PEKING, THE ARMY, AND THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 25, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Peking, the Army, and the Provincial Authorities
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Page
Summary ..................................... 1
Peking Presses Regional and Provin-
cial Party Members ......................... 5
The Provinces Fight Back ..................... 7
The Armed Forces on the Sidelines............ 8
The PLA Faces a Choice ....................... 12
The Army Gets in Line ........................ 15
An Olive Branch to the Party Establish-
ment... o ................... o ............... 17
The Role of Chou En-lai ...................... 20
The Trend Toward Moderation Continues........ 21
The "Rebels" Strike Back ..................... 23
The Central Committee Meets .................. 25
The Interim Course........... ................. 26
Prospects .................................... 28
Annex:
North China Bureau ....................... A-1
Northeast Bureau ........................ A-7
Northwest Pureau ........................ A-11
East China Bureau ....................... A-17
Central South Bureau .................... A-24
Southwest Bureau........ ................. A-28
Map: Chinese Communist Party Regions......... Follows
Annex
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 April 1,967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Peking, the Army, and the Provincial Authorities
Summary
The origins of the Cultural Revolution in China
are obscure, and the kind of information available
concerning the disorderly course it has followed
permits a variety of interpretations. It seems likely
that the trouble which has kept China in turmoil for
more than a year and which brought the country to
the verge of anarchy in January 1967 had its roots
in differences over policy in the fall of 1965. Mao's
plans for rekindling revolutionary enthusiasm among
the people and "steeling" the next generation to
ensure that China would not backslide into revision-
ism were probably an important issue--probably the
major question taken up at a top-level meeting in
Peking during September and October 1965.
Conflicts generated by this basic issue prob-
ably became entwined with a struggle inside the
party leadership during the winter of 1965-66. There
is some reason to believe that Mao became seriously
ill after he dropped out of sight in November, and
this would almost certainly have triggered prepara-
tory maneuvering to claim his mantle among the
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of Research and
Reports and with the Research Staff of the Deputy
Director for Intelligence. Discussions were also
held with analysts of the Office of National Esti-
mates.
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finely balanced forces at the top of the hierarchy
in Peking. When Mao returned to take up an active
role again in early spring this led to the destruc-
tion of several major party leaders who had opposed
Mao and whose ambitions and conniving had been
exposed. The purge--the first to affect politburo
figures in seven years--deepened Mao's suspicions
of all the rest and thus helped set the stage for
the 11th central committee plenum in early August
1966. The evidence indicates that this plenum was
the scene of a showdown between Mao and the old-line
party apparatus responsive to Liu Shao-chi and Teng
Hsiao-ping. Mao, supported by Lin Piao and Premier
Chou En-lai, won a victory in Peking. It was not
conclusive, however, because the new team of top
leaders--a basically unstable group--faced growing
resistance from powerful leaders in the provinces.
Most of these men had been clients of Liu and Teng
and could read the writing on the wall.
A drive to bring some of these provincial party
leaders down began at once, but was not pressed
strongly until December. By then the opposition
included virtually every first secretary in the
regional party bureaus and provinces and about half
the commanders of the 13 military regions. They
were aligned with a number of key party and military
figures still able to function in Peking and thus
made a potentially formidable group. They struggled
desperately to retain their positions and succeeded
in this until the military establishment entered
the conflict on the side of Peking during the last
week in January.
The basis on which leaders at the center gained
positive support from the armed forces is not clear.
It seems likely that a number of high-ranking mili-
tary officers opposed Mao and Lin Piao on this issue
in December--former Marshal Ho Lung and 19 other
major military figures were later charged with having
plotted a "coup" and were purged shortly after the
turn of the year.
There is reason to believe that up to mid-
January a number of key field. commanders were still
uncommitted, some because they were confused by the
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situation in Peking and others because they had
reservations about the course of the Cultural Revo-
lution. The military swung solidly into line in
late January and early February, however, at a time
when the Cultural Revolution was being moderated.
A firm causal connection cannot be established on
the basis of the evidence available, but the se-
quence of events suggests that the views of military
leaders were probably a factor--perhaps a major
one--in Peking's decision to put a damper on "rebel"
activity.
It seems likely that the military establishment
is an essentially conservative political organism,
and as such would opt for stability and unity. There
is no way of knowing whether a significant number
of commanders would have defied Peking if the Cul-
tural Revolution had not been moderated toward the
end of January. Doubts on this score almost cer-
tainly existed at the center, however, and would
have provided powerful support for arguments in favor
of a change in tactics.
When it appeared that the restoration of order
had been given priority by Peking and moves were
made to reassure the military concerning the conduct
of the Cultural Revolution within the armed forces,
the army moved into action decisively. This is a
reflection of the extent to which China has become
a modern state, with an army motivated by national-
istic patriotism,
Despite indications that some military leaders
were uncertain about whom to support in Peking, and
that a few may for a time have backed efforts by
regional political authorities to maintain their
positions, there has been no evidence of wavering
loyalty to the state within the officer corps at
large or among the rank and file, or of any wide-
spread disposition to support a movement toward
secession.
Once the military took an active role, resist-
ance in the provinces collapsed and there were
indications in February that the brakes had been
applied to the Cultural Revolution. In early March,
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however, there was a resurgence of "rebel" revolu-
tionary attacks on government and party officials.
These apparently were ordered by Mao to reverse the
trend toward phasing out the more violent and dis-
orderly aspects of the Cultural Revolution. A new
campaign launched against Liu Shao-chi and Teng
Hsiao-ping at the end of March apparently was in-
tended to prepare for their formal removal.
The outcome of these latest developments cannot
be predicted, beyond a general forecast of continued
confusion with new "twists and turns" in the months
ahead as the current leaders work to construct new
administrative machinery from the wreckage of the
old party and government apparatus. The course of
the struggle during the December-January crisis,
and the final victory of the center over power con-
stellations on the periphery suggest, however, that
over the longer run the prospect is for a unified
China governed on strongly nationalistic principles.
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Peking Presses Regional and Provincial Party
Members
1. Attacks on powerful figures in the regional and
provincial party apparatus began soon after the central
committee plenum in August 1966 and the subsequent crea-
tion of the Red Guards as a mass action political weapon
responsive to forces supporting Mao and Lin Piao. Red
Guard activist teams fanned out all over China during
September and October to spread the Cultural Revolution
and "bombard the headquarters" of local authorities in
a disorderly campaign of riotous demonstrations and mob
violence.
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2. regional party 25X1
bureaus and more than a dozen provincia party commit-
tees were brought under varying degrees of pressure.
The political and governmental apparatus outside the
capital resisted with a variety of devices, pretending
in some instances to welcome :Red Guard teams and offer-
ing sham cooperation but in fact attempting to block
their efforts. Local "guards" were often organized
and pitted against the interlopers from Peking. Secu-
rity forces were used by local authorites to channel Red
Guard violence and where necessary to suppress hoodlum
gangs attacking local leadership organs.
3. The pressure was stepped up by Peking during
November. Red Guard organization was improved and the
assault by them on the provincial apparatus was more
carefully focused. Up to the beginning of December,
however, the only major provincial leaders dismissed were
the first secretary of the Hopei provincial committee--
who had been in trouble prior to August--and the second
secretaries in Shensi and Heilungkiang provinces. In
Peking, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping continued to
show up with Mao at Red Guard rallies, although they were
by then shorn of significant political power.
4. In December the attack from the center went
into high gear. Former party leaders such as Peng Chen,
already brought down, were "dragged out" by Red Guards
and physically abused. A full-scale campaign, backed
by Madame Mao and other leaders, was launched against
Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. The charges brought
against Liu and Teng were tantamount to treason, and
it appeared that preparations were being made for formal
proceedings against them. The new attacks, in fact,
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amounted to a threatened declaration of war against
power holders on the periphery. The option of a settle-
ment between Peking and regional satraps was still open,
though by no means an inviting one since the terms of-
fered by the center were close to unconditional surrender.
The Opposition
7. The men threatened by this drive to finish off
resistance in the provinces belonged to cohesive local
groups loosely connected with each other and sharing
a common interest in political survival. Most offi-
cials under attack owed their positions to Liu Shao-
chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, who
had been demoted at the 11th party plenum in August. For
years Liu and Teng had been building the party apparatus,
both in Peking and the provinces, and their fall from
grace jeopardized the positions of large numbers of key
officials.
8. Apart from this, the generally united front
presented by regional and provincial officials against
efforts to bring them down was a reflection of loyal-
ties developed among men working together in outlying
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areas. Day-to-day operation of governmental and party
machinery in regional organizations led, almost in-
evitably, to the growth of self-serving "establish-
ments" made up of officials accustomed to dealing with
one another and taken up with local problems.
9. It seems likely, moreover, that over the years
many of these men have become progressively alienated
from authorities at the center who have been the source
of relentless pressure to achieve results and who re-
peatedly made local officials the scapegoats for
blunders committed in Peking. The considerable de-
gree of popular support commanded by these men stems
mainly from the regional diversity and provincialism
based on geographic, economic, ethnic, linguistic, and
cultural differences which still exist.
The Provinces Fight Back
10. Local authorities outside the capital responded
to Peking's offensive with a counterblow using political
weapons denounced by central authorities under the
blanket term "economism." This was an appeal to paro-
chial self-interest designed to produce paralyzing
confusion and at the same time to enlist support from
the people by offering them improvement in their lot.
Peking had in fact issued instructions which authorized
some of the actions taken by provincial authorities.
Later, however, the center charged that local authori-
ties were "bribing" the workers with wage increases and
a share-out of public property, encouraging them to
strike and go to the capital in order to present griev-
ances. Other devices used by local authorities included
deception tactics--setting up false "rebel" groups and
staging sham "take-overs"--and a kind of political
judo which involved overcompliance with orders from
the center such as the demand that workers be placed
in charge. Management technicians followed this in-
struction by leaving their jobs and thus crippling
operations in key installations or shutting them down
entirely.
11. All this added up to a kind of passive
resistance which produced disorder verging on chaos
in many parts of China. Peking's propaganda asserted
that a "revisionist" conspiracy to seize power lay at
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the bottom of these troubles. There is, however, no evi-
dence that opposition forces were ever anything more than
a loose coalition, or that leaders at the regional or
provincial level were playing for anything more than a
stalemate which would enable them to retain their posi-
tions. Most of the provincial. and regional power hold-
ers were able to hold out until after the middle of
January, a situation which would not have existed if
the armed forces had been committed on the side of
central authority. It seems equally clear that, if the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) had been firmly backing
provincial and regional authorities, unarmed bands of
troublemakers from other parts of China would never
have been able to humiliate local officials and dis-
rupt the operation of the party and government appara-
tus.
The Armed Forces on the Sidelines
12. Peking's directive publicized on 23 January
ordering the PLA actively to support Maoist revolution-
aries implies that the army had until then been under
instructions to stand clear of the struggle. Peking's
failure to use the armed forces against resistance in
the provinces during the August-December period might
have resulted from a decision. by Mao and Lin Piao that
the situation was not serious enough to warrant such
drastic action, or that it was not yet time to bring
the Cultural Revolution to a victorious conclusion.
During the early part of the period this explanation
is a plausible hypothesis but. after the middle of De-
cember it is unconvincing. The situation outside the
capital became steadily worse toward the end of the
month, and by the turn of the year it had become the
most serious internal security crisis faced by the
regime since it took power in 19.49. It is hard to be-
lieve that Mao and Lin would have permitted the massive
disorder to drag on in East China as it did from late
December to the middle of January--in particular the
cutting of the important Shanzghai-Peking rail line--if
they had been certain of the PLA.
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15. Attacks on important military figures by the
Maoists which began in early January suggest that the
armed forces were not used because some key military
leaders had opposed plans to achieve final victory for
Mao's radical program by using military means to over-
throw political leaders in outlying areas with whom
they had connections. They may have confronted Mao
with demands that he should relieve the crisis by
moderating the course of the revolution and coming
to terms with his opponents. The timing of events is
obscure, but if such a showdown took place it seems
most likely to have occurred shortly before the end
of the year.
The "Plot" of Ho Lung
16. Heavy criticism of military leaders began in
earnest when Liu Chih-chien came under fire on 8 Janu-
ary. A deputy director of the PLA General Political
Department since 1958, Liu had headed the army's Cul-
tural Revolution Group charged with purging the armed
forces during late 1966. The group was reorganized
on 11 January and Madame Mao was named as its "ad-
viser."
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17. An editorial in the Liberation Army Journal
on 12 January declared that the new body would open
"ferocious fire" on the "handful" in power within the
armed forces who had taken the "capitalist road."
The Army journal reaffirmed the assertion made in People's
Daily and Red Flag on 11 January that the Cultural Revolu-
tion had been pushed" to a new stage by recent events and
reminded readers that the army is the "mainstay of the pro-
letarian dictatorship"--i.e., the chief instrument of
domestic control. According to poster reports, Lin Piao
made a speech before the Cultural Revolution Group a few
days earlier in which he declared that the country was
in a "state of civil war."
18. The.scope and nature of the opposition in the
military leadership is suggested by charges surfaced sev-
eral days after the reorganization of the army purge
machinery. Posters put up on 15 January charged that
important party and military leaders had been involved
in a coup plot hatched by Ho Lung in February 1966. Ho,
a marshal until ranks were abolished in 1965 and a mem-
ber of the military affairs committee of the central
committee, was said to have headed a group which in-
cluded "many" military leaders from the general staff,
the air force, navy, and the Peking and Chengtu Military
regions; 19 were eventually identified by name.
19. The charge that plotting of some kind had been go-
ing on among the military is credible, and involvement of
officers in the Chengtu Military Region--the stronghold
of Southwest Bureau chief Li Ching-chuan--and the key
Peking Military Region makes sense. It seems unlikely,
however, that the details of the accusation, particularly
the date adduced, are accurate. The charges should prob-
ably best be viewed as symbolic ones, revealing opposition
but masking its true nature. It would thus appear that
the crimes were not actually plotting a "palace coup," and
that the indictment may have been backdated--perhaps in
order to conceal the fact that Maoist forces were cur-
rently facing strong opposition within the military lead-
ership over the issue of using the armed forces as Mao's
iron fist to win quick political victory in the provinces.
20. The fall of Tao Chu, denounced in poster at-
tacks shortly after his last appearance on 29 December,
is another reflection of the depth of the struggle that
was under way in December. Until around the middle
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of the month Tao had appeared firmly established as
number four man in the post-August hierarchy.
Posters annearina in late November charged
in the
b
osses
1- -
Tao with protecting several party
inces, including Li Pao-hua--third secretary in the
arty chief in Anhwei Province.
and
p
East China Bureau
Tao would thus have had an interest in blocking a drive
to eliminate power centers outside Peking. His sudden
and unexpected denunciation at the end of December may
indicate that he joined the military and party oppo-
sition in desperation when the issue came to a head.
The Army Reacts to the Purge
21. It was clear that bringing down Ho Lung and
his fellow conspirators did not mark the end of the
matter so far as the military establishment was con-
cerned. Even the newly reorganized armed forces' purge
machinery was not regarded as reliable by its creators.
Within a few days after the reorganization, two
members--both editors of Liberation Arm Journal--had
been removed. Instead of stimulating new enthusiasm
for the "revolution," the move to strengthen the mili-
tary purge apparatus, together with attacks on major
military figures, may actually have operated to heighten
fears regarding their future position among senior troop
commanders--generals of armies and high-ranking staff
officers in the military regions--and inclined them to
hang back.
22. Many of these men had former ties of one sort
or another with military leaders who had come under
attack, and even those with no connections which then
appeared to be potentially dangerous must have been
fearful of what a further enlargement of the "revolution"
might bring in the way of ex post facto charges later
on. Up to mid-January local political leaders had been
successfully resisting in virtually every province, and
commanders in almost every military region must have
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foreseen the possibility that they might be held respon-
sible for this following a Maoist triumph even if they
had been acting all along on the basis of orders from
their superiors.
23. Apprehensions of this sort could be expected
to reinforce the fundamental lack of sympathy for the
Cultural Revolution which was probably widespread among
officers of field grade or higher. We have no firm
evidence on which to base an assessment of the state of
mind ...within the officer corps of the PLA, but mili-
tary establishments tend to be conservative and it
seems reasonable to suppose that by this time the pro-
fessional soldiers who formed its backbone had seen
more than enough revolutionary disorder and would be
receptive to proposals which would bring it to a halt.
The PLA Faces a Choice
24. The problem probably came to a head for the
military around the third week in January. A directive
was issued on 23 January ordering the army to take an
active role in backing pro-Mao forces. The earlier
practice of "standing on the sidelines" in the struggle
was condemned and all orders to this effect were counter-
manded. A major editorial printed in People's Daily
the day before puts this directive into perspective. It
admitted that Mao had recently suffered a "serious set-
back" and spoke gloomily of the possibility of increas-
ing violence and "zigzags and ups and downs" before
victory could be achieved. The tone was violent, almost
hysterical, and the prescription given for Maoist success
was to "seize power! power!! and more power!!!" The
editorial asserted flatly that "he who is without power
is nothing. Of all the important things, the possession
of power is the most important!"
25. Assertions that troops were being used in
force to subdue Mao's opponents in the provinces ap-
peared in Peking broadcasts immediately following
issuance of the new directive. Claims of successful
take-overs by Maoists, however, indicated that in fact
widespread resistance was continuing and that the armed
forces did not move as one man to follow the new in-
structions. In some areas the response was prompt,
but in others resistance and confusion persisted for
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weeks, suggesting that the military--who held the key
to the situation--were dragging their feet.
26. Liu Lan-tao, party boss in the Northwest
Region where resistance had been very strong, was re-
ported to have been "dragged out" by Red Guards in Sian
about 23 January along with 17 of his chief lieutenants.
A photograph of this event was posted in Peking on 8
February. Li Ching-chuan, first secretary of the
Southwest Bureau--another hotbed of resistance--was
paraded in disgrace through the streets of Chengtu
about the same time.
27. Trouble continued to be reported in many
parts of China during early February, however, espe-
cially in Tibet and Szechwan where Red Guards com-
plained--as they had been doing for months--that they
were being suppressed by military units.
28. These differences cannot be satisfactorily
explained on the ground that the armed forces lacked the
strength to impose the will of the center on provincial
leaders immediately, or that the military did not have
clear instructions. It appears, therefore, that the
spotty performance of the military reflected unwilling-
ness on the part of key commanders in some areas to carry
out orders. Under normal circumstances the response to
such a situation would be immediate removal and court
martial of the insubordinate commanders--sending in
troops from other areas to accomplish this if necessary.
29. Peking appears instead to have changed the
orders, moderating the Cultural Revolution so that it
would be acceptable to the armed forces--providing as-
surances which would win the active support of the
military. Specific arrangements may have been made
with a number of individual commanders-'in Tibet, Inner
Mongolia, and Sinkiang--similar to the bargains struck
with the warlords in the 1930s?--but the over-all appeal
for army backing looked more like an effort to reach
political consensus.
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rmy ournal roa cas y
i era ion
i
A
n
An e i oria
Peking on 25 January emphas.i.zed,the point that in assist-
ing the "rebel revolutionaries" the army should rely on
political persuasion rather than force.
33. A new directive to the armed forces issued on
27 January provided justification for a slowdown in the
pace of the Cultural Revolution. According to posters
observed in Peking, Mao on that day had ordered all mil-
itary regions to be alert against the "forces of imperial-
ism and revisionism," specifically mentioning Sinkiang
and the military regions.on China's Pacific coast. Mao
was quoted as saying that in view of the current mili-
tary situation the "timetable for the Cultural Revolution
may be set back somewhat." The directive was issued
under the name of Yeh Chien-yang for the Military Affairs
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Committee--the body of which Lin Piao had been "in charge"
since 1960.
34. Another directive was issued by the Military
Affairs Committee on 28 January concerning the conduct
of the Cultural Revolution within the armed forces. Or-
ders were reportedly issued that,ssldiers, "especially
commanders," were not to be arrested or physically
harmed, although they might be "ridiculed." Attacks
against individuals were to be permitted but it was
forbidden to "criticize the command" itself. The
implied guarantee of immunity to most senior officers
may reflect a successful attempt to reassure PLA lead-
ers, which brought the weight of the armed forces behind
the authorities in Peking.
The Army Gets in Line
35. With the armed forces no longer on the side-
lines, provincial resistance began to collapse
during the last week in January. On 27 January a radio-
broadcast from the capital of Anhwei Province announced
the dismissal of provincial first secretary Li Pao-hua
and four other local party and government figures. Li
was also third secretary of the headless East China
Bureau and was probably a client of Tao Chu.
36. A new type of government organization began
to appear in the provinces based on a three-way alliance
between military, party, and "revolutionary" elements.
The first of these alliances appeared in Heilungkiang
around 1 February, a second in Fukien on 11 February,
and a third was announced in Kweichow on 14 February.
Propaganda broadcasts concerning all of these new or-
ganizations stressed the key role of the armed forces
in setting them up. A representative of the PLA was
the featured speaker in the inaugural rally in Heilung-
kiang. In Fukien, Han Hsien-chu, the ranking profes-
sional military figure in the Foochow Military Region,
and Wei Chin-shui, who is governor and a party secretary,
were the principal speakers. Military men and "revolu-
tionary leading cadres"--the term Peking began to use
to describe acceptable party leaders in the provinces--
took the leading roles, with "revolutionary elements"
taking a subordinate position.
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37. Orders were apparently issued about this time
aimed at curbing military participation in Cultural
Revolution agitation. Authoritative posters seen on
8 February reported a directive by Lin Piao that sol-
diers who had been engaged in "exchanging revolutionary
experiences" were all to return to their posts by 20
February. Lin declared that all "liaison offices" co-
ordinating local revolutionary rebel activity would
soon be abolished.
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39. A wall newspaper 25X1
escribed efforts to restore order in Inner
Mongolia. The Military Affairs Committee and the State
Council reportedly issued a joint directive on 6 Feb-
ruary ordering party, army, and "rebel" units in the
region to stop fighting. The poster stated that a
plane had been dispatched to the capital city of
Inner Mongolia to bring representatives of the three 25X1
groups to Peking to settle the conflict.
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40. The behavior of military units and the role
they played appear to have differed in some particulars
from place to place. The over-all pattern, however,
indicates that the armed forces displayed great in-
ternal cohesion and took a conservative position--in
opposition alike to the "rebel" revolutionaries and
troublemaking local authorities. The PLA appears
generally to have held back until the movement to slow
down and to moderate the Cultural Revolution began to
gain strength.
An Olive Branch to the Party Establishment
41. Moves to bring the armed forces into the
struggle were accompanied by a parallel shift in Pe-
king's approach to the party apparatus, signaled by
a Red Flag editorial broadcast on 30 January which
referred to experienced cadres as the "treasure of
the party" and warned against indiscriminate attacks
on them. This was not a new line in that bad ele-
ments in the party had from the outset been called
a "handful," but the emphasis was markedly different
from that in pronouncements during December and early
January.
42. The shift was also reflected in a wall news-
paper observed some time later which reported that
Chou En-lai had met with representatives of 23 "revo-
lutionary" factions on 1 February and had urged a
return to the policy of correcting erring party offi-
cials in a way which would not destroy their future
usefulness. Chou reportedly warned that mistreatment
of party cadres, particularly those at the basic level,
might alienate "revolutionary forces" from the people.
A broadcast from Lhasa on 9 February quoted the Red
Flag editorial publicized by Peking on 31 January
urging true "revolutionaries" to trust and use party
leaders, even those who had committed errors, so long
as they were not "antiparty." Those who indiscrimi-
nately labeled party leaders as "persons in authority
who are taking the capitalist road" were denounced.
43. A broadcast from the provincial capital of In-
ner Mongolia on 10 February denounced ultraleftists,
who it said were "enthusiastic about internal war and
advocate aimless fighting." A similar line was taken
by ,a broadcast from Heilungkiang four days later
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which criticized a "very small handful" of such people
in the "revolutionary ranks" who refused to cooperate
with the old-line party leaders retained in the new
revolutionary committee which had been formed for the
province on 31 January. The broadcast stated flatly
that these dissidents were "counterrevolutionaries."
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45. Provincial broadcasts soon began to reflect
this new approach to the party machine at the local
level. On 15 February the radio in Tsingtao, a port
city in Shantung Province seized by Maoist "rebels"
on 29 January, lashed out at those who had charged that
"all leading cadres are guilty of suppressing the
revolution." The same day the Harbin station in
Heilungkiang demanded that leading cadres "must be
given an opportunity to repent" and enumerated
broad categories of cadres who were redeemable.
New Impetus to "Tripartite Alliances"
46. Editorials in People's Daily on 17 February
and in Liberation Army Journal on the 18th underscored
earlier announcements praising the policy of forming
a "tripartite alliance" among old-line party officials,
the army, and "revolutionary" organizations and
claimed that this had already been achieved in four
provinces and two municipalities. This concept ap-
parently supplanted the notion of establishing new
revolutionary "communes" as governing bodies. Until
early February an organization supposedly based on
the Paris Commune of 1871 was being touted as a model,
and the formation of "communes" was announced with
great fanfare in a number of cities. On 19 February,
however, the party central committee ordered that
no city or province would use the name "commune" in
its title and that those which had established them
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should promptly establish new "revolutionary com-
mittees."
47. About the same time, according to posters,
several leaders in Peking questioned whether the Paris
Commune provided a useful guide for China. Some
months earlier the commune had been extolled in
speeches and articles and its applicability to the
situation in China had been stressed. The anarchic
nature of the organization apparently worried some
leaders in Peking, however, and Minister of Public
Security Hsieh Fu-chih was reported by posters to have
said that establishing communes might lead to a weak-
ening of central control.
48. The directive regarding "communes" on 19
February was one of a number issued about the same time
designed to put an end to confusion. Many of these
reinforced earlier orders but. in stronger terms. They
instructed "revolutionary" forces to disband organi-
zations not approved by the central committee, to stop
attacking party officials, and to include important
party officials in take-over organizations. Their
tone and substance was reflected in a speech report-
edly given by Chou En-lai to Red Guards. on 17 February.
49. According to poster accounts, Chou denounced
"rebels" for seizing government ministries without
central committee approval. He specifically mentioned
the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the
Ministry of Public Security as organizations in which
seizure of power ""cannot be recognized." Chou angrily
criticized "rebel" attempts to arrest the minister
of commerce after he had been invited by Chou to
"rest" and declared.that this action was like issuing
a warrant "against the party central committee."
50. Chou again deplored "revolutionary" excesses
committed against veteran government and party offi-
cials. Parading them around in dunce caps could not
be condoned, he said, and went on to declare that
such "uncivilized" treatment was not necessary "even
against Peng Chen." Chou criticized three powerful
and militant Red Guard organizations by name, citing
the "low quality" of the posters they had put up all
over China. He said that the central committee did
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not necessarily agree with these posters. This re-
mark, together with Chou's criticism of irresponsible
accusations and his statement: that the list of party
officials to be attacked should be "boiled down,"
implied that Peking had decided to start dismantling
extremist organizations.
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The Role of Chou En-lai
52. There is insufficient evidence to reach a
confident conclusion with regard to Chou En-lai's motiva-
tion and role during the period of revolutionary retreat.
He was clearly in the thick of things, however, and the
fact that the shift toward a more moderate course in Feb-
ruary reflects the relatively conservative position Chou
has taken since last August suggests that he had gained
the initiative at the center.
53. Chou has been notable as a defender of in-
dividuals under attack by "rebel" Red Guards, and has
repeatedly supported officials who were part of his
power base within the government structure. He has
also backed a number of military leaders who appeared
to be in trouble. Chou has gone along with the main
line of the Cultural Revolution but his statements
have been more moderate than those of Lin Piao, Chiang
Ching, Chen Po-ta, and other Maoist spokesmen. He
has repeatedly stressed the importance of maintaining
production and has come out against "excesses," under-
scoring the necessity of "treating the illness to
save the patient."
54. It seems likely that the flow of events
placed Chou in a key position, in part at least by de-
fault, and that he argued successfully for the reten-
tion of surviving authorities in the second or third
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echelon of the provincial and regional hierarchies. These
men were doubtless regarded by the Maoists as dangerously
tainted with revisionism but their skills and experience
made them indispensable in halting the trend toward an-
archy and in dealing with practical problems such as get-
ting the vital spring planting done.
55. Mao and Lin Piao had from the outset been pub-
licly committed to a violent course aimed at achieving
radical changes of the most sweeping kind and their com-
mitment had led to an accretion of power in the hands of
the most radical elements in the Chinese body politic. This,
would have made it very difficult to get agreement on a
shift toward moderation. Chou's counsel may have been
endorsed by a number of important military leaders and
his efforts at persuasion were probably strengthened in
any case by doubts which almost certainly existed at the
center concerning the loyalty of the armed forces in all
circumstances. Mao appears to have been forced to accept
the need for a move toward moderation in tactics but clearly
regarded it as a temporary expedient.
The Trend Toward Moderation Continues
56. The Cultural Revolution continued to lose
velocity during late February and early March amid in-
dications that order was being restored. Essential
services provided by the government, seriously dis-
rupted from December on, were again available in most
places by February. The Red Guard apparatus was being
gradually modified and in some cases dismantled.
57. On 22 February Chou En-lai addressed a mass
meeting of university Red Guards in Peking and repeat-
edly cited Mao as the authority for what clearly was
an effort to weld the disparate revolutionary rou s
together into a more manageable organization.
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58. On 6 March Peking radio put its stamp of
approval on the dissolution of city-wide "revolution-
ary" organizations in the Shantung city of Tsingtao.
The governing revolutionary committee in Tsingtao had
directed on 2 March that the headquarters of rebel
organizations be disbanded and the "tripartite alli-
ances" of rebels, army elements, and party cadres be
formed within work units. In its announcement, Peking
acknowledged that disorder had resulted when workers
within a unit belonged to different--and often antago-
nistic--revolutionary organizations.
59. Efforts to get the economy rolling again,
especially in the vital agricultural sector, began to
be evident.
A Red Flag article broad-
cast by Peking on 27 February laid out what amounted
to a blueprint for the role of the military in restoring
order. The article identified "anarchism" as the chief
danger--an implicit criticism of Maoist revolutionaries--
and underscored the importance of production. People's
Daily, in an editorial broadcast on 1 March, again
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made the case for unity and opposed extremism and
anarchy.
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The "Rebels" Strike Back
61. Efforts to let the steam out of Mao's Cultural
Revolution and to move China back toward something like
normalcy were not unopposed.
Ion 25 February a wa newspaper reported
that nine secondary-level officials had been displayed
and denounced at a rally of 1.00,000 Red Guards, workers,
and troops at the Workers' Stadium in Peking. This
was the first such public humiliation of officials
since mid-February when Chou En-lai had declared that
Mao deplored "uncivilized" treatment of his enemies.
On 9 March posters and wall newspapers appeared all
over Peking denouncing Tan Chen-lin, the agricultural
specialist on the politburo.
63. Tan was the first senior party official to
come under fire since the Cultural Revolution began to
subside at the end of January. Posters attacking him
were signed by revolutionary groups in numerous gov-
ernment ministries, suggesting that the campaign against
him had high-level approval. Tan was accused of having
"deceived" Chou En-lai and of having attempted to
moderate the Cultural Revolution in the countryside.
64. The depth and seriousness of the renewed con-
flict at the center over the question of moderating
the Cultural Revolution was indicated by a major Red
Flag editorial broadcast on 10 March. The editorial
complained that militant revolutionaries were not being
given a large enough role in the new revolutionary
governing bodies being set up throughout China. Some
of these bodies, it warned, have "compromised with
class enemies" by allowing too many party officials,
including "some who have not repented," to help run
the new organizations. Red _~Fllaag predicted that this
would lead to "new seesaw battles," an implicit threat
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that attacks on what was left of the party apparatus out-
side the capital would be resumed.
65. Attacks on Tan Chen--lin continued on 11
March with a rally held to denounce him at the Ministry
of State Farms. A poster was observed on 11 March
stating that past statements by high officials de-
fending Tan had been withdrawn. He had come under
sporadic poster attack in previous months but had been
defended by both Chou En-lai and Madame Mao in January.
On 14 March Tan was denounced again by 100,000 parading
Red Guards, workers, and troops. In these attacks he
was linked with fallen party :Leaders Liu Shao-chi and
Teng Hsiao-ping, and the disciplined character of the
demonstration indicated that it had official sanction.
66. Two more vice premiers joined Tan Chen-lin as
targets for criticism on 15 and 16 March. On these days
posters went up attacking Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien
and Li Fu-chun, who is in charge of state planning. Like
Tan, both men are politburo members, and Li Fu-chun is
also on the standing committee. Neither of these men
was attacked as violently as Tan, and posters defending
them as "good students of Mao" appeared along with
those criticizing them.
67. The development was clearly regarded in a
serious light, however, and may have been an oblique
attack on Chou En-lai himself since all three men were
his close associates and worked under his direction.
Many defensive sounding posters asserting that Chou
"follows the revolutionary line laid down by Chairman
Mao" were displayed in Peking on 16 March--the same
day that an editorial appeared in the Shanghai Wen
Hui Pao--a newspaper in the vanguard of the Cultural
Revolution last year--castigating those who had said
the Red Guards were "overdoing it" and stating flatly
that anyone who criticized the guards for their rela-
tively few mistakes was opposing the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Chou may have been the indirect target of this
editorial in that he has on several occasions taken
the Red Guards sharply to task for their excesses.
68. Efforts to work out an accommodation with
leaders in the strategic border regions such as
Sinkiang came under fire in posters put up in Peking
on 18 March by powerful Red Guard groups. These posters,
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which were put up all over the city, denounced Sinkiang
military and party boss Wang En-mao and demanded his
dismissal. Wang, a die-hard opponent of pro-Maoist
revolutionaries, had been reported by a Sinkiang
broadcast on 12 March to have met with Mao and Lin
Piao in what may have been a move toward compromise.
Wang was described in this broadcast as a "good cadre."
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earlier period of tension and discord in October 1966.
Revolution which had been gaining strength since
1 February.
71. These meetings probably lasted about a week
and it seems likely that they were similar to the
central committee "work conference" held during an
The Central Committee Meets
69. Posters put up in Peking on 16 March quoted
Nieh Yuan-tzu, a radical female Red Guard leader who
is an important member of the Maoist faction, as de-
claring that the central committee and the military
affairs committee of that group were meeting and that
the atmosphere was one of "struggle." According to
the posters, Nieh declared that it was the most impor-
tant stage of the revolution since the "rebel" drive
began in January. The main question, she said, was
who is to hold power.
70. Another ultramilitant Red Guard leader, Kuai
Ta-fu, was quoted by a poster as describing the situa-
tion as the "lull before the decisive battle." Major
Red Guard newspapers circulated in Peking claimed that
a "reactionary adverse current" was running from the
top to the bottom of the regime--almost certainly a
reference to the trend toward damping down the Cultural
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72. Chou En-lai reportedly told a foreign newsman
sometime around 1 April that Liu Shao-chi had attended
the central committee session in "mid-March" and had
been "put in minority seven times." Chou remarked that
he was postponing plans for a trip abroad because
there would be "great events in China in the next two
months."
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The Interim Course
73. Developments in late March and early April
suggest that, during coming weeks and perhaps for the
next few months, efforts to maintain order in the prov-
inces, to construct new administrative machinery on
the wreckage of the shattered government and party
apparatus, and to get vital economic work done will
continue.
On 22 March Chou En- ai toia a con-
ference o in us rial and mining workers in Peking
that industry was the "leading factor" in the economy
and urged them to emulate and surpass the efforts of
the peasants engaged in farm. work. The conference
adopted a resolution calling upon workers to maintain
the eight-hour work day and to participate in the
Cultural Revolution only "during nonworking hours."
ds in
11as --- - --- -----s
Peking on 25 March that from then on they were to
"make revolution" in school? A resolution issued by
the newly formed Red Guard Congress informed the
students that they were to keep an eye on the country
"from their classrooms."
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76. On both 19 and 22 March Chou En-lai was
the main speaker at congresses of mass organizations.
A major theme stressed on these occasions was the need
for early formation of a revolutionary committee to
govern the city of Peking. What may be the model for
new provincial government machinery--a provincial
revolutionary committee--had emerged about a week
earlier in Shansi Province and was publicized by Peking
on 23 March. This organization has taken over and
consolidated tasks previously carried out by the bu-
reaucracy and party apparatus, and includes seven
former provincial and municipal-level officials in
leadership positions. The senior army political
commissar appeared to be the real power. He chaired
the Shansi congress and was elected ranking vice
chairman of the committee.
"Rebel" Counterpressure
77. Indications that the February trend toward
comparative moderation was still continuing were
accompanied by evidence that militant "rebel" elements
had been instructed to get the revolution back into high
gear and rolling ahead once again. A new attack was
launched against the discredited Liu Shao-chi, once
number two in the party and still nominally chief of
state, and against Teng Hsiao-ping--still technically
head of the party secretariat but clearly without
real power since the August 1966 plenum.
78. Both these men had been under vicious attack
in posters, Red Guard newspapers, and rallies since
December. On 30 March they began to come under even
heavier fire from the propaganda vehicles of the central
committee, Red Flag, and People's Daily. The official
news agency, NCNA, carried voluminous accounts of
rallies and demonstrations at which thousands of well-
disciplined marchers shouted "down with Liu and Teng."
79. The new assault on Liu and Teng has thus far
been carried on mainly in the capital and has, for
the most part, involved only major figures in the hier-
archy. If the attacks are in preparation for formal
public action to strip these men of official position
and drum them out of the party, as seems likely, they
could be the prelude to political interment for a host
of lesser figures still holding positions in the party
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apparatus--which was staffed and managed by Liu and Teng
for more than a decade.
80. A larger and more immediate purpose of the cam-
paign against the "Liu-Teng gang" is probably to rekindle
enthusiasm for the Cultural Revolution, get it in motion
throughout the country once more, and thus to bolster
the position of the extremist militants. Militant Red
Guard groups, under pressure and apparently in decline
during the February retreat from revolution, have become
active once more and their leaders--people like Nieh
Yuan-tzu and Kuai Ta-fu--are again asserting themselves.
Unheard from for many weeks prior to mid-March, they have
since been passing judgment on men in high places, declar-
ing which ones should be "watched carefully," which can
hope to be excused if they repent and reform, and which
are outside the pale of redemption.
81. Continuing parallel attacks on officials asso-
ciated with Chou En-lai and on high-ranking military lead-
ers may indicate that these men, successful proponents of
moderation in February, are resisting a return to the vio-
lent and disorderly course taken by the Cultural Revolution
up to the end of January. The continuing emphasis on Mao's
injunction to "pursue the tottering foe" suggests that cau-
tious elements in Peking are arguing that the Revolution
has already achieved its major purpose and should now be
conducted more deliberately and at a lower pitch.
Prospects
82. The immediate outcome of the latest developments
in Peking is impossible to predict, beyond a general fore-
cast of continued confusion with new "twists and turns"
in the months ahead. Communist China now appears to be
ruled by a very small and disunited group of leaders op-
erating under a triumvirate in which Mao probably plays
the dominant role--when he chooses and is physically able.
It seems likely that both the shadowy Lin Piao and Chou
En-lai, in subordinate but powerful and probably
antagonistic positions, make independent self-serving de-
cisions when circumstances permit.
83. The immediate objective of those at the top
in Peking at present is probably to construct new adminis-
trative machinery from the wreckage of the shattered
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party and government apparatus. This is proceeding fit-
fully and at a snail's pace, which suggests that conflict-
ing factions are striving for future dominance by plac-
ing their own adherents in key positions within the new
political structure.
84. Such a situation is basically unstable and
might result in a violent struggle at the center which
could conceivably lead to civil war. The course of events
during January and early February when resistance in the
provinces was subdued and differences were compromised
under the aegis of the armed forces, however, makes this
seem unlikely.
85. During that period of turmoil the military es-
tablishment as a whole opted for stability and national
unity. Despite indications that some high-ranking lead-
ers sided with provincial and regional authorities
against Peking, there was no evidence of wavering basic
loyalty in the officer corps at large or among the rank
and file, or of any disposition to support a movement
toward secession. The PLA has remained a united and
functional organization throughout the course of the Cul-
tural Revolution. When the armed forces intervened it
was in general on the side of order and central author-
ity, and on balance it seems probable that they would
do so again in reacting to a split at the center. This
is a reflection of the extent to which China has become
a modern nation-state.
The Seeds of Patriotism
86. The process started with the Western incur-
sion into China about a hundred years ago. It was
carried forward by the reformers of the late 19th
century, given new impetus and direction by the nation-
alist revolutionaries who sought to fill the political
vacuum left by the collapse of the empire in 1911.
Japan served as a catalyst, first in demonstrating that
an Asian nation could stand as an equal with the powers
of the West, and later as the focus of national enmity
during the Japanese attempt to conquer China.
87. Utilizing the foundations constructed by
Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang with these materials,
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the Communists established a new state in 1949 with a
political structure fundamentally different from any
which had previously existed in China. Under it the
people once despairingly described by Sun Yat-sen as
a "heap of loose sand" have finally become united and
given a sense of national purpose after decades of
bloody and turbulent struggle. In doing this Mao and
his comrades were reaping a harvest sown by their
predecessors.
"New China"
88. The Communists imposed a government which
for the first time in Chinese history reached all the
people and directly affected their lives. Rule under
the empire had always been autocratic and Peking was
the ultimate center of authority but the force of
government was applied locally by a county magistrate--
the only official an average Chinese ever saw--working
through clan and family channels. The general lines
of policy were established by the imperial court,
transmitted downward through a mandarinate of approxi-
mately 10,000 scholar officials, and interpreted by
provincial authorities who exercised a great deal of
autonomy. The functioning of the system for most of
the people, most of the time, was quite accurately
described by the folk saying, "The sun is in the
heavens and the emperor is far away."
89. Under the new Communist rule the bureaucracy
reached the village level and operated from detailed
directives passed down through a disciplined and
pervasive chain of command which at the same time
kept Peking informed of events at the lowest level.
Communications were developed to a point which made it
theoretically possible for a village cadre to talk
on the telephone with Mao himself. Closed-circuit
loudspeaker systems were installed in both rural
and urban areas to pass propaganda from the center
directly to the people.
90. The regime launched a vigorous and effective
attack on illiteracy, using simplified characters and
other devices, and made progress toward establishing
a national language. These tools were used to in-
doctrinate the population with Marxist ideology and
at the same time to foster the growth of Western-style
nationalism.
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91. National feeling and popular identification
with the regime were further enhanced by the economic
and social achievements of the new regime. The over-all
improvement of the economic situation was in large part
the result of reconstruction and restoration of public
order but the results achieved provided a practical
demonstration of the value of national unity. China
was not transformed into a land of milk and honey,
but at least there was no mass starvation. The early
social reforms instituted by the regime were harsh
but they destroyed genuine evils--oppression by land-
lords and money lenders, the remnants of traditional
family system--and were welcomed by the population
as a whole. The social services provided by the
new regime--schools, clinics, courts, public welfare
services--while not impressive by Western standards,
were better and more abundant than anything known
previously in China.
92. Finally, the Communists created a modern
national army, based on the principle of universal
conscription, to replace the essentially regional
armed forces with which they had won the revolution.
Such an army is a powerful unifying force, particularly
when it has a major stake in preserving the state
mechanism.
93. Chiang Kai-shek made progress in all of these
areas and had it not been for the Japanese attack
might have been able to create a unified state. It
is likely that the Communist leaders regard their own
success in doing so as the greatest single achievement
of their regime. A conviction that political unity is
vitally important--a belief probably now shared by
a majority of the Chinese people--is the root of the
basic consensus that seems likely to hold China to-
gether.
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Recent Developments in Regional Party Bureaus,
Military Regions, and. Provinces
NORTH CHINA BUREAU
First Secretary Li Hsueh-feng was portrayed in
February and March posters as a "category three"
official, i.e., one who has committed serious er-
rors but is being given a chance to serve in a
lesser role. It is doubtful if he retains sig-
nificant authority. Li was under heavy and sus-
tained attack by Red Guards, through posters and
demonstrations, in October and November (in his
concurrent role of first secretary of the Peking
city party committee). He apparently was replaced
in his Peking job in that period by his deputy,
Wu Te.
Little was heard of Li after November until 31 Jan-
uary when Chou En-lai was quoted in a poster as
saying that Li was on probation and had been sent
to Tientsin to clear up a troublesome situation.
The position of weakness from which Li is operating
was clearly indicated by a contrite statement he
made at a Tientsin rally on 18 March. Li said if
he was "able to engage in useful work in Tientsin
and correct his past mistakes" he would owe it all
to the invincible thought of Mao. By late March,
however, Li was in deep trouble again.
Shortly after the official campaign against Liu
Shao-chi was launched, post r attacks on Li
Hsueh-fen were resumed.
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In January and February, there were many reports
detailing clashes involving Red Guard groups in
the city of Peking, in other cities in Hopeh, and
in the capital city of Inner Mongolia. Shansi has
been quiet.
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PEKING MILITARY REGION (Peking City, Shansi, and Hopeh)
Peking commander Yang Yung came under attack
on 22 January for denouncing the army's po-
litical boss, Hsiao Hua, on 19 January. Hsiao
was defended by top leaders on 21 and 22 Janu-
ary. On 31 January, Chen Po-ta stated that
Yang posed an "extremely grave" problem. On
the same day Chou En-lai accused Yang of "plot-
ting to cause confusion." A Red Guard news-
paper on 7 February reported that Yang had been
dismissed. His political commissar, Liao Han-
sheng, was charged early in January of plot-
ting a military coup with the Ho Lung group.
Peking City
Wu Te, who replaced Li Hsueh-feng in Octo-
ber or November, was described in posters
in late February as a "comparatively good"
cadre. Wu had been criticized from time
to time and was briefly "arrested" by Red
Guards in mid-January. On 20 January,
however, Madame Mao sternly ordered the
Guards to release Wu and let him go back
to work. On 2 March a Peking broadcast
identified Wu as a leading member of the
"Peking municipality."
The broadcast avoided naming the governing
body Wu leads, but posters said he still
headed the party committee, by then a
nearly powerless body. Posters in late
January stated that a Paris-style commune
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was being formed for Peking. However,
Mao and other officials soon were being
quoted as saying that the idea of a
commune was remature.
HHopeh
Liu Tzu-hou, who became first secretary
in October, was paraded in late January
in a humiliating way, according to a
picture in a Red Guard newspaper. The
accompanying newspaper story accused Liu
of causin a "blood incident" on 21 Janu-
ar .
Clashes between opposing factions were re-
ported in four major provincial cities in
January and February. In several cases,
PLA forces were sent in to restore order.
On 18 February a poster reported that the
PLA had assumed control over the Tientsin
Public Security Bureau. Thus, the situ-
ation in this-province appears to have
been resolved by the use of the military.
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Shansi
The party committee and government were
abolished on :L2 January and replaced with
a "revolutionary committee." The former
first secretary Wei Heng apparently was
not retained in a leading position. He
and four other party leaders were criti-
cized at a rally in Taiyuan on 5 February.
All except Wei were then publicly paraded.
The chairman of the new "revolutionary
committee" is former vice governor Liu
Ko-ping. The party is said to be playing
a unique role in Shansi, although only one
of the 11 former secretaries has yet
emerged in good standing. The Shansi
"revolutionary committee," unlike those
set up elsewhere, is being run jointly by
a "CCP Shansi core group" and the revolu-
tionary rebels. The deputy head of the
core group is Chang Jih-ching, political
commissar of the Shansi military district.
Other members named so far include Liu
Ko-ping, Jen Chen, a former provincial
secretary and concurrently first secretary
of Taiyuan city, and Liu Kuan-i, an ap-
parently minor official whose former post
is unknown. Liu Kuan-i is general secre-
tary of the core group.
Chou En-lai and Cultural Revolution offi-
cial Wang Li have singled out Liu Ko-ping
as one of the few "good cadres" in China.
Liu's chief merit, according to Wang Li,
is that he was once "oppressed" by Liu
Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Liu Ko-ping
was the first secretary of Ninghsia until
1960 when he was dismissed for "rightist
tendencies" and given the unimportant post
of vice governor in Shansi.
Peking's claim that Mao's enemies in Shansi
had struggled desperately before their de-
feat in January may be largely fabricated.
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In previous months there had been no re-
ports of any kind of trouble in Shansi. In
line with the key role assigned by Peking
to the military in power seizures in late
January, the PLA in Shansi received effusive
praise for the part it allegedly played in
the take-over.
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NORTHEAST BUREAU
The party apparatus of this region, which Mao re-
portedly selected as a model area, has emerged from
the Cultural Revolution the least damaged of any in
China. First Secretary Sung Jen-chiung was praised
by Peking as a leading revolutionary cadre and
played a leading role in the formation of the
Heilungkiang revolutionary committee established
in early February. He was defended from Red Guard
criticism last October by Chou En-lai, who may be
his chief sponsor in Peking. Three of the bureau's
12 secretaries have also emerged in their former
positions, but appear to be functioning as observers
SHENYANG MILITARY REGION (coterminous with the North-
east Bureau
Commander Chen Hsi--lien showed up at several
major rallies last fall, and presumably has
sided with Maoist forces, although he has not
appeared in 1967.
Heilungkiang
Pan Fu-sheng, first secretary of the
former provincial party committee, was
named director of the "Heilungkiang Pro-
vincial Revolutionary Committee" estab-
lished on 31 January, and is the only
provincial first secretary to have sur-
vived a revolutionary take-over. Pan's
background indicates that he is a spe-
cial case, however. He was dismissed
as first secretary of Honan for "right-
ist" errors in 1958 and relegated to an
obscure position in Peking until the
spring of 1966 when he unexpectedly
emerged as first secretary of Heilung-
kiang. This record suggests that he
has been out of favor with Liu and
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Teng for years; his reinstatement in
1966 probably was a sign that their
power was already weakening. Pan
was praised by Chou En-lai last fall.
Wang Chia-tao, commander of the Heilung-
kiang Military District, is deputy di-
rector of the new revolutionary committee.
Second secretary Li Fan-wu and Li Chien-
pei, a secretary, were dismissed in Sep-
tember 1966. Nine other secretaries
have dropped from sight and by now it
is doubtful whether few, if any, have
survived.
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Kirin
The first secretary is unknown. Chao
Lin, second secretary, was named acting
first secretary in June 1966 when the
then first secretary, Wu Te, was trans-
ferred to Peking. Chao has not appeared
since 2 September, but he has also not
been under attack, and thus may still
hold an authoritative position in the
province. In mid-January a poster
charged that Wu Te had attempted to es-
tablish an "independent kingdom" in
Kirin during his reign, a charge not re-
played in official media or Red Guard
newspapers. In early February Radio
Peking stated that local PLA troops had
been ordered to intervene on behalf of
the rebels in Changchun in late January,
when, according to posters, the rebels
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fought a four-day battle to seize con-
trol of the Kirin Dail , the public
security bureau, and other organs.
A revolutionary take-over at Kirin has
not been announced, but recent broad-
casts from Changchun indicate that a
"revolutionary committee" may be
imminent.
Liaoning
Both first secretary Huang Huo-ching and
second secretary - governor Huang Ho-tung
have been out of sight for more than a
year. Huang Huo-ching, in his role as
a secretary of the Northeast party bureau,
was attacked on 6 January for "misdemean-
ors" in Liaoning, and posters were noted
on 21 January calling for the removal
of Huang Ho-tung. Neither official media
nor authoritative Red Guard newspapers
have replayed these possibly isolated
attacks.
Other party officials who have been at-
tacked are the Shenyang first secretary,
Yang Chun-pu, for "opposition activities"
in early January, and eight Luta (Dairen)
party officials who were paraded at a
rally in Luta on 22 January. No revolu-
tionary cadre (party people) have been
noted active in Liaoning. A rally in
Shenyang on 27 February was attended by
Hu Chieh, described as a secretary of
the Northeast Bureau, Yang Chih, rep-
resenting the Liaoning Military District,
and another military figure from the
Shenyang PLA units.
The apparent lack of activity may be due
to confusion stemming from a continuing
local power struggle. Peking radio and
posters stated that PLA troops intervened
on behalf of the rebels in late January.
On 15 February posters appeared in Peking
charging that PLA troops were "suppressing"
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rebel Red Guards in the Dairen area.
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slipping facilities at e
port have returned to normal.
The Liaoning Military District commander,
Ho Ching-wu, has not been noted for over
a year. The complete absence to date of
any of the pre - Cultural Revolution mili-
tary officials, however, could indicate
that the provincial military establish-
ment may have been shaken up.
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NORTHWEST BUREAU
confirm that irs se ary Ela
Lan-tao, un er fitter Red Guard attack since August
1966, and a majority of the Northwest secretariat
have been paraded in disgrace. Liu has been de-
nounced by a high Cultural Revolution official in
Peking as a "bad hat" and probably has been ousted
from office. Liu and 42 'bureau and provincial of-
ficials were publicly humiliated on 23 January and
have been frequently paraded in the streets of
Sian since then. None of the 11 bureau secretar-
ies has yet been endorsed by Peking as a "good
cadre." Orly, i-h-r Annear to have escaped direct
criticism.
With the exception of Ninghsia, this area has been
the scene of consistent and much-publicized strife
since mid-December. Militant Red Guards appear, to
have had more success here than in any other area
in China.
LANCHOW MILITARY REGION (Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, and
Tsinghai
Commander Chang Ta-chih and his political
commissar, Hsien Heng-han, were attacked in
early February for suppressing rebel ac-
tivities in Kansu and Lanchow. The rebels
charged that the sons of Chang and Hsien
were leading "counterrevolutionary" organi-
zations. The rebels also charged that the
Kansu Daily and the Lanchow radio station
were nothing more than "mouthpieces" for
the militar .
SINKIANG MILITARY REGION
The status of Commander Wang En-mao, who is
concurrently the party first secretary, is
discussed below in the Sinkiang section.
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Sinkiang
First secretary Wang En-mao appears to
have reached an uneasy compromise with
Peking in February after many months of
sustained Red Guard attacks on him.
That anti-Wang campaign culminated in
serious disorders in'December and Janu-
ary involving the large Production-Con-
struction Army in Sinkiang. Sinkiang has
been quiet since late January, however,
when Wang reportedly was working out an
agreement in Peking with Chou En-lai.
Several times during March and April the
Sinkiang provincial radio station re-
ported that Wang attended rallies in
Urumchi, still holding all his old po-
sitions. These broadcasts, confirming
earlier poster accounts of a Wang-Chou
agreement, said that the Sinkiang situ-
ation had been stabilized on the basis of
a 12-point directive prepared by Chou
and endorsed by Mao and Lin. Red Guard
newspapers had reported that such a di-
rective had been issued on 11 February.
Wang's position still seems insecure, how-
ever. Peking media have not reported
that Wang is still in place or repeated
Urumchi radio's accounts of Wang's ac-
tivities. Sporadic Red Guard attacks on
Wang continued in Peking after Wang re-
surfaced in Urumchi, and on 16 April
detailed poster attacks on Liu Shao-chi
accused Wang En-mao and other Northwest
leaders of plotting with Liu last spring,
when Liu visited Sinkiang en route to
Pakistan. The resurgence of a radical
atmosphere in Peking since mid-March
suggests that the status of all compromises
reached during the February period of mod-
eration, such as the one with Wang, is
now being questioned by militant elements
in the leadership.
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Tsinghai
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Both first secretary Wang Chih-lin and
second secretary Wang Chao have probably
suffered the same fate as most other top
party leaders in the Northwest Bureau area.
broadcasts indicate that e province has
been governed by the Tsinghai Military
District since February.
ra io-
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Tsinghai
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Shensi
Liu Hsien-chuan, commander of the
Tsinghai Military District since 1963,
was noted active in Hsining on 15 April,
his first appearance since October.
His role in the "suppression" of rebel
activities in the province during Febru-
ary is unknown; he may have prudently
stayed in the background, lettin sub-
ordinates ub-
ordinates carry- out the orders.
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First secretary Huo Shih-lien and second
secretary Chao Shou-i were paraded in
Sian in late January and February. Chao
had been dismissed in September; Huo
undoubtedly is now out. At least two
members of the nine-member secretariat
were also paraded. 25X1
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"revolutionaries" occupying all adminis- 25X1
trative positions. Hu Ping-yun, commander
of the Shensi Military District, has not
been noted under attack.
PLA appeared to be taking
a neutral stance in Sian, not aiding
either the revolutionaries (most of whom
appeared to be students), or the "opposition"
(composed mostly of workers).
There have been numerous disorders re-
ported in Sian since the start of the
Cultural Revolution. The "incidents"
have usually resulted from rebel attacks
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Kansu
on the party committees of the Northwest
Bureau, Shensi, and Sian city. In mid-
January, according to Sian radio broad-
casts, the rebels seized control of the
three party committees. Shensi has not
been recognized as a true take-over by
Peking, and appears to have been little
affected by the recent phase of modera-
tion. The dominance of the revolution-
aries suggests that Shensi may represent
a "problem" area with which Peking in-
tends to deal after the Cultural Revo-
lution ends in other places.
First secretary Wang Feng, who last showed
up in public on 1 October 1966, appears to
have been sacrificed to pro-Mao forces in
November or December.
on 7 February a wall poster
identified his replacement as Hu Chi-
tsung, formerly a secretary in the Kansu
party committee, and then stated that Hu
was "Tao Chu's timebomb in the Northwest."
The same poster charged that the Kansu
party committee, in collusion with the
Military District Commander and Lanchow
Military Region officials, had suppressed
revolutionaries near Lanchow in late Janu-
ary. On 11 February a poster charged that
the Kansu Military District had "conspired"
with the party committee in order to re-
press the rebels. The sons of the Lanchow
Military Region commander, Chang Ta-chih,
and Political Commissar Hsien Heng-han
were accused of leading counterrevolutionary
organizations in Lanchow and Kansu. Cur-
rently, the military appears to be in
charge of the province. No prominent mil-
itary or political figures have been
mentioned in broadcasts in 1967.
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Ninghsia
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Lanchow in late January and early February.
However, most of these incidents probably
involved attacks on low-level bureaucrats,
of incidents occurred in and around
A quiet, unimportant area. First secretary
Yang Ching-jen last appeared 1 October at
National Day celebrations.
In
late January a poster in Peking stated
that the Ninghsia Daily was one of several
provincial newspapers that the rebels had
seized.
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EAST CHINA BUREAU
The post of first secretary has been unfilled
since the death of Ko Ching-shih in April 1965.
Five of the East China Bureau's six secretaries
have been severely criticized; two have been of-
ficially dismissed from office. Even the two
alternate secretaries came under attack in Janu-
ary..
The heavy casualties apparently suffered by the
East China party apparatus may be due in part
to the fact that Teng Hsiao-ping probably ran
the bureau until his political downfall in Au-
gust 1966. Thereafter, Tao Chu, former Central-
South party boss who was promoted into the stand-
ing committee in August, reportedly tried to ex-
tend his influence into the East China Bureau.
There was widespread disorder and some bloody
fighting in East China in December and January.
Party leaders under attack incited workers to
riot and strike, and many d to disrupt railroad
services and production.
I much of the region WdS
in administrative weeks. However, order
was restored by February.,
TSINAN MILITARY REGION (Shantung)
Although the political commissar, Tan Chi-
lung, was officially dismissed on 4 February
from his positions, the commander of the re-
gion, Yang Te-chih, spoke at a 1 March rally,
and the Tsinan Military Region itself is be-
ing acclaimed for its role in the Shantung
seizure in early February.
NANKING MILITARY REGION (Kiangsu, Shanghai City, Anhwei,
Chekiang)
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Red Guard posters criticized this military
region and, indirectly, its commander, Hsu
Shih-yu, for failing prom tl to back Maoist
forces in early January.
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FOOCHOW MILITARY REGION (Fukien, Kiangsi)
The identity of the commander is uncertain.
Yeh Fei, who is concurrently political com-
missar and first secretary of the Fukien party
committee, was last identified as commander
in 1962. The ranking military professional
in the province, Han Hsien-chu, was named
deputy chief of staff in 1965, and may have
replaced Yeh Fei. Nevertheless, Han, who
was the leading speaker at a "victory" rally
staged by revolutionaries in Foochow on 11
February, was identified only as a "responsible
member of PLA units on the Fukien front."
The status of Yeh Fei is unclear. He was
under attack by local Red Guards from August
to December but authoritative Red Guard news-
papers in Peking have not mentioned him. Pe-
king has praised the leading role of the
PLA in the "triple alliance" in Fukien, indi-
cating that military authorities in this re-
gion are supported by the central leadership.
Shantung
First Secretary Tan Chi-lung was offi-
cially ousted in early February at the
time of the announced take-over of the
provincial party and governmental adminis-
tration. Credit for the take-over has
been given to Wang Hsiao-wu, an unknown
who is now described as the leading party
official in Shantung, and to the command-
ers of the Tsi:nan Military Region. In-
formation on other emerging leaders sug-
gests that obscure government adminis-
trators are playing a leading role in the
new Shantung revolutionary committee.
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Anhwei
Kiangsu
In January there were numerous reports
of clashes in the port city of Tsingtao,
but elsewhere in Shantung there has
been little evidence of violence.
After sustained attacks on First Secre-
tary Li Pao-hua dating back to late Au-
gust, Hofei radio announced the dismissal
of Li and four other ranking leaders on
26 January. Li has been included in
semiofficial lists of both Liu-Teng
followers and the Tao Chu group.
On 26 January, the provincial broad-
casting station announced the rebel
take-over of provincial party and gov-
ernment organs. Peking has never of-
ficially recognized this take-over. It
is possible that the regime cannot agree
on who is to lead this province..
Recent and frequent appearances of high-
level military district leaders suggest
that the PLA is running Anhwei. However,
two secretaries of the former provincial
CCP committee showed up in late March
and probably hold posts in the new
provincial administration.
The provincial, leadership has not been
attacked, which is puzzling in light of
the considerable violence and confusion
which occurred in the province during
January. First Secretary Chiang Wei-ching
was active throughout 1966. During
the first three months of the year
he attended seven military conferences,
suggesting he was aligned with PLA
forces in his area. Even in late De-
cember, when most first secretaries
had disappeared from public view, Chiang
made two official appearances in his
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Shanghai
province. Chiang is one of the few
provincial leaders who has not been
linked with the Liu-Teng or Tao Chu
groups.
Posters in early January reported Nan-
king to be the site of violent clashes
between "rebel. factions" and "loyal-
ist factions." Probably exaggerated
accounts of incidents stated 54 persons
were killed, 900 wounded, and as many
as 10,000 persons involved in heavy
fighting. Poster accounts attributed
responsibility for the violence to dif-
ferent persons. According to one ac-
count, Chou En-lai charged Tao Chu and
the Kiangsu and East China Bureau CCP
committees with responsibility. Another
poster claimed that senior party offi-
cials in Shanghai had urged workers to
go to Nanking and create disturbances.
18 February when it issued an announce-
ment on an alleged take-over of the
Kiangsu broadcasting station on 26
January. Since then, however, broad-
casting has returned to normal. The
only provincial officials appearing in
public since January have been leaders
of the Kiangsu Military District. Thus,
the fate of the party leaders in Kiangsu
remains unclear.
broadcasting local news on 7 January
and did not end this blackout until
Nan ing radio ceased
First Secretary Chen Pei-hsien and Mayor
Tsao Ti-chiu were paraded in disgrace in
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Chekiang
January after the party committee was
abolished. Rallies were still being held
during February to denounce Chen and
Tsao for their alleged use of economic
inducements to "buy" support from work-
ers in Shanghai.
Throughout January the Shanghai take-over
was acclaimed as a model for other areas,
but Peking's enthusiasm dimmed during
February, when considerable administra-
tive disorder persisted. On 5 February,
a Shanghai People's Commune was formed
and two members of the Cultural Revolution
Group in Peking, Chang Chun-chiao and
Yao Wen-yuan, were sent down to head it.
In late February, however, Shanghai radio
announced that the name "commune" had
been changed to the Shanghai Revolutionary
Committee, in line with Peking's orders
Chang and Yao were described as "lead-
ing members" of the renamed organization.
I
the city was in constant turmoil from
August 1966 through February 1967, al-
though economic and social order does
not seem to have seriously broken down
at any time.
emonstrations
in Shanghai were completely chaotic, in
contrast with the well-organized and
disciplined demonstrations recently seen
in Peking.
This province has been one of the quiet-
est areas in China during the current
period of upheaval. Neither First Sec-
retary Chiang Hua or the provincial party
committee has been attacked.
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Fukien
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There have been no reports of rebel take-
overs in Chekiang, and Hangchow radio
was one of the few in China which con-
tinued broadcasting local news during
the confused weeks of late January. Al-
though Chiang Hua has not made a public
appearance since September 1966, he
may emerge in good standing. Military
leaders are the only persons who have
reappeared in the last two months.
First Secretary Yeh Fei was the subject
of severe Red Guard criticism throughout
the fall of 1966, but significant attacks
on him have not appeared in recent
months and his position in Fukien is
On 16 February, Peking reported on a
"victory rally" in Fukien on 11 February,
implying but not stating that it was
held to celebrate a rebel take-over.
Han Hsien-chun, a major officer or pos-
sibly the commander of the Foochow Mili-
tary Region, presided over the rally.
Wei Chin-shui, governor and a party sec-
retary of Fukien, and representatives
of the 29 August rebels also spoke at
the rally. Just three days earlier, on
8 February, a Foochow broadcast had
condemned the 29 August rebels for
launchi an attack on the Fukien
Dail .
IThe
forces behind a attaei and
the 29 August group may have been
either ultraleftists who lost out or
entrenched party figures under Yeh
Fei.
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The situation in Fukien as of mid-April
is difficult to assess inasmuch as Foo-
chow radio has been reporting very little
local news since 13 February.
Kiangsi
First Secretary Yang Shang-kuei dropped
out of sight in 1965 and may have been
replaced long before the latest phase
of the Cultural Revolution. If so, his
replacement has never been publicly
identified. No senior party official
in the province has come under Red
Guard attack. On the other hand,
none has emerged since revolutionary
rebels seized power and abolished the
party committee on 26 January. This
seizure was reported by Nanchang Radio,
but like several other take-overs an-
nounced by provincial radios in January,
it has not been acknowledged by Peking.
Recently broadcast listings of what
may be new leaders include only minor
military, party, and government officials.
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claimed a city o i
chaotic conditions and as a result
industry was paralyzed and railroad
service was disrupted. Broadcasts
and posters in January alleged that
entrenched party officials had organized
a 200,000-man "peasants red militia
army" to attack the pro-Maoists, but
the existence of such a group has not
been confirmed.
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CENTRAL SOUTH BUREAU
Tao Chu had developed a strong following in this
region which he headed before he was brought into
the inner circle of leaders around Mao and Lin in
August 1966. Consequently, when Tao fell from
favor at the end of December, his replacement in
the regional bureau and the first secretaries in
four of the region's five provinces were implicated
with him. (Honan apparently had no first secretary
at the time.) All have appeared in semiofficial
blacklists of Tao's followers distributed in Peking
in January and February.
Wang Jen-chung, the new first secretary of the
Central South, was denounced by Madame Mao and
other leaders at the end of December. On 4 January
she told a contingent of 'Red Guards from Canton to
go home and arrest Wang, but whether they succeeded
is unknown, since nothing has been heard of his
whereabouts since then.
Although a major political struggle appears to have
taken place in the Central South since December,
relatively little disorder has been reported.
Possibly key military commanders sided with Mao and
Lin from the beginning to block attempts by polit-
ical leaders to resist. Some clashes were reported
in Kwangtung, Honan, and Hunan, but transportation
services operated throughout the region with few
disruptions.
WUHAN MILITARY REGION (Hupeh, Honan)
The commander, Chen Tsai-tao, has not been
attacked and appears to have remained loyal to
Mao and Lin. On 2 March, Chen made an official
appearance and spoke to PLA cadres on the need
for them to participate in spring planting.
CANTON MILITARY REGION (Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan)
Commander Huang Yung-sheng has not appeared
since 12 December 1966 and he has been implicated
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by poster attacks on his command. He has long-
standing ties with Lin Piao, but his promotion
in 1963 under Tao Chu may cause Maoist leaders
to mistrust him.
Hupeh
First Secretary Liu Chien-hsun, who has
been in Peking since August, was identified
on 4 March as a "leading member" of the
Peking municipal committee. Liu's replace-
ment in Honan has not been announced.
Honan was quiet last year. In late Feb-
ruary and early March posters carried
reports of clashes between the PLA and the
rebels. However, the trouble seems merely
to have involved attempts by local military
authorities, apparently on orders from
Peking, to put, down unruly Red Guard groups.
Although these groups complained bitterly
in posters of their suppression by Chang
Shu-chih, commander of the Hunan Military
District, he appeared early in March, and
the military has been running the province
since then.
First Secretary Wang Jen-chung is concur-
rently first secretary of the Central-South
Bureau. As noted above, he fell with his
former boss Tao Chu at the end of December.
Chang Ti-hsueh, second secretary in Hupeh,
has also been severely attacked.
Military district leaders have been adminis-
tering this province in recent weeks. Since
early March the Hupeh military district has
been issuing directives on matters ranging
from afforestation and spring planting to
the opening of middle schools. As yet,
there has been no official announcement
of a new governing unit for the province,
but the PLA, presumably acting on orders
from Peking, is clearly in command.
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Kwangsi
As in Hupeh, First Secretary Chang Ping-hua
and Second Secretary Wang Yen-chun have
both come under serious criticism for their
association with Tao Chu. Chang and Wang
are included in blacklists of Tao Chu
followers.
Local broadcasts have given no identification
of new leading figures in this province; the
military is currently being portrayed as
running provincial affairs.
First Secretary Wei Kuo-ching was included
in one blacklist of Tao Chu followers
published in a Red Guard newspaper in Feb-
ruary, but his name is missing from other
lists of this type, and no detailed denuncia-
tion of Wei has been seen.
Nanning radio announced a rebel take-over
in late January which was never confirmed by
Peking. Since January, only minor military
officials have made public appearances,
suggesting that Peking leaders have not
yet decided on new leaders for Kwangsi.
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Kwangtung
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First Secretary Chao Tzu-yang and the majority
of senior party and government leaders have
been under heavy fire since Tao Chu fell.
They have not been officially dismissed, but
by mid-March the PLA had taken over man
government and police functions and
the canton and wang ung party committees
Poster reporting on Chao Tzu-yang indicates
he has made desperate efforts to survive by
ingratiating himself with revolutionary
forces. Following reports that he was
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paraded in disgrace on 20 January, jeering
posters claimed he had staged the show him-
self in a futile attempt to show a properly
adject attitude. On 11 February, Chao, by
then a pathetic figure, pleaded before a
group of Red Guards that he had not been
able to get in touch with the central
committee in Peking recently, and therefore
did not know how to respond to Red Guard
demands.
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SOUTHWEST BUREAU
First Secretary Li Ching-chuan, who has been under
bitter and heavy attack since the start of the
Cultural Revolution, almost certainly has been
brought down. Li was criticized in a speech by
Madame Mao on 18 December for engaging in "spying
activities" in Peking; Chou En-lai on 18 January
stated that Li's "gang bosses" in the "control
units" of the western district of Peking had been
arrested; and a poster seen in Peking on 14 March
charged Li with manipulating the Chungking municipal
committee to cause the recent death of a revolu-
tionary writer. In addition, numerous posters and
Red Guard newspapers since late December have
linked Li with the Ho Lung conspirators and the
Liu-Teng gang. Poster photographs seen ii Peking
on 10 February showed Li and other officials of the
Southwest Bureau being paraded by Red Guards in
Chengtu, Szechwan, probably in mid-January.
Other bureau officials who have come under attack
are secretaries Li Ta-chang and Liao Chih-kuo (both
from Szechwan). Li Ta-chang was paraded in Chengtu,
probably at the same time as Li Ching-chuan; Liao
probably suffered the same fate.
CHENGTU MILITARY REGION (COtE'.rminous with Szechwan)
Commander Huang Hsin-ting, First Political
Commissar Li Ching--chuan, and Second Political
Commissar Kuo Lin-hsiang appeared in lists of
the "Ho Lung plot group" distributed in Peking
in mid-January. On 27 January a Red Guard
newspaper said that Huang and Kuo had been
"dismissed." Wei Chieh, Chien Chun-hua, and
Li Wen-ching, deputy commanders of the Chengtu
Military Region (CMR) came in for mild criticism
in February under circumstances suggesting they
were merely carrying out Peking's orders. A
poster in Peking on 12 February charged that PLA
troops had arrested rebel demonstrators in
Chengtu on 11 February; these demonstrators
were attacking the military region headquarters.
Another poster on 25 February charged Wei Chieh
and.Li Wen-ching with "suppression" of rebel
activities in Szechwan, implying that Wei and
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Li were still exercising authority at that time.
On 11 March, Radio Chengtu broadcast a short
propaganda piece on spring farming, which stated
that Wei Chieh, "deputy commander of the Chengtu
Military Region," had joined the laborers and
farmers in spring farm work; a broadcast on
5 March listed Chu Yu-ting also in his usual
position as CMR chief of staff.
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KUNMING MILITARY REGION (Yunnan, Kweichow)
Commander Chin Chi-wei was listed in a 20 Jan-
uary poster as one of the Ho Lung coup plotters.
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Appro
First Secretary Chang Kuo-hua, also com-
mander of the Tibet Military Region,
presently appears to enjoy the support of
Peking. He has not made a public appear-
ance since the National Day celebrations
in Lhasa on 1 October; however, Chang was
alleged to have been in Lhasa on 3 April.
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IA number of lesser 25X1
secretaries may nave teen sacrificed by
Chang, perhaps in an attempt to placate
rebel demands and also as a concession to
Peking. On 22 January a poster admonished
Chang for dismissing party secretaries
25X1 Chou - M? -tai and Kuo Hsi-
lan.
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First Secretary Liao Chih-kao has been
bitterly attacked, and may have been
paraded in mid-January with Li Ching-chuan
and other officials. Li Ta-chang, a party
secretary, and. vice governor Chang Hu-chen
were also paraded at this time. To date,
no senior party cadres are known to be
active. Military officials (from the
Chengtu Military Region) are running
provincial affairs. Wei Chieh, a deputy
commander, and. Chu Yu-ting, a deputy chief
of staff, and two other Chengtu Military
Region officials, are the only officials
noted active in the province since early
January.
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25X1 Ire e s were very active in Chungking
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Kweichow
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one outlying area in January and February.
Rebel endeavors have not been noted since
mid-February,
in ecember and January, and in at least
With
the exception o pro forma announcements
on spring farming, etc., Chengtu radio
has maintained a virtual blackout on local
activities.
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First Secretary Chia Chi-yun, who was
attacked by Red Guards last October, may
have been purged; he certainly no longer
holds a leading position in the province.
The Kweichow party committee was abolished
on 25 January, and the "Kweichow Provincial
Revolutionary Committee" which replaced it
is headed by a. military man and a minor
government functionary. It is a military-
run province. The only senior party man
publicly participating in the new committee
is Li Li, a former provincial party secre-
tary and governor. Other members are the
commander of the Kweichow Military District,
the political commissar and a number of
lesser military figures. Li Tsia-han, one
of the deputy political aommi'ssars,.is chair-
man;, the deputy chairman is Chang Ming,
who used to be deputy chief of the province's
supply bureau. 25X1
This province has been relativel~i free of
rebel-instigated disorders,
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the military appears to have
ept a Eight lid on the province. Although
cited by Peking as an example of a revolu-
tionary take-?over, the preponderance of
military officials in leading roles
blatantly conflicts with the three-way
model recommended by Peking, in which
revolutionaries, party cadres, and the
military all play important roles.
First Secretary Yen Hung-yen died on 8 Jan-
uary, probably at the hands of the Red
Guards. Chou. En-lai whitewashed the
incident, and. asserted that Yen had com-
mitted suicide. On 2 February a poster
announced that the provincial and municipal
(Kunming) party committees had been seized
on 26 January; however, Peking has yet to
recognize a revolutionary take-over in
this province, and no senior party offi-
cials have been praised as "revolutionary
cadres" either by Kunming Radio or by
Peking. A 27 March Kunming radiobroadcast
stated that revolutionaries from the Kwei-
chow Provincial Revolutionary Committee,
acting as "advisers," and "leadership
comrades" from the Kunming Military Region
and the Yunnan Military District were as-
sisting the Yunnan revolutionaries on the
"problems" of forming three-way alliances
and organizing revolutionary organizations.
As in Kweichow and Szechwan, military
officials are running provincial affairs.
Li Ming, a deputy commander of the Yunnan
Military District, Li Hsi-fu, a deputy
political commissar, and other lesser
military officials are the only politically
active persons identified since January.
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CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY REGIONS
?U-chi
SINKiANG UIGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION
NORTHWEST
TIBETAN
AUTONOMOUS REGION
SOUTHWEST
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Sian;
SHEN$I
Cheng chow
HUNAN
SZECH WAN
'=Ch'eng-tu
Wuch'an
CENTRAL,-
Kueiyang '
KWEICHOW
Chang-shad
HUNAN
Hangchow
CHEKIANG
KWANGTUNG
Canton
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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-W 1%W
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2 6 APR 1967
25
x1
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ne., which treats in considerable detail developments in
each o China's party bureaus, military regions, and
provinces.
at year or so You may also be interested in the an-
3. The research on this subject, h wever, did pro-,
duce a study in some depth on the roles of the Chinese
hierarchy in Peking, the army, and the provincial authori-
ties during the course of the "Cultural Revolution." In
addition to pointing out the conflicts within and among
these forces, the study assesses the prospects for a
unified China. You may find it helpful in clarifying
the complex and sometimes violent events In China in the
tuza,1 Revolution since our discussion, a return to
lordism" in China seems unlikely,.
The Honorable
The Secretary
1. The attached morandtr resulted from an attempt
to identify potential "warlords"' who might assume control
of the various provinces of China should central author-
ity break dam. You will recall that we discussed this
subject some time ago.
2. For several reasons it has proved impossible to
single out likely leaders in many of the regions and prow--
maces. ?urthermore, in `view of developments in the ' Cul-
`/s/ Richard Helms
ichard elms
Director
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Concur:
J. Sritka < APQ
R. CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010015-9
Deputy Director for Intelligence
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010015-9
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Distribution:
O - Addressee (w/att) (Copy No. 01)
1 - DCf (w/o/att)
1 - DDCI (w/o/att)
1 - ER (w/o/att)
2 - DDI (w/o/att)
1 - D/OCI (w/o%att)
j,X - MCO (w/o/att)
DDI/OCI/Pres
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 Approved For Release004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00826AO019QA010015-9
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79 00826AO01900010015-9
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