CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010064-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: February 13, 1967
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010064-8
Tap Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN NORTH VIETNAM
Top Secret
23
13 February 1967
 Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010064-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010064-8
 Approved :'or Rele
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
13 February 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Chinese Communist Forces in North Vietnam
Summary
The general composition and force level of the
Chinese Communist military support units in North
Vietnam have remained basically unchanged in recent
months although a number of units have moved in and
out of Vietnam./ I
NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
Current Intelligence. It has been coordinated
with the Office of Research and Reports and
the Office of National Estimates. The estimated
total troop strength of the Chinese forces
presently in North Vietnam specified in the
memorandum has been coordinated with the De-
fense Intelligence Agency. This estimate is
based on the limited evidence available and
is, of course, subject to change as more in-
formation is acquired or as analysis continues.
DIA does not believe that the evidence is suf-
ficient to support the force structure pro-
jected in this memorandum.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010064-8
This is the first actual augmentation since
August 1965, when the Chinese AAA units initially
deployed into northern North Vietnam. The addition
of a confirmed third AAA division raises the es-
timated number of Chinese military personnel in
North Vietnam to a range of 26,000-48,000. If the
suspect CCA AAA unit also proves to be of division
size, it would raise the upper range to about 50,000.
The increase in Chinese AAA strength may be
related to the recent geographical expansion of Chi-
nese construction activities. A major Chinese en-
gineer unit was recently deployed to the Hanoi area,
the first time that any major Chinese unit has been
detected this far south. The move coincides with
photographic evidence which indicates that a dual
gauge rail line is probably completed between the
Chinese border and Kep and apparently will be ex-
tended southward into the Hanoi area.
Other major Chinese engineering projects in
northern North Vietnam include apparently completed
coastal defense sites in the northeast, a large air-
field being constructed at Yen Bai in the northwest,
rail and road construction and improvement, and the
construction of dispersed military camps and storage
facilities in the mountain regions near the Chinese
border. Most of these projects are long-term en-
deavors designed to upgrade North Vietnam's overall
defensive capabilities. The improvements in land
transportation routes between China and North Viet-
nam also enhance Peking's capability to increase
its support for the Hanoi regime.
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010064-8
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010064-8
 Approved F
8. Prior to the entry of the AAA
Division, the strength of the Chinese orces in North
Vietnam was estimated in the range of 25,000 to
45,000. If the AAA Division is up to normal
strength--and there is no reason to suppose that it
is not--then the upper limit of the troop strength
figure should be raised by about 3,000. Leaving
open the possibility that it entered North Vietnam
at reduced strength, however, the lower limit is in-
creased by a correspondingly smaller amount. Thus
the new estimate of Chinese military personnel in
North Vietnam is the range of 26,000 to 48,000. Con-
firmation of a division-level status for the suspect
CCA AAA unit in northeast DRV would raise these fig-
ures by another 1,000 and 3,000 respectively.
 Approved F - 064-8
Chinese Construction Activity in North Vietnam
9. There is growing evidence that most of the
major construction projects (see map) in the northern
third of North Vietnam are being undertaken largely
by Chinese army engineers. Many of the skilled North
Vietnamese construction crews were apparently trans-
ferred to southern North Vietnam in 1965 to concen-
trate on the repair of transportation routes damaged
by US air strikes.
Rail Construction
11. One of the chief Chinese projects is the
reconstruction of the rail line leading northeast
from Hanoi to the Chinese border. The northern
half of this narrow gauge line has apparently been
converted to a dual meter and standard gauge line
by the addition of a third rail from Ping-hsiang
to Kep. Although photography has confirmed the
presence of a third rail only on the southern por-
tion of this segment, the recent appearance of
standard-gauge rolling stock in the Kep area strongly
suggests that the third rail runs all the way to
Ping-hsiang.
12. Recent photography suggests that the dual
gauge line will be extended southward to at least
the important Yen Vien rail classification yard
north of Hanoi. These signs include the appearance
of oversize rail ties south of Kep and the construc-
tion of a turning wye with a large radius of curva-
ture'at the Yen Vien yard. Because of the difficult
 Approved F_' elease 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010064-8
102
Construction Activity in NW
North Vietnam, 1966
Road
Railroad
Telecommunications line
o New military/storage area
0 25 50 Kilometers
T
104
1
104
 --or Release 2007/03/14 ~ Approved - 0064-8
terrain in the area south of Kep, it is expected
that this portion of the project will probably not
be complete before mid-1967.
13. Analysis of photography indicates that
the new standard gauge line between Kep and the large
but still incomplete iron and steel complex at Thai
Nguyen was finished by late November. Completion
of this line and the dual gauge line between Kep
and China will permit standard gauge rolling stock
to move directly from China. This line, which is
about 30 miles long, has 11 major bridges and tun-
nels, and was completed in about ten months.
14. Other recent photography indicates that
the Chinese are giving increased attention to the
rail line leading northwest from Hanoi to the bor-
der town of Lao Cai. Preliminary work on the re-
alignment and improvement of this narrow gauge line
has been noted at several points in the Yen Bai area
since early November. Although this line histor-
ically has been of only secondary importance, its
overall strategic value will increase as the Chinese
push forward with their own ambitious rail construc-
tion projects in Yunnan.
15. There is also evidence that the Chinese
may be putting in a major effort on road construc-
tion in the northern border area (see map). This
activity, which apparently extends on both sides of
the border, is much harder to detect because of the
lack of high resolution photography along the Sino-
North Vietnamese frontier.
16. However, there have been a number of high
altitude reconnaissance missions over one section
of the border in the Lai Chau area. Detailed analysis
of this photography has revealed extensive construc-
tion activity along the major road net from the Chi-
nese border to the Lai Chau area. If this area is
representative of the kind of work going on along
the entire Sino-North Vietnamese border, the Chinese
are investing considerable time and effort in this
endeavor.
 Approve( Fui Release 2007103114 10000 - -
17. The activity detected between the border
and the town of Lai Chau falls into two basic categories:
road construction and the construction of dispersed
military camps and storage facilities. The road con-
struction consists of roadbed improvements, realign-
ment, and new road development. Some of this work
was begun in early 1965, mainly in the immediate vi-
cinity of the border. It is being carried out at a
moderate but sustained rate. A similarity in the
layout of the workcamps along the construction sites
of those in Yunnan, plus the general southward develop-
ment of this network, suggests active participation
by Chinese construction crews.
18. The photography also reveals that since
early 1966 some 35 dispersed storage facilities and
military camps have been built along the improved
road system in the Lai Chau area. Over 300 small
storage buildings with a capacity of 10,000 to 20,000
tons have been detected thus far. Some of these
installations are protected by automatic weapons
positions and personnel trenches. There does not
appear to be any deliberate attempt to camouflage
the buildings or other structures.
19. The purpose of these facilities remains
undetermined. Their appearance in conjunction with
the southward development of the road and telecom-
munications system from China suggests that they
may be related to Chinese military contingency needs.
There can be little question but that these facilities
will provide the Chinese with improved access to North
Vietnam and northern Laos.
Airfield Construction
20. The Chinese airfield construction project
at Yen Bai has made little progress in the past few
months. The field was flooded by heavy rains last
fall. Available information indicates that Chinese
engineer troops are still in the process of leveling
and filling the runway base. Even with a maximum
effort, it is doubtful that the airfield can be made
serviceable before late this year.
21. The timing of the airfield completion may
take on added significance in the months ahead. There
 Approved (-.IA-PnP7QTnnR9RAnnlRnnnlnnRA-R
are some indications that the airbase ultimately may
be intended for Chinese use.
Coastal Defense Installations
24. When Chinese engineers were dispatched to
North Vietnam in the summer of 1965, the first units
were put to work on improving the coastal defense
positions, suggesting that Hanoi's and Peking's first
concern was the threat of an allied invasion of the
northeast coast. The area's proximity to the China
border makes it of special concern to Peking.
25. The troops that accomplished this task re-
turned to China in October 1966, the first noted
withdrawal of a major Chinese unit from North Viet-
nam. The new coastal defense installations apparently
have been occupied by North Vietnamese units, 25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010064-8
26. Peking's official expressions of support
for North Vietnam continue to be stated in formula-
tions vague enough to cover a wide range of activities.
Our evidence indicates that the-.Chinese are limiting
their efforts to logistical backup of Hanoi--in keep-
ing with Peking's repeated assertion that China is
the "great rear area" of the North Vietnamese.
27. There is no evidence thus far that the cur-
rert political turmoil in China is having any direct
impact on the kind or level of assistance bein pro-
vided to North Vietnam.
Unless something like
a civil war situation develops in China it seems
likely that there will be no major cutbacks in aid,
although disruption of rail transport inside China
could slow up delivery schedules.
28. Regular Chinese engineer and AAA units
have now been operating in North Vietnam for 18
months. Until the major construction-related unit
arrived in the Hanoi area in late December, the Chi-
nese had been scrupulously avoiding the densely
populated Red River delta area. Most of the Chinese
units have remained in the remote mountain regions
near the Chinese border. This probably explains
why so few eye-witness reports have been received
concerning the presence of major Chinese units in
North Vietnam.
29. For the short term, it seems likely that
the major Chinese engineer units will remain in North
Vietnam and may extend their activities farther south
as they complete their assignments. It is also
reasonable to assume that under these circumstances
Chinese AAA units would deploy southward to provide
local protection for the engineer troops.
30. The extent and purpose of Chinese involve-
ment at Yen Bai should become clearer in time.
 Approved For Rele
e 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79TOO826AOOJ600010064-8
31. A steady buildup of air defense and naval
forces has been underway in south China for many
years. There has, however, been no movement of
ground force units in China which would signal a
decision to alter the present pattern of cautious
Chinese involvement. The Chinese have not moved a
single major combat unit closer to the Vietnamese
border, and all important army formations have re-
mained essentially in the same areas they have oc-
cupied for years, F
r-7hr Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010064-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010064-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010064-8
 Approved For1ease 2007/03/14: CIA-R DP79T008001600010064-8
13 February 1967
Talking Paper on "Chinese Communist Forces in North Vietnam"
1. This is the sixth memorandum published on this
subject. Secretary of Defense McNamara has expressed a
desire for periodic reviews of this situation. The last
memorandum was published on; September.
2. The memorandum's main conclusions:
a., The general composition and force level of
the Chinese Communist military forces in North Vietnam have
remained basically unchanged, although there has been a
recent augmentation of Chinese AAA units in northeast North
Vietnam.
b. There are presently nine major Chinese units
in North Vietnam--five engineer units and three, possibly
four, antiaircraft divisions.
3. Routine internal and external dissemination is
recommended.
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010064-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010064-8