COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICAN LABOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: February 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Communist Influence in Latin American Labor
U
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
1 February 1967
No. 0622/-67 0
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WARNING'
This document contains information affecting the national
defense-' of the United States, xithin the meaning of Title
18, sec ions 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its tra' ismission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt tfy an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[K)`A'NORAIRNC AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
1 February 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist Influence in Latin American Labor
Summary
At the present time, Communists occupy the
principal offices and control the directorates of
the major labor confederations in Chile and Uruguay.
These confederations were organized and built up by
Communist exploitation of legitimate labor griev-
ances. On matters concerning the rectification of
grievances the Communists almost always
have
the
full support of their unions' members.
Thus
far,
however, they do not have anywhere near
such
back-
ing of the rank and file on purely political
issues.
In the rest of Latin America, Communist
influ-
ence in organized labor varies from negligible to
an ability, in a few countries, to exploit labor
grievances against the incumbent administrations.
At present, for example, the Communists appear to
be making some gains in Brazil, the Dominican Re-
public, and possibly in Costa Rica. Although free
labor strength now far exceeds that dominated by
Communists, the failure of non-Communist labor
leadership to raise worker benefits and wages could
facilitate further Communist infiltration and con-
trol of urban and rural labor groups in several
Latin American countries.
NOTE: -This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the Office
of Research and Reports the Office of Na-
tional Estimates
The memorandum does not attempt to assess the
current status of the entire Latin American
labor movement, but appraises only the degree
of Communist influence on it.
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Background
1. The Communists have always directed more
attention toward penetrating and influencing labor
and student movements than any other mass organiza-
tions in Latin America. In the labor field they
have been encouraged both by their desire to at-
tract working-class members into the party and by
their conviction that through control of organized
labor they can create enough instability to bring
down an existing government. Once the labor move-
ment is controlled, some union funds and influence
can be diverted for party purposes, as well as for
solidifying labor gains, and infiltration of im-
portant governmental positions can begin.
2. Communism began to have an influence on
Latin American Labor organizations following the
Russian Revolution and World War I. This newly
propagated doctrine was in conflict with the im-
migrant-introduced theories of anarchism, syndi-
calism, and socialism. The phenomenal growth of
its influence in contrast with these other radical
doctrines was attributable to the fact that it was
introduced and directed by traveling international
agents rather than by stationary individuals with
ties to immigrant groups. Furthermore, these agents
tended to seek out ways and means to coexist with
the traditional Latin American dictatorial regimes.
An example is the manner in which the Cuban Commu-
nists were able to accommodate themselves to
Batista.
3. By 1929 the Communists had established a
Latin American confederation of unions as a branch
of the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern).
From that time on, the Latin American Communists
have sought persistently to draw their national
labor units into a vast regional organization
associated with their international labor front.
For several years they dominated the only impor-
tant regional labor confederation in the area.
This was the Confederation of Latin American Workers
(CTAL), established in 1938 and led by Vicente Lom-
bardo Toledano, who was then a leader of organized
labor in Mexico and later a vice president of the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).
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4. Initially the CTAL was a legitimate labor
central, supported by the major labor confedera-
tions of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,
Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico. From the outset, how-
ever, Communist labor leaders were prominent in the
confederation, and their influence increased during
World War II, when Communist labor activities were
encouraged or tolerated by most of the Latin American
governments. Local or national labor groups from 14
countries were associated with the CTAL in 1944 and
the Communists controlled most of the top offices.
5. The take-over was facilitated by Lombardo
Toledano, who had been ousted from his Mexican labor
post in 1940 and subsequently identified himself in-
creasingly with Communist elements in the WFTU.
With the onset of the cold war in the late 1940s,
membership in the confederation fell off drastically
as its non-Communist affiliates withdrew to join
either the anti-Communist Inter-American Regional
Labor Organization (ORIT) or the Association of
Latin American Labor Unions (ATLAS), which was pro-
moted by the Peron regime of Argentina. CTAL soon
became little more than a paper organization and a
propaganda instrument for the Communist movement.
CTAL eventually affiliated with WFTU and parroted
every theme of the Moscow Communist line, gradually
losing prestige until it too became dormant in 1962.
Recently there has been an attempt to establish, a
new labor front, the Single Center of Latin American
Workers, headquartered in Chile but sponsored by
Havana. Thus far, this organization exists in name
only.
6. At present, free labor strength far ex-
ceeds that controlled by the Communists in Latin
America; the Communists play a dominant role in the
labor movements only in Chile and Uruguay, but they
appear to be making modest gains in Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, and possibly in Costa Rica.
In most countries, their emphasis is on improving
organizational techniques rather than on agitation.
Although the Communists' role in the various coun-
tries' labor organizations ranges from dominance to
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insignificance, and although in no country are the
Communists likely to assume a significant role in
the national government at any early date, they do
have a disturbing potential in certain countries to
exploit legitimate popular grievances against the
governments.
7. Despite the fact that most Latin American
pro-Moscow parties are facing some competition from
pro-Peking splinter groups, Communist fortunes in
Latin American labor have not been affected to any
appreciable degree by the Sino-Soviet split. Neither
have the Communists' appeal to labor and their
ability to penetrate and exploit non-Communist
unions been foiled by the publicized deterioration
of Cuban Communist leadership in Latin,America, by
the bitter lessons learned by many democratic groups
who formed labor partnerships in the past with the
Communists, nor by the political developments in
several countries--e.g., the exposure of Communist
elements in the Brazilian labor movement and the
defeat of the pro-Communist coalition's candidate
in the 1964 Chilean elections.
8. Although Communists have been able to win
strong positions in the labor organizations of some
Latin American countries, they have not always been
able to maintain their influence. Thus the rise of
Peron soon undermined the important role the Commu-
nists had obtained in Argentine labor by mid-1943;
the collapse of Communist control over Guatemalan
labor followed hard on Arbenz' ouster in 1954; the
removal of Goulart in 1964 rolled back the burgeoning
influence of Communists in the Brazilian labor move-
ment; and, since the overthrow of the Paz Estenssoro
regime in late 1964, the previous strong Communist
position in the Bolivian miners' unions have been
sharply reduced by the the Barrientos administration.
9. Other influences contributing to anti-Com-
munist gains include the Alliance for Progress, AID
labor programs--particularly the American Institute
for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)--the reinvigo-
rated activities of the American labor movement in
cooperation with the Inter-American Regional Labor
Organization and the international trade secretariats,
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the expanding activities of an increasingly social-
minded Catholic church and other Catholic forces,
better labor-management-government relationships,
and the improving leadership and resources of the
indigenous labor movements of the area. The suc-
cess of these organizations has been limited, how-
ever, by the lack of organizationally strong na-
tional affiliates.
Strategy and Tactics
10. In some unions, and in some countries, the
Communists might have succeeded in controlling the
labor movement except for a change of government or
some strong government action against them. The
successes they can still claim, however, are at-
tributable in large part to the inefficiency and
disorganization of those who oppose them and to the
lack of governmental attention to social reform.
11. The strategy of the orthodox Communists in
respect to urban as well as rural labor in Latin
America continues to emphasize long-range revolu-
tionary goals, with present tactics aimed at uniting
labor under nationalistic, anti-imperialistic (i.e.,
US) banners, forming other national labor centers,
such as Chile's CUTCh, as rallying and coordinating
points, and exploiting chronic Latin American po-
litical, social, and economic unrest. They will
continue to use whatever unions they can manipulate
as disruptive forces in strikes and as recruiting
and training grounds for party and front-organiza-
tion members and leaders. On some occasions, they
may commit their labor assets to political demon-
strations and other forms of direct action.
12. The present Communist strategy is by nature
opportunistic and is directed by nationalistic,
anti-imperialist labor unity with emphasis on dom-
inating organizations by strategically locating ac-
tivists from the top federations down to the locals.
There appears to be no particular effort at the
present time to develop a mass following among union
members or to establish Communist unions--except
where favorable conditions for such developments
already exist. In other areas, activists are
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worked into the top functionary positions of the
local unions. They are well trained in trade union
problems, activities, and organization techniques.
Unlike many democratic labor leaders, the Commu-
nists generally are capable workers who have ample
funds and can devote full time to their work. They
usually do not seek the top job, but use their in-
fluence to gain this spot for a well-known, pliable,
"democratic" leader. Often he holds this position
at their sufferance; knowing this, he is prone to
go along with their policies.
13. Minor activists also work themselves into
the local unions. Again they have the funds, time,
and organizing talent to move into strategic spots.
They work hard on workmen's complaints, the negotia-
tion of contracts, and the handling of details and
paper work for the union in dealing with government
agencies. They gain influence in union newspapers
and use this propaganda medium to push their line.
Their efforts sometimes pay off well enough to per-
mit the subsequent penetration of certain key gov-
ernment ministries (e.g., education, welfare, and
agriculture, as well as in labor as occurred in
Brazil under Presidents Vargas and Goulart.)
14. Any lasting effects of disagreements on
ideology and tactics or a sudden increase in ten-
sion between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking elements, in
the field of labor, particularly if the peaceful
line in Brazil and Chile should fail, remain to be
seen. So far, however, the dominant pro-Moscow
Communists are trying to rebuild their strength
and appeal to the lower and emerging middle classes
or urban workers and peasant groups without resort-
ing to violence.
15. Organized labor in Latin America has been
prone to political influence and control through-
out its history. In most of the countries, the
Communist party is one of the most strongly dis-
ciplined political groups. In addition, it is the
one most likely to appeal to the workers if the
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economies of the Latin American countries do not
expand and if the workers are unable to secure gains
in wages and other benefits through collective
bargaining. The Communist appeal may therefore
become increasingly attractive to urban workers as
well as to the rural peasants, who have long had
legitimate grievances.
16. In the series of annexes which follow, the
question of Communist involvement in labor in each
of the Latin American countries is stated in detail.
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A. Statistics
1. Total labor force 8.2 million
2. Organized : 3.3 million (c. 40 percent)
(a)Communist influenced: 66,000 (2 percent)
B. List of Major Labor Membership Orientation
Confederations Thousands)
General Confederation of 2,500 The CGT is now con-
Labor (CGT) trolled by the moder-
ate faction of the "62
Bloc" Unions. The in-
dependent unions and
the former "32 Bloc"
are also members of the
CGT. The orthodox
peronists are now out
of power and participate
in CGT activities only
spasmodically. The Com-
munists have been sys-
tematically excluded
from CGT activities.
Movement of Unity and
Coordination (MUCS)
Communist
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. The Communists have had a notable lack of success in
gaining control of organized labor in Argentina. In fact,
what strength they do have has diminished ever since the days of
Peron, as the Argentine working man looks to Personism rather
than to Communism for labor gains. The Communists have made re-
peated efforts to work with the Peronists, but the latter have
consistently rejected any real alliance. Today, only a fringe
group of Peronists who believe in violence and extremism have
expressed any interest in working with the Communists against the
government.
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2. The Communist-led Movimiento de Unidad y Coorinacion
(MUCS) is doing very little. Two Communist unions in Buenos
Aires have been intervened by the government, apparently with
Peronist support. CGT leaders have systematically excluded
MUCS from participation in CGT activities.
3. Communism is, therefore, an ineffective force in
Argentine labor and there seems to be little prospect at the
present time that it will ever be resurrected. The major dif-
ference between Argentina and the other countries of the hem-
isphere is, of course, Peronism, which has proved to be an
effective alternative to the more radical philosophy of Marx-
ism. It appears that the MUCS will continue to lose followers
to the point where it may disappear as a representative of
organized labor.
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ANNEX II
BOLIVIA
A. Statistics
1. Total labor force : 1.3 million
2. Organized 480,000 (c. 37 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 24,000 (5 percent)
B. List of Major Unions Membership Orientation
(Thousan
Federacion Sindical de 20 Communist/Leftist
Trabajadores Mineros (Outlawed 1965)
De Bolivia (FSTMB)
Communist
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. Since May 1965, the Bolivian labor situation has
been chaotic. In early June 1965, the ruling military
junta abolished all existing labor unions and federations.
It was the junta's intention to weaken the leftist-led labor
unions and federations, and then rebuild a strong movement,
which would be democratically oriented. This process is
still in progress.
2. Although the labor movement in Bolivia has always
been a main pillar of Communist strength and the major target
of Communist activity, the party's future in the country's
labor appears to be poor at this time. Only the FSTMB, which
is not recognized by the government, is still in extremist
hands.
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1. Total labor force 24 million
2. Organized 7 million (c. 29 percent)
(about 1.5 million are dues
paying members)
(a) Communist influenced: Unknown
B. List of Major Membership Orientation
Confederations Thousands)
National Confederation of 5,000
Industrial Workers (CNTI)
National Confederation of 3,500
Commercial Workers (CNTC)
National Confederation of
Land Transport Workers
(CNTTT)
National Confederation of
Workers in Credit Institu-
tions (CONTEC)
National Confederation of
Maritime, Water and Air
Transport Workers (CNTTMFA)
National Confederation of 2,500
Agricultural Workers
(CONTAG)
National Confederation of
Communications and Publicity
Workers (CONTCOP)
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N-C. ICFTU ORIT
ITS-International
Federation of Commer-
cial, Clerical, and
Technical Employees
N-C.
N-C.
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C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. After the 1964 revolution, most Communist union leaders
were purged and the government intervened many unions. Because
of the government control currently exercised over the labor
movement, the Communists seem to be content to sit back, main-
tain a minimum level of activity, and wait. Government wage
restrictions have resulted in a decline in the real wages of
almost all workers. Non-Communist leadership--which has more
or less been imposed from above on many unions--has not been
able to win wage increases in line with the rise in the cost of
living. As a result, there has been a continuing drift to the
left in union sentiment which is not likely to be reversed, at
least until real wages begin to increase.
2. The long-range outlook for the Communists is fairly
favorable. They have been able to seize a position as the
focal point for antigovernment sentiment. The gradual drift to
the left and the resurgence of leftist and pro-Communist leader-
ship in the unions could be affected by several factors. For
instance, any violent strike which brought workers into sharp
clashes with security forces could speed up the swing to the
left, as could a repressive government labor policy. On the
other hand, such a swing could be slowed if the government
tried to talk to workers and to alleviate their most pressing
problems--wages, housing, education, etc. However, a Communist
base organization exists and would probably regain considerable
influence if governmental controls were lifted.
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ANNEX IV
CHILE
A. Statistics
1. Total Labor Force : 2.75 million
2. Organized : 410 thousand (c. 15 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 287 thousand (c. 70 percent)
B. List of Major Unions Membership Orientation
Thousands)
Central Union of Chilean 400 *P-C. No international
Workers (CUTCh) affiliation
Union de Campesinos 30 Christian Democratic
Cristianos (UCC)
Confederation of Chilean 22 Contains both Communist
Private Employees (CEPCH) and non-Communist
unions
Chilean Trade Union 20 **N-C. CISC
Association (ASICH)
National Confederation of 15 N-C. No international
Workers' Unions (CNSO) affiliation
Maritime Confederation of 28 N-C. ICFTU. ITS-Int'l.
Chile (COMACH) Transport Workers'
Federation
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. The Communists, in alliance with the Socialists,
started the Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUTCh) and have
never lost control. Thus far, the Christian Democrats have
been unable to challenge the Communists in the labor field
except in rural peasant organizations.
* Pro-Communist
**Non-Communist
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2. The Communist-Socialist dominated CUTCh has cap-
italized on labor opposition to the Frei administration's
stabilization program to press for wage increases larger
than the maximums set by the program. In certain key
cases, such as copper mining, CUTCh has succeeded but has
not had much luck in mobilizing its unions on political
issues. Its strength in the labor field, however, could
be sharply expanded if the Frei government should falter
in its program of social and economic reforms, or if a
Popular Front alliance were to come to power in 1970.
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A. Statistics
1. Total labor force
:
5.4 million
2. Organized : 590,000 (c. 11 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 83,000 (c. 14 percent)
B. List of Major Unions Membership
Orientation
(Thousan
ds)
Trade Union Confederation
150
*P-C. No int'l aff.
of Workers of Colombia
(CONSICOL)
National Union of Colombian
499
**N-C.
ICFTU
Workers (UTC)
Colombian Confederation of
150
N-C.
ICFTU
Workers (CTC)
Colombian Federation of
8
N-C.
ITS-Postal,
Telecommunications Workers
Telegraph and Tele-
(FCTT)
phone Int'l.
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. Communism is not a seriously disruptive factor in
Colombian labor at this time. Communist labor unions are spend-
ing their time on normal trade union activities, with their
main effort directed toward increasing the strength and influ-
ence of CONSICOL. They lack dynamism and have not grown in
recent years, probably because of disunity within the Com-
munist movement and fear of government repression. It is dif-
ficult at this time to foresee circumstances in which the Com-
munists could improve their over-all position, but the situation
could change very rapidly.
2. As the petroleum industry expands, however, the
strength and influence of the small Communist-oriented Feder-
ation of Petroleum Workers (GEDEPETROL) could increase.
* Pro-Communist
**Non-Communist
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1. Total labor force : 400,000
2. Organized 20,000 (c. 5 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 4,000 (20 percent)
B. List of Major Unions Membership Orientation
(z ousands)
Costa Rican Confederation of 6 *N-C. ICFTU
Democratic Workers (CCTD)
General Confederation of 2.5
Workers of Costa Rica (CGTC)
Christian Worker and Peasant .2
Federation (FOCC)
National Confederation of .8
Workers (CNT)
Capital Workers Federation (PCC) 1.2
Sole Workers' Federation of the .1
Southern Pacific Zone (FUTRA)
N-C. Formerly
Peronista.
No int'l aff.
P-C. No
intl. aff.
1. Communist unions have not attempted to disrupt the
government but have been expanding their organizational efforts
while non-Communist oriented groups have been inactive in an
organizational sense for two or three years. Communists have
recently organized the 700-member National Association of Trans-
port Workers and several campesino organizations.
2. The relatively weak WFTU-affiliated CGTC serves as a
useful propaganda arm of the illegal Partido Vanguardia Popular
(PVP), the Communist Party. The CGTC faithfully follows the
Moscow line on international issues and has attempted to form
a united labor front, issuing repeated calls for cooperation in
achieving goals vital to labor--such as job protection for
unionists. These efforts, largely aimed at the CLASC affiliate,
have not prospered.
* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
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1. Total labor force 1.3 million
2. Organized : 156,000 (12 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 23,000 (c.15 percent)
B. List of Major Unions Membership Orientation
Thousands)
Autonomous Confederation of 30 *N-C.
Christian Unions (CASC)
National Confederation of 30 ORIT affiliate
Free Workers (CONATRAL)
National Confederation of 5 **P-C.
Workers (FOUPSA-CESITRADO)
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. The Communists made significant gains in the labor
movement in the wake of the 1965 revolt. The provisional gov-
ernment of Garcia Godoy, besieged with many problems, took a
hands-off attitude toward labor, and CONATRAL lost support be-
cause of its backing of US policy during the revolt. The Com-
munists quickly adopted strong-arm tactics and took advantage
of CONATRAL bungling to take over unions that had formerly
been linked to this confederation. In addition, the Commu-
nists used such classic tactics as delaying meetings for hours
before voting, attempting to discredit existing leaders by
implying corruption, and confusing the issues.
2. The Communists have recently put a considerable amount
of work into political activities. In December 1965, and in
January and February 1966, they were in the forefront of
strikes designed to attack the military leadership and support
Garcia Godoy in his effort to effect military command changes.
In December 1966, however, they failed miserably in an attempt
to confront Balaguer with a general strike over the Christmas
bonus issue.
* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
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3. At the present time, the Communists are a signifi-
cant nuisance but not a major threat in the Dominican labor
movement. They are not strong enough in terms of unions,
finance, and leadership to challenge the government. Fur-
thermore, because of their predominance in government-con-
trolled sectors of the economy, they are also vulnerable to
government counteraction. As was demonstrated many times
under the provisional government and again in December 1966,
the Communists need to enter into a working alliance with
CASC and Dominican Revolutionary Party labor groups to be
effective and to pose a problem for the government.
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1. Total labor force
: 2.2 million (c. 900,000 are
wage and salary earners)
2. Organized : 108,000
(a) Communist influenced: 16,000
(c.12 percent)
(c.15 percent)
B. List of Major Unions
Membership
Orientation
TThousa nas )
Confederation of Ecuado-
rean Workers (CTE)
60
*P-C.
WFTU
Ecuadorean Confederation
of Christian Workers
(CEDOC)
12
**N-C.
CISC
Social Christian Peasant
Federation (FCSC)
N-C.
CISC
Ecuadorean Confederation of
Free Trade Union Organiza-
tions (CEOSL)
20
N-C.
ICFTU
National Federation of Tele-
3
N-C.
ITS-Postal,
communications Workers of
Telegraph, and Tele-
Ecuador (FENETEL)
phone Int'l.
Union for Railroad Workers
Action and Betterment (SAMF)
3.2
N-C.
National Union of Educators
(UNE)
8.5
N-C.
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. The Communists have lost influence in Ecuadorean labor
in recent months in part because the hard-line and the Moscow-
line groups are fighting for control of the CTE, the largest
* Pro-Communist
**Non-Communist
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labor federation. The Moscow group won control of the
CTE directorate at the congress in December 1966. In
the fight, the CTS has lost influence and is now relying
heavily on its campesino affiliates. In August 1966, the
largest union in Ecuador, that of the chauffeurs, pulled
out of the federation, leaving it, for all practical pur-
poses, only a facade.
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1. Total labor force
2. Organized
: 1 million
: 30,000 (c. 3 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 7,500 (25 percent)
B. Lists of Major Unions
Membership
Orientation
(
ousan s
General Confederation
Trade Unions (CGS)
of
15
*N-C.
Salvadoran Labor Unity
6
**P-C.
Federation (FUSS)
National Union of Christian .2 N-C CLASC Affiliate
Workers (UNOC)
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. The inhospitable atmosphere in which the trade union
movement came into being in El Salvador--mostly during the
dictatorship of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martines (1931-
1944)--forced it to remain clandestine and made it an easy target
for Communist domination. Beginning around 1950, the labor
movement was allowed more freedom to operate and was granted
more legal protection. Since that time, the movement, although
still weak, has attained a degree of respectability and has, for
the most part, produced responsible leaders. The Communists--
discredited by their complicity in the peasant uprising of 1932
and by their activities--have been unable to regain their
earlier leadership.
2. The most recent attempt by the Communists to gain
control of the entire labor movement occurred in 1965 when they
invited the CGS to attend a conference aimed at "strengthening
the social security system." Representatives of the CGS joined
in the discussion, but the FUSS was unable to interest them in
any form of permanent or continuing association. It is unlikely
that the Communists will be able to make any successful inroads
into democratic labor as long as the government continues to
support the free trade union movement and makes an effort to
improve the living conditions of the lower economic groups.
Non-Communist
** Pro-Communist
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ANNEX X
GUATEMALA
A. Statistics
1. Total labor force 1.5 million
2. Organized 30,000 (c. 2 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: Unknown
B. List of Major Unions Membership Orientation
Thousands)
Railway Workers Union 3.6 *N-C.
(SAMF)
Other small unions
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. Labor has not been a serious source of subversion in
Guatemala since Castillo Armas purged many labor leaders soon
after the beginning of his presidency in 1954. The most im-
portant and largest union in the country, the Railway Workers'
Union (SAMF), has been working recently toward the construction
of a democratic unified labor movement free of ties to domestic
political parties or foreign labor groups.
2. The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) has had little
success in its efforts to gain influence within the SAMF move-
ment or in SAMF itself. It has, however, apparently revived
FASGUA, The Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala,
which had been moribund for several years, and has entered
into a period of unaccustomed activity. It may have made some
progress in organizing the migrant workers in rural areas.
*Non-Communist
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ANNEX XI
GUYANA
A. Statistics
1. Total labor force
.
225,000
2. Organized .
(a) Communist influenced:
49,500 (c. 22 percent)
1,500 (c. 3 percent)
B. List of Major Unions
Membership
Orientation
(Thousands)
Guyana Trade Union Council
(GTUC )
42
*N-C.
ICFTU/ORIT
Guyana Manpower Citizens
Asso. (MPCA) (an affili-
ate of the above)
21
N-C.
ICFTU/IFPAAW
Guyana Agriculture Workers
Union (GAWU)
3
**P-C.
Rice Marketing Board Workers
1
P-C.
Union (RMBWU)
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1,. A number of small unions are loosely linked to the
Communist-oriented People's Progressive Party (PPP), which is
using its ability to provide funds in an effort to gain firmer
control over them.
2. Over the long run, because of its East Indian domina-
tion, the PPP's prospects for further penetrating the East
Indian labor unions are fairly good. It is unlikely to make
much progress among the Negroes, however, and unless strains
within the governing coalition should bring PPP leader Cheddi
Jagan back to power, its influence in the labor movement is un-
likely to increase significantly. Nevertheless, the PPP can
presently create major upheavals in the East Indian - dominated
sugar industry.
* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
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ANNEX XII
HAITI
A. Statistics
1. Total labor force 2.6 million
2. Organized Less than 1 percent
(a) Communist influenced: Insignificant
B. List of Unions Membership Orientation
Thousands)
National Union of Workers .03 *N-C. ICFTU
of Haiti in Exile (UNCH
in Exile)
Haitian Confederation of N-C.
Workers (CHT)
Federation of Workers N-C.
and Peasants of Haiti
(FOPH)
Inter-Syndical Union **P-C. Activities sus-
of Haiti (UIH) pended 12/63.
Haitian Federation of 5 N-C. CISC
Christian Trade Unions
(FHSC)
Government Labor Federa- 16 N-C.
tion
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. The Moscow-oriented Parti d'Entente Populaire (PDP) con-
trols the Front Syndical Haitien (FSH-Haitian Syndicate Front)
which may include some of the leaders and rank and file of the
Inter-Syndical Union of Haiti (UIH)--suspended in 1963. The
* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
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FSH probably has the sympathy of some influential labor
supervisors in foreign-owned industries in and around
Port-au-Prince. These supervisors could be counted on
to create disturbances if the climate for such activity
were to improve. Their influence over the rank and file
at present, however, is slight.
2. The development of any independent labor move-
ment under Duvalier is impossible, given his complete
control of all segments of society. Even when that con-
trol is removed, labor organizers will be hampered by the
indifference and illiteracy of the people, and by the
fact that over 80 percent of the population is dependent
on agriculture.
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Statistics
1. Total labor force
2. Organized
: 640,000
19,500 (c. 3 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: Insignificant
List of Major Unions
Membership
Orientation
(Thousan-d-S)
North Coast Federation of
9.4
*N.-C.
ICFTU
Workers' Unions of
Honduras (FESITRANH)
Authentic Federation of
N-C.
CISC
Honduran Unions (FASH)
Central Labor Federation
.6
N-C.
ICFTU
(FECESITLIH)
National Federation of
2.5
N-C.
No intl.
Workers and Campesinos
aff.
of Honduras (FENACH)
(defunct)
C. Current Activities and Assessment of
Communists in Labor
1. Communism in the Honduran labor movement, on the wane
in recent years, received a further setback in 1965 with the
election of pro-democratic elements to the board of directors
of the Central Labor Federation (FECESITLIH). Although there
are a few examples of Communist infiltration in some of the
smaller labor unions, total Communist influence in the Honduran
labor movement appears to be at an all-time low and generally
ineffective.
2. Communist attempts to infiltrate the campesino move-
ment in 1963 failed. The Communist-sponsored Federation of
Honduran Campesinos has since collapsed, and a new and demo-
cratic campesino organization, ANACH, has been formed in close
association with the Honduran Labor Confederation (CTH). The
Christian Democratic peasant leagues in southern Honduras appear
to have offset the possibility of a Communist-infiltrated campe-
sino movement in that area.
* Non-Communist
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1; EC
A, Statistics
1. Total labor force
2. Organized
13.8 million
2.7 million (c. 20 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: Insignificant
B, List of Major Unions
Membership
Orientation
(Thousands)
Confederation of Mexican
Workers (CTM)
1,500
*N-C.
ICFTU
Federation of Unions of
Government Workers
(FSTSE)
325
N-C.
No int'l. aff.
Revolutionary Confederation
of Mexican Workers and
Farmers (CROC)
270
N-C.
No int'l. aff.
Workers' Regional Confedera-
135
N-C.
Formerly was
tion of Mexico (CROM)
Peronista member in
ATLAS.
General Confederation of
Labor (CGT)
40
N-C.
No intl. aff.
National Workers' Center
(C NT)
370
N-C.
No intl. aff..
General Union of Workers
and Farmers of Mexico
(UGOCM)
7.5
**P-C.
WFTU
Federation of Independent
27
N-C.
No int'l. aff.
Trade Unions of Nuevo
Leon (FSINL)
* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
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Industrial Union of Mine, 80 N-C. No intl. aff.
Metallurgical and re-
lated workers of the Re-
public of Mexico
Union of Railroad 100 N-C. No int'l. aff.
Workers of Mexico
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. There is not much organized Communism in Mexican labor,
but some party members are active in labor matters.
2. The most powerful labor organization in Mexico is the
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), founded by Vicente
Lombardo Toledano and associated during the 1930s and 1940s
with his Latin American labor movement and with the Communist
WFTU. Since 1950, however, it has shifted its affiliation to
the ICFTU and has become the labor arm of the governing In-
stitutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
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1, Total labor force : 500,000
2. Organized 15,000 (c. 3 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 3,000 (20 percent)
B. List of Major Unions
Membership
Orientation
(Thousands)
General Confederation of
3
*N-C.
ORIT
Labor (CGT)
ICFTU
"Illegal" General
2.8
**P-C.
No int'l aff.
Confederation of Labor
("Illegal" CGT)
United Transport Workers'
2.9
N-C.
ITS-Int'l
Federation of Nicaragua
ORIT
(FTUN)
ICFTU
Transport Workers'
Federation
Autonomous Trade Union
2.0
N-C.
CISC
Movement
CLASC
National Confederation of
2
N-C.
ORIT
Democratic Workers (CNTD)
ICFTU
Workers and Peasants;
2.8
N-C.
ORIf
Federation of Nicaragua
ICFTU
(FOCN)
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. Communists have recently formed several peasant organ-
izations in Nicaragua. These organizations have not yet become
active, however, and are not likely to make any progress in the
near future.
* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
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2. Communist involvement in labor has been growing
weaker since 1964 as democratic international groups have as-
sisted their affiliates to become stronger. Communist potential
for the future is slight, especially as long as the Somoza dy-
nasty endures.
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ANNEX XVI
PANAMA
A. Statistics
1. Total labor force
360,000
2. Organized : 18,000 (c. 5 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 11000 (c. 6 percent)
B List of Major Unions
Membership
Orientation
Thousands)
Confederation of Workers
4.5
*N-C.
ICFTU
of the Republic of
Panama (CTRP)
Trade Union Federation of
.2
**P-C.
WFTU
Workers of the Republic
of Panama (FSTRP)
Isthmian Federation of
3
N-C.
CISC
Christian Workers (FITC)
General Confederation of
Labor of Panama (CGTP)
N-C.
ITS-Int'l.
Union
Allied
of Food and
Workers'
Associations
General Union of the Re-
public of Panama (UCTRP)
.4
N-C.
No int'l. aff.
Panamaian Syndical Action
(ASP)
N-C.
CISC
Federation of Workers of
1.8
N-C.
No int'l. aff.
the North Zone of the
Republic of Panama
* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
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C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. The FSTRP is the labor arm of the Moscow-oriented
Peoples Party (PDP). There have been indications that the
FSTRP has agreed to accept the support of Peking-line Com-
munists, but this group is so disorganized that its support
would be insignificant. The FSTRP is affiliated with the
Communist-controlled Confederation of Workers of Latin
America (CTAL) and with the WFTU.
2. The Communists are having difficulties within the
labor movement and their influence has been steadily declin-
ing in recent years. During the riots of January 1964, de-
spite a concerted effort, the FSTRP was unable to muster labor
forces in Panama City into a solid front to participate in
the violence. The Communists will certainly try to exploit
individual areas of labor instability or socioeconomic ten-
sions, and to identify with other groups engaged in antigov-
ernment activities. However, their chance of success is
slim.
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ANNEX XVII
PARAGUAY
A. Statistics
1. Total labor force
2. Organized
. 600,000
30,000 (c. 5 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: Insignificant
B. List of Major Unions
Membership
Orientation
Thousands)
Confederation of Paraguayan
Workers (CPT)
Confederation of Paraguayan
30
*N-C.
No int'l. aff.
Workers in Exile
N-C.
ICFTU
Christian Confederation of
Workers (CGT)
0.3
N-C.
CISC
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. For all practical purposes there is no Communist pene-
tration of what poses as a labor movement in Paraguay. The
Communist Party has fewer than 500 members inside the country
and most of these are not particularly active. The Stroessner
government is strongly anti-Communist, keeps close tabs on
Communist activity, and would quickly end any efforts to in-
fluence the CPT or the member unions.
*Non-Communist
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1. Total labor force : 3.1 million
2. Organized : 1.4 million (c. 45 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 170,000 (c 12 percent)
B. List of Major Unions Membership Orientation
(Thousands
Peruvian Confederation 500 *N-C. ICFTU
of Labor (CTP)
Christian Trade Movement 30 N-C. CISC
of Peru (MOSICP)
Executive Committee for the 22.5 **P-C. No int'l aff.
Reorganization and Unifi-
cation of the Peruvian
Confederation of Labor
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communism in Labor
1. The greater part of the Peruvian labor movement, united in
the Peruvian Confederation of Labor (CTP), has been politically
linked to APRA, a leftist, non-Communist party. Its dominance has
not gone unchallenged, however, and conflicts with opponents have
had a disruptive and far-reaching effect on labor union develop-
ment. Anti-APRA governments have traditionally worked with the
Communists against the Apristas. The most recent example is the
entrance of President Belaunde's Popular Action Party (AP) and
the Christian Labor Movement (MOSCIP) into the contest. The
result has been an intensification of political involvement and
factionalism among the various labor groups, which has benefited
the Communists.
Non= ommunis -
**Pro-Communist
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2. The present Communist goal is the establishment of a
new labor confederation to rival the CTP. 25X1
The
US Embassy sees a serious possibility o co a ora ion in this
endeavor between the Communists and certain leftist AP leaders,
which would constitute a greater danger to democratic labor
forces in Peru than earlier attempts to create a rival labor
confederation 1962-1963.
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1. Total labor force 1 million
2. Organized 280,000 (c. 28 percent)
(a) Communist influenced: 250,000 (c. 90 percent)
B. List of Major Membership Orientation
Confederations (Thousands)
Confederation of Uru- 10 *N-C. ICFTU (defunct)
guayan Trade Unions
(CSU)
Autonomous Union Front 8 N-C. No intl. aff.
(FAS) (inactive)
Christian Trade Union 2 N-C. CISC (ICFTU)
Movement of Uruguay
(ASU)
National Workers' Con- 200 **P-C. No intl. aff.
vention
C. Current Activities and Assessment of Communists in Labor
1. Until late in 1965 the Communists followed a policy of
keeping labor militancy within acceptable bounds in order not
to provoke repressive governmental measures. They then changed
to a policy of violent and general strikes which were designed
to encourage worker discontent with the government, and to es-
tablish the Communists as champions of the people.
2. At the present time, the party is not trying to organ-
ize any major labor agitation, but is continuing to exploit
worker grievances. Action may be stepped up again following
the inauguration of the new government in March.
* Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
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3. The Communists are'extremely powerful in the labor
movement and their potential is great. They are skillful,
well financed, have a deteriorating economic situation to
work with, and have a tremendous lead over any democratic
organization. Only strong, decisive government action could
limit the strong influence of this major leftist segment of
society.
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(a) Communist influenced: 225,000
B. List of Major Unions
Membership
(Thoouusands
Confederation of Venezuela
Workers
1,300
Sole Central of Workers of
Venezuela (CUTV)
100
Central Committee of
Christian Trade
Unionists (CUSIC)
20
Society of Letter Carriers
5
(c. 15 percent)
Orientation
*N-C. ICFTU
**N-C. Not legally
recognized.
WFTU
N-C.
N-C. Government em-
of Venezuela (SCV)* ployees are not
permitted to join
or form trade
unions and there-
fore form associa-
tions.
ITS-Postal, Tel.
& Tel. Int'1.
1. The Venezuelan labor movement is one of the healthiest in
Latin America. It has benefited somewhat from AID and ORIT pro-
grams, and the governing Democratic Action Party has promoted
the development of organized labor.
Non-Communist
**Pro-Communist
1. Total labor force : 2.8 million
2. Organized : 1.5 million (c. 54 percent)
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2. Labor is dominated by the Confederation of Workers
of Venezuela (CTV), which is heavily influenced by the labor-
oriented government party. Therefore, the Communists have not
been able to exert much influence. Barring a complete change
in the current Venezuelan situation (e.g., a military dictator-
ship), it is not likely that the Communists will make significant
inroads.
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1 February 1967
Talking Paper for the memorandum,
"Communist Influence in. Latin. American. Labor"
1. The memorandum focuses on. the extent of Commu-
nist influence in Latin American labor today; it also
gives some of the historical background and the tactics
employed over the years by the Communists in the hemi-
sphere.
We believe a in-
dividual country annexes will provide a particularly
useful research aid to future studies on labor in Latin.
America as well as proving generally enlightening to our
consumers, especially those making preparations for a
possible presidential "summit" meeting later this year.
3 ,.The memorandum was coordinated with ONE, ORR,
we recommended that it receive normal dissem-
r ,.~ r"T
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