ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010056-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: June 20, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Official Use Only
MEMORANDUM
Arab Territories Under Israeli Occupation
Official Use Only
63
20 June 1967
No. 0657/67
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
20 June 1967
Arab Territories Under Israeli Occupation
C O N T E N T S
I. DATA ON ARAB AREAS UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION
II. COSTS TO ISRAEL OF CONTROLLING AND ADMINISTER-
ING OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY
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Gaza ' H> bran
GAZA
ah1f
I an'
_.... Uwaygila
1 I
An Nakhl
? At Kuntillae
Eila,-,4Aqaba
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I. DATA ON ARAB AREAS UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION
Summary
The areas of Jordan, Syria, and the United
Arab Republic now occupied by Israel provide nota-
ble security advantages. The more than 1,000,000
Arabs living in these areas, however, present siz-
able economic and population control problems.
Population
Area in
Square
Miles
Rural
Population
Density
(Per Sq. Mile)
Refugees
Registered
With UNRWA
Food
West Jordan
850,000
2,200
250
487,000
Deficit
Syrian High-
land
100,000
500
200
14,000
Surplus
Gaza Strip
400,000
140
3,000 plus
300,000
Deficit
Sinai
45,000
23,200
less than 1
--
25X1
TOTALS
1,395,000
26,040
--
801,000
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 West Jordan
WA~~I~IYERyIV use
PROJECTS
Canals
Completed
Proposed
Abandoned
Pipelines
Completed
Proposed
Proposed dam
(30"
to
40"
pipe
Tunnel
0 Pump station
A Siphon
708"
pipe
Gitani
Wazzani Spring
xT II
Pp-
#0 At Ta
695 {t.
Lake Y
Reservoir Tiberias
0Jalazone U ?
'Mu`askar ,\\?Aq
io 20 SALT PANS
SYRIA
Proposed
diversion
project,
Mukhaybah
Darn
Irbed0
Camp
jl East Ghor %-"
Canal
Karameh 'Amman
Jabal Hussein*
h i
ultan\ll New Camp
Dat JaAr
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East Line
66"
pipe
I Beersheba 0 \r -- tProposed reservoirs
ISRAEL
66911 6-67
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West Jordan is a rocky hill area 80 miles long north
to south by 30 miles east to west with a population of ap-
proximately 850,000 people. The area occupies only six
percent of the total land area of Jordan but it contains
47 percent of the people. Some 65 percent of the popu-
lation are rural villagers. The average density of the
rural population approximates 250 persons per square
mile. The heaviest concentrations of people are found
on the relatively well-watered slopes facing the Medi-
terranean Sea. Very few people reside on the steep,
barren land facing the Jordan Valley. Little water is
available for irrigation and all of the limited arable
land is devoted to olive groves, small orchards and vege-
table gardens, and dry farming of grain on rocky hill-
sides. Goats and sheep forage among the rocks where the
land is not suited to cultivation. Since 60 percent of
the food value in the diet of local people is based on
grain products in this grain-deficit area, near-famine
conditions occur in drought years in spite of relief pro-
vided by the United Nations and private charities.
Palestine refugees registered with the United Na-
tions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) make up almost 60 percent of the
total population of West Jordan. They numbered 486,956
on 30 June 1966. The majority of these people are re-
ceiving UNRWA rations in some form and a hard core of
some 170,000 unskilled workers and their families are
permanent residents of 21 UNRWA operated refugee camps.
An area of West Jordan west of a line along the
highest ground (shaded red on the map), the possession
of which would improve the security of the Israeli
coastal plain, amounts to some 1,100 square miles.
Within this area are the City of Jerusalem, the most
desirable farmland, about 65 percent of the West Jordan
population, and 10 refugee camps with 50,000 residents.
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Jerusalem
NEW CITY
Nnesset
Building
Prim. Minister's
Office- _
9 M.C.A.
Co sued
O L D
C I T Y
Dome of
the Rack
W' Hadasseh
Hospital
-Al Isawiyah
(Village)
NEUTRAL ZONE
ISRAELI VERSION
7 18LY 1948
ORDANIAN VERSION
21 JULY 1946
ISRAELI-HELD JORDANIAN-HELD
Cove sen~lfouse%i /-/
f al{?a ~~rWi?~N ~fl(~ uy~s'
SITUATION PRIOR
TO HOSTILITIES
ARMISTICE LINE
NO MANS LAND
DISPUTED TERRITORY
MAJOR ROADS
1000 2000 3000 4000
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Jerusalem
Arab Jerusalem, Jordan's third largest city,
covers an area of a little more than one square mile
and has a population of some 85,000 including a siz-
able Christian element. The walls of the Old City
enclose only about .3 square mile which includes a
crowded residential area and most of the Jewish, Mus-
lim and Christian shrines, A more modern residential
area lies north of the Old City. Tourism centered
on religious activities is the most important eco-
nomic activity in Arab Jerusalem and has been an im-
portant source of Jordan's foreign exchange earnings.
The only airport serving Jerusalem is on the Jorda-
nian side five miles due north of the city.
The entire city of Jerusalem has a population of
about 275,000 and covers an area of slightly less
than five square miles. The Jewish sector, usually
referred to as the New City, has a population of
190,000 and spreads over about 3-1/2 square miles.
Government and business occupy the center of the
New City. New suburbs have sprung up in the northern
part of town, and the southern half of the city is
also largely residential. Light industry has been
actively encouraged in the northwest section and mil-
itary installations are scattered across the entire
Jewish sector.
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Syrian Highlands
Qutraytirah
,4.
AREA OPT,
k CUPIED BY r
Yf
I SRA .`
Frg
pEM 4ti A Z i
? Sabam
? Samar
AMMAN
JORDAN
UAR
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Syrian Highlands
Occupation of the southwestern highlands of
Syria greatly improves Israel's ability to pro-
tect her settlements in the Upper Jordan Valley.
In addition, occupation of these highlands gives
Israel control,of the Baniyas River--a major source
of the Jordan River--and an opportunity to press
for control of Yarmuk River waters. The projected
Arab canal for diversion of headwaters of the
Jordan River to the Yarmuk River crosses Israeli-
occupied territory. In addition, the Trans-Arabian
Pipeline crosses this territory en route from the
Persian Gulf to the Sidon Terminal in Lebanon.
The occupied territory is some 40 miles long
by 12 miles wide and comprises about 500 square
miles of semi-arid hills and rolling plains. The
terrain rises abruptly eastward to elevations
2,000 feet above the Jordan Valley and then
slopes to the northeast. An estimated 100,000
Syrian villagers are engaged primarily in rais-
ing wheat and livestock in the area. When rain-
fall is short, this is a food deficit area. The
rural population density, approximately 200 per-
sons per square mile, is high for Syria. Qunay-
tirah, a town of some 25,000 people, is the only
large settlement. Approximately 14,000 refugees
registered with UNRWA are living in the area.
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THE GAZA STRIP
Armistice line
Principal road
Other road or track
Railroad
Water pipeline (alignments
approximate)
Airfield
Gaza Strip town
Refugee camp
Israeli settlement
Sand dune area
Irrigated area in the Gaza Strip
o i z
Miles
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The Gaza Strip
The Gaza Strip is a dry patch of coastal plain
less than 30 miles long and varying in width from 4
to 8 miles. The present population is more than
400,000 of whom more than 300,000 are registered
refugees. Most people are clustered in a few densely
populated communities, including refugee camps. About
100,000 live in Khan Yunis, some 50,000 in the town
of Gaza, and 7,000 in the village of Rafah. More
than 195,000 persons reside in the eight refugee
camps that are strung out the length of the Strip.
Although the population density of the Strip is more
than 3,000 persons per square mile, there are some
coastal dune and desert areas which are virtually
empty.
The largest employer in the past was the Egyptian
military government which had a payroll of some 7,000
persons, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) employed
about 3,600 persons, all but,a dozen of whom were Pal-
estinians. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
had a local staff of more than 1,500 and occasionally
employed an additional 6,500 laborers. Some 35,000
to 40,000 seasonal agricultural jobs have not custom-
arily paid a living wage.
Agriculturists working in the Gaza Strip during
the 125-day Israeli occupation in 1956-57 estimated
that if the Strip were tied to the nearby irrigation
network of Israel and the water used to full advantage,
the potentially self-supporting segment of the popula-
tion could be doubled--an increase from 80,0.00 to
160,000 persons. Portions of the Strip are well suited
to citrus production, but there is little substance in
local boasts that the entire area could be turned into
a citrus grove. Most of the gainful employment would
be generated through agricultural production and mar-
keting, but the increased income would promote ad-
ditional jobs in other sectors of the economy. Even
full development of the agricultural potential, how-
ever, could not meet the needs of the area and would
still leave more than 220,000 dependent persons.
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Sharm ash-Shaykh
TIil_~P OF
,\,A QABA
71(
Shaykf Y
Hami4
1Nabq
i:'ritc rJ risr 't,S 2 d''. v
View from Ras Nosroni toward Tiran Island
Profile line
)AC NACDArvr
Il /1" 1) ASr /
0 MILES
PROFILE OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN
sr:ucje
F.
Grafton passage
241) feet deep
Reefs and shallows with
single criannel 54 feet deep
SAUDI
U.A.R.
TIRAN
LAND
ARABIA
MILES
1
0
12
1
J
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A largely barren and inhospitable area, Sinai
has a population of only about.45,000, two thirds
of whom live in the vicinity of Al-Arish on the
Mediterranean Coast. An area of great importance
to Israel is Sharm ash-Shaykh. Occupation of
this area gives Israel control of the approaches
to the Strait of Tiran--the entrance to the Gulf
of Aqaba. Sharm ash-Shaykh itself is a small bay
backed by a narrow coastal plain and rugged, arid
mountains. The small jetty and an adjacent air-
field suitable for C-47 aircraft make the site
convenient as a base of operations. Egyptian,
United Nations, and Israeli forces have all
used the area as a base camp in the past. Ac-
tual control of the strait, which narrows to less
than 5;000 yards, is easily exercised from Ras
Nasrani on the Sinai mainland due west to Tiran
Island. The center of Enterprise Passage, the
most favorable channel, lies on the west side
of Tiran Island approximately 1,000 yards off
Ras Nasrani, while Grafton Passage is 3,500
yards farther. There is a narrow, twisting pas-
sage east of Tiran Island, but it is not con-
sidered safe for ocean shipping.
Southern Sinai is virtually uninhabited
rocky wasteland. The amount of territory Israel
might consider necessary to protect a force sta-
tioned at Sharm ash-Shaykh is unknown.
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II. COSTS TO ISRAEL OF CONTROLLING AND ADMINISTERING
OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY
In five days of hostilities Israel brought un-
der its control a total of 26,040 square miles of Arab
territory. This area includes the sparsely populated
Sinai desert and the heavily populated West Bank area
of Jordan. Israel has the military means to defend
this territory, but it will need to keep a larger than
normal force on active duty to control it. Tel Aviv
has already demobilized substantially from the peak
it reached during hostilities, but a total of around
125,000 men will probably have to remain under arms
for a considerable time. We assess below the economic
costs of maintaining this extra mobilization and of
administering the captured areas.
The cost to Israel of occupying the conquered
territories is estimated to be about $10 million a
month, consisting almost entirely of expenditures for
the Israeli military and for food relief. Such costs
are well within the country's financial resources.
They amount to less than four percent of GNP and about
seven percent of total government expenditures in 1966.
The war-induced foreign remittances already received
by Israel would cover these expenditures for several
months. Moreover, there is enough slack in the Is-
raeli labor market to supply military needs for labor
due to occupation without affecting the civilian econ-
omy significantly.
The additional military expenditures attribut-
able to occupation are estimated at about $8 million
monthly. This estimate is based on a force level of
125,000 men compared with a normal 80-85,000 for the
regular army, air and naval forces, paramilitary
forces, and reservists on duty. The increase over
normal levels is 40-45,000 reservists. This force
would cost from $7.8 to $8.7 million a month. Add-
itional logistical support in the Sinai would be less
than $0.5 million. The principal item is operation
and maintenance of about 300 2 1/2-ton trucks to
carry water, food, and other supplies. Monthly cost
of this service is estimated to be up to $300,000.
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No allowance is made for additional logistical support
in Syria, Gaza, or Jordan because such costs would be
largely offset by reductions in training exercises,
normally a large item in Israeli military expenditures.
At least initially the occupied areas prob-
ably will be an economic liability for Israel, but
the cost of supporting their populations will be
small. Most local needs for services, such as police
and health care, will continue to be provided by lo-
cals. What manufacturing there is in these areas is
based mainly on local supplies and most of it should
continue. The West Bank produces cons-iderable quan-
tities of vegetables and fruit and some grain, but is
a grain deficit area. The Gaza Strip produces little
of its food needs. The occupied areas are unlikely
to export nearly enough goods to pay for imports from
Israel, but should soon attract a great many tourists,
particularly to Jerusalem. The expenditures of these
tourists could, in time, transform the occupied areas
from an economic liability for Israel into an asset.
The cost of supplementing local supplies of
food and other essential commodities in the occupied
areas is estimated to, be about $1 million a month,
excluding the cost of supporting refugees under UNRWA
programs. The population of the Gaza Strip is about
400,000 and that of the West Bank about 850,000. The
population of Sinai is very small; that of occupied
Syria numbers about 100,000 and is largely self-
supporting. It is assumed that about 150,000 people
in Gaza not supplied food by UNRWA and half or more
of the 487,000 refugees on the West Bank not receiving
UNRWA aid (some 250,000) will have to receive some
help from Israel. The extent of Israeli assistance
probably would not exceed the average UNRWA ration of
$2 to $3 a month.
Continued partial mobilization probably would
have little'or no negative effect on the Israeli
economy at least for several months. Keeping 40-
45,000 reservists in the armed forces will not strain
the labor supply because most of the skilled
managerial and technical people needed in the civilian
economy will be released quickly and many of the less
skilled people would have difficulty finding civilian
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employment if they were discharged even though demand
for civilian labor probably has increased somewhat as
a result of the war. Just before the crisis, Israel
had a great deal of unemployment--up to 80,000.
Occupation and continued mobilization will
not strain Israel's foreign exchange supplies. Just
before the crisis, gross holdings of gold and for-
eign exchange were more than $600 million, adequate
under normal conditions to cover about nine months'
imports. These reserves probably have increased as
a result of the crisis thanks to a massive inflow of
remittances. Remittances from the US alone amount to
several tens of millions of dollars and additional
large sums almost certainly are being obtained in
Europe. The increase in remittances probably has
more than paid for the foreign exchange costs of the
war, which include the loss to date of $2 to $3
million in tourist receipts (these have been running
about $4.6 million a month) and probably some slight
increase in imports and reduction in exports. More-
over, prospects for the balance of payments are
favorable. Remittances will decline in time but
tourist earnings will boom; exports should proceed
normally; and any increase in import requirements
due to occupation and mobilization will be small.
11-3
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