THE MERCENARY MUTINY AND THE TSHOMBE PLOT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002400290001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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op Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Mercenary Mutiny and the Tshombe Plot
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Top Secret
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25 July 1967
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 July 1967
The Mercenary Mutiny and the Tshombe Plot
Summary
The mutiny in the eastern Congo is sub-
siding, and in its wake, there is a growing
suspicion in'some quarters--backed by some
fairly good evidence--that it was part of a
larger plot aimed at restoring former
premier Moise Tshombe to power. That
Tshombe had been almost constantly engaged
in some form of "plotting" since he left the
Congo is almost certain. He may even have
been in touch over the past few months with
the mercenaries who staged the mutiny, since
he was probably planning to use them in his
comeback attempt. That the mutiny, however,
was part of a Tshombist "master plan" is
much less certain. The available evidence
suggests that even if there was a plot, the
mercenary action was essentially spontaneous,
stimulated by Tshombe's.kidnaping on 30 June
as well as by parochial mercenary grievances.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
,It was prepared by the Office of Current Intel-
ligence and coordinated with the Office of National
Estimates and with the Clandestine Services.
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re two aspects ot the situation i se
which throw doubt on the theory that the mutiny
was designed to be part of a Tshombd take-over.
In the first place, it seems unlikely that a plot
would be put into action right after its leader
had been taken out of circulation. Second, any
plot of this type must aim at seizing Katanga or
Kinshasa (or both) to have any hope of success.
For this,. additional troops would be necessary.
Although the story of a mercenary camp in Angola
is one of the most durable features of the
Tshombist-plot literature, there is no good evi-
dence that such a camp exists. Without a camp in
Angola--or a fleet of mercenary-laden planes in
Rhodesia, or some outside force of this type--a
mutiny in the northeastern Congo would have little
chance of success. The plotters outside the Congo
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have given many indications that they are aware
of this, and it seems unlikely that they would
start action without being sure that more forces
were available.
One Possible Scenario
3. As is usually the case in the murky world
of Congolese intrigue, there is no completely
satisfactory answer to all these questions. A
good case can be made, however, for a scenario in
which the mercenaries acted after warning their
outside contacts but without the approval of the
latter. On this theory, the mercenaries, unpaid for
months and knowing that Mok?utu was planning to dis-
band them, reacted in a typically aggressive and
unforesighted fashion when the news of Tshombd's
kidnaping was added to their other grievances:
they moved into the nearest towns (Kisangani,
Bukavu, and perhaps Kindu), shot up a few Congolese
soldiers, scared off the rest, behaved in courtly
fashion toward local Europeans, and then tried to
decide what to do next.
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5. If this reading of the evidence is accurate,
it appears that while Tshombd awaited his fate at
the hands of the Algerian courts, Tshombd's assets
for any comeback attempt were being expended in a
piecemeal and uncoordinated way which gave Mobutu
an opportunity to neutralize the plot as well as the
chief plotter. Thus, if Mobutu's outside opponents
are still interested in moving against him in the
wake of the kidnaping and the mutiny, they will have
to do so with drastically shrunken resources.
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Talking Paper for "The Mercenary Mutiny and the Tshombe
Plot"
1. There has been wide speculation in the press
and a spate of diverse intelligence reports alleging
that the mercenary mutiny in the Congo was part of a
Tshombist plot to stage a coup against the Mobutu gov-
ernment. This memo is an effort to examine the facts
as well as the allegations and to draw up a scorecard
of the evidence supporting the plot theory and the data
denying such a plot.
2. We believe that a Tshombe plot--or indeed
perhaps several Tshombe plots--did exist. That the
mutiny, however, was part of a Tshombist "master plan"
is much less certain. In any event, the available
evidence suggests that the mercenary part of any such
plot went off permaturely, stimulated by Tshombess
kidnaping on 30 June as well as by parochial mercenary
grievances.
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