THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010047-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: May 5, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
ARMY review(s) completed.
Top Secret
11.0
5 May 1967
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Information as of 1600
ay
US Marines have captured the last of three
strategic hills north of Khe Sanh.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
US Marines have captured the last of t~iree strategic
hills north of Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province
after 11 days of heavy fighting (Paras. 1-4). Two
South Vietnamese Army search-and-destroy operations
report successful encounters with enemy forces (Paras.
5-6). Aerial photography has revealed the existence
of eight more enemy artillery positions in the DMZ
(Paras. 7-9).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
T e
the presidential electoral law (Para. 2).
ons i uent Assem as approve out one t .rd of
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
on y
ea s a een caused y US air strikes
since August 1964 (paras. 5-6).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: Recent
US air strikes are reported to have seriously
affected morale in Hanoi (Paras. 1-2). The VC
Liberation Front representative in Hanoi has been
making a special effort to convince non-Communist
colleagues in Hanoi that there are significant
differences of opinion and policy between Hanoi
and the Front (Paras. 3-5).
VI. Other Major Aspects: A report of diffi-
culties in Haiphong port operations and possible
food shortages is contradicted by other evidence
(Paras. 1-5).
5 May 1967
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. On the afternoon of 5 May, US Marines secured
the northern heights of Hill 881 northwest of the
Marine outpost at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province. Press
reports state that enemy resistance was light at this
obaective, indicating that the North Vietnamese may
have finally abandoned their attempt to control the
strategic high ground overlooking Khe Sanh and enemy
infiltration routes. Cumulative casualties for this
11-day action now stand at 133 Marines killed and 383
wounded, as opposed to confirmed enemy losses of 551
killed. The Marines estimate that at least an addi-
tional 600 of the enemy were probably killed and many
were wounded.
2. MACV has provided additional information from
the interrogation of two North Vietnamese soldiers who
were captured during the Khe Sanh battle. The prisoners
claim to be members of the 2nd Regiment of the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) 325th Division.
3. One of the prisoners stated that the lst and
2nd ~,egiments of the division had a transportation
mission--presumably in the Laos panhandle. The 3rd
Regiment was to screen this activity by controlling
the high ground near Khe Sanh. This man further
stated that the 4th Battalion of the 2rd Regiment had
to reinforce the 3rd Regiment when the latter unit
sustained heavy casualties in encounters with US
Marines. Both the lst and 3rd regiments are now re-
portedly back in Laos, north of Route 9.
4. The commitment of the NVA 25th Division to
South Vietnam--if confirmed--could raise the number
of North Vietnamese division-level units in the DMZ -
Quang Tri Province area to as many as five. The 25X1
324 "B" and 341st divisions have alread been con-
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Two ARVN Operations Successfully Engage Enemy k'orces
5. South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) troops conducted
successful operations a't. opposite ends of the coun-
try on 3 and 4 May. In an area centered about six
miles east of Hue in northern Thua Thien Province,
ARVN forces of Operation LAM SON 48 reported killing
89 enemy soldiers on 4 May. Six ARVN soldiers were
killed in the five-hour fire.fight and 29 were
wounded. This is the second successful South Viet-
namese operation this week near the threatened north-
ern provincial capital. Operation LAM SON 47 had
accounted for more than 150 enemy killed during an
engagement five miles north of the city on 2 May.
6. Meanwhile, in the Mekong Delta province of
Dinh Tuong, 45 miles southwest of Saigon, ARVN
troops in Operation CUU LONG 61C killed 78 members
of the Viet Cong 514th Battalion and captured 45
suspects in two days of heavy fighting. In this
action, the South Vietnamese lost four killed and
26 men wounded. Earlier this week, elements of
the US 9th Infantry Division in Dinh Tuong Prov-
ince killed nearly 200 members of this same Viet
Cong battalion in a heavy engagement. This area
of central Dinh Tuong Province has long been
known as a manor Communist stronghold.
New Communist Artillery Sites Located in the DMZ
7. Eight Communist artillery positions have
been located in the eastern section of the DMZ
about four miles north-northeast of the allied
outpost at Con Tl~.ien by recent allied aerial photog-
raphy. Six of the eight positions are believed
to be occupied but the size of the ra~eapons has not
been determined; a fire-direction center was also
observed.
8. These newly discovered artillery sites
probably participated in the heavy barrage on 27-
28 April against US and South Vietnamese positions
immediately south of the DMZ in which at least 12
Americans were killed and nearly 200 others
wounded. Moreover, the US 175-mm. artillery posi-
tion at C.;io Linh--a favorite target of Communist
mortar crews--has been subjected to two artillery
attacks that included 105-mm. howitzer fire.
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9. These Communist bombardments are in part in-
tended to neutralize--at minimum enemy expense--the
apparently successful effects of the long-range Amer-
ican ets in and north of the
DMZ.
25X1 similar attacks--including
both artillery an mor ar fire--can be expected in the
future against allied positions in northern Quang
Tri Province.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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Presidential Electoral_Law
2. In three da~~s of plenary sessions, the Con-
stituent Assembly has approved a~out one third of
the presidential election law. `y'he articles expected
to cause the most controversy will be debated in the
next few meetings. The only significant alteration
of the draft regulations so far is a stipulation that
prospective candidates must be "introduced" by at
least 30 representatives from among the nearly 600
elected assembly deputies and provincial and municipal
council members. Such a provision is designed to
limit the field of candidates by eliminating those
who have little popular support. This apparent con-
cession to the procivilian deputies may make it easier
for assemblymen who favor a military candidate to keep
out of the law any provision for a runoff between
the candidates with the highest pluralities.
5 May 1967
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Reports of Civilian Casualties in the DRV
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pri a o a eat s in North Vietnam
from American action since Au ust 1964 were only
20,000." this low
figure was e main actor in encouraging the
North Vietnamese to continue the war.
6. There has been no reliable reporting on
North Vietnamese casualties during the war--either
civilian or military. This figure of 20,000, how-
ever, is well within the range of various US esti-
mates of North Vietnamese casualties.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
recen air s ri es ~n the Hanoi
area a seriously affected morale, that there
was a definite breakdown in order as people ran
wildly toward shelters, and that people were
no longer attempting to hide their fear or fat'
In contrast
e anoi popu anon was generally
ca man well disciplined. It is apparently true,
however, that the number of air raid alarms has
significantly increased in the past few weeks,
and that people have had to seek shelter both
during the day and at night. It is thus possible
that there was at least a temporary panic pro-
duced among the populace. It is too early. to
assess the long-range effect on popular morale
and will.
Liberation Frant Stresses Tts "Independence"
3. The Liberation Front representative in
Hanoi, Nguyen Van Tien, has apparently been making
a special effort in the past few weeks to convince
his non-Communist colleagues in the North Vietnam-
ese capital that significant differences of opinion
and policy exist between Hanoi and the Liberat'
Front. In early April,
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claimed that Tien was telling his diplomatic col-
leagues in Hanoi that the Front and not the DRV
should be contacted on matters concerning South 25X1
ame month,
the Front represen a?-ive a
given the impression that Hanoi au-
thorities were genuinely concerned over the Front's
asserting too much independence and, specifically,
did not approve of the Front's willingness to es-
tablish a coalition government in South Vietnam.
4. There have been no reliable reports of
Hanoi's disapproval of this long-standing Libera-
tion Front policy of willingness to participate
in a non-Communist interim government'in South
Vietnam prior to reunification with the North,
and both Hanoi and Front spokesmen have endorsed
this policy. In recent statements, the Front has
offered to cooperate with non-Communists regardless
of their past political activities--with the ex-
ception of those prominently associated with the
present South Vietnamese Government--and has even
hinted that some prominent members of the present
Saigon government would be acceptable but not any
of the so-called "Ky-Thieu clique."
5. Since approximately the first of the year,
there have been scattered rumors, 25X1
alleging that contac?s ave peen
mace a weep tubers of the Ky government in Sai-
gon and Liberation Front members. Such reports can-
not be verified,
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1
por conges ion ~.n aip ong e aye e un-
oa ing of merchant ships from two to three weeks,
that ships carrying foodstuffs received preferential
treatment, and that the laborers unloading the food
25X1 ships were not only "greedily pilfering the so a
beans " but were eating them raw on the docks.
one reason far the delay was
th~~tFiat-t7.z~ipments were transloaded di-
rectly into trucks, end that there were not enough
trucks 1? hters to maintain a high rate of dis-
2~X1 charge. several ships
were unable to enter e ar or e a e their draft
was too deep.
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Silting Problems in Haiphong Channel
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indicate continuing
silting pro ems a e mai aiphong ship channel,
making it difficult but not impossible for ocean
freighters to enter the harbor.
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Food Problems
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nam at record rates since the first of the year, and
Food supplies, owever,
are tight in North Vietnam at this particular time,
largely because of a poor harvest in 1966. Neverthe-
less, 'shipments of food have been entering North Viet-
T e DRV vernmen as
as substitutes for the rice ration, but
throughout 1967 the ration as genera y een o ed
in full. In the countryside, regime spokesmen have
told the peasants that they cannot expect the ration
to be maintained at peacetime levels, but there is no
indication that at least minimum levels of the ration
are not bein maintained.
5. It is too early to determine whether the early
rice crop--due to be harvested in June and July and ac-
counting for about one third of the annual rice harvest--
will be large enough to ease the tight food situation.
The planned acreage f r this cro was below that of
the revious ear,
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