THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010055-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: April 14, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
108
14 April 1967
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 Appr
Information as of 1600
14 April 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
The major land supply route between Da Nang and
provinces to the north has been reopened.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Highway One is open again between Da Nang and prov-
inces to the north with the completion of an al-
ternate bridge to replace the one destroyed by Viet
Cong guerrillas earlier this week (Para. 1). South
Vietnamese Operation DAN CHI 285B killed nearly 250
Viet Cong in a heavy battle on 13 April in southern
Phong Dinh Province (Para. 2). Captured enemy mes-
sages provide further information about the organi-
zation and command structures of the NVA 324B Division
(Paras. 3-6). A recently captured enemy document
contains possible Viet Cong plans to attack a US
base camp in Tay Ninh Province (Paras. 7-8). Docu-
ments captured in Tay Province revealed a major re-
organization of units subordinate to COSVN (Paras.
9-16).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
As the national elections draw nearer, internal
power alignments within various religious and po-
litical groups are starting to show some strain
(Paras. 1-3).
III. Military Develo ments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: An ar-
ticle in the DRV press calls for "unity" among lo-
cal officials (Paras. 1-2).
VI. Other Major Aspects: The DRV postal serv-
ice is apparently having some difficulties (Paras.
1-2).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Coastal Highway 1, the major land supply
route to US Marine installations in Quang Tri
Province, was reopened to traffic at 1530 today
(Vietnam time) by the installation of a floating
bridge. A large bridge on this highway some eight
miles north of Da Nang was badly damaged by Viet
Cong commandos on 13 April.
2. On 13 April, elements of the six-battalion
ARVN Operation DAN CHI 285 B made heavy contact
with Communist main force units some 80 miles south
of Saigon in the Mekong Delta province of Phong
Dinh. The action resulted in 243 enemy killed
and 29 persons detained. ARVN casualties were 46
dead and 168 wounded. In addition, six US per-
sonnel were wounded, two helicopters were destroyed,
and four others were damaged in this operation. US
helicopters, artillery, and air strikes furnished
support to the ARVN troops.
Further Information on NVA
Divis ion
3. A study of recently captured enemy tactical
messages has provided further insight into the
organizational and command structure of elements
of the North Vietnamese 324 B Division in northern
Quang Tri Province. Various other reports indicate
that the Communists are planning a major 'summer
campaign' in this area and that the 324 B Division
will play a major part. These captured communica-
tions cover the 22 February - 3 March period when
the 4th Battalion, 812th Regiment, 324 B Division
was in contact with allied units immediately south
of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
4. The 4th Battalion apparently is organized
with three infantry companies; an engineer unit;
60-, 82-, and 120-mm. mortar units (possibly company
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sized); three reconnaissance teams; an antitank
element equipped with 3-40 socket launchers; and
other support groups. (The 5th and 6th battalions
of the 812th, a possible artillery-related 72nd
Battalion, and the Cam Lo (Viet Cong) District
Unit were also noted in the captured communications
texts.)
5. The 812th regimental headquarters appears
to be divided into two sectionp, one at a forward
command post and another at an unspecified "rear
area." Message exchanges indicate that the
forward regimental command post contains a fire
direction center: that controls additional 82-
and 120-mm. mortar units.
6. These communications also contain various
references to the "Front"--possibly the "DMZ
Front" which is believed to be the over-all Commu-
nist operational headquarters in the southern DRV
DMZ - northern Quang Tri area. The "Front"
appears to have issued directives to various ele-
ments of the 324 B Division.
Plans For A.t?cac': on US Installation
7. An enemy document recently captured in
northeastern Tay Ninh Province reveals an extensive
reconnaissance program targeted against a US base
camp by elements of the Viet Cong 9th Division.
The report, dated 16 February, contained detailed
information on the allied forces, defenses, fre-
quency and patterns of patrols, and other intelli-
gence factors for the base camp of the 3r_d Brigade
of the US 4th Infantry Division at Dau Tieng in
northwestern Binh Duong Province.
8. An estimate of US reaction in the event of
a Viet Cong mortar attack against this camp is also
included in the report. This estimate is based on
reactions to earlier mortar attacks conducted by
the Viet Cong 272nd Regiment against similar Ameri-
can installations. Although forces of Operation
JUNCTION CITY, now reduced to 11 battalions, are
operating north of Dau Tieng, this base camp still
remains a lucrative target for Communist forces in
the area.
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Reorganization of Units and Command Structure in
COSVN Base Area
9. Two Communist documents captured during
Operation JUNCTION CITY have revealed that a major
reorganization of units and command structure
occurred in December 1966 in the base area of the
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in Tay
Ninh Province. The reorganization, designed to in-
crease protection of the base, was probably prompted
by Operation ATTLEBORO, conducted in the War Zone
C area of Tay Ninh in November.
10. The first document, issued on 16 December
by the headquarters of the Liberation Army, ordered
the reorganization of the Viet Cong 70th Security
Guard Regiment--responsible for protecting COSVN
headquarters--and established a new command committee
in the base area specifically for the conduct of
countersweep operations.
11. All agencies and units subordinate to the
headquarters of the 70th Regiment, according to the
document, were ordered deactivated and the regiment's
1st Battalion placed under the direct military and
political control of the COSVN Military Staff. The
1st Battalion was redesignated as Group 70. Two of
its companies were transferred to the control of
sections subordinate to the Military Staff--the 3rd
company to the signal section and the 6th company to
the engineer section.
12. The document does not give any indication of
the disposition of the 70th Regiment's remaining two
battalions. They may be retained as supporting
units to the new Group 70 or as independent battal-
ions to provide additional protection as necessary
for COSVN. The resubordination of the two combat
support companies of the 1st Battalion appears to be
a move toward concentrating all maneuver elements
into one unit for the prosecution of the new counter-
sweep plan.
13. In connection with this plan, the document
ordered the establishment of a command corrnittcr,
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designated the Minh Chau District Headquarters, to
direct all countersweep operations in the base
area. The entire base area was divided into eight
sectors, each with its own command committee. Al-
though it has a new designation, the Minh Chau
District probably encompasses the same area as the
Viet Uong's former district of Duong Minh Chau,
which covered War Zone C and roughly corresponded
to the GVN's Phu Khuong District.
14. The second document--issued on the following
day by the Military Staff--outlined in detail the
duties of the sector command committees. Each
committee, composed of commanders of various agencies
and installations operating in the base area, is
responsible in general for the planning and conduct
of countersweep operations--under the direction of
the Minh Chau District headquarters and in coordina-
tion with main force units in the sectors--to protect
the COSVN base area. Specific duties include terrain
reconnaissance, proper positioning of all subordinate
units, supervision of equipment in each unit, estab-
lishment of air defense observation posts and guard
posts, control of traffic in and out of the sectors,
control of mess and billeting facilities, collection
of intelligence on allied positions, and support of
main force units by providing guides, performing
medical evacuation, and supplying equipment when
possible.
15. The sector command committee's control ex-
tends to all units operating in the sector, with
the exception of main force units. For the proper
maintenance of security, however, these main force
units are subject to the sector's traffic control
apparatus when bivouackin and traveling to and from
the sector. Sector personnel were ordered to remain
in their sectors to "fight the enemy aggressively,"
and were specifically directed never to abandon
their sectors or run away. They may, however, move
about within the sector in order to "resist the
enemy, protect themselves, and ensure the performance
of special duties."
16. The establishment of the district and
sector command committees apparently does not call
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for additional manpower or indicate a buildup of
Communist forces in the COSVN base area. It appears,
rather, to be simply a means of gaining closer
control of units in the area in order to direct
their activities toward the specific mission of
countering allied incursions into the base area.
In view of the noncombat, defensive nature of many
of the command committees' duties and the reference
to "moving about within the sector," it appears that
the emphasis in countersweep operations was intended
to be more one of passive resistance than of aggres-
sive action by local force and guerrilla units.
During Operation JUNCTION CITY, Communist military
activity--other than that of main force units--has
thus far indicated that the reorientation may in-
deed have occurred in this manner. Local force and
guerrilla units have in general avoided contact with
allied forces, but have offered resistance when
cornered; it may be assumed that they have provided
support to the main force units that have initiated
action against the allies.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The proximity of national elections has pre-
cipitated some internal strains within various reli-
giousand political organizations. The lay branch of
the Hoa Hao religious sect, for example, is currently
involved in a conflict over two contenders for the
chairmanship of their central executive committee.
Although factionalism and internal rivalry within the
Hoa Hao is not unusual, the present struggle is com-
plicated by a desire of each of the contenders to
solicit support for, and be supported by, the military
candidate for the presidency.
2. The delta-based Hoa Hao could deliver--if
united--a sizable bloc of votes in the election.
Presently, both contenders for the chairmanship of
the lay branch are claiming the support of the govern-
ment in an effort to gain control of the committee and
reap the benefits should the military candidate be
elected.
3. Concern with the fall elections is also com-
pounding the problems of the minority Greater People's
Bloc (GPB)--mostly Revolutionary Dai Viet Party members
from central Vietnams--in'the Constituent Assembly.
the bloc's leader has
been losing his in uence over the grouping, partially
because he has spent too much time in the pre-election
campaign of Ha Thuc Ky, the Revolutionary Dai Viet
Party's presidential candidate. The GPB leader report-
edly believes that this erosion of influence is not too
vital since, in coming months, preoccupation both with the
presidential election and with possible candidates for
the legislative elections will continue to dominate
assembly interests.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Under the headline "unity is the basis of
all strength," the,North Vietnamese party daily
Nhan Dan in an editorial broadcast domestically on
T -ApriT-called upon the DRV populace to pull to-
gether and eliminate differences in order to bring
the "revolutionary cause" to complete success.
The editorial pointed out that while many local.
officials had pursued their duties with a sense
of "unity," there were some who had not. Nhan Dan
specifically singled out "key leading cadre
at the local level for lack of imagination and
intiative in solving their problems, as well for
being overbearing in their leadership. The edi-
torial characterized these faults as "sometimes
serious and lasting." It pointed out that these
cadre, by developing a sense of collective re-
sponsibility and relying on the efforts of the
group, would overcome weak points and come to
share the same views on the "struggle objectives"
which are approved after democratic discussion.
2. Criticism of local officials is not unpre-
cedented in North Vietnamese media although this
open call for "unity" is unusual. The article
strongly implies that local cadre members by their
arbitrary attitude may have made it difficult for
the regime to get its decisions implemented by
scattered local officials without considerable de-
bate and changes. At the same time, there is no
indication that the regime is meeting any serious
resistance to its program or that the difficulties
that have cropped up have in any way affected the
prosecution of the war effort.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Transport difficulties may have forced North
Vietnam to curt it postal service to outlying areas
of the country.
L as of mid-March, no mail was being accep e or
the two provinces in the extreme south or for the
town of Lao Cai on the northwest border with China.
In addition, a weight limit of ten kilograms (22 pounds)
was in force for mail to other provinces distant from
Hanoi.
2. These restrictions suggest that although the
North Vietnamese are able to maintain essential trans-
port movements in the face of air attacks, the effort
required is taxing, and goods of secondary importance
cannot always be accommodated.
It may e that parcel
pos servicet to., areas farthest from Hanoi have at
least been temporarily stopped or curtailed because
regular means of deliveries such as rai roa s nave
no capacity to spare.
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Top Secret
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