WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010061-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: February 13, 1967
• Content Type: IR

Approved For ease 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826601600)0~- ,
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Weekly Report
Prepared Exclusively for the
Senior Interdepartmental Group
Secret
44
13 February 1967
No. 0397/67
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Secret
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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1. Warsaw Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. India-Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 2
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The pact foreign ministers met in Warsaw on 8-10
February to discuss changes in the European scene
since their conference in Bucharest last July.
The terms and tone of the brief communiqu6 is-
sued at the conclusion of the talks suggest that the
participants differed rather sharply on some of the
subjects discussed.
The principal disagreement almost certainly was
the refusal of some Eastern European states to ac-
cept Moscow's prescriptions for recognition of West
Germany: that Bonn must first recognize East Ger-
many and the Oder-Neisse border and formally reject
the use of nuclear weapons for all time.
East Germany, probably with the backing of Po-
land and the USSR, undoubtedly urged the others not
to follow Rumania's example in rushing to recognize
Bonn, virtually without preconditions. Hungary and
Bulgaria have been expected to follow Bucharest's
lead shortly, and initial discussions with the West
Germans have been undertaken by Czechoslovakia. It
is not likely that the Warsaw meeting will deter
either the Hungarians or the Bulgarians, although
the latter may insist on the proviso that the Ger-
mans help them ease the imbalance in their foreign
trade.
Rumania, which announced recognition of West
Germany on 1 February, was piqued by East Germany's
sharp criticism of its action, and had refused to
attend the meeting if it was held in East Berlin or
if Rumanian policy was to be criticized in any way.
Wary to the end, Bucharest sent a deputy for
minister to Warsaw.
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2. INDIA-PAKISTAN
Relations between India and Pakistan have neither
improved nor seriously deteriorated in recent months
as both sides wait out the Indian elections (15-21
February).
The chances for some progress in resolving the
issues between them after the elections are still
minimal, and serious electoral losses by the Congress
Party--particularly to the more nationalist right-
wing opposition--could make the Indian Government
even more wary of significant concessions to Paki-
stan. The Indians will not discuss the possible
transfer to Pakistan of any territory they now hold
in Kashmir, and the Pakistanis insist that some
progress toward a "solution"--presumably involv-
ing a plebiscite in Kashmir--is essential to any
over-all reduction in tensions.
The Tashkent Declaration of January 1966 called
for meetings at the ministerial level. The last
of these, however, was in March 1966. Subsequent
attempts throughout the summer to establish the
ground rules for a further meeting collapsed, as
did efforts last fall to start secret diplomatic
negotiations.
Under US urging, both governments have indicated
a willingness to explore the possibility of an arms
limitation agreement, but have made no moves to do
so. One bright spot in this otherwise gloomy pic-
ture was an agreement in September between the two
army commanders in chief which regulated various
border matters and reduced the likelihood that iso-
lated incidents could spark a major conflict.
During January 1967 US soundings in both coun-
tries indicated the promise of a mild thaw in rela-
tions. Although this prospect was threatened in
early February by the downing of a Pakistani ci-
vilian plane over India and by a skirmish between
border patrols, these incidents have been played
down by both governments, and the way is still
open for possible new attempts to resolve differ-
ences in the postelection period.
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