WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010059-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: April 17, 1967
• Content Type: IR

Approved Fes' Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00GASA001800010059-2
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Weekly Report
Prepared Exclusively for the
Senior Interdepartmental Group
State Dept. review completed
Secret
44
17 April 1967
No. 0406/67
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 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010059-2
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Page
1. Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. UN and South-West Africa. . . . . . . . 2
3. Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
17 April 1967
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STAf R
 Ask
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1. BOLIVIA
The guerrilla situation in southeast Bolivia is
becoming increasingly serious as the government re-
peatedly demonstrates its inability to cope with
the problem.
On 10 April guerrillas ambushed another army pa-
trol near the site of the initial clash on 23 March
(see map). Eleven soldiers were killed and several
were wounded in this latest encounter, bringing the
total known dead and wounded to almost 30. Guer-
rilla casualties have been negligible.
Very little is known about the guerrillas, but
they are obviously well organized, well trained, and
heavily armed. They are believed to number somewhere
between 35 and 100 and to be led by Moises Guevara,
a former member of the central committee of the pro-
Chinese Bolivian Communist Party.
Guerrilla successes are to a considerable degree
a reflection of the ineptitude of the Bolivian coun-
terinsurgency forces. The 650 troops committed to
the campaig are ill equipped, poorly trained, and
badly led. unless the
army is retrained in counter insurgpiques it
will continue to suffer reverses. These losses in
turn could result in a deterioration of the govern-
ment's over-all position.
The guerrillas will probably continue their hit-
and-run tactics. It is unlikely that they are strong
enough to seize control of any portion of the country,
but their success may encourage other extremists to
attempt terrorism and subversion.
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2. UN AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
The special session of the UN General Assembly
convening on 21 April is unlikely to solve the prob-
lem of divesting South Africa of its mandate over
South-West Africa. The assembly committee set up
last fall to deal with the problem has failed to
agree on any proposals and will merely summarize the
committee's discussions without making recommenda-
tions.
Three proposals have been discussed. The African
proposal goes the furthest. It calls for the estab-
lishment of a UN administration in the territory,
and coercive action against Pretoria under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter if it resists. The Latin
American plan contains no enforcement measures and
would rely on a UN "council" to negotiate the trans-
fer of the territory to UN control. The third pro-
posal,. put forth by Italy, Canada, and the US,
would ask a special representative to survey the
situation and leave the problem of implementation
to the next assembly.
It is unlikely that the African proposal has
majority support in the assembly. The third pro-
posal is not acceptable to the Africans or to the
Communist bloc. The only possibility for assembly
action would appear to be something along the lines
of the Latin American plan.
This plan, however, would require moderation
on the part of the Africans, a prospect which has
probably been reduced by South Africa's recently
announced willingness to offer eventual self-gov-
ernment to the different peoples of South-West
Africa. The. African governments have charged that
this is merely a subterfuge to cover the annexa-
tion of the valuable white areas of the mandate to
South Africa.
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3. BURMA
Burgeoning economic' problems may force General
Ne Win to back away from his highly doctrinaire "Bur-
mese Way to Socialism" and seek foreign economic as-
sistance.
The steady decline of Burma's economy over the
past several years has accelerated in recent months.
A drop in rice exports, which account for 70 percent
of Burma's foreign exchange earnings, is a major fac-
tor. A government official has estimated that total
export earnings this year will not exceed $115 mil-
lion, a decline of 40 percent from last year.
Aside from decontrolling a few commodities late
last year, Ne Win has been reluctant to modify his
drive toward socialism. There are signs, however,
that more fundamental changes may be forthcoming.
Ne Win appears to have quietly laid the groundwork
for the forced retirement of Brigadier Tin Pe, re-
garded as the theorist behind the "Burmese Way to
Socialism," and now serving as vice chairman of the
ruling Revolutionary Council.
Ne Win is reported to be considering asking for
help from either the United States or Britain. Here-
tofore he has carefully refrained from entering into
major new economic assistance programs with leading
world powers, although government officials initiated
discussions with US representatives in Rangoon last
January about the possible acquisition of substantial
amounts of new military equipment. Also, the Burmese
are now drawing heavily on an $84-million credit
originally extended by Communist China in 1961.
Unless Ne Win is at least partially successful
in reviving the nation's moribund economy., he could
conceivably lose the support of the armed forces,
which he needs both to maintain his regime and to
carry out his policies. 25X1
17 April 1967
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Secret
Secret
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