A PROPOSAL FOR INCREASING VIET CONG DEFECTIONS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010059-2
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 25, 2001
Sequence Number: 
59
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 17, 1967
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010059-2.pdf173.19 KB
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SfJV Approved For Release 20Q6/10/20 SftI R.PT00826A00170 010059-2 17 March 1967 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: A Proposal for Increasing Viet Cong Defections 1. The rate at which the Viet Cong have sur- rendered in January and February of 1967 is run- ning 65 percent higher than that the first two months of 1966. Tet, the Vietnamese New Year celebration, falls in this period. In the past, large numbers of both government and enemy personnel have taken ad- vantage of the traditional Tet visits to their families as an opportunity to desert, go AWOL or,over-stay their leaves. But this year, the marked upsurge in the number of Viet Cong who have formally rallied to the government through the Chien Hoi system, reveals two major causal factors. The high defection rate is obviously a direct reflection of the erosion in morale and the worsening conditions which the Viet Cong have experienced in the year that has elapsed since Tet 1966. As Allied and GVN pressure increases and expands, this attitude of personal defeat and loss of will to continue will become more widespread in Communist military and political ranks of the enemy causing, the Communists :internal problems. But Since people are the essence of this war, negative attitudes are insufficient for victory. There must be a demonstrable crossing of the line, a cessation of active support for the enemy and at least an im- plied political acceptance of the Saigon government. 2. Defection is a personal act, and this raises the second factor underlying the recent step- up in t4e Chieu Hoi rate. The Tet truce removed the most immediate, and probably most important, barrier to defection. It enabled individual VC to leave their units openly, with the blessings of their commanders and without the fear that is present, at any other tilife of the year,; ~ that such ; an act could mean death. During the past ten months captured, documents and prisoner interrogations have shown that the prevention of desertion has become a major enemy SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-R?P79T00826A001700010059-2 Approved For Release 20 6/l0/20s 1 T00826A001700010059-2 Nw~ pie-occupation. In April 1965 a captured document, essentially a piiner on how to spot incipient defec- tions, revealed that the VC was willing, that early, to chance the psychological losses that the admission of the seriousness of the problem might cause, in an effort to stem this rising tide. Security restric- tions will become increasingly severe and will dis- suade many from straying *hose decision, given the overall climate of defeat, might otherwise be to give up the fight. The major impediment to an even greater disintegration of the Viet Cong organiza- tion in the months ahead will. be the very real, in- dividual fear of immediate VC reprisal. The improve- ments in the national administration of the Chieu Hoi program, the addition of a host of new defection inducements are actually less important than getting the individual VC to lay down lie gun and take the first step away from his unit. Advice on how and when to leave the VC, and a believeable guarantee of safe escort out of the zone of retribution would be the most incisive blow we could strike in the ex- ploitation of the breakdown in morale. 3. With 1,100 ralliers now being processed through the Chieu Hoi machinery weekly, we have that many successful case histories to cull to determine, pragmatically, how security restrictions can be cir- cumvented. And in that number we also have the source of talent for a program that will enable us to ag- gressively engineer more defections. Experience with the few armed Chieu Hoi teams that were created on the model of the People's Action Teams showed that, when properly re-motivated, they were highly effective, zealous workers in the GVN cause. 4. We propose that under the Ministry of In- formation and Chieu Hoi, teams of five to six ex-VC with political and military experience be formed, trained and posted to populous districts where Allied/ 9VN military actions are planned or where Revolu- t,4onary Development programs are being expanded. Actual utilization of the teams would vary from prov- ince to province, but when assigned to combat units as a psywar adjunct they would have access to prisoner interrogations to assess, on the spot, the status of the enemy units' morale and the potential for large- scale defections at squad and platoon level. They SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01700010059-2 Approved For Release 20 6/10120 : ?ft~~iWt7 T00826A001700010059-2 could inventory the internal. frictions, personnel and disciplinary problems which could be exacerbated later by tailored propaganda and determine as well the identities of those others most likely to defect to whom personal appeals then could be made. 5. With the entry of RD teams into new hamlets, ex-VC Chieu Hai teams, preferably ones native to that area, would make initial appeals to the inhab- itants to contact their VC relations and encourage them to desert the lost cause. During their stay in a hamlet, these teams could actually provide a confidential counselling service on modes of con- tact and escape. Citing.their own experiences they could offer their assistance to any VC willing to defect--providing him the bridge to the nearest secure reception point. If the control and utiliza- tion.of such teams were properly coordinated with province and district officials (particularly with an expanded provincial constabulary structure), the teams could provide the contact instrument through which secure defections were arranged. 6. No single program or technique is going to crack the Viet Cong organization, but in the pool of ex-VC who have already defected we have an unuti.lized resource which, if properly exploited, could produce dramatic results. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/20: CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010059-2