WHITE HOUSE MEETING ON HAITI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002200270001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 22, 1967
• Content Type: MFR

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22 June 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: White House Meeting on Haiti
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1., Mr, W, Rostov chaired a meeting on Haiti.
Also present were: Assistant Secretary of State for
American Republic Affairs,, Covey T. Oliver; his deputy,
Mr. Robert Sayre; Ambassador to the OAS, Sol Linowitz; 25X1A
Mr Lon
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to Haiti Mr. Timmons: Mr. William Lang of ISA;
25X1A of CIA; and Mr. William Bowdler
of the White House Staff,
2. Mr, Rostov said that the President was concerned
about the situation in Haiti. He then asked the newly
appointed Assistant Secretary Oliver to take the floor.
Oliver expressed his concern and then stated that he felt
a variation of C and D of the Contingency Coordinating
Committee's paper on Haiti seemed more likely -- or, perhaps,
more closely D. He is particularly concerned with the
US Lines of Action that have a bearing on those operations
regarding US public, the US Congress and the other Latin
American governments, What do we say publicly in the event
the Haitian situation explodes and requires military inter-
vention? What do we say to the American republics?
3. Mr, Lonowitz mentioned talks he had recently with
representatives in the OAS, The Argentine ambassador, who
is close to his foreign minister, said that without an
IAPF the US must pick up the pieces. He might have been
hinting that we should push for an IAPF, The Brazilian
ambassador said he had instructions to keep Haiti off any
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agenda for the OAS meeting that will discuss Venezuela's
charges against Cuba, The Dominican ambassador said that
he feels the US press has greatly overplayed the dangers
in Haiti., (He obviously hasn't been reading his own press
which is much more strident.) Linowitz said that President
Frei was indirect in his response on Haiti when the
ambassador was recently in Chile. Frei opined that if the
situation in Haiti should endanger the hemisphere "something
would have to be done."
4. It was noted that a few of the Latin American
foreign ministers would soon be -- or were presently at --
the United Nations, Mr. Rostow suggested that Secretary
Rusk might want to talk informally to them about Haiti,
5, Linowitz felt that Article 39 of the Charter of
the OAS would permit moving in any military if the need
arose. Mr. Rostow opined that the mix of any force sent
in would be different from that that went into the Dominican
Republic in 1965. He felt that perhaps police and economic
types would be useful, Mr. Oliver said we should be trying
to get juridical cover through discussions in the OAS.
Should the situation "blow" there should be a factual sit-
rep "at whatever hour" by the President to the other
presidents of the OAS countries, to Linowitz for his
colleagues in the OAS and to the Latin American ambassadors
in Washington and to all of our embassies in Latin America.
This same type of multiple communications on a draft
resolution for the OAS. There should also be quick action
to prevent any ship landings on Haitian beaches, The
question was raised as to whether there should not be a
Caribbean naval patrol -- ours and others. Also a quick
and "fresh look" would have to be made at the CCC paper
on Haiti.
6. Mr, Sayre raised the question of an OAS technical
mission to Haiti in order to provide an OAS presence there.
Such a group could -- and would probably at any rate --
take a lot of time on feasibility studies before we would
be faced with any requests for large capital investments.
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7. Former ambassador to Haiti, Mr. Timmons, feels
that chaos will not break out when Duvalier goes, This was
not a general concensus. In fact, Mr, Rostow asked in
this regard what pressures were on Duvalier that makes him
feel he must murder so many people, especially some of his
own cohorts.
8, Mr, Linowitz feels that intelligence should keep
on top of any information on any outside help, especially
from Communists. Mr. Oliver feels we should have more
discussions with the small Caribbean countries to see if we
can get help or at least suggestions from them, Mr. Sayre
pointed out that there is an outgoing message from State
to all of our embassies in Latin America. We have replies
from seven large countries because they received the request
by cable the smaller countries were getting airgrams.
9. At times the suggestion was made that when Haiti
blows it might be more like a "Watts affair" than a coup.
In this case police and economic technicians would seem
more appropriate, Mr. Rostov asked if we knew any Latinos
who spoke French and who might be able to head up such a
group. Mr. Oliver mentioned a former Colombian foreign
minister by the name of Caicedo Castilla, The subject ended
there,
10, Mr, Oliver again mentioned that we must have a
basis of stopping second guessing, especially from our
Congress,
11. Mr, Rostow asked that CIA prepare a paper on.
Communists and Haiti,. with emphasis on facts and figures
and not generalizations.
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No. 1253/67
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 June 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist Capabilities in Haiti
Introduction
1. The Communist movement in Haiti is divided
and weak and has only a limited capability for spon-
soring anti-Duvalier activities at the present time.
We do not believe the Haitian Communists will play
a significant role in a post-Duvalier situation un-
less near anarchy develops in the country. Communist
opportunities after Duvalier will be greatly af-
fected by the manner of his demise. More than likely,
some kind of "palace coup" will occur which would
present the Communists with a fait accompli. They
would have little room for maneuver unless wide-
spread opposition developed against the new ruler
or rulers. If the new government could not soon
establish its authority, the Communists' capability
for exploiting the situation would markedly increase.
2. Haitian Communists inside and outside Haiti
may number as many as 650. Only 125 of them can be
considered dedicated, hard-core Communists; many
are in exile. Nevertheless, Communist leaders, wit-
nesging the erosion of the Duvalier regime during
the past nine months, have embarked on a program to
train cadres, hoping that they will be able to take
advantage of any disorganization which might follow
Duvalier's demise.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office. of National Es-
timates and the Clandestine Services.
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3. Until about a year ago the two Communist
parties in Haiti were the Party of Popular Accord
(PEP), a.Moscow-oriented party, and the Popular
Party of National Liberation (PPLN), a nationalist
and essentially Castroist party. The PPLN has been
in disarray since a government crack-down in mid-
1965, when its leadership was arrested or driven
into exile. Nevertheless, the party continued to
exist until it was succeeded in mid-1966 by a more
militant Communist party referred to by its Creole
initials as PUDA (United Haitian Democratic Party).
Recent information suggests that,the PEP and the
PUDA are collaborating to some degree in a "united
front," both inside and outside of Haiti.
Current Situation
4. The total membership of the PEP is.believed
to range from 200 to 500. The identities of current
Central Committee members are unknown, but Gerald
Brisson and Raymond Jean-Francois appear to be lead-
ing PEP members. The PEP's strategy is to follow a
united front policy, seeking alliances with other
"progressive" groups inside and outside of Haiti such
as PUDA. PEP and its front activities are coordinated
by its representative in Mexico, Gerard Pierre-Charles.
Most of the PEP's funds come from the USSR, but it has
also received financial support from the French and .
Italian parties as well as the Cubans and a Communist
faction in the Dominican Republic.
5. In an attempt to re-establish itself after
the regime's repressive actions in mid-1965, the
PPLN changed its name to the Haitian United Democratic
Party (PUDA). Its leaders are believed to be Roger
Gaillard, Yves Barbot, Lionel Loubeau, and Frank Nau.
The PUDA may have. been involved in the antiregime dem-
onstrations in St. Marc, Arcahaie, and Gonaives last
fall. PUDA members and sympathizers in Haiti may num-
ber as many as 150. The PUDA has little political
influence among Haitian exiles, although it does
have contacts across the border in the Dominican
Republic with some members of the former "Consti-
tutionalist" forces there. The PUDA has at least one
leader in the Dominican Republic recruiting Haitians
located there. Inside Haiti, the PUDA has.linked
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up with a small Marxist-oriented Catholic political
group and a pro-Chinese group to form a front to
counter PEP's coalition. There is some evidence of
cooperation between the PEP and PUDA groups, but
the extent of this collaboration is not clear.
6. So far, the Haitian Communists are believed
to possess only a limited number of arms, probably
no more than a few revolvers and home made bombs.
The PEP claims credit, however, for the three bombs
which exploded in Port-au-Prince in mid-April.
International Contacts and Assistance
7. One PEP leader is stationed in the Domin-
ican Republic and acts as an operations and support
officer. He recruits Haitians living in the Domin-
ican Republic who are willing to return to Haiti and
arranges for them to receive training in weapons
handling. The PEP maintains a clandestine communic-
ations system with its officers in the Bahamas and
the Dominican Republic as well as in Mexico.
8. Cuba beams 14 hours of propaganda radio
broadcasts to Haiti each week. It has also provided
some training, but only to a small number of Haitian
revolutionaries. Some Cuban funds may also be
reaching one or two of the more militant Haitian
exile organizations.
9. The USSR has provided financial assistance
to the PEP for a number of years, but has also
trained some Haitian Communists in schools in the
Soviet Union. In 1966, 15 Haitians reportedly were
being trained in Marxist doctrine and guerrilla
warfare in the USSR; the Soviets also maintain con-
tacts with leading Communist Haitian exile organiza-
tions.
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11. Duvalier's control apparatus has under-
gone considerable erosion in recent weeks. About
one fifth of his military household has been re-
placed,with a concomitant weakening of the regime's
repressive powers. Nevertheless, the conclusion
reached in National Intelligence Estimate 86.1-66,
The Situation and Prospects in Haiti, of October
1966 is still largely valid today: "The two Com-
munist parties are too small and weak to be able to
contend for power even in a disorderly situation
following Duvalier's departure. We doubt that out-
side Communist support--from Castro, the Soviets,
or Haitian Communist exiles--would be forthcoming
on a significant scale."
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