THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010060-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 60
• Content Type: MEMO

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95
OCI No. 0718/67
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of-Intelligence
17 April 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Situation in Ghana
1* A coup led by junior Ghanaian army officers has
apparently been quickly squelched by troops loyal to the
ruling National Liberation Council (NLC). The coup was
poorly planned and executed,, and the leaders appear to have
had the support of only a limited number of army units. No
connection has been established between Nkrumahts schemes
to regain power and the coup leaders, who may have been
motivated primarily by personal and perhaps tribal considera-
tion. By late morning Accra was calm and traffic was moving
normally,
2, The rebels succeeded in gaining temporary control
of Ghana radio and the residences of NLC Chairman Ankrah
and Army Commander Kotoka. At 0100 EST they announced
that the NLC had been dissolved and that a new three-man
military junta had been established, At 0500 EST, however,
an army captain announced over the radio that the coup had
been foiled, and a short while later police commissioner
Hartley, NLC vice chairman, announced that the rebel troops
and their commanders had been overpowered and disarmed,
Maj., Gen Ocran, an NLC member and Chief of Staff of the
Ghanaian Armed Forces, was reported earlier to'have been
rallying loyal troops at Burma Camp (the army arrison in
Accra l, He clearly played a key role along with Hartley
in suppressing the coup attempt.
3. Despite rebel claims of support from several army
elements, the only unit posit ,vely identified as participating
in the coup is the Reconnaissance Regiment at Burma Camp
headed by a Major Achaab. The officer proclaimed by rebels
as the head of their junta,.Lt. Col. Assasie, commander of
Ghana's First Paratroop Battalion at Tamale in the Northern
Region, has disclaimed any knowledge of the coup.
State Dept. review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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4. The motivations behind the coup have not yet been
clarified, but there have been some morale problems and an
undercurrent of "tribalism" among junior officers and men
since the overthrow of Nkrumah in February 1966. Rumblings
of discontent among these officers. reached a peak during
the fall of 1966 and then trailed off. There have been no
recent reports of serious dissatisfaction in the army.
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un or officers bitter over the
army's poor equipment, the lack of housing, and the fact
that most of the senior army leaders were away from the
troops and had forgotten their problems. The younger
officers have also apparently resented the fast promotion
of many senior officers since the February 1966 coup. Much
of this criticism appears to stem from officers of Akan
tribes (Ashanti, Fanti, Akin, etc.) who claim that the
preponderance of senior officers are from the Ewe tribe,
and that Kotoka, an.~ Ewe, was busy promoting his fellow
tribesmen
CONFIDENTIAL
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top Secret
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
110
17 April 1967
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Information as of 1600
17 April 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Phase III of Operation JUNCTION CITY began on 15 April
in northern Tay Ninh Province (Paras. 1-4).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam
e
latest round of government negotiations with FUL
collapsed (Paras. 5-6). Over 80 percent of the regis-
tered voters turned out for Sunday's local elections
(Para. 7).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: There
is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: An unusual
number of military articles have recently been pub-
lished in the North Vietnamese press (Paras. 1-3).
VI. Other Major Aspects:
Hanoi s management of the flow of
supplies rom Cambodia to Communist forces in South
Vietnam (Paras. 1-2).
ANNEX: Assessment of the situation in the southern
delta.
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c Vinh
fnsn to
PHU ?' x
YEN .u8Hoe
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Phase III of Operation JUNCTION CITY--
the largest US ground offensive of the Vietnam
war--began on 15 April, with the primary objective
of preventing elements subordinate to the 9th Viet
Cong Division and the Central Office for South
Vietnam (COSVN) from re-establishing themselves
in their War Zone "C" base area of northern Tay
Ninh Province.
2. During the initial phases of JUNCTION
CITY, the maximum number of allied maneuver bat-
talions fielded at any one time was 23. However,
only four battalions--three US and one ARVN--have
been committed to Phase III under a new tactical
formula known as the "floating brigade" concept.
This concept involves the highly mobile circulation
and maneuver of allied units throughout War Zone
"C" to intercept and destroy Communist forces
attempting to reinfiltrate the area. Logistical
support will be accomplished mainly by aerial
resupply, utilizing airdrop by both parachute and
helicopters, to keep the rov-?nc allied forces as
flexible as possible.
3. Since JUNCTION CITY began on 21 February,
Communist losses have totaled more than 2,700
killed in contrast to US losses of 260 killed and
1,500 wounded. The kill ratio of more than 10
to 1 is one of the most favorable achieved in any
of the large US operations and can be partially
attributed to the unusually heavy losses sustained
by the enemy during their three abortive regimental-
size attacks against US positions in late March.
4. 25X1
major Communist units, including CUuUbVN,
success u y evaded the drive by US troops through
War Zone "C" by seeking sanctuary in Cambodia or
in more remote areas of the war zone before and
during earlier phases of JUNCTION CITY. 25X1
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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FULRO Negotiations Collapse
5. The latest hope of accomplishing a
rapprochement with Y B'ham, dissident tribal leader
of FULRO--the highland autonomy movement--was
squashed last weekend when he declined at the last
minute to come out of Cambodia to meet with GVN
officials. On 15 April, II Corps commander General
Vinh Loc, along with GVN montagnard delegates and
FULRO negotiators, waited at the palace in Ban Me
Thuot in Darlac Province for the exile FULRO dele-
gation, only to receive a letter from Y B'ham post-
poning the meeting. The letter, addressed to "my
American friends," made no mention of the GVN.
6. Considering the long-standing mutual
animosity between the Vietnamese and the highlanders,
General Vinh Loc and other Vietnamese involved in
the effort to win the confidence of the FULRO
dissidents had exhibited an unusual amount of
patience in arranging for the return of FULRO
troops to the GVN and for the supposed meeting
with Y B'ham. Vinh Loc was reportedly not surprised
at the rebuff, but did suggest to a US Embassy of-
ficer that the GVN would be hard pressed to be as
patient in the future. The US Embassy apparently
has no specific information on the reason for
Y Wham's failure to attend the meeting as sched-
uled.
Local Elections
7. For the third successive Sunday, over 80
percent of registered voters turned out in the
balloting to elect village councils and hamlet
chiefs in 244 villages. Direct Viet Cong anti-
election activity was officially reported in
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seven provinces, but none of the polling sites was
apparently harassed. Two more candidates in the
16 April contest, however, were assassinated and
one was kidnaped making a total of six candidates
killed and 23 abducted so far during the three
successive weeks of voting. The April phase of
the local contests will continue for the next two
Sundays.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Within the last ten days Hanoi has broadcast
an unusual number of military articles authored by an
impressive list of prominent DRV military spokesmen.
On 3 April, Hanoi broadcast a speech by Defense Minis-
ter Vo Nguyen Giap given last January on the importance
of the militia and self defense forces. Although the
emphasis on small-scale guerrilla forces has important
implications for the strategy and tactics of the war
in the South, Giap appeared to be talking in rela-
tively routine terms mostly about the role of such
forces in the North.
2. Two days later Hanoi broadcast another speech
given earlier by General Song Hao. General Hao dis-
cussed the importance of building strong "basic" i?.nits
in the regular armed forces, a topic which he frequently
discusses in his role as chief of the army's Political
Department. In addition to these two speeches, Hanoi
also broadcast several commentaries on the war in the
South this week--one by Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung
from the April Hoc ]T 2R, and a long five-part series
authored by Cuu Long, the pseudonym for an unidentified,
but authoritative, military writer in South Vietnam.
3. The release of such a larce volume of mili-
tary speeches and articles raises the possibility that
Hanoi's military strategists have concluded another
round of discussions on the conduct of the war. In
the past Hanoi has often delayed the dissemination of
military commentaries while high-level party meetings
and discussions were actually under way. The texts of
the important articles and speeches given at the con-
ference were simultaneously published at a later date.
Last spring when there was evidence that military dis-
cussions on the war in the South were under way in
Hanoi, the regime delayed for three months the pub-
lication of two important propaganda speeches by PParty
Secretary Le Duan and Defense Minister Giap at a 19 May
military conference. The speeches released in the
current series do not appear to be polemic in nature
and give little hint of the substance of any discus-
sions which may have taken place recently.
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LAOS PANHANDLE
No 7if VIET AM\
long }-I
Muong Nlong
1 . , BarS-, .
Phone.-
-~DEM,ARCAYION LINE
Dong 14a
923
a. Bouang
Hill 200
open
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
2. the flow of Cambodian
supplies along Route 110-- e "Sihanouk Trail"--to
Route 96 for shipment to Communist forces in South Viet-
nam is controlled by a Cambodia-based North Vietnamese
Army element formed from the NVA 98th Support Regiment
which entered Laos in May 1964. Roughly 1,200 tons
of supplies per month, including foodstuffs, medicine
and POL, are reportedly sent from Cambodia in Cambodian
boats up the Se Kong River to a point near the di-
vergence of the Se Kong and the Laos-Cambodia border.
North Vietnamese motorized pirogues then take the
shipments to a storage area where trucks are loaded
for transport east along Route 110.
a fleet of trucks--possibly as many as --carry e
supplies from Cambodia along Route 110 toward the South
Vietnamese border in two stages. The supplies are
transloaded to other shuttle trucks at a point near
the halfway point in Route 110 known to the North Viet-
namese as "Hill 200." Considerable numbers of NVA
troops, possibly as many as fourteen companies, are
reported responsible for the maintenance and security
of this route.
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I V CORPS
. K?ns
2CR.:
Ban Me
Thuot
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Assessment of the Situation in the Southern Delta
Summary
Recent US intelligence assessments from the
southern Mekong Delta provinces conclude generally
that the Viet Cong have lost their momentum in this
area and are now conducting what is essentially a
"holding operation." At the same time these reports
warn that there has been little positive progress
on the government side. Despite some ambitious
plans for Revolutionary Development, the situation
in the southern delta at present appears to be vir-
tually a stalemate.
Viet Cong Status
1. The Communist loss of momentum in the south-
ern delta provinces--including An Giang, An Xuyen,
Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chau Doc, Chuong Thien, Kien
Giang and Phong Dinh--has been caused to a consid-
erable extent by the presence of US and other allied
forces north of Saigon during the past year and a
half. To try to "balance" and counter this presence,
Viet Cong troops, including guerrillas, were drawn
out of the delta, causing a decline in their strength
in the far south. Another major factor contributing
to the present static nature of the war in the delta
is the vulnerability of the Communists in this area
to US air operations. The open terrain, which char-
acterizes most of the delta, makes it difficult to
conceal large conventional combat units. Viet Cong
attacks of battalion size and larger declined sharply
after US tactical jet aircraft were introduced in
early 1965. In this context, tactical air support
has given ARVN forces in the delta a great advantage
in engagements with the enemy.
2. Consequently, the Viet Cong have apparently
been forced to maintain only a low tempo of operations
in the southern delta provinces. They have launched
a few company- and battalion-size attacks in recent
months, and have mounted mortar attacks against
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government outposts and several district towns.
Current tactics for the most part, however,
consist of such harassments as sniping, mining
of roads, and setting booby traps. According
to the various provincial assessments, these
actions have been sufficient to keep the
populace well aware of the VC presence and to
prevent any significant government gains.
GVN Pacification Efforts
3. On the government side, the tempo of
operations has been correspondingly low. Many
South Vietnamese Government officials in the
lower delta are considered by US observers to
be apathetic, inefficient, and corrupt. The
Revolutionary Development program in most of
these provinces has started poorly, and there has
been little genuine interest in the present
round of village elections, except on the part
of those officials ordered to be concerned.
4. In nearly all of the southern delta
provinces, US officials characterize the pre-
vailing attitude among the general population
as political apathy, with the primary desire being
for personal physical security. This frame of
mind has made it difficult for GVN officials to
mobilize the people for effective action. The
average peasant shows respect for the government
only when the South Vietnamese Army increases
its operations, and shows force in an area.
5. In many instances, GVN provincial of-
ficials apparently tolerate known Communist ele-
ments often because VC economic activities dove-
tail with their own. This is particularly apparent
in Chau Doc Province where, according to a US
provincial representative, a great deal of revenue
comes from the smuggling trade to and from Cam-
bodia, and where both GVN and Viet Cong officials
are heavily involved in the profits from this
trade.
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6. I uin many parts of
the lower delta, there appears to be tacit agree-
ment between the South Vietnamese Government and
the Viet Cong to maintain the status quo. Both the
ARVN and the Viet Cong have maintained "safe" areas
for many years and neither side has shown a strong
desire to disturb this arrangement in recent months.
7. In the southern delta, the main VC strong-
hold is the U Minh Forest complex in Kien Giang and
An Xuyen provinces. Another important base is in
the Co To mountain region near 0 Lam village in
Chau Doc Province. The U Minh complex has remained
essentially untouched since the early 1950s despite
sporadic ARVN forays into the area. There is no
permanent GVN presence in 0 Lam village, one of the
richest rice-producing and cattle-raising areas of
Chau Doc Province. GVN forces rarely dare to enter
this area.
8. A change in the status quo did occur re-
cently when, after many weeks of vacillation, ARVN
troops moved into the Hon Chong peninsula in Kien
Giang Province. This was not accomplished without
rumors of a Viet Cong/GVN "accommodation." This
rich and productive area had formerly been under
firm Communist control. Now the Communist control
is not overt, but it
is quite probable that peasants in areas sucn as
this still pay taxes to the clandestine Viet Cong
infrastructure.
Prospects
9. Many of the reporting officers comment that
the Viet Cong are expecting a sizable number of US
troops to enter the delta and that some reactions
are already evident. In several areas the Communists
are building up their main force battalions, suggest-
ing an intention to meet the US forces head on.
At the same time, they are reportedly storing caches
of food and arms in various locations to support
an increased emphasis on guerrilla activity.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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