THE HUK RESURGENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010063-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: April 18, 1967
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01800010063-7
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01800010063-7
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
18 April 1967
The Huk Resurgence in the Philippines
1. The resurgence of the Hukbong Magpapalaya Sa
Bayan--commonly known as the Huks--could cause President
Marcos serious political difficulties, although so far
the resurgence poses no major threat to his government.
He has made eradication of the Huk movement, mainly based
in Central Luzon, a major goal of his administration.
2. During the past 20 months, both the strength and,
the activities of the Huks have shown a marked increase.
The number of armed cadre has grown from an estimated 37
to possibly 300-400, and the US Embassy in Manila esti-
mates that the mass base support has increased by five
to eight percent to about 28-29,000 persons, roughly one
percent of the population in the affected provinces. The
number of assassinations and kidnapings jumped abruptly
from a total of 17 in 1965 to 71 in the first eight months
of 1966. Although later figures are not available, the
higher level of activity appears to be continuing. The
most flagrant act of terror was the murder in July 1966
of Mayor Anastasio Gallardo of Candaba, chairman of the
anti-Huk Mayors' League of Pampanga, while he was on his
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
State Dept. review(s) completed.
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way to a meeting with President Marcos. The league has
since become dormant, its members fearing Huk reprisals.
3. Originally the paramilitary arm of the illegal
Philippine Communist Party (PKP), the Huks over the years
have taken on the appearance of marauding bandits and ex-
tortionists, rather than of revolutionaries motivated
by Communist ideology. Although there have been recent
indications that recruits are again receiving Marxist in-
doctrination, among the peasantry the Huks maintain a
"Robin Hood" image of assisting the poor. In fact, the
Huks' separate system of justice in the areas they in-
fluence, chiefly in the rice-producing provinces of Cen-
tral Luzon, appears to be more efficient than the govern-
ment's slow-moving and often corrupt judicial system. The
Huks' decisions, which do not always favor the peasant,
seem to be accepted by many landlords as well.
4. The Huks' present ties with the PKP are vague
and contradictory. The terrorism that sustains Huk power
is not in keeping with the party's purported abandonment
of terror for the "parliamentary struggle." Links be-
tween the leadership of the two groups appear`tenipus.
Pedro Taruc, until recently the Huk chieftain, is'pne of
a three-man committee that reportedly has taken over the
functions of imprisoned PKP secretary general Jesus Lava.
Taruc has rplin-
quished Huk leadership to Faustino e Mundo whos Com-
munist leanings are believed none too firm.
the imprisoned former party lea ers
may retain control through intermediaries of both the
party and the Hubs.
5. Marcos moved quickly to meet the revived Huk
threat. Last June he launched Operation Central uzon,
later renamed thq Central Luzon Development Program.
The immediate mission of this plan was to implement the
land reform code in critical areas of eastern Pampanga
Province, Central Luzon, and eventually to construct
roads, schools, and irrigation projects, and to improve
agricultural methods. So far, results have been modest.
To improve security conditions, Marcos has requested
funds in the FY-1968 budget to expand and improve 'the
Philippine constabulary.
6. A major stumbling block to reducing Huk influ-
ence is the continuing collaboration of local politicians
seeking the votes the Huks can deliver. With the approach
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of off-year elections this November, there appears to have
been an increase in this collaboration. In Pampanga, the
I-Iuks seem to enjoy the support of the governor. More
critical, however, is the evident acquiescence of much of
the peasantry. This attitude can be expected to continue
as long as local landlords block reform effortq, as cor-
ruption by officials diverts funds from developmenj
projects, and as legal redress remains slow and one-sided.
7. A manifest failure by Marcos to reduce Hine, influ-
ence could contribute to his future defeat at the polls.
Over the long run, if not effectively dealt with, the
Huk movement could again develop into a major insurgent
threat.
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