AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010036-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: February 16, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(THROUGH 16 FEBRUARY 1961)
FEBRUARY 1967
S-2081/AP-4
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 16 FEBRUARY 1967
FOREWORD
This report is prepared on a monthly
basis at the request of the Secretary of
Defense for an evaluation of certain
effects of the ROLLING THUNDER program.
The report covers three general areas of
concern: Effects on Military Targets;
Leadership and Public Reactions; and
Effects on theNVN Economy. The dis-
cussion of political effects is limited
to those developments within North Vietnam
which relate to Hanoi's attitude toward
continuing the war and the effects the
ROLLING THUNDER attack has on civilian
morale in North Vietnam.
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1w "W
I ? DIEN BIpN PHU
NINH BINH,
VNG PHONG TH NG
THANH HOAR
CO DINH ? ~,
DONG DANE
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NORTH VIETNAM
BOMBING APPRAISAL OF
NORTH VIETNAM
16 FEB 67
~ LAN6.ON
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 16 FEBRUARY 1967
SUMMARY
1. The preponderance of air strikes against North
Vietnam during the reporting period continued to be against lines
of communications (LOCs). Rail lines suffered severe although
temporary damage and damage to watercraft increased. Inclement
weather hampered the air interdiction effort during most of January.
2. All railroad lines were attacked during the
reporting period with the exception of the line from Hanoi to
Haiphong. But despite the increased level of damage inflicted on
the North Vietnamese rail system during January, all of the major
lines are now open for at least limited through service. The North
Vietnamese are also constructing an increasing number of bypasses
for rail yards to reduce the vulnerability of the rail network to
air attacks.
3? The bulk of the highway interdiction effort
continued to be against the principal roads south of the 20th
parallel. However, the effectiveness of the interdiction was
limited by the increasingly numerous bypass facilities such as
ferries or fording sites, as well as alternate roads and bridges.
As an over-all result of the relatively low level of strikes and
the stand-down during TET (Vietnamese Lunar New Year), the
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condition of the highway network probably improved slightly during
the period.
4. As a result of continued strikes again: \J teL-
borne traffic, transshipment activities have been widely dispersed
and concentrations of vessels, either in port or at sea, have been
avoided. Available coastal transport junks have been augmented by
fishing vessels and fishermen have reportedly been impressed into
coastal transport duty for six-month periods.
5. The North Vietnamese took advantage of the stand-
down of the ROLLING THUNDER program during the 96-hour TET truce
period to move substantial quantities of supplies. The daily
sightings of vessels and trucks in the area between the 17th and
19th parallels were the highest ever noted. Truck traffic moving
south into the Mu Gia Pass area during TET was the most ever
observed in a four day period. The quantities of supplies
moved during the 96-hour stand-down will significantly improve
the North Vietnamese logistics posture in the DMZ area, the
Laotian Panhandle, and eventually South Vietnam.
6. The North Vietnamese air defense system continues
to grow and consumes an increasing portion of the national military
effort. The over-all total of North Vietnamese and foreign presence
directly and indirectly engaged in air defense is currently
estimated at 120-125 thousand military personnel.
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7. The cumulative effects of the air strikes have
limited North Vietnam's capability for sustained large scale
conventional military operations against South Vietnam. Ilowever,
the North Vietnamese still retain the capability to support
activities in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased
combat levels and force structures.
8. The North Vietnamese leadership's desire to get
the US bombing program halted was reflected during the past month
in an intensified propaganda and diplomatic campaign. However,
the North Vietnamese offered no indication that they would make
any reciprocal military deescalation in return for a bombing
exercises firm control over the populace and that the deleterious
effect of the continued bombings on popular morale has not reached
the point where it would force the regime to alter its current
policies.
Air strikes against North Vietnam during the
reporting period caused little direct economic damage, but the
cumulative effects of the bombing have continued to disrupt
portions of the economy. These cumulative effects have caused
considerable economic loss, but the Hanoi regime has been able to
adjust its economic activities to the bombing. A major factor in
maintaining the economy has been the generous economic aid furnished
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by other Communist countries.
10.I Ithe food supply in
North Vietnam may have worsened somewhat, although there ore still
no indications of critical food shortages. Rice production in
1966 is estimated to have been about 300,000 metric tons below the
annual average for recent years. Although the rice deficit will
create additional problems for the regime, it can be overcome by
increased imports of food from other Communist countries. Food
imports were unusually large in January, and
food imports will continue to be unusually heavy at least
through March.
11. Unusually large seaborne imports of POL, totaling
about 21,300 metric tons, were identified on foreign ships calling
at North Vietnam in January, and 8,000 additional tons may have
come in. Petroleum stocks in North Vietnam as of mid-February are
estimated to be between 50,000 and 60,000 metric tons -- equivalent
to between 90 and 110 days of supply. An estimated 1,100 metric
tons of POL storage capacity was destroyed by air strikes at
Ha Gia during the reporting period.
12. Although seaborne imports of food and petroleum
were high, imports of miscellaneous and general cargoes were
relatively low in January. Exports of coal and cement continued
to lag below normal levels and there continued to be no shipments
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13. Cumulative measurable damage to economic and
military facilities and equipment in North Vietnam inflicLud by
air strikes during 1965-1966 and January 1967 is estimated at $215
million. In addition to these costs, there continue to be many
other losses to the economy and to the military establishment
which cannot be assigned meaningful values.
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Effects on Military Targets
1. The preponderance of air strikes against North
Vietnam during the reporting period continued to be against lines
of communications (LOCs). Total strikes against highway targets
decreased, while strikes against watercraft and rail targets in-
creased. Rail lines suffered severe although temporary damage
and damage to watercraft increased over the previous period.
Inclement weather hampered the air interdiction effort during
most of January. The North Vietnamese again took advantage of a
complete stand-down of ROLLING THUNDER operations -- during TET --
to move substantial amounts of supplies south toward the DMZ area
and the Laotian Panhandle.
reporting period with the exception of the line from Hanoi to
Haiphong. Through service on the Hanoi-Dong Dang and Hanoi-Thai
Nguyen lines was interrupted for about two days and on the Kep-
Thai Nguyen route for approximately a week. The Thai Nguyen rail
yard was severely damaged but this had little effect on through
traffic. The rail route south from Hanoi to Vinh was the hardest
hit -- especially in the areas of Ninh Binh and Dong Phong
Thuong -- and it was probably inoperable for through rail service
for about two-thirds of the reporting period. However, it is
estimated that the line is now open for limited through traffic
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all the way to Vinh as the result of repairs made during TET.
Throughout the period through service on the Hanoi-Lao Cai line
continued to be limited by the necessity to use freight cnr.?
ferries at the site of the destroyed bridge at Viet Tri. In
addition the line was closed to all through rail traffic for
about a fourth of the period by strikes on the line between Viet
Tri and Boa Ha.
3. Thus, despite the increased level of damage in-
flicted on the North Vietnamese rail system during January, all of
the major lines are now open for at least limited through service.
The North Vietnamese are also constructing an increasing number
of bypasses for rail yards to reduce the vulnerability of the rail
network to air attacks. Several new spurs, sidings, and at least
one yard (just north of Yen Vien) are under construction.
way interdiction decreased and there was a consequent drop in the
level of damage inflicted against highway targets. The bulk of
the highway interdiction effort continued to be against the
principal roads south of the 20th parallel. Most of the road
cuts were on Routes 1A, 7, and 15. However, the effectiveness of
the interdiction was limited by the increasingly numerous bypass
facilities such as ferries or fording sites, as well as alternate
roads and bridges. As an over-all result of the relatively low
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level of strikes and the stand-down during TET, the condition of
the highway network probably improved slightly during the period.
5. Nevertheless, traffic on the roads must move
very slowly over an increasingly circuitous road network. Air
interdiction has increased the difficulty of using road transport
by creating bottlenecks. These bottlenecks are requiring trans-
shipment by ferry over major water barriers and the use of porters
around temporary major road cuts. Such cargo transfers have
reduced normal road capacities but the capacity of the road system
at the present level of interdiction is still adequate to meet
requirements.
During January there was a slight increase in the
number of watercraft sighted and struck. This activity was con-
centrated in the Red River delta and along the intracoastal route
between the 19th and 21st parallels. As a result of continued
strikes against waterborne traffic, transshipment activities have
been widely dispersed and concentrations of vessels, either in
port or at sea, have been avoided. Available coastal transport
junks have been augmented by fishing vessels and fishermen have
reportedly been impressed into coastal transport duty for six-
month periods.
7. The North Vietnamese took advantage of the stand-
down of the ROLLING THUNDER program during the 96-hour TET truce
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period to move substantial quantities of supplies. The daily
sightings of vessels and trucks in the area between the 17th and
19th parallels were the highest ever noted. The majority of the
trucks sighted were loading along the Kien Giang and Song Giang
Rivers or were moving toward the DMZ or Mu Gia Pass. Truck
traffic moving south into the Mu Gia Pass area during TET was the
most ever observed in a four day period.. In addition a section of
the tramway south of Vinh was utilized to move supplies during the
truce period. The quantities of supplies moved during the 96-hour
stand-down will significantly improve the North Vietnamese logistics
posture in the DMZ area, the Laotian Panhandle, and eventually
South Vietnam.
system in North Vietnam, it remains able to adequately support the
civilian economy, air defense requirements, and the insurgency in
South Vietnam and Laos. However, the North Vietnamese apparently
have been forced to place much more reliance on primitive forms of
transport, and there undoubtedly are periodic delays in the receipt
of goods. The relentless mangling of the facilities and equipment
of railroads, roads, and watercraft in the area south of Thanh Hoa
has not been sufficient to reduce capacity below the small. require-
ments for traffic in this region. The countermeasures taken by
the North Vietnamese have been costly in time and effort, but have
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been effective. The air strikes against transportation in the
economically more important parts of the country, including the
principal routes to China, have not been sufficiently sustained to
erode the transport capacity below the volume needed to support the
economy and to move economic and military aid. Moreover, aid from
other Communist countries has made it possible for North Vietnam
generally to maintain inventories of transport equipment in spite
of the substantial destruction and damage inflicted on equipment by
the air strikes. There is no evidence that the Cultural Revolution
in Communist China has disrupted Soviet economic or military aid
shipments to North Vietnam by rail.
9. The North Vietnamese air defense system continues
to grow and consumes an increasing portion of the national military
effort. It is estimated that 83,000 or about 20 per cent of North
Vietnam's active military strength is directly engaged in air
defense. An additional 27,500 personnel are indirectly involved.
In addition about 10-14,000 foreign personnel are supporting the
North Vietnamese air defense system. The over-all total of North
Vietnamese and foreign presence directly and indirectly engaged
in air defense is currently estimated at 120-125 thousand
military personnel.
10. The cumulative effects of the air strikes have
limited North Vietnam's capability for sustained large scale
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conventional military operations against South Vietnam. However,
the North Vietnamese still retain the capability to support
activities in South Vietnam and Laos at present or incres.sea
combat levels and force structures.
Leadership and Public Reactions
11. The North Vietnamese leadership's desire to get
the US bombing program halted was reflected during the past month
in an intensified propaganda and diplomatic campaign. Hanoi
radio on 28 January quoted a statement by the North Vietnamese.
Foreign Minister to pro-Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett
that if the US stopped the bombings unilaterally and for good
there "could" be "talks." In pushing this line, however, the
North Vietnamese offered no indication that they would make any
reciprocal military deescalation in return for a bombing halt. At
the same time, regime propaganda played up the theme that the US
was deliberately bombing civilian targets and used this line to
try to heighten international pressure on the US for a halt in
the air strikes.
12. There continue to be no signs from within North
Vietnam that the bombing raids are creating any insurmountable
problems for the regime. All evidence continues to indicate that
the leadership exercises firm control over the populace and that
the deleterious effect of the continued bombings on popular morale
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has not reached the point where it would force the regime to alter
its current policies. The leadership has continued to emphasize
that the road ahead in the struggle against the US will be long
and hard but that it will eventually lead to victory. During the
TET period, for example, the regime called upon the populace to
put aside holiday celebrations and to work with "vigilance and
vigor" to further projects connected with the war effort.
Effects on the Economy
13. Air strikes against North Vietnam during the
reporting period caused little direct economic damage, but the
cumulative effects of the bombing have continued to disrupt
portions of the economy. These cumulative effects have caused
considerable economic loss, but the Hanoi regime has been able to
adjust its economic activities to the bombing. The dispersal of
some industry, problems in management, and reallocations of man-
power are creating difficulties. However, North Vietnam continues
to negotiate with other Communist countries for additional
industrial plants. A major factor in maintaining the economy has
been the generous economic aid furnished by other Communist
countries. Economic aid to North Vietnam amounted to $150 million*
in 1965 and
275 million in 1966 compared with $75 million in 1964.
14.I Ithe food supply in
North Vietnam may have worsened somewhat, although there are still
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no indications of critical food shortages. Rice production in
1966 is estimated to have been about 300,000 metric tons below
the annual average for the past several years of about 2.5 million
metric tons. The 1966 short-fall resulted from a combination of
poor planning and lack of coordination and declining labor
productivity -- both caused, at least in part, from the disruptions
of the bombing -- and adverse weather conditions. Temporary short-
ages of labor which normally occur during peak workloads in the
crop cycle undoubtedly have been intensified by the drawing off of
some men for new construction, repair activities, civil defense,
and military duties. The manpower drain has been only partially
relieved by the greater use of women. Although the rice deficit
will create additional problems for the regime, it can be overcome
by increased imports of food from other Communist countries and/or
by substituting other domestically produced foods for rice.
Identified seaborne imports of bulk foodstuffs, consisting mainly
of wheat flour, corn, and rice, totaled 23,800 metric tons in
January, compared with an average monthly volume of 6,400 metric tons
in 1966. This volume was unusually large for a January, and there
are indications that food imports will continue to be unusually
heavy at least through March.
15. In spite of the bombing, North Vietnam is still
showing signs of expanding its industrial base with the help of
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the other Communist countries. The most recent area of intended
expansion is food-processing, but investment in other industrial
projects also continues to be considered. Hungary has recently
agreed to construct several small food-processing plants -- one
for rice flour and corn meal and two for the production of
vegetable oil. North Vietnam also recently requested Hungary to
construct about 15 plants for the manufacture of jars, plastic
containers, and packing materials for processed foods. Other
industrial projects being negotiated include the expansion of the
Tinh Tuc Tin Mine and its processing plant, which will provide
additional exports to earn badly needed foreign exchange.
electric power facilities during January, and the estimate of
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generating capacity out of operation remains at 59,000 kilowatts,
about one-third of the total national capacity. The continued
presence of Soviet engineers at the Uong Bi Power Plant suggests
that salvage or possible restoration work is in progress. However,
it is estimated that an additional six to eight months would be
necessary to even partially repair the heavy damage inflicted in
August 1966. Recent aerial photography of the Co Dinh Power Plant,
restruck in November 1966, confirms that it is almost completely
destroyed. The plant was not in operation at the time of the re-
strike and no attempt had been made to repair the damage inflicted
in mid-1965.
There is no evidence that the loss of petroleum
or petroleum storage facilities has weakened seriously the economy
of North Vietnam. Unusually large amounts of seaborne imports of
POL, totaling about 21,300 metric tons, were identified on foreign
ships calling at North Vietnam in January. A possible additional
8,000 metric tons of POL may have been imported in January, which
if confirmed would bring the month's imports by sea to the highest
level since May 1966. In the first half of February, 7,600 metric
tons of petroleum arrived by sea. Petroleum stocks in North
Vietnam as of mid-February are estimated to be between 50,000
and 60,000 metric tons* -- equivalent to between 90 and 110 days
* Excluding the unconfirmed 8,000 metric tons reported for January.
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of supply. An estimated 1,100 metric tons of storage capacity were
destroyed by air strikes at Ha Gia during the reporting period.
19. Although seaborne imports of food and petroleum
were high, imports of miscellaneous and general cargoes were
relatively low in January, totaling 18,800 metric tons compared
with an average monthly volume of 34,700 metric tons in 1966. These
imports included rolled steel, generators, tractors, barges, paper,
and textiles from the USSR, and 3,000 metric tons of coking coal
from China. No new direct effects of the bombing program on
seaborne exports were noted in January, but exports of coal and
cement continued to lag below normal levels and there continued to
be no shipments of apatite by sea. A ship apparently loaded coal
for export at Haiphong in January, indicating that the mine at
Vang Danh, located north of Port Redon, probably has become opera-
tional. This mine was restored with Soviet aid. Port Redon is
considerably closer to Haiphong than Hon Gay, which has been the
principal source of coal used in the Haiphong area. With the Vang
Danh mine operating, fewer barges will be needed to meet Haiphong's
requirements.
20. Cumulative measurable damage to economic and
military facilities and equipment in North Vietnam inflicted by
air strikes during 1965-1966 and January 1967 is estimated at
$215 million. (See Tab B). Much of the increase in the cost over
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the previous reporting period results from recent additional
information on damage that had been inflicted during 1966. Of the
total damage, about
70 million resulted from air strikes during
1965 about $130 million from air strikes in 1966, and about
million from air strikes in January 1967. In addition to these
costs, there continue to be many other losses to the economy and
to the military establishment which cannot be assigned meaningful
values.
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TABLE 360
RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS a/ THRU 11 FEBRUARY 1967
Targets
National c/ JCS d/
Capacity Targeted
(X 1000) No(*) %
Barracks 443 men
Ammo Depots 112.6 iv
POL Storage * 133.
Supply Depots 10550 SQFT
Power Plants -177 KW
Maritime Ports 7. ST/DY
Railroad Yards 33.7 ST/DY
Explosive Plant 1 MT
Airfields 23
Naval Bases 15
Bridges 1,234
Comoro Install 45
Radar Sites 160
SAM Sites 134
Locks & Dams 91
Ferries 34
65
41.08
46
1
100
13
13
100
13
27
0.77
1
20
94-5
8
95
4
8 7
3
1
100
1
11
4
5
3
61
48
5
2
5
5
58
8
2
11
25.5 243 2441 23.04
72.2 53 1157 69.3
100 7 6 657 2.
18 5 649 13.
46.6 34 283 30.3
44 27 235 1 .2
5 31 294 17-0
100 3 28 71
19d/ 12 359 19
42d/ 20 219 19.5
280 2745 49.4(of those tgtd)
2 15 20
73 430 42.9
112 388
10.6 2
Total Sorties: 10,164 Results f/
*JCS targets only; does not
Armed Recce Sorties
Destroyed
Damaged
include dispersed storage.
99,457 Vessels.
4451
8233
Vehicles
2548
2377
RR Stock
1508
1859
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined as more accurate
information becomes available.
b/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this
summary assigned to principal target.
c/ National capacity in 1,000's where measurement shown.
d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
Per cent inactive due to dismantling or abandonment of facilities as a result of air
strikes.
() These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and
struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets. (i.e., barracks,
supply and ammo depots).
NOTE: For comparative purposes.
US world-wide ammo storage capacity is 6,936,000 metric tons (CONUS 5,719,000 MT).
US world-wide military POL storage capacity is 15,452,000 MT; national US commercial
capacity is 151,325,000 MT; approximate average $ value of 1 MT of POL products is $28.
US world-wide military supply depot covered storage space is 137,100,000 sq. ft.
(CONUS 121,300,000 sq. ft.).
Total kilowatt capacity of power plants serving metropolitan areas: New York - 7.6
million; Chicago - 6 million; Washington (DC and Md/suburbs only) - 2.4 million.
f/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked and road and rail cuts made.
TAB A 25X1
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Targets % Of Nationalg/
Struck b/ Capacity
d/ - Destroyed or in-
No. e/ Strike active because
No(*) % Attacks Sorties of air strikes.
 Economic Facilities and Equipment
Direct Losses Million US $
Railroad/Highway Bridges 22.4 a/b/
Transportation Equipment 36.41- cr
Electric Power Plants 12.5
Petroleum 6.9 a/
Manufacturing Facilities 2.1
Railroad Yards 2.0 a/
Maritime Ports 1.5
Value of Damage to Economic and Military Facilities and
Equipment Attacked Under The ROLLING THUNDER Program
1965-1966 and January 1967
Miscellaneous Armed
Reconnaissance
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Subtotal, Direct Losses 85.1
Exports 16.7
Agriculture e/ 25.5
Fishing 5.0
Subtotal, Indirect Losses 47.2
Total, Direct and Indirect 132.3
Military Facilities and Equipment
Direct Losses Million US $
Barracks 17.9 a/
Ammunition Depots 4.7
Supply Depots 3.6
Airfields O,4
Radar and Communications
Sites 2.8 d/
SAM Sites 7.9 a~
Naval Bases 1.6
Aircraft 30.3
Naval Craft 8.1
Miscellaneous Armed
Reconnaissance 5.2
Total, Direct 82.5
Total
Million US $
Economic 132
Military 83
a. Estimate is incomplete because of inadequate post-strike photography.
b. Of the total, $3.3 million is estimated to have been expended to date
on the repair of damaged and destroyed bridges and $19.1 million is estimated
for complete restoration in the future of bridges damaged or destroyed. In
addition, $1.2 million would be required to make temporary repairs to presently
unrepaired bridges. Contrary to the methodology used in the previous appraisals,
the latter estimate has been excluded from the total because there is no
assurance that temporary repairs will be undertaken on all the remaining un-
repaired bridges. As a result, the total is slightly less than the figure
reported last month.
c. Excluding the cost of trucks destroyed and damaged in Laos and water-
craft destroyed and damaged by US naval operations along the coast of southern
North Vietnam.
d. Including only JCS-targeted radar and communications sites. The
estimated cost of radar destroyed by armed reconnaissance air strikes has been
transferred to the cost given for "Miscellaneous Armed Reconnaissance."
e. It should be noted that losses of agricultural crops are arbitrarily
attributed entirely to the indirect effects of the bombing. An unknown part
of these losses is in fact due to weather and other natural causes.
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DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THE WHITE HOUSE:
Vice President
Gen Maxwell Taylor
Mr. Bromley Smith
1 Cy
1 Cy
5 Cys
DEFENSE:
SECDEF 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (PA) 1 Cy
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 1 Cy
TREASURY (Secretary) 1 Cy
USIA 1 Cy
AID 1 Cy
NASA 1 Cy
NSA 5 Cys
STATE 18 Cys
AEC 1 Cy
FBI 1 Cy
NIC 1 Cy
ACDA 1 Cy
CHAIRMAN, JCS 1 Cy
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF 1 Cy
J-1 1 Cy
J-3 2 Cys
j-4 1 Cy
J-5 1 Cy
J-6 1 Cy
SACSA 1 Cy
NMCC 3 Cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF
DCSOPS
ACSFOR
ACSI
ACSI-CI
ACSI-Eastern
STAG
2 Cys
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010036-9
 Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010036-9
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
DNI
OP- 921E
OP-922Y1
OP-922Y2
OP-92B1
2 Cys
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
AIR FORCE:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
ACS,I/USAF 1 Cy
AFNINDE 6 Cys
AFNIEBB 1 Cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation) 1 Cy
AUL (Air Univ Library) 1 Cy
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT 1 Cy
G-2 1 Cy
CINCPAC 2 Cys
CINCPACAF 1 Cy
CINCUSARPAC 1 Cy
CINCPACFLT 1 Cy
COMUSMACV 2 Cys
7AF 2 Cys
COMSEVENTHFLT 1 Cy
COMATKCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFUT (CTF 77) 1 Cy
CINCLANT 1 Cy
CINCSTRIKE 1 Cy
CINCSAC 1 Cy
SAC 544 1 Cy
CINCTAC 1 Cy
AFSTRIKE 1 Cy
CONTIC 1 Cy
CINCALCOM 1 Cy
CINCEUR 1 Cy
CINCUSAREUR 1 Cy
CINCUSAFE 1 Cy
CINCNAVEUR 1 Cy
CINCCONAD 1 Cy
CIA 125 Cys
Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010036-9
 Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010036-9
DIADR
DIADD
DIASC-1
JS
C0-2C
AP
AP-2
AP-2C2
AP-2D1
AP-2D2
AP- 3
AP- 4
AP-1+A
AP-4A2 (Pent)
AP-4A2 (AHaS )
AP-4B4
AP-1+C
AP-7
AP-8
XX
JT
1. Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
10 Cys
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
6 Cys
4 Cys
2 Cys
3 Cys
2 Cys
2 Cys
1 Cy
1 Cy
Approved For Release 2009/03/12 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010036-9
25X1