime dem-
onstrations in St. Marc, Arcahaie, and Gonaives last
fall. PUDA members and sympathizers in Haiti may num-
ber as many as 150. The PUDA has little political
influence among Haitian exiles, although it does
have contacts across the border in the Dominican
Republic with some members of the former ".Consti-
tutionalist" forces there. The PUDA has at least one
leader in the Dominican Republic recruiting Haitians
located there. Inside Haiti, the PUDA has.linked
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up with a small Marxist-oriented Catholic political
group and a pro-Chinese group to form a front to
counter PEP's coalition. There is some evidence of
cooperation between the PEP and PUDA groups, but
the extent of this collaboration is not clear.
6. So far, the Haitian Communists are believed
to possess only a limited number of arms, probably
no more than a few revolvers and home made bombs.
The PEP claims credit, however, for the three bombs
which exploded in Port-au-Prince in mid-April.
International Contacts and Assistance
7. One PEP leader is stationed in the Domin-
ican Republic and acts as an operations and support
officer. He recruits Haitians living in the Domin-
ican Republic who are willing to return to Haiti and
arranges for them to receive training in weapons
handling. The PEP maintains a clandestine communic-
ations system with its officers in the Bahamas and
the Dominican Republic as well as in Mexico.
8. Cuba beams 14 hours of propaganda radio
broadcasts to Haiti each week. It has also provided
some training, but only to a small number of Haitian
revolutionaries. Some Cuban funds may also be
reaching one or two of the more militant Haitian
exile organizations.
9. The USSR has provided financial assistance
to the PEP for a number of years, but has also
trained some Haitian Communists in schools in the
Soviet Union. In 1966, 15 Haitians reportedly were
being trained in Marxist doctrine and guerrilla
warfare in the USSR; the Soviets also maintain con-
tacts with leading Communist Haitian exile organiza-
tions.
10. Two groups of Haitian Communists located
in Paris are in contact with the Chinese Communists
there, and are now
receiving assistance from them. One of these groups,
led by Fred Baptiste who traveled to Peking in the
spring of 1967, has been promised financial support
and training. A few of Baptiste's militants are re-
portedly in transit to Peking to receive training.
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11. Duvalier's control apparatus has under-
gone considerable erosion in recent weeks. About
one fifth of his military household has been re-
placed,with a concomitant weakening of the regime's
repressive powers. Nevertheless, the conclusion
reached in National Intelligence Estimate 86.1-66,
The Situation and Prospects in Haiti, of October
1966 is still largely valid today: "The two Com-
munist parties are too small and weak to be able to
contend for power even in a disorderly situation
following Duvalier's departure. We doubt that out-
side Communist support--from Castro, the Soviets,
or Haitian Communist exiles--would be forthcoming
on a significant scale."
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