THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010024-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: March 5, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top qg!Uet
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Information as 1600
5 March 1967
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The Communists appear to be developing an new
logistics base in the tri-border area of Laos, Cam-
bodia, and South Vietnam.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Allied operations continued withoug significant
contact over the weekend. (Para. 1).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Another government-inspired demonstration against
accommodation with the Viet Cong was held in Saigon
on 4 March (Paras. 1-2). Government ministers deal-
ing with economic affairs may soon be replaced (Para.
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III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
Statistics on North Vietnamese infiltration into South
Vietnam, Oct 1965- February 1967 (Paras. 1-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Communist
propaganda continues to protest US "escalation of the
war" (Paras. 1-2). Initial reaction to Kennedy speech
on Vietnam (Paras. 3-5).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Communists may be con-
structing new logistics base in tri-border area (Paras.
1-2).
The Situation in the Region Surrounding Saigon
The influx of allied military forces over the past
year into the area surrounding Saigon--Viet Cong Region
IV--appears to have cut into Communist capabilities.
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By the Communists' own statement--in recently cap-
tured documents--morale is low, defections are in-
creasing, security is poor, and popular support is
waning. Although the Viet Cong are no longer
likely to launch large-scale military operations
in the area, they still retain the capability--and
the will--to continue and probably to increase
smaller scale terrorist and sabotage actions both
in Saigon and on its outskirts.
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tS ayannakhet
*Phan (Rang
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 7,5 160 E lameters
VIETNAM
NORTH 'Qong Hot
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. All allied operations in South Vietnam con-
tinued without significant contact over the weekend.
Six US battalions have now been withdrawn from Opera-
tion JUNCTION CITY in Tay Ninh Province. The original
23-battalion force has been engaged since 21 February
in a major effort to clear the long-time Communist
stronghold in War Zone "C." So far, 377 enemy troops
and 93 Americans have been killed in the battle.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Another in the series of government inspired
demonstr4tions against peace negotiations leading to
a coalition government was held on the morning of
4 March in Saigon. The government's minister of edu-
cation reportedly organized a group of about 10,000
secondary school students who marched by the French
Consulate. French property, however, was well guarded
by Vietnamese police, and there was no violence. Press
reports indicated that a demonstration with similar
overtones was staged in Da Nang on 4 March, also under
strict government supervision and control.
2. Creeping into the issues behind the demonstra-
tions are the related questions of Vietnamese sover-
eignty and who will decide if and when peace negotia-
tions are to be held. US Embassy officials reported
that a seminar being organized by the minister for
youth late on 4 March included the theme that "the
US Government cannot negotiate alone with North Viet-
nam regarding peace for Vietnam." In addition, the
Peoples-Army Council, an :adv.isory group appointed by
and responsive to the military government, is scheduled
on 9 March to debate the question of Vietnamese sover-
eignty, especially regarding the subject of peace ne-
gotiations.
Possible Personnel Changes in the Ministry of Economy
and Finance
3. US Embassy officials have been told that Na-
tional Bank Governor Hanh has agreed to head the super
Ministry of Economy and Finance, which is responsible
for supervising the ministries of commerce, finance,
industry, and communications. A public announcement
of the change, however, is to be withheld until re-
placements can be found for the current ministers of
commerce and finance as well. US officials are in-
clined to believe that such changes are probably in
the offing. They also feel that the appointment of
Hanh, along with more forceful and effective commerce
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and' finance rlnisters;., wwwould be a major step forward in
solving the goternment's'_administrative problems in
managing the economy.
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INFILTRATION TOTALS SIN('--E 1 OCT.
Based on MACV holdings as of 28 February 1967
CONFIRMED
965
ACCEPTED
PROBABLE
1 TOTAL
POSSIBLE
MONTHLY
TOTALS
1965
OCTOBER
6,000
6,000
700
6,700
NOVEMBER
1, 600
200
1, 800
600
2,400
DECEMBER
2,000
400
2,400
200
2,600
1966
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
3,500
6,700
1, 800
2, 400
5,300
9,100
2, 400
2,400
7, 700
11,500
MARCH
APRIL
11,500
100
1,300
400
12,800
500
3,900
-
16,700
500
MAY
400
2, 900
3,300
3, 500
6, 800
JUNE
10,500
600
11,100
1,300
12,400
JULY
4,200
100
4,300
5,500
9,800
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
1,600
1,400
400
-
2,000
1,400
3,300
600
5,300
2,000
OCTOBER
100
500
600
4,600
5,200
NOVEMBER
-
-
-
600
600
DECEMBER
-
-
-
1, 100
1,100
1967
JANUARY
-
-
-
700
700
FEBRUARY
-
-
-
-
-
TOTALS
49,600
11,000
60,600
31,400
92,000
MONTHLY AVERAGE OCT. 1965- 28 FEB. 1967)
ACCEPTED: CONFIRMED AND PROEABLE 3,600
TOTAL ACCEPTED AND PO : IBLE 5,400
ACCEPTED INFILTRATIONr Those NVA personnel, groups, and units which have entered South Vietnam and are carried
in the confirmed or probable categories.
CONFIRMED: A confirmed infiltration unit/group is PROBABLE: A probable infiltration unit/group is one which
one which is accepted in South Vietnom on the basis is accepter' in South Vietnam on the basis of information
of Information provided by a minimum of two POWs provided bs' one POW or returnee (Hoi Chanh) from the
or returnees (Hai Chanh) from the unit'group,or two unit/group, or a captured document, supported by information
captured documents from the unit, or u combination of from other sources which con be evaluated as probably true.
personnel and documents.
POSSIBLE INFILTRATION: A possible infiltration unit/group is one shich may be in South Vietnam on the basis of
information which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no POW, returnee (Ho; Chanh), or document is
available to verify the reports.
NOTE: In addition to the infiltrators which fall into the above infiltration categories, other units or groups have been
mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, interrogation reports and sightings by +riendly forces, but the information
is insufficient to warrant inclusion of these units or groups in any of the above categories.
MONTH OF INFILTRATION: The month established as the date an infiltration unit/group crosses the international border
into South Vietnam for the first time.
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III. NORT}T VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. The chart on the facing page sets forth
statistics on North Vietnamese infiltration of
SVN for the period 1 October 1965 through 28 Feb-
ruary 1967. These ata---sunpl:ied. by MACV--will
henceforth be reported on a monthly basis. The
beginning date of 1 October 1965 is used since it
coincides with a period of substantial increase in
infiltration and provides a sufficient data base
on which to base an average figure. Significant re-
ports of infiltration which MACV disseminates between
its monthly statistical accountings will continue to
be reported as they become available.
2. It is recognized that there are a1 ?". ar
guments for the use of other data time frames in
computing averages of aaonthly infiltration. For ex-
ample, the average of the "Accepted" category for
1966 would be about 4,200 while the average of the
and "Possible" catecrories woihl' be slightly
more than 6,600 men per month. If time frames other
than that reflected by MACV are used, however, the in-
formation portrayed will be accompanied by specific
references to the time frame used to preclude confu-
sion.
3. It is important to remember that the compu-
tation of an average monthly infiltration fiqure based
on past historical data cannot be vali_cly usood". to project
trends in infiltration, or to determine whether there
has been any change in the pattern of infiltration.
In short, current infiltration figures do not forecast
enemy intentions. The nature of the enemy's infiltra-
tion of personnel is such that it is difficult to de~
tect many groups of personnel until after they have
been in South Vietnam for as long as six months. In
some instances, it has taken even longer. Therefore,
the ficrures currently developed for the period from
about 1 August 1966 through the end of February 1967
are considered to be incomplete. Infiltration data
are subject to continuing re-evaluation as additional
information becomes available. Consequently, the data
for recent months--as well. as the computation of in-
filtration averages--are: not adequate for determining
trends. It should be emphasized that the lata. displayed
for the months August 1966 through February 1967 represent
the only valid statistical information available at this
time.
III-1 5 March 1967
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Vietnamese Communist propaganda this weekend
focused on protesting the new US "escalation of the
war" and underscoring Hanoi's determination to meet
whatever military challenge the US :rings to bear in
Vietnam. This theme was developed in an editorial
in the Hanoi party daily, in a formal central com-
mittee statement by the principal mass organization
in North Vietnam--the Fatherland Front--in a South
Vietnamese Liberation news commentary, and at a Lib-
eration Front press conference in Peking. The Front
commentary made a special effort to deny rumors of
"secret talks" between US officials and Front repre-
sentatives, and to discredit the sincerity of the
US desire for a peaceful settlement.
2. The North Vietnamese commentary reiterated
the necessity for the US to recognize the DRV four-
point peace program and highlighted recent evidence
of public US opposition to official US policy. The
commentary cited Senate opposition to the supplementary
military authorization b>il.l for Vietnam as well as
Senator Kennedy's 2 a I speech as new evidence of
widespread public opposition to the US policy of
"widening the war."
3. To date, Communist propaganda has not given
extensive coverage to Senator Kennedy's Vietnam speech.
In addition to the passing references in the official
party daily cited above, Hanoi's only other discussion
of the Kennedy speech to date was a broadcast to South
Vietnam. It quoted Western press speculation on the
widening breach between the New York senator and the
US President, and claimed that even the Western press
see Senator Kenedy's speech as an example of the "con-
tinuous and severe criticism" which the US President
faces on Vietnam fro.,, within his "own political fac-
tion.'-'
4. Moscow, in its only commentary of note on the
Kennedy speech, took a different tack. On 4 March,
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Izvestia quoted its correspondent in Washington to
the effect that the senator's disagreement with US
policy should not be exaggerated, that opposition in
the US S`.nate is "irresolute and small," and that
it does not influence the White House.
5. Initial Peking reaction has not yet been
noted.
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the eve opmen o a probable Communist logistic
base in northeast Cambodia between the Se San River
and the South Vietnamese border. 25X1
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(three new encampments, in-
c uc: ing 12 buildings and 10 areas of row cropping agriculture,
which have been developed on the north side of the Se
San River. It also reveals a new road segment extend-
ing from Route 197 north about six miles to a probable
transshipment point on the south bank of the Se San op-
posite the new encampments. The development of the a -
parent new logistics base has all occurred since
January 1967
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TRI TAM ( ? B I N f H1 PHU GIAO
SAIGON
--!_UC BINH
CHANH
o8en Luc
\\O N G
LA!
THIEU
NHA
A Nha
Can Giuoc"~.,
CAN GIOUC
BIEDI
CQN.G TNANN
VC Military Region (MR) 4 Boundary
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THE SITUATION IN THE REGION SURROUNDING SAIGON
1. This area--Viet Cong Region IV--has long
been a prime target for Viet Cong infiltration. In
the past, Communist military units were able to move
freely on the very doorstep of the capital city, and
even today, the Viet Cong have 24-hour control of
small areas within a few miles of Saigon. The sta-
tioning of additional allied troops in the area dur-
ing the past year and the initiation of a realistic
pacification program have, however, begun to weaken
seriously the Communists' position.
Administration
2. In both the government and the Viet Cong
organizational apparatus, the area surrounding Sai-
gon is administered as a separate entity. The gov-
ernment's Capital Special Zone (CSZ), which includes
all of Gia Dinh Province except Quang Xuyen and Can
Gio Districts, had a status equal to the four corps
areas until mid-1966, when responsibility for the
CSZ was placed under III Corps. The Viet Cong's
Saigon - Cholon - Gia Dinh Special Zone, or "Region
IV," as it is now called by the Communists, roughly
approximates the CSZ, but includes, in addition, Cu
Chi District in Hau Nghia Province, Phu Hoa District
in Binh Duong, and Di An District in Bien Hoa. In-
cluding the residents of Saigon, some 3.5 million
people reside in Region IV.
3. Operation CEDAR FALLS, conducted between
7 and 26 January in southwestern Binh Duong Prov-
ince, attempted to locate and destroy the Communist
headquarters apparatus of Region IV. The operation
ranged through such long-time Communist redoubts as
the "Iron Triangle" and portions of the Ho Bo and
Boi Loi Woods, both of which are strategically lo-
cated along Viet Cong communications-liaison routes
between Saigon and Communist War Zones "C" and "D."
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4. The terrain in the area surrounding Saigon
generally favors small unit activity. The rice fields,
which cover a major portion Of the region, provide
good concealment for smaller units except during the
harvest in December and January. An area of marsh-
land in Cu Chi and abandoned rubber plantations in
Phu Hoa also help to conceal small units, and make
vehicular movement and large unit deployment diffi-
cult? Both the Viet Cong and the allies make exten-
sive use of the numerous waterways in the area and
the large road network leading into Saigon, but allied
elements using either of these are subject to Viet
Cong harassment and interdiction. Even well-armed
convoys travelling principal roads leading from Sai-
gon--National Routes 1, 4 and 5A, and 13--are subject
to ambush.
5. Ships travelling the principal shipping
channel to Saigon, the Long Tau River, are vulner-
able to attacks by Viet Cong units concealed along
the river banks.
Pacification in the Region
6.
The Hop Tac program for the pacification of
the
area
surrounding Saigon,,:initiated in early 1964,
was
the
government's first coordinated effort to
clear the area of Communists. The project proved
impracticable and over-ambitious, however, and new
goals were set in the spring of 1966 when the area
was made a National Priority Area in the newly..
established Revolutionary Development program,
7. The latest available Revolutionary Develop-
ment figures (compiled before Operation CEDAR FALLS,
which relocated some 6,100 people from Viet Cong-
controlled areas of Binh Duong Province), placed the
population secured by the government in the Gia Dinh
- Hau Nghia - Binh Du.ong - Bien Hoa province complex
at 74 percent, with only 9.7 percent under Viet Cong
control. The government is working to bring the re-
maining 16.3 percent under control. Most of this
secured population, however, lives in the Saigon-
Cholon area and in Gia Dinh Province.
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8. Bien Hoa Province, in addition, has always
been one of the most pacified of the provinces
around Saigon. The principal reason for this has
been that the Viet Cong, for unknown reasons, placed
Bien Hoa (where over 327,000 people reside) low on
their list of priorities. Even though small-scale
incidents in the province have increased in the last
few years, the status of pacification has not been
greatly affected. In fact, a recent Viet Cong docu-
ment complained that the guerrilla warfare movement
in Bien Hoa was bogging down and that too many young
men were joining government forces.
9. Figures for Hau Nghia on the other hand
showed only 19.5 percent of the population firmly
under government control, with 46.2 percent under
direct Viet Cong control (there are over 222,000
people in Hau Nghia); Binh Duong Province had 48 per-
cent secured and 19.8 percent under Communist domina-
tion (some 232,000 people live in Binh Duong). The
areas of greatest Communist concentration in these
two provinces are Cu Chi and Phu Hoa districts, both
administered by the Communists as one district,
which they call Cu Chi. The Viet Cong regard this
district as the most strategically important within
Region IV.
Viet Cong Problems
10. Despite continuing Viet Cong influence in
Cu Chi and Phu Hoa, allied military and psychological
warfare operations during the past year have made it
difficult for the Communists to expand or even to
maintain the scope of their activities. Captured
documents have revealed that allied pressure exerted
on Cu Chi during 1966 forced the Viet Cong to move
their Region IV headquarters from that district to
Binh Duong Province and to disperse politico/admin-
istrative agencies and military forces previously
concentrated in the Cu Chi area.
11. Other documents from Cu Chi, captured dur-
ing Operation CEDAR FALLS, complain of low morale,
increasing defections, recruitment difficulties,
shortages of raw materials for weapons production,
lack of preparation for combat, and inadequate
follow-up on the establishment of village party
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 committees. The documents attribute most of these
problems to the effects of allied military actions
and Chieu Hoi activities.
12. Morale is apparently the principal problem
in Cu Chi. Several documents note that Viet Cong
cadre and troops alike feared combat, became
"panic-stricken" during napalm attacks, and were
"badly demoralized" by B-52 strikes. Morale in some
cases was so low that troops refused to fight and
cadre grumbled that "Cu Chi was lost." Both the
low morale and the effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi
program have caused increasing defections, which
have, in turn, cut into Viet Cong military strength.
One document complained that replacements could not
be found to "fill ranks decimated by casualties and
desertions"; another criticized village cadre for
failing to comply with an order to recruit large
numbers of women, "even those of 15 or 16 years of
age."
13. Security is also a major problem for the
Viet Cong in Cu Chi, as well as elsewhere in Region
IV. According to several documents, cadre and
troops are negligent in maintaining security and
reveal unit locations and plans through careless
conversations in public places. There were com-
plaints that the allies have obtained good informa-
tion from defectors--some of it "70 to 80 percent
accurate"--or by capturing Viet Cong documents.
14. A number of documents suggest an increas-
ing distrust of the loyalties of the local populace
and an attempt to avoid friction between the Viet
Cong and the local inhabitants. The documents com-
plained variously that local inhabitants have at-
tempted to "keep away from cadre: and troops," that
they have urged relatives working for the Viet Cong
to come home, that political cadre have remained too
aloof from the people, and that "unity between the
army and the people" has been broken. A document
from Nha Be District in Gia Dinh Province stated that
163 persons in two villages were successfully in-
doctrinated, but "the general impression is that most
of the population is not eager to join in political
struggles because they are afraid of losing their
lands and jobs."
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Viet Cong Political Strengths
15. No recent Viet Cong documents are available
detailing the current strength of the Communist po-
litical apparatus in Region IV. A captured document
dating from mid-1965 indicated, however, that, ex-
cluding low-level agents and informants, personnel
assets controlled by the region's party committee
totaled approximately 2,500, including party activ-
ists and sympathizers, apparently assigned to Saigon.*
There were, in addition, some 5,600 party and revo-
lutionary Youth Group members scattered throughout
the remainder of the region. Approximately 2,000 of
these were subordinate to the Military Affairs Com-
mittee, however, and may therefore have been members
of military units. The Communists' reported diffi-
culties with recruitment, cadre morale, popular sup-
port, and arrests by government security forces
strongly suggest that they were unable to effect any
significant increase in their political personnel
strengths during 1966 and may, indeed, have lost a
number of cadre and sympathizers.
Viet Cong Military Strength in the Area
16. Documents and interrogations from Operation
CEDAR FALLS revealed that the Communist maneuver and
combat support units were recently reorganized with-
in Region IV. In the summer of 1966, six battalions
of the seven-battalion 165A Regiment were placed
under the control of the Communists' six "inter-
district (canh) committees," which are roughly
equivalent to the nine government districts in Re-
gion IV. The battalions of the 165A have tradi-
tionally operated in company strength in the dis-
tricts, and such a reorganization would seem to be
a logical step to enhance control mechanisms over
* The MACV Order of Battle carries 1,065 political
cadre in Gia Dinh Province. Although Gia Dinh is
not equivalent to Viet Cong Region IV, it would
probably contain the majority of such cadre. This
MACV figure does not include sympathizers.
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these units and to permit them effectively to con-
duct local military operations.*
17. Additionally, the assignment of one or two
"special action" teams and a squad or two of sappers
to the "interdistricts" also took place in the sum-
mer of 1966, apparently in a further effort to in-
crease lower level capabilities, The C-10 Sapper
Battalion, however,, which is responsible for demoli-
tions operations, remains directly subordinate to
Region IV and appears to direct much of the sabotage
effort in the region. This unit is strongly oriented
toward harassment of river traffic. Viet Cong dis-
trict forces of from one to three platoons exist in
the Viet Cong interdistricts of Cu Chi, Nha Be, Binh
Tan, Go Mon, and Di An.
18. Region IV apparently attempted in July 1966
to organize another regiment of four battalions,
Group A189. Two existing battalions..,wer.e.ta.be,
used as its base. In December 1966, however, the
Viet Cong apparently decided that a large concen-
tration of forces was dangerous in the face of the
overwhelming allied strength in the area, and the
regiment was deactivated. The two existing battal-
ions were placed under the control of the region's
Military Affairs Committee.
* The headquarters of the 165A Regiment has been
dropped from MACV Order of Battle holdings and
six battalions have been switched from the main
force to the local force category. The 1st Battal-
ion:. remains in the main force category and is
now carried as directly subordinate to Region IV
headquarters. Viet Cong maneuver units now sub-
ordinate to the district military affairs commit-
tees are located as follows: the 2nd Battalion is
in the Go Vap-Hoc Mon area; the 3rd is in Di An;
the 4th in Thu Duc; the 5th in Nha Be; the 6th in
the Binh Chanh-Tan Binh area; and the 7th in Cu
Chi. The 1st is located in Cu Chi District and
is apparently used as the region's reserve bat.
talion,
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19. Estimates of total enemy military strength
in Region IV will probably be revised as prisoners
and ralliers from Operation CEDAR FALLS continue to
be exploited. Initial information derived from in-
terrogations and documents suggests, however, that
Viet Cong combat and service units subordinate to
the region and interdistricts probably number at
least 4,300.* Viet Cong irregular forces (guerrillas,
self defense, and secret self defense) number ap-
proximately 2,840.** From accounts in the documents,
individual and crew-served weapons in the possession
of Viet Cong combat and service units (excluding some
interdistrict units) and irregulars in Region IV total
approximately 3,240.
Government Military and Security Forces
20. There are six government battalions perma-
nently assigned to the Capital Special Zone, in ad-
dition to several units from the 13-battalion Gen-
eral Reserve (marine and airborne) which is normally
based there. The permanently assigned battalions
* This figure includes estimates of possible strengths
of maneuver, combat support, and administrative
service units. MACV J2 Order of Battle carries
2,785 as the strength of the seven Viet Cong bat-
talions, five district units, and the C-10 Sapper
Battalion.
**This figure is taken from two Viet Cong documents
captured during Operation CEDAR. FALLS.. Current
MACV figures list 1,215 irregulars in Gia Dinh,
1,400 in Hau Nghia, and 1,660 in Binh Duong. They
are not broken down by MACV under a district head-
ing. Assuming that two-thirds of the irregulars
listed by MACV in Hau Nghia are located in Cu Chi
District, (since this is the area of the largest
Communist concentration in the province) and that
one-fifth of those in Binh Duong are in Phu Hoa
District (since Phu Hoa covers approximately one-
fifth of the province's area), the total number of
irregulars in the Region IV area, as carried by
MACV, would come to approximately 2,480.
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have an authorized strength of 4,602 but an average
present-for-duty strength of only 3,350. There is
a possibility that up to 21 National Police Field
Force companies may be assigned to augment other
government forces in security and Revolutionary De-
velopment work in the .CSZ. Presently, the Police
Field Forces in Gia Dinh number three provincial
companies, none of which are being employed accord-
ing to the RD concept.
21. Police in both Gia Dinh and Saigon have
performed well, but are operating under a number of
handicaps. Their pay is inadequate, morale is re-
portedly low, and they have often incurred the wrath
of the local populace because neighborhood checks
necessarily result in the arrest of a number of in-
nocent persons who simply do not have proper docu-
mentation. The police are also hampered by poor
liaison and coordination with ARVN in carrying out
their activities in the Saigon suburbs or in Gia
Dinh Province.
22. In spite of their handicaps, the police
have proved to be an important factor in keeping
the Viet Cong off balance in Saigon and Gia Dinh.
This is evident from complaints seen in captured
Communist documents which reveal that the increased
danger of police arrest is contributing to Viet
Cong difficulties in recruiting sympathizers. Po-
lice resources-control checkpoints have been effec-
tive in decreasing the flow of Viet Cong materials
into and out of Saigon, but it remains virtually
impossible to stop this movement entirely.
Prospects
23. Since 1965, Viet Cong military activities
in the Capital Special Zone have decreased in both
magnitude and scope, primarily as the result of the
activities of an overwhelming number of allied
troops and security forces located within the area.
24. Within the past several months, allied
forces have made significant headway against the
enemy in the area surrounding Saigon. The CEDAR
FALLS operation disrupted the communications ac-
tivity of the Viet Cong Region IV committee, causing
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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