THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010044-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: February 3, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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49 Top Secret
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
State Dept. review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
Top Secret
112
3 February 1967
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3 February 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
On the military front, large truck convoys
continue to move south through the Mu Gia Pass
On the political front, Hanoi continues to
hold out the prospect of talks if the bombings are
stopped.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
No significant contact on 3 February has been re-
ported between Communist forces and any of the 33
allied ground operations (Paras. 1-2). Personnel
shortages apparently are forcing the Viet Cong to
recruit 14-year-old boys and to place recruits in
main force combat units (Paras. 3-4). A recently
captured document discloses friction between the
local populace and Viet Cong troops (Paras. 5-6).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent Assembly made further progress on
2 February in approving procedural provisions con-
cerning an elected legislature, but may end up
postponing debate on the more controversial legis-
lative powers until after Tet (Paras. 1-2). Pre-
mier Ky participated in a 3 February Hoa Hao cere-
mony in the delta, possibly to offset Chief of
State Thieu's earlier delta tour which was widely
interpreted as a campaign swing (Paras. 3-4).
South Vietnam released 28 North Vietnamese Army
prisoners across the demarcation line to North
Vietnam on 3 February (Para. 5).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: A pre-
liminary translation of a newly captured document
provides some details of Le Duan's speech at the
North Vietnamese Communist Party's 12th central
committee meeting (Paras. 1-5). Hanoi continues
to publicize the possibility of talks with the US
if the bombings stop (Paras. 6-7).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Trucks continue to
move through Mu Gia Pass into Laos at a high rate
(Paras. 1-3).
3 February 1967
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4
106
NORTH
VIETNAM
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Cheo Reo.
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USMC
OPERATION
DESOTO
.-Qtii Nhon
-::u ~-
._Z;~uyHoa
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I. THE MILITARY SITITATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Although allied forces continued to press
33 battalion-size or larger ground operations against
known or suspected Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army
troop concentrations a~.,' base areas on 3 February,
no significant new contact has been reported. Ameri-
can forces are currently involved in 15 of these 33
operations.
2. Early on 2 February in the coastal flatlands
of Quang Ngai Province, one platoon of US Marines
participating in Operation DESOTO located an enemy
force of approximately 30 men. The marines requested
naval gunfire support and six of the enemy soldiers
were reported killed. Since this one-battalion search-
and-destroy operation began on 26 January, a total of
74 Communists have been killed and five suspects de-
tained compared with American losses of 14 killed and
86 wounded.
Viet Cong Personnel Shortages Continue
the Viet Cong in the northeastern
part of coastal Quang Tin Province have started an in-
tensive recruiting campaign. The new recruits--in-
cluding boys as young as 14--will be assigned to armed
Viet Cong units from guerrilla to main force size.
4. The recruitment of 14-year-olds and the assign-
ment of recruits to main force units indicates that a
severe manpower shortage may exist at all levels. Pre-
vious reports have indicated Viet Cong intentions to
conscript both young men and women in other parts of
the country, including the Mekong Delta provinces.
Friction Among Viet Cong Units in MR IV
5. The first evidence of actual fighting among
Viet Cong units, as well as further indications of
friction between the local populace and Viet Cong troops
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were disclosed in a document captured during Operation
CEDAR FALLS. The document did not specify the reason
for the fracas.
6? According to the document, which consisted
of minutes of a meeting held in September 1966, a
fight that broke out between guerrillas and a unit of
MR IV almost resulted in a fire fights In addition,
the document observed that the war had affected the
people?s morale, that many "wanted to keep away from
cadres and troops," and that "unity between the army
and the people was broken." This friction was blamed
on poor discipline among troops and on their failure
to observe regulations, References in the document
to directives restricting troop movements along
Route 14 to the hours of darknes? only, prohibiting
troop bivouacking in local hamlets, and requiring
that troops on the move disguise themselves as ci-
vilians, may reflect not only regular security meas-
ures but also an effort to reduce such friction,
3 February 1967
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. On 2 February, the Constituent Assembly
approved various constitutional provisions dealing
with requirements to be met by candidates for the
upper house of the legislature, the filling of
vacancies in the upper and lower houses, and the
immunity to prosecution or-arrest for members'of
both houses during their terms The only contro-
versial issue to arise was whether there should be
a separate electoral law for ethnic minority candi-
dates to the upper house, whose membership is
elected At large. The assembly resolved the issue
by adopting an article stipulating that-procedures
and conditions for the election of candidates in-
cluding minority representatives to both houses
would be prescribed by law.
2. The assembly session scheduled for 3 Febru-
ary was delayed until the afternoon in order to per-
mit 38 deputies to attend a Hoa Hao ceremony in the
delta in the morning. The. US Embassy believes that
this delay, together with some revamping of the order
in which certain articles are being taken up, could
postpone debate on the more controversial questions
of legislative powers until after the Tet holidays.
Such a delay, however, might permit the assembly to
work out a quiet compromise with the Directorate on
these sections. The assembly has also appointed a
small subcommittee to polish up the language of arti-
cles of the constitution already approved. This may
allow for some further adjustment of provisions not
yet fully satisfactory to the Directorate.
Presidential Campaigning
3. Premier Ky flew to the delta on 3 February
to participate in the ceremony of the Hoa Hao reli-'
gious sect. Although Ky's trip is possibly designed.
in part to assuage any Hoa Hao concern over rumors of
a pending reshuffle of province chiefs in the delta,
it may also be intended to offset the publicity given
Chief of State Thieu's tour of the delta early last
week. Thieu's trip was widely interpreted as a
"campaign swing".
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4. Touching also on themes discussed by Thieu
in a press reception in Saigon this week, Ky told
reporters that he hoped to speed up the elections
by some three months to early summer, to adopt a
"new" program of issuing land titles to farmers
tilling former French lands, and to make a sys-
tematic investigation of corruption in all four
corps areas. Ky also declared that Hanoi may now
be increasing its peace feelers because it: fears
an elected government in Saigon, he said that peace
would come when North Vietnam ceased its aggression,
and that he would be "willing" to talk with Ho Chi
Minh to achieve .such a peace.
Release of DRV Prisoners
5. South Vietnam on 3 February transported 28
North Vietnamese prisoners of war and two Viet Cong
prisoners to the Ben Hai River bridge between North
and South Vietnam for release to North Vietnamese
authorities. The two Viet Cong prisoners declined
at the last minute to depart, and were accepted by
GVN officials as Chieu Hoi rallierso The 28 North
Vietnamese crossed the bridge, and were met and
taken off in trucks by local police. A similar re-
lease of North Vietnamese prisoners by the GVN in con-
nection with the Tet holidays occurred last year.
Hanoi on 2 February had denounced the"repatriation"
as a "hoax" and said that the "compatriots" will be
allowed to choose whether they will stay in the North
or return to the South.
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port.
1. There is nothingiof significance to re-
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1. A preliminary MACV translation of a recently
captured Communist notebook in South Vietnam provides
gists of a briefing at the Central Office for South
Vietnam (COSVN) concerning the 12th central committee
meeting in North Vietnam as well as some revealing
comments on the situation in the South.
2. According to the notebook, the briefing
covered a report given by party first secretary Le
Duan on the situation in the North. Le Duan stated
that US air strikes "did not amount to anything"
since North Vietnam received its arms from foreign
sources. The party first secretary also reported
that Soviet party official Shelepin, who visited Hanoi
in January 1966, had intended to try to convince
North Vietnam to negotiate with the US. The North
Vietnamese, however, had confronted him upon his ar-
rival with a communique that stated Hanoi's determina-
tion to continue the war. Consequently, according
to the notebook, Shelepin did not reveal his inten-
tion and promised instead to support Hanoi as long as
the war lasted. This is undoubtedly a North Vietnam-
ese version of events and may not accurately reflect
the circumstances of Shelepin's visit. However,
there have been other reports tending to confirm
that Shelepin did come to Hanoi in the hope of gaining
North Vietnamese agreement to take steps toward ne-
gotiations.
3. The notebook quoted the briefer as saying
that the 12th central committee resolution advocated
the policy of "tactical negotiation" in the "coming
rainy season." No explanation was given of what was
meant by "tactical negotiation" and since the excerpted
translation does not provide the date of this particu-
lar note, or the date of the 12th resolution, it is
impossible to determine which rainy season is meant.
The notebook account of the briefing went on to state
that "negotiation is one thing and fighting is another,
and at the present time the balance of power is not
quite in our favor." The cryptic nature of these ref-
erences reveals little of DRV intent. The complete
translation of the notebook might provide a clarifica-
tion.
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4. Other sections of the captured notebook
contained interesting assessments of the war in
the South. For example, it stated that the status
of guerrilla warfare had decreased and had not de-
veloped. It also noted that too little value was
being placed on guerrilla forces and their rudi-
mentary weapons, and too much attention was placed
on concentrated forces. These same observations
have been made in several recently published arti-
cles in the North Vietnamese press. According to
the notebook, a 15 December 1966 COSVN resolution
directed that strong attacks be launched utilizing
individual initiative and that consideration should
be given to the guerrilla warfare movement.
5. The notebook also mentioned that during
the first ten months of 1966, 440,000 people had
been removed by the allies from the "liberated
areas." Another recently captured Communitt note-
book implied that one million additional people in
rural areas had come under Saigon control in 1966.
Hanoi On Negotiations
6. The North Vietnamese continue to appear
anxious to have their willingness to talk with the
US widely publicized. DRV representatives abroad
are beginning to publicize the 28 January statement
of their foreign minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, promis-
ing Hanoi's consideration of US-DRV talks in exchange
for an unconditional cessation of the bombings. The
DRV ambassador in Cairo discussed the foreign minister's
statement with local press representatives on 28 January
and on 2 February. In Phnom Penh, according to a
Reuters dispatch, the DRV representative at a 3 February
press conference also said that Hanoi would be willing to
have conversations with US officials after a bombing
cessation. The DRV ambassador in New Delhi reiterated
this line at a 3 February press conference.
7. The Soviet ambassador in Djakarta quickly
passed on to US Embassy officials a conversation
that he had had the previous evening with the North
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Vietnamese ambassador. According to the Soviet of-
ficial, the Hanoi diplomat had been "eager" to dis-
cuss prospects of ending the conflict and had af-
firmed that the DRV Government would be prepared to
enter discussion with the US immediately if the US
ceased the bombings. On 3 February limited unoffi-
cial Soviet and East European commentaries have
begun to charge that the US by not responding to
the Hanoi offer, is not genuinely interested in a
peaceful settlement.
3 February 1967
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LAOS PANHANDLE
tram t.
Phone
923
`Bouang
IYam
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1. Trained observers continue to report large
numbers of trucks moving south in the Mu Gia Pass
area of the Laotian panhandle. During the week of
17-23 January, a total of about 150 southbound
trucks were sighted compared with some 235 south-
bound trucks the previous week.
2. For the first three weeks of January, truck
traffic entering Laos through the pass appears to
have been at the highest level since the beginning
of the current dry season in October 1966. This
would still be somewhat less than the approximately
28 southbound trucks per day average believed to
have been maintained on the northern portion of the
infiltration corridor during the 1965-66 dry season.
However, irregularity of coverage makes any year-to-
year comparison of levels of traffic rather tenuous.
3. Farther south, the panhandle road network
leading to the South Vietnamese border remains open,
although only light traffic has been reported during
January on Routes 911 and 91. Sporadic reporting
from ground observers points to continued low-level
truck movement on Route 110. Such activity probably
reflects continuing Communist efforts to maintain a
flow of Cambodian foodstuffs tQ Communist forces in
Laos and South Vietnam.
3 February 1967
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