SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION FRANCE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002200380001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
FRANCE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
29 June 1967
Arms Policy
1. On 5 June Paris publicly announced a decision
made on 2 June -- before the opening of Middle East
hostilities -- to place a total embargo on arms to all
countries involved in the conflict. This particularly
affected Israel, since its armed forces relied heavily
on French armaments. On 8 June the policy was to be
modified to permit the shipment of spare parts but
not offensive weapons, reportedly as a result of Pre-
mier Pompidou's reminder to De Gaulle that all armaments
contracts with Israel included a clause to supply
spares for 10 years. The embargo is officially still
in effect, but there has been a welter of conflicting
information on whether it is being observed.
2. All indications are that shipment of spare
parts was resumed after a short break in early June
and is continuing.
3. On the matter of offensive weapons, Israel
is almost certainly receiving some equipment which
falls in this category.
4. Powerful banking and business circles, such
as the House of Rothschild and Marcel Dassault, have
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put pressure on French officials, and particularly on
Premier Pompidou (former Director General of the House
of Rothschild), to lift the embargo. The Dassault
firm argued that French manufacturers would lose out
completely in the future as suppliers of arms to
friendly nations if they were not able to resupply
in time of real need.
6. There have been rumors that Israel cancelled
its arms contracts with France. Our best judgment is
that there have been discussions of cancellation but
that no decision had been taken.
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Attitudes Toward a Settlement
8. France's attitude toward any possible middle
East settlement will be conditioned by its desire to
increase its influence in the area and to enhance its
credentials as the major power most likely to be con-
sidered impartial by the "third world" nations. Ef-
forts to extend French influence in the Middle East
have been given a boost by careful cultivation of
the Arabs during the conflict, and there have been
indications that some Arab states would favor France
as a mediator in the conflict. The deterioration of
the US and British positions in the area opens the
door even wider for the French, and Arab dissatisfac-
tion at the USSR's role in the crisis, reduces compe-
tition from the Communist camp. France is the only
major power which is not linked with either of the
combatants or their big power supporters--a point
which Paris unfailingly makes.
9. Paris believes that any lasting solution for
the problem should be found within the framework of
the four major powers, although it is aware that
significant negotiations are unlikely until passions
have cooled. For this reason, the French probably
regard the UN as a satisfactory forum for discussions
for the present. For France any UN action, however,
should result from decisions of the Security Council--
where the focus is on the four powers--and not the
General Assembly. Although the French have yet to
outline any detailed ideas for a solution, they main-
tain that any agreements should be of a permanent
nature so that another crisis will not erupt within
a few years. Moreover, France has already indicated
that it will not regard Israeli territorial gains
a fait accompli but will insist that a settlement
should be acceptable to all parties to the conflict
and "consecrated" by the international community.
In addition, Paris believes that a settlement should
include some solution for the Palestine. refugee prob-
lem as well as freedom of navigation of both the
Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal.
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10. Paris' official position remains one of neu-
trality, although the handling of the government's
statement of 21 June on the crisis seems to have dis-
torted De Gaulle's intentions. Wide segments of the
press and the diplomatic community interpreted that
part of the statement condemning the opening of hos-
tilities by Israel as abandonment of France's neutral
posture. It probably is the government's judgment
that Israel launched hostilities, but the minister of
information told a journalist that the statement would
never have been issued had he and the foreign minister
been in Paris. The press twisted the import of the
release by concentrating attention on the condemnation
of Israel without noting that the declaration also
censured the "threat to destroy it which its neighbors
had made." The fact that the government took several
unusual steps to clarify the statement indicates
that the declaration was not intended to deviate from
the neutral position previously established. Finally,
Couve de Murville's General Assembly speech on the
following day was rewritten to avoid the appearance of
siding with either camp.
11. Before the press communique contretemps, there
had been considerable comment that the government's
policy and conduct in the crisis were widely unpopular,
not only in opposition circles but among Gaullists as
well. A recent poll did indeed reveal that 58 per-
cent of those questioned were sympathetic to Israel,
but 59 percent, however, approved De Gaulle's "neu-
tral" position--a clear indication that at least some
of those with pro-Israeli leanings recognized the po-
litical and economic advantages of neutrality to France.
The opposition in France has been sharply split on the
issue, with the French Communist Party echoing the
Soviet line and the non-Communist Federation of the
Left taking a pro-Israeli stance. Recent indications
that the split will prevent or at least delay develop-
ment of a common political program by the two groups
can only be pleasing to De Gaulle. Although Gaullists
both within and without the government have also been
disenchanted with the General's stance, the limits
of possible dissidence are firmly set by their aware-
ness that the government majority in the National
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Assembly is a slender one and by their recognition that
the neutral posture might yet permit France to play a
crucial role in the negotiations.
12. At this point, De Gaulle appears to have been
successful in his efforts to induce Moscow to give con-
sideration to Paris and to prevent the "super powers"
from negotiating without France. The French Presi-
dent initially was discouraged by Moscow's unreceptive
attitude to his proposal for quadripartite talks. De
Gaulle, however, probably interprets Premier Kosygin's
stop-over in Paris before the Soviet leader's meet-
ing with President Johnson and his planned visit on
1 July as de facto big power consultations, and thus
a vindication of his neutral position.
Possible Future Developments in France's Arms Policy
13. When the embargo was instituted, De Gaulle
doubtless did not wish to see Israel defeated, not
only because this would have put France in an extremely
awkward position due to its earlier commitments to
Israel but also--and more importantly--because he did
not wish to see the USSR greatly improve its position
in the Middle East. Moreover, the French President
probably estimated that the Israelis could hold their
own militarily and that they would have sufficient
equipment to see them through the hostilities, which
would not be prolonged. Therefore, De Gaulle probably
concluded he could afford to embargo arms, leaving
open the question of what policy France would pursue
in the future.
14. For the present, so long as the Middle East
conflict has center stage in the international arena,
De Gaulle probably will maintain the"embargoofficially
but continue to close his eyes to the secret but
limited flow of offensive weapons to Israel. De Gaulle
might still hope that a threat to cut off even the
present supply of arms and spare parts would give him
some leverage on Israel which could be used to lead it
to moderate its demands for a settlement.
15. Over the longer run, France might under cer-
tain circumstances lift its embargo. If the crisis
drags on and Paris is getting nowhere with its hopes
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of direct mediation or four-power negotiations,then
De Gaulle might conclude that an appearance of strict
neutrality was not paying off and thus let the em-
bargo drop. While France might take this decision quite
independently of what the other major powers do, it
seems certain that Paris would resume arms sales if
these powers were themselves making major deliveries
to countries involved in t2.e conflict. De Gaulle could
plausibly argue that France's neutral status was not
impaired by indicating that any French arms sales would
be strictly on a commercial basis and open to Arabs
and Israelis alike.
16. De Gaulle probably believes there is only a
small chance that the major--powers could agree on
any meaningful system of limiting arms to the Middle
East. Nonetheless, he would probably agree to French
participation under certain conditions: 1) participa-
tion by all four major powers--the US, the USSR, the
UK and France; 2) effective inspection, which would
necessitate Arab and Israeli cooperation; 3) a reason-
able balance in armed strength of t'.1e two sides. Even
should the US and USSR make an agreement on arms limi-
tation without including the French in the negotiating
stage, which seems unlikely, France probably would
tacitly go along by simply continuing the present
embargo. In this way, De Gaulle would not have to
assent openly to an agreement negotiated over his
head by the super powers but at the same time could
conform to the substance of it.
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