SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010057-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: June 20, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential ~-
D
MEMORANDUM
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN'S UN SPEECH, 19 JUNE 1967
Confidential
85
20 June 1967
No. 0658/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2C June 1967
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's UN Speech,
19 June 1967
1. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, in his speech
yesterday in the UN General Assembly, coupled his re-
jection of the Soviet charge that Israel had committed
aggression against the Arabs with a vigorous denuncia-
tion of the Soviet Union's "provocative role" in the
crisis. He said Israel viewed as "totally unacceptable"
the further Soviet recommendation that Israel should
acquiesce in a return to the situation that existed be-
fore fighting began. Eban reiterated Israel's position
that its Arab neighbors must recognize Israel's exist-
ence, and that a settlement can only be reached through
direct negotiations with each of them. Israel, he
added, would offer in such negotiations "durable and
just solutions" to the problems that have plagued the
Middle East, but he gave no hint as to what these pro-
posals might be, thus offering little immediate hope
for meaningful progress toward a settlement. The speech,
which included an appeal to other "small nations,"
nevertheless may have won support for a rejection of
the Soviet resolution presented to the Assembly.
2. Eban's speech in general was as much a counter-
attack against the Soviet Union as it was a defense of
Israel's actions during the crisis and an exposition of
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. it
was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
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his government's present position. He asserted that
although the threat to Israel's existence had been
directed against it in the first instance by the
neighboring Arab states, the situation has been ag-
gravated by the Soviet Union's "alarmist and incen-
diary reports" of Israeli intentions, which it had
spread among Arab governments. He called this claim
"a monstrous fiction." The Soviet Union, he charged,
"has for 14 years afflicted the Middle East with a
headlong armaments race, with the paralysis of the
United Nations as an instrument of security, and
with an attitude of blind identification with those
who threaten peace against those who defend it."
3. In the light of this history, Eban observed,
the General Assembly would easily understand Israel's
reaction to the Soviet initiative in convening the
special session for the purpose of condemning Israel.
and recommending a withdrawal to the position that
existed before the war. The Soviet Union's record,
he said, gravely undermined its claims to objectivity,
and it was rather a legitimate object of international
criticism for its role in the crisis.
4. In rejecting the Soviet proposal on the res-
toration of pre-war conditions, Eban noted that the
Security Council, "where the primary responsibility
lies," had also rejected such a course. He blamed
Syria, Egypt, and Jordan for having shattered the
fabric of Arab-Israeli relations that had existed for
a decade, and warned that to go back to the situation
out of which the conflict arose would mean that "all
the conditions for renewed hostilities would be brought
together again." "We dare not be satisfied with inter-
mediate arrangements which are neither war nor peace,"
he said.
5. Eban made clear Israel's belief that the
precipitous withdrawal from Sinai of the UN Emergency
Force (UNEF) which had been formed in one of those in-
termediate arrangements, had been an important factor
leading to the war. His criticism of U Thant was
pointed for having acceded to Nasir's demand that
UNEF withdraw. "What is the use of a fire brigade
which vanishes from the scene as soon as the first
smoke and flames appear? Is it surprising that we are
firmly resolved never again to allow a vital Israeli
interest and our very security to rest on such a fragile
foundation?"
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6. Nasir's subsequent blockade of the Gulf of
Aqaba, Eban said, was an act of war which made the
question of who fired the first shot irrelevant.
As to the actual start of hostilities Eban restated
Israel's clai 25X1
Ithat Egyptian orces on une were
moving against Israel's western coast and southern
territory."
7. Eban did answer, without any direct reference
to it, the Arab charge that Israel had been supported
by the US and the UK during the fighting. "Alone," he
said, "unaided, neither seeking nor receiving help,
our nation rose in self-defense."
8. The speech contained no direct reference to
the question of an Israeli withdrawal from occupied
Arab territories. It did, however, emphasize that
Israel's insistence that there should be no return to
the previous status quo had a special meaning with
respect to Jerusalem. Eban accused King Husayn of
having rejected an Israeli proposal, made after the
outbreak of fighting in Sinai, to avoid hostilities
on the Jordanian front, adding that the King's action
"cannot fail to have its consequences in the peace
settlement." Later in the speech Eban indicated that
Israel was resolved to have access to Jewish shrines
in the Old City. On 18 June, the Israeli government
decided to postpone a declaration it had been consid-
ering on the status of the Old City, apparently in
order to maintain a consistent position on the "in-
separability" of territorial questions and a peace
settlement.
9. Eban, in his UN speech, also was scrupulous
in avoiding any specific proposals on the terms of a
settlement, obviously in deference to the priority
Israel places on direct negotiations with the Arabs.
If the Israeli government is ready to make concessions
--to the Palestinian refugees, for example--it is clear
they will not be made unless and until the Arabs agree
to face the Israelis at the conference table.
10. In sum, Eban scored some debating points in
his exchange with Kosygin, but that in itself is un-
likely to improve prospects for a settlement.
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Talking Paper for Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's UN Speech,
1. This memo reports the highlights of Eban's General
Assembly speech, takes note of his avoidance both of the
question of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and
of specific terms for a settlement, and briefly assesses the
speech's success. It concludes that Eban may have won sup-
port for a rejection of the Soviet resolution before the As-
sembly. Eban's address was as much a counterattack against
Soviet charges as a defense of Israel's actions.
2. Routine internal and external dissemination is re-
commended.
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