THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM AND ENEMY COUNTERMEASURES 1 JANUARY 1966 - 30 APRIL 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010057-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 101
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 57
• Content Type: REPORT

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JCS review
completed.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
AND ENEMY COUNTERMEASURES
NGA Review Completed 1 January 1966 - 30 April 1967
USAF review(s)
completed.
Summarj
The Rolling Thunder program has made some
progress in meeting its current two-fold objective:
(1) 1 To limit, or raise, the cost of sending
men and supplies to South Vietnam.
(2) To make North Vietnam pay a price for
its aggression against the South.
The recent expansion of the bombing pro-
gram has had some positive effects relative
to these objectives, particularly in the modern
sector of the North Vietnamese economy. Increased.
disruptions to orderly economic activity and sus-
tained pressures on North Vietnam's limited human
and material resources are evident. The damage to
economic and military target systems has not been
sufficient, however, to cause a meaningful degrada-
tion of North Vietnam's ability to support the war,
at least at current levels of combat. There are
no signs that the determination of the regime to
persist in its aggression has abated; despite in-
creasing hardships, popular morale has not eroded
to the point where widespread apathy and war wear-
iness are threatening the control of the Hanoi regime.
NSA review completed
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The bombing program has forced North Vietnam
to divert from 575,000 to 700,000 individuals, about
equally divided between full-time and part-time
workers and troops, to air defense activities and
to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs.
.The cost of physical and military damage has been
growing. Total damage resulting from air attacks
!through April 1967 is estimated at over $233 mil-
lion. More than 70 percent of this damage was in-
flicted on economic target systems.
Despite the increasing costs and burdens result-
ing from the air attacks, North Vietnam, aided by
an increased flow of.imports from the USSR and Communist.
China has managed to maintain, and in many respects to
improve, its organized support of the war. The
electric power industry has been the most heavily
damaged sector of the economy, and its neutraliza-
tion may paralyze almost all of the modern indus-
trial sector. However, the modern sector makes
only a marginal contribution to the war effort since
virtually all war--supporting materiel is imported.
Other important targets which have been subjected
to heavy attack --?- particularly transportation and
petroleum storage facilities -- have successfully
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employed countermeasures so that their overall per-
formance and support capabilities remain as high
as, if not higher than, they were when the bomb-
ing programs started.
The attacks on military target systems through
April 1967 had not significantly reduced the capa-
bilities of the military establishment. These capa-
bilities have, in fact, been greatly expanded through
large infusions of military aid from the USSR and
Communist China.
The ability of North Vietnam to withstand the
pressures of air attacks is explained by several
factors. The economy is essentially agrarian and
provides little direct input, other than manpower,
into the war in the South. The increasing flow
of essential economic and military aid into North
Vietnam far surpasses the total damage resulting
from air attacks. This aid provides North Vietnam
the necessary materials to continue the war; it also
implies that the USSR and Communist China will un-
derwrite the damage sustained and the eventual re-
construction of the country, as they did in the
case of North Korea. Finally, the North Vietnam-
ese have devised and employed an elaborate and
highly successful system of countermeasures -- dis-
persal of industry, mobilization of labor units,
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evacuation of population and the like -- which
negates most of the desired impact of air attack
-on the vital flow of men and supplies to the war
in the South.
The results to be expected from a further ex-
pansion of the bombing program, with the possible
exception of a mining program, are limited, ruling
out for humanitarian reasons attacks on dikes or
population centers. Experience indicates that the
remaining land transportation targets will be extremely
difficult and costly to interdict. The few lucrative
economic targets remaining do not make a significant
contribution to the war effort, and their loss can
be compensated by additional foreign aid. The neu-
tralization of the remaining military targets, such
as airfields, SAM sites, and radars, would reduce
losses to US aircraft but would have virtually no
effect on the ability of Hanoi to support the war
in the South.
There seems, in summary, to be no politically
feasible bombing program which would create suffi-
cient pressures or problems to prevent Hanoi from
sustaining the flow of essential military materials
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and continuing its support of the war in the South.
The mining of Haiphong and other ports would, however,
give promise of imposing greater hardships on North
Vietnam and of raising further the cost of sustain-
ing the insurgency than would other alternatives.
Virtually all of the remaining economic targets
are concentrated in densely populated and heavily
defended areas of North Vietnam. Their neutraliza-
.tion could be very costly to US air forces. The
recent attacks on targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong
area indicate, for example, that the combat loss
rate for US aircraft could be as much as 10 times
greater than that experienced in the air campaigns
over other areas of North Vietnam.
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I. Physical Effects
A. General
The extension of the Rolling Thunder program
during 1967 to include attacks against major indus-
trial facilities in former' sanctuaryareas, and
against important military targets such as airfields,
a
has given new dimensions to the nature of US air
operations. However, the program remains prepon-
derantly an interdiction campaign against lines of
communication and logistic targets of opportunity
in the southern part of the country.
The changed scope of the bombing program
has been sufficient to erode significantly North
Vietnam's limited industrial and military base. The
increased damage inflicted on North Vietnam undoubt-
edly will have unfavorable repercussions, particu-
larly in the modern industrial sector of the economy.
Many of the achievements of a decade of industrial
growth have been neutralized, if not lost. Programs
for orderly economic development have been forgone.
The allocation of limited human and material re-
sources has been a particularly disruptive problem.
The cumulative measurable. damage to economic and
military target systems through April 1967 is esti-
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mated at over $233 million.* Over 70 percent of the'
cumulative damage has been inflicted on economic
targets. A comparison of total measurable damage
to economic and military target systems for 1965,
1966, and January-April 1967 is as follows:
Million US $
January-April
Type of Target 1965 1966 1967
Economic 36.2 93.3 36.2
Military 32.5 19.1 16.0
Total 68.7 112.4 52.2
The cost of damage to both economic and
military target systems has increased as the US air
campaign has been directed against the more lucrative
targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North Vietnam.
Economic damage in the first four months of 1967 has
been at an average monthly rate of $9.1 million,
compared with rates of $3.6 million during 1965 and
$8.5 million during 1966. Military targets have
sustained damage at an average monthly rate of $4.0
million during January-April 1967, compared with
rates of $3.3 million during 1965 and $1.7 million
during 1966.
.*These estimates are based on bomb damage assess-
ments using post-strike photography available to this
Agency as of 7 May 1967. This photographic coverage,
with minor exceptions, includes all major targets
as of the end of April 1967.
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The estimated value of damage to"the economic
and military facilities and equipment attached under
the Rolling Thunder program through April 1967 is
as follows:
Economic Facilities and Equipment Military Facilities and Equipment
Million Million
Direct Losses
US $ Direct Lo
s
ses US $
Transportation
e~uipment
Rai road/highway
b idges
Electric powerplants
20.5 Supply de
p
ots
Manufacturing
facilities
11.8 Ammunitio
n
depots
4.9
7.4** Naval cra
f
t*
3.8
Railroad yards'and
shops
3.5 SAM sites
3.4
Maritime ports
1.4 Radar sit
e
s
2.6
Miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance
1.4 Naval bas
Airfield
Miscella
e
s
ne
s
ous armed
reconnaissance
.Subtotal, direct
losses 112.2
*Previous assessments of the value of aircraft and naval craft
damaged or destroyed by air attack were calculated on the basis of
US production costs for comparable equipment. The assessment in
this report is made on the basis of Soviet foreign trade prices
(prices charged for similar equipment sold to less developed
countries) as those most closely approximating the true value of
this equipment:.
**Midpoint of the range at $7.1 million to $7.8 million.
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Indirect Losses
Exports 20.2
Agriculture 25.5
Fishing 7.8
Subtotal, indirect
losses 53.5
Total, direct and
indirect losses 165.7 Total
Despite the rising costs inflicted by the
Rolling Thunder program, the damage to North Vietnam
has apparently been within acceptable limits, and
the regime has continued its hard-nosed stand on
negotiations. No vital part of Hanoi's military
establishment has been neutralized nor has its war-
supporting capability been significantly reduced.
With the exception of electric power generation, the
North Vietnamese have been able to devise and exe-
cute adequate countermeasures to keep most essential
economic war-supporting activity going. The loss
of electric power facilities is having unfavorable
repercussions throughout most of the modern indus-
trial sector. But modern industry does not play a
vital. part in sustaining North Vietnam's ability to
continue with the war. The USSR and Communist China
are underwriting most of the costs of the war by
providing the military the economic aid necessary
67.6
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for the defense of North Vietnam and its aggression
in the South. The North Vietnamese regime shows no
apparent weakening in either its determination or
its ability to continue with the war. Although
reports of food shortages, distribution problems,
and increasing hardships being borne by the people
are received more frequently, popular morale is
j judged not to have eroded significantly.
B. Economic Damage
1. Direct Effects
The cost of direct damage inflicted on
.economic target systems in North Vietnam through
..April 1967 is estimated at over $112 million. (For
a chart showing total damage--direct and indirect--
see Figure 1.) More than one-fourth of this damage--
$28.9 million--occurred in the first four months of
1967, as shown in the following tabulation:
Million
US $
January-April
1965 1966
1967
Damage to economic
facilities and
equipment 26.8 56.5
28.9
The emphasis on the Rolling Thunder
program as.an interdiction campaign is reflected in
the losses sustained by the several economic target
systems. More than one-fourth--$41.4 million--of
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the estimated direct damage is accounted for by
the destruction or damage of transport equipment.
Destruction or damage of railroad and highway bridges
amounts to almost $25 million. In terms of value,
the greatest amount of damage to industrial target
systems was inflicted upon the electric power in-
dustry, which lost about 70 percent of its power-
generating capacity at an estimated cost of over $20
million. The recent emphasis in attacks on modern
industrial facilities such as the Thai Nguyen iron
and steel complex and the Haiphong cement plant is
reflected in the estimates of damage to manufacturing
facilities. Direct damage to manufacturing facili-
ties is estimated at almost $12 million. More than
85 percent of this damage was inflicted during the
first four months of 1967.
The most heavily damaged target system
in terms of loss of capacity has been the petroleum
storage system, which has lost about 85 percent
of the major bulk storage facilities existing prior
to the Rolling Thunder. This loss amounted to an
estimated $7.4 million. The disruptive effects of
the loss of storage facilities have been offset by
an elaborate system of dispersed storage and distri-
bution of petroleum stocks.
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None of the remaining economic target
systems has sustained direct bomb damage to any
significant extent. The physical effects of the
direct bomb damage to each of the major economic
target systems are discussed in the following
sections.
2. Electric Power
Air strikes against- electric power fa-
cilities in North Vietnam have put out of operation
about 131,000 kilowatts of power-generating capacity,
or 70 percent of the national total. The cost of
restoration of these facilities is estimated at $20.5
million.
About 55 percent of the reduction of
capacity in the main power network, which is centered
on Hanoi and Haiphong, has resulted from attacks
during 1967. Damage to central generating facili-
ties has reduced the serviceable capacity of this
network from 136,000 kw to 32,500 kw, about .24 per-
cent of the pre-strike level. The air strikes during
January-April 1967 inflicted severe damage on power-
plants at Hon Gai (with an original capacity of
15,000 kw), Thai Nguyen (24,000 kw), and Viet Tri
(16,000 kw), Haiphong West (10,000 kw), and Haiphong
East (7,000 kw). The time required to restore partial
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operation of these plants will be a minimum of four
months, with the exception of the Haiphong East plant
which will require at least one year. Complete res-
toration in every instance will take one year or more.
Damage inflicted by two strikes on the
Dong Anh transmission substation, the most important
in the network, will prevent operation of the instal-
lation for at least two to three months. The results
of a 4 May strike on the substation are not yet known.
An additional powerplant at Bac Giang (12,000 kw),
which is outside the main power network, was put out
of operation for a minimum of three months.
Loss of the generating capacity at Hon
Gai, Viet Tri, and Thai Nguyen has eliminated the
supplementary supply of power formerly received by
Hanoi and Haiphong from the main transmission network.
The neutralization of the main power network means
that Hanoi now is dependent on one local powerplant
with a capacity of 32,500 kw, which is believed
capable of serving about one-half of its normal needs.
Haiphong is without a central power supply and must
rely on whatever mobile or stationary diesel-generat-
ing equipment that is available in addition to a
small amount that can be supplied from Hanoi for high-
priority needs.
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The degree of curtailment of electric
power supply is difficult to quantify. The loss of
generating facilities undoubtedly has created a se-
vere shortage of power and disrupted activities that
normally depend on a reliable central power supply
in addition to the small amount that can be supplied
from Hanoi for high-priority needs.
It appears almost certain that non-
essential consumption by residences, commercial
establishments, and street lighting has been elimi-
nated. Curtailment of the industrial power supply
probably has caused fragmentation of industrial
processes in some cases, and in other cases has
caused complete shutdown. The few heavy or contin-
uous-process industries, such as the Viet Tri chem-
ical and paper complex or the Haiphong cement plant,*
will probably be forced to stop operations unless
some provision for power supply has been made by the
installation of diesel-generating units larger than
those currently estimated to be available. In sev-
eral instances there is no ready substitute for the
industrial process steam formerly furnished by the
central powerplants. Industrial. or manufacturing
processes that can be divided into small segments
*This plant also sustained bomb damage in April
1967.
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(such as machine shops, truck repair facilities,
coal mining, or port loading operations) can prob-
ably be furnished sufficient power by small diesel-
generating units, but not without some loss of effi-
ciency.
There are some signs of strain and bottle-
necks in North Vietnamese attempts to rebuild damaged
power facilities. Progress in reconstruction during
1966 was largely thwarted by restrikes that took place
during the year. Repair of the Thai Nguyen power-
plant was rapidly accomplished in the latter part of
1966 after damage was inflicted in July. The Uong
Bi plant, damaged in August 1966, showed little sign
of reconstruction.in January.19.67. The Th.anh Hoa and.
Ben Thuy plants were apparently still unserviceable
in April 1967. Work on the Nam Dinh plant progressed
steadily until late 1966, and then apparently halted.
Although some of the boilers.at Nam Dinh currently
are serviceable, it is estimated that the plant still
cannot generate electricity. Reconstruction of small
plants at Co Dinh and at Ban Thach apparently has
been abandoned. The North Vietnamese seem willing
to restore damaged powerplants to partial operation
where limited damage permits equipment to be readily
salvaged. Some evidence indicates that they are
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willing to abandon plants for which a major recon-
struction effort would be required.
3. Petroleum Storage Facilities
On 1 January 1965, North Vietnam had a
combined petroleum storage capacity of about 128,000
tons* at 13 fixed facilities that were JCS-targeted.
By the end of 1966 about 85 percent of this capacity
was destroyed. There were eight air strikes against
JCS-targeted facilities during the first four months
of 1967. The only identified damage was inflicted on
i
;Son, where all of the residual capacity was de-
stroyed -- an additional one percent of the original
capacity. Damage to the Haiphong terminal as a re-
sult of an attack in April 1967 was restricted to
rail facilities and buildings in the terminal. No
.damage to tankage was observed. At the end of April
1967, therefore, a combined capacity of only about
18,000 tons, or 14 percent of the original capacity,
remained at seven JCS-targeted facilities.
The total value of the tankage, contents,
and related facilities destroyed at JCS-targeted
sites is estimated at about $6.7 million to $7.4
million. In addition, an estimated 5,000 tons of
*Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout
unless otherwise indicated.
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storage capacity -- including contents -- at dispersed
tank sites were destroyed during 1966 with a value
of about $0.4 million. Although the 55 gallon drum
inventory also has been attacked since 1965, no ade-
quate assessment of the damage inflicted can be made.
Thus the measurable damage to all petroleum facili-
ties and contents through April 1967 is estimated
at about $7.1 million to $7.8 million.
Air strikes against JCS-targeted petro-
leum facilities undoubtedly have been effective when
measured in terms of the storage capacity and petro-
leum destroyed. Although the cost and difficulty of
importing and distributing petroleum have been-in-
creased, the bombing has not effectively reduced
North Vietnam's capability to maintain petroleum
supplies. This capability stems principally from
the development of dispersed bulk oil storage ca-
pacity before extensive attacks against JCS-targeted
facilities began.
By the end of April 1967, there probably
were more than 100 dispersed petroleum storage tank
sites in North Vietnam with a total estimated ca-
pacity of between 30,000 and 40,000 tons. The ac-
cumulation of 55 gallon drums also has given North
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Vietnam increased flexibility in petroleum storage
and distribution. The storage capacity represented
by the drum inventory at the end of April 1967 prob-
ably was between 35,000 and 40,000 tons. In addition,
there is an indeterminate amount of "floating storage
capacity" represented by oil barges, rail tank cars,
tank trucks, and a newly assigned small tanker for
use in North Vietnamese waters. Soviet willingness
to modify petroleum delivery procedures by shifting
from supply sources in the Black Sea -- almost 30
days' sailing time from North Vietnam -- to sources
of supply in the Soviet Far East -- only 5 days'
sailing -- also has eased the burden on available
petroleum storage capacity'in North Vietnam. The
relative invulnerability of the dispersed tank sites
and drums makes it improbable that bombing will ad-
versely affect the North Vietnamese capability to
import and distribute petroleum.
There is no evidence that the bombing of
petroleum targets has seriously weakened the economy,.
produced significant shortages of petroleum, or
diminished North Vietnam's capability to support
military activities or the infiltration of men and
supplies into Laos and South Vietnam.
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4. Manufacturing
The small manufacturing sector of North
Vietnam has suffered important setbacks as a result
of US air strikes during the first four months of
1967. Not only is North Vietnam's industry now faced
by a general electric power shortage, but the Thai
Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine and the Haiphong Cement
Plant -- North Vietnam's largest industrial facili-
ties -- have been damaged by bombing. The value of
direct bomb damage to North Vietnamese manufacturing
facilities through April 1967 is estimated to total
$11.8 million, of which $9.5 million is accounted
for by damage to the Thai Nguyen Plant in 1967 as
shown in the following tabulation:
Million US $
1965
1966
Jan-Apr 1967
Total
Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel Combine
---
--
9.5
9.5
Haiphong Cement
Plant
--
--
0.3
0.3
Nam Dinh Textile
Mill
0.8
0.2
0.4
1.4
Cam Pha Coal
Treatment Plant
--
0.1
Viet Tri Paper
Mill
--
0.1
Lang Chi Explosives
Plant
0.4
0.4
10.2
11.8
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The indirect costs of the bombing to the
manufacturing sector are also substantial. These
costs, in terms of lost production and the resulting
loss of foreign exchange earnings, probably will
amount to tens of millions of dollars annually. Most
of North Vietnam's major chemical facilities have
probably been forced to curtail operations because
of the damage to electric powerplants. The more
intensive use of capital equipment and the inclusion
of additional women in the labor force have mitigated
some of the losses to production. Nevertheless, ap-
parently the best that North Vietnam could claim for
the chemical and coal industries -- even in 1966 was that they "continued.operating" and for light
industry that it "increased the production of neces-
sities and turned out new varieties of goods."
The effect of the air strikes on North
Vietnam's manufacturing facilities has been uneven.
It is not possible at this time, for example, to
make a firm estimate of the effects on production
of the 12 attacks against the Thai. Nguyen Iron and
Steel Combine. This plant is primarily a producer
of pig iron and coke. It has also engaged in the
fabrication of barges, small watercraft, pontoons,
petroleum storage tanks, and construction materials
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from imported steel. Most of these products are
inputs to North Vietnam's transportation and logistics
system. Much of this fabrication work undoubtedly
has been disrupted by the bombing. Available pho-
tography covering strikes through 23 April shows no
direct.damage to the blast furnaces. Therefore, the
production of pig iron may be possible unless it has
been affected by damage to associated facilities such
as the steam plant.
The Haiphong cement plant is estimated to
be inoperative both because of the air strikes on
20 and 25 April 1967 and because of the loss of elec-
tric power from the damaged Haiphong,ThermaI Power
Plant West. Partial operation of the plant at about
85 percent of its original capacity (600,000 tons a
year) could probably be achieved in 90 days. It is
highly unlikely that the plant would be restored to
full capacity until after the cessation of the bomb-
ings. The loss of cement output will deprive North
Vietnam of one of its few earners of foreign exchange.
if the bomb damage is not restored quickly, North
Vietnam will also be forced to import cement, probably
from Communist China.
It is not possible to quantify the effect
on production at most of the remaining manufacturing
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facilities. No effort has been made to repair the
Nam Dinh textile mill, which accounted for half of
North Vietnam's weaving capacity in 1965. Much of
the equipment from this mill was dispersed after the
first inadvertent strike in July 1965. The Cam Pha
coal treatment plant has been inadvertently struck
three times. Although damage to this plant has been
minor, this damage in combination with a shortage of
power normally supplied from Hon Cai apparently was
the reason for a sharp drop in coal exports during
April. The Viet Tri paper mill, the largest producer
of paper in North Vietnam, was inadvertently struck
in July 1966 and the-damage was repaired by the end
of 1966. Pr.oduction may again have been disrupted,
by the damage to the Viet Tri powerplant in March
1967. The Lang Chi explosives plant remains in-
operable from the heavy damage inflicted by air
strikes in July and August 1965.
The damage already inflicted to North
Vietnamese industry by the bombing undoubtedly has
crushed North Vietnam's once promising hopes for a
-high rate of economic growth, and has added to the
heavy burden on economic management. Still, North
Vietnam has always been a predominantly agricultural
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nation with an important local industry and handi-
craft sector providing for a large degree of self-
sufficiency.' Moreover, industry has played only a
small role in support of the military effort, with
a great part of military and military-associated
materiel being imported from North Vietnam's Commu-
i
nist allies. Thus the destruction of the remainder
of North Vietnam's major industrial facilities --
mainly the large chemical, fertilizer, and engineer-
ing plants and the large undamaged part of the cement
plant -- would not add significantly to the problems
of the civil population or detract significantly
from the military effort. Added imports would be
required, but not-at a level beyond North Vietnam's
present import and distribution capability.
5. Transportation
Air strikes against the transport system
of North Vietnam during the past two years have not
significantly affected North Vietnam's transport
capability or its ability to move supplies in support
of the economy or the war effort. There have been
no indications of serious supply shortages or bottle-
necks. Interdictions have been effectively repaired,
and the use of rail ferries, pontoon bridges, by-
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passes, and shuttling facilities has been effective
in reducing time lost due to damage caused by air
strikes.
The capacity of nearly all major transport
routes continues to be greater than the volume of
traffic to be moved on the routes -- thus traffic
delayed due to bombing is moved after repairs are
made. A comparison of performance estimates for the
entire transport system indicates that, while total
ton-kilometer performance has declined slightly, the
total amount of tons carried has increased from year
to year (see Table 1). Performance on the rail lines
has decreased from the high in 1964, when tons,car-
ried were 4.13 million and ton-kilometers equaled
927 million. In 1966, it is estimated that 3.3
million tons were'carried and ton-kilometers reached
620 million. The decline in rail performance is
attributable for the most part to the loss of apatite
exports normally carried by rail to Haiphong and to
the ending of Chinese rail transit traffic through
North Vietnam.
Performance on the highways has increased
slightly, and waterway and coastal transport have
shown the largest increases. The increased use of
these modes of transport reflects North Vietnam?s
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increasing reliance on means of transport which are
less vulnerable to air attack.
Table 1
North Vietnam's Transport Performance, 1963-1966
Million Ton-Kilometers
1963
1964 1
96
5
1966
Railroad
847
927
7
70
620
Highway
164
179
2
00
200
Inland waterway
448
490
5
40
590
Coastal waterway
142
156
1
70
190
Total
1,601
1,752 1,
7
00
1,600
Million Tons Carried
1963
1964 .1
9
65
1966
Railroad
3.86
4.13
3
.7
3.3
Highway
6.71
7.18
7
.9
7.9
Inland waterway
6.56
7.01
7
.7
8.5
Coastal waterway
0.35
0.37
0
.4
0.5
Total
17.48
18.69 1
9
.7
20.2
The data on performance make it clear
that the transport network is still providing ade-
quate service to meet the country's economic and
military needs.
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Railroads
The Rolling Thunder program has had
some adverse effects on the railroad system of North
Vietnam during the past year, but in general the
network. is still capable of fulfilling the country's
requirements. The destruction of the rail bridge at
Viet Tri_ in the summer of 1.966, the most significant
result of the program against lines of communication
during the year, reduced the capacity of the Hanoi-
Lao Cai line from 3,000 to 600 tons each way per day.
The line south of Hanoi has been repeatedly attacked --
reducing capacity from 1,800 to 500 tans each way per
day and heavily damaging the rail yard facilities at
Vinh, Thanh Hoa, and Nam Dinh -- but this line ac-
counted for less than five percent of the total rail
performance in North Vietnam prior to the initiation
of the Rolling Thunder program. Infrequent attacks
against the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen and Kep-Thai Nguyen
lines have disrupted through traffic for only a day
or two at a time. However, attacks against the Thai
Nguyen rail yard in the first quarter of 1967 have
created more severe problems for the movement of
traffic on the Kep-Thai Nguyen and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen
lines.
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During April 1967 the Hanoi Railway/
Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides was struck.
A photo mission of 30 April indicated that two spans
are destroyed and that the rail line north of the
bridge is interdicted. This destruction cuts Hanoi's
connection with the Lao Cai and Dong Dang lines and
should effectively limit operations until the bridge
is reconstructed or bypasses are built. The impor-
tant line between Hanoi and Haiphong, on which most
of North Vietnam's import and export materials enter
and leave the country, has been open for through
traffic most of the time during the.Rolling Thunder
program. The Hanoi-Dong Dang line, the other major
import-export rail line in North Vietnam, has been
only intermittently attacked during much of the
Rolling Thunder program. However, during the last
two weeks of April 1967 the level of air strikes
against the line increased, probably disrupting
traffic for a few days. The key rail yards at Vu
Chua, Kep, Bac De, and Cao Nung were attacked, as
were the bridges at Bac Giang and Dap Cau.
Despite two years of bombing, there
have been no significant, adverse effects on the
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North Vietnamese rail system as a whole. Indeed
the system has been extended and improved. The
network is still able to move adequate supplies to
meet the country's requirements, although hindered
at times by interdictions, shuttling, and damaged
yard facilities. In terms of total capacity on all
lines, the system has improved slightly during the
past year as the Kep-Thai Nguyen line has been com-
pleted and dual-gauging is in progress.
b. Highways
Air strikes against the highway
system of North Vietnam have had no sustained effects
on motor truck operations. The road system serves
primarily as a short-haul feeder service for the
railroads and connects areas not served by other
transport facili ies. The majority of the air
strikes have been concentrated in the region south
of Thanh Hoa, with Routes IA, 15, and 7 receiving
the heaviest damage. Although traffic has been
interrupted and slowed by frequent interdictions
and the need for shuttling operations, North Viet-
namese repair efforts have been effective and suf-
ficient to maintain traffic at required levels.
Route 15, near the Mu Gia Pass, however, has been
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repeatedly attacked and seeded with delayed action
bombs, and maintenance of traffic on this route
has probably been difficult.
Nevertheless, average truck traffic,
as reported by ground observers, has increased sig-
nificantly during the first quarter of 1967 compared
with past years. It is estimated that the tonnage
delivered daily by truck into Laos along Routes 7
and 15 during the current dry season is considerably
higher than that delivered during the 1964-65 and
1965-66 dry seasons.
c. Waterways
Attacks against. the waterway system
in North Vietnam-have not appreciably affected op-
erations on the inland waterways or along the coast.
While important transshipment arey such as Quang Khe,
Dong Hoi, and Vinh have been repeatedly attacked,
causing supplies to be off-loaded "over-the-beach"
in many instances, the system remains very flexible
and capable of meeting the country's requirements
because of the ability of the North Vietnamese to
restore, improvise, or relocate their transfer op-
erations.
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The mining of the Kien Giang, Song
Ca, Song Giang, and Song Ma rivers, all key waterways
in the southern portion of the country, has probably
impaired operations in these areas. Sightings of
watercraft in the mined areas declined, but did not
cease, after the mining. Through the use of counter-
measures, operations are now being maintained at
fairly normal levels. Total sightings of watercraft
by pilots and naval observers have remained at fairly
constant levels with some minor fluctuations --
throughout the bombing.
d. Railroad Yards and Shops
Eight comparatively important railroad
_yards have been attacked since the beginning of the
Rolling Thunder program, four of which are JCS tar.
gets. Two of these yards, at Gia Lam and Thai Nguyen,
also have railroad repair facilities in the complex./
In addition, many small yards and sidings have been'
attacked under miscellaneous armed reconnaissance.
The key rail yard and repair facility
at Gia Lam was attacked in April 1967 and is one of
the most significant air strikes against rail yards
thus far in 1967. An initial readout indicates that
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numerous buildings and some rolling stock were de-
stroyed. Sixteen percent of the rail car repair
shop floor plan is estimated to be destroyed, as well
as 27 percent of the floor plan area of support build-
ings. In general, more than 5 percent of the na-
tional capacity of North Vietnam's railroad. repair
I
shops and over 20 percent of its rail yard capacity
had been neutralized as of 8 May 1967. The cost of
restoration of the damage inflicted on railroad yards
and shops from January to April 1967 is estimated at
$2.2 million,'bringing the total of such damage by
the Rolling Thunder program to about $3.5 million.
Most of this estimate stems from the cost of repair?-
ing or reconstructing warehouses and other buildings
rather than yard track. Air strikes have resulted
in only temporary disruption to through service, and
damage has usually been restored in about 24 hours
after each attack.
3. Maritime Ports
Six North Vietnamese ports, repre-
senting 88 percent of the country's total maritime
cargo-handling capacity, have been selected as JCS
targets. Ben Thuy -- which represents 4 percent of
the total capacity -- and Ham Rong -- which accounts
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for only 1 percent -- were struck in 1965. During
1966, Ben Thuy was restruck and Cam Pha -- which
represents 16 percent of the total capacity -- was
attacked for the first time. Ben Thuy was the only
port struck during the first four months of 1967.
Damage to port facilities through 1966 is estimated
at $1.4 million. Information is not available to
assess the damage done in 1967.
The direct impact of this damage on
North Vietnam's economy is not significant, although
significant indirect export losses have resulted,
particularly from the attacks against the port of
Cam Pha Twenty-one percent of the cargo-handling
capacity at, Cam Pha has been destroyed, representing
a nominal cost of only $160,000. During the attacks,
however, Cam Pha's coal-washing machinery and rail
facilities were also hit, reducing the port's capacity
for producing washed and graded coal. The damage to
these facilities resulted in coal export losses of
more than $6.8 million through April 1967.
f. Transport Equipment
Destruction and damage of all types
of transport equipment by air strikes increased during
the first quarter of 1967, compared with the same
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period in 1966. However, the extent of destruction
and damage was significantly lower than the quarterly
average in 1966. Destruction and damage of trucks
and watercraft increased significantly in the month
of April and reached the peak levels obtained during
the summer of 1966. Table 2, which is based primarily
on pilot reports and includes some duplication,*
provides a general indication of the damage inflicted,
by type of equipment.
The estimated cost to the North
Vietnamese of replacing or repairing transport equip-
ment damaged from the initiation of air strikes,
through the first four months of 1967 is estimated
at $41.4 million.
While the level of damage inflicted
during 1966 and 1967 was significantly higher than in
1965, there has been no evidence of serious transport
problems resulting from equipment shortages. Imports
of trucks have been. sufficient to maintain the in-
ventory at previous levels. Imports of railroad
rolling stock have not equaled the reported attrition
*Data have been adjusted downward. to eliminate
duplication whenever possible.
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rate,* but there is no indication of any problems
associated with rail equipment shortages. In addition,
Chinese rail equipment is available in sufficient
numbers to compensate for any shortages. Destruc-
tion and damage of watercraft have not been signifi-
cant in relation to the North Vietnamese watercraft
inventory.
*Reported losses of railroad rolling stock have
included many small, makeshift cars used on the rail
line south of Hanoi which are not included in the
inventory estimate of mainline freight cars.
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25X1
North Vietnam: Destruction and Damage of Transport Equipment
1965-66 and First Quarter 1967
Qua
rterl
y
1965 - 10 Months 1966 - 12 Months
Aver
age 1
966
First Quarter 1967
Type of Equipment
Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged Des
troy
ed D
amaged
Destroyed
Damaged
Locomotives
6
6
10
14
2
.5
3.5
0
0
Rail freight cars
227
592
1,101
935
275
234
61
84
Trucks
318
487
1,935
1,801
484
450
178
172
Ferries
53
56
67
131
17
33
0
1
Barges
263
487
2,520
4,289
630
1,072
453
1,313
Other watercraft
144
210
867
1,372
217
343
79
234
Total
1,011 1,
838
6,500
8,542 1
,62
5
2,135
771
1,804
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g. Bridges
The number of attacks against JCS-
targeted bridges increased slightly in 1966 compared
with 1965, but the number of such bridges attacked
was slightly less than the total in 1965, as shown
in the following tabulation:
1965
1966
-
January--April 19 6.7
Strikes Brides
Strikes Bridges.*
Strikes
Bridges*
Rail and rail/
highway
67
14
110
16
34
10
Highway
77
30
76
23
42
13
Total
144
44
186
39
76
23
*Including'bridges struck initially before the time period.
In the first four months of 1967,76 strikes were
conducted against 23 bridges, all but two of which
had been previously attacked. The number of strikes
against highway bridges decreased slightly during
1966, while strikes against rail and rail-highway com-
bination bridges increased. During the first four
months of 1967, this trend was reversed.
The total ,lumber of bridges, (both
JCS-targeted and non-targeted) confirmed by available
photography to have been damaged or destroyed by the
Rolling Thunder program now stands at 410. In this
total, which includes both original and bypass bridges,
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there are 303 highway, 77 railroad, and 30 combina-
tion railroad/highway structures. These figures un-
derstate somewhat the number of smaller bridges(pri-
marily highway) that actually have been damaged or
destroyed because photography may not be available
for some of these bridges. The estimated cumulative
;cost of completely restoring the confirmed damaged
Ior destroyed bridges to their original condition
through March 1967 would be $20.7 million -- an in-
crease of 9 percent since 31 December 1966 and double
the estimate of 1965.* It is estimated that at
least $4.1 million have been spent already on tem-
op racy repairs to bridges through March 1967, of
.which an estimated $0.8 million were spent during
the first quarter of 1967. Estimated cost for tem-
porary repairs to the number of unrepaired bridges
at the end of March 1967 is $1.25 million.
Although estimates of what it would
cost the North Vietnamese to restore bridges to their
original condition or how much they have spent on
temporary repairs are of value, they do not give
any qualitative answer to the effects of bomb damage
on bridges. Thus a survey of the 410 bridges con-
firmed by available photography to have been damaged
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or destroyed showed that 377 bridges have had one
or more "serious damage occurrences" (SDO's)** There
have been a total of 598 SDO's since the beginning of
the bombings in February 1965 through March 1967.
The number of SDO's by year and the average number
f times each of the 377 bridges were interdicted
are as follows:
*The estimated costs for restoring bridges to their
original condition as of the end of 1965 and 1966 were
$10.1 million and $19 million, respectively.
**A "serious damage occurrence" consists of initial
hits and re-hits and is defined as damage sufficiently
severe that a crossing is denied to users until a sig-
nificant amount of repairs has been performed --- re-
quiring considerable time, materials, and labor. For
example, serious damage would include a dropped span(s),
a destroyed pier(s), or a destroyed abutment(s). Holes
in a deck, cratered approaches, twisted superstructure,
or a slight shifting of spans is not considered serious
damage.
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Number of
Average Number
Bridges with
of Interdictions
Year SDO's
SDO's
Per Damaged Bridge
1965 218
177
1.23
1966 334
185
1.81
1967 (first quarter) 46
15
3.07 a/
a. The high figure for the first quarter of 1967 is not comparable to
the earlier two periods because the time span is too short for a mean-
ingful comparison.
While a specific bridge may be interdicted an increas-
ing number of times, in most cases the crossing is
bypassed in a variety of ways. Bypass bridges, more-
over, have not been damaged as.extensively as the
original bridges. Of-the 129 bypass bridges observed
in aerial photography, only'30 have sustained 46 SD0's.'
2. Indirect Effects
The air campaign has also resulted in
sizable losses to the economy of North Vietnam, which
are indirect results of the bombing. The principal
indirect losses result from shortfalls in production,
disruptions of normal economic activity, and the
impairment of foreign exchange earnings through de-
creases in the quantities of goods available for
export. Many of these losses cannot be quantified.
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The few that can -- reductions in agricultural
output and the fish catch, and the loss of export
earnings -- totaled $53.5 million through April
1967, or almost one-third of total economic damage.
The unquantifiable losses -- production inefficiencies,
the costs of dispersing industry, civil defense measures,
production losses due to lack of power, the realloca-
tion of manpower, and the like -- undoubtedly total
in the tens of millions of dollars.
a. Agriculture and Fishing
Although agriculture and commercial fish-
ing have not been direct targets of the air strikes
against North Vietnam, the bombing campaign has-had
.significant indirect effects on production. These
indirect effects have resulted from the disruption
.of normal farming and fishing schedules, the loss
of some managerial cadres and labor due to transfer
to war-related activities which has intensified man-
power
problems during peak loads in the crop cycle,
and disruptions in the manufacture and distribution
of fertilizers. Since it is not possible to separate
the effects of the bombing campaign from the effects
of adverse weather on agriculture, the estimates of
losses in agricultural output also include those
resulting from adverse weather.
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The cumulative losses in agriculture
and fishing through the first four months of 1967
are estimated at about $33.3 million as shown in the
following tabulation:
Million US $
Losses from 1965 1966 January-April 1967 Total
Rice Production 3.5 22.0 N.A. 25.5
Fishing 1.7 3.3 2.8 7.8
Total 5.2 25.3 2.8 33.3
The shortfall in rice production is
estimated to be about 300,000 tons below the normal
average of about 4.5 million tons. Although all of
this loss occurred in 1966, $3.5 million is attributed
to the effects of bombing in 1965 because the spring
rice crop was planted. in that year. The final outcome
of the 1967 spring rice crop -- normally about one-
third of the annual harvest -- cannot yet be evaluated.
However, the acreage planted was less than usual and
transplanting of the crop was delayed, so that the
harvest probably will be below normal. The loss in
the salt-water fish catch resulted primarily from
the interruption of normal fishing activities because
of the threat of air attack.
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Recent information indicates that agricultural and fish
shortages have contributed to a deteriorating food situation in North
Vietnam. Salt-water fish, fish sauce, sugar, and meat are reported to
be in short supply. Prices of many food items have risen, and known
seaborne imports of bulk foods during the first four months of 1967 --
about 100,000 tons -- are nearly nine times the volume known to have
been imported by sea during the same period in 1966. However, these
imports amount to about two percent of the normal annual production
of rice, and has become critical. Fresh-water fish and vegetables are
adequate in many areas, and the rice ration --albeit frequently mixed
with corn and other subsidiary crops -- has been maintained.
25X1 b. Export Losses
The cumulative measurable value of reductions in sea-
borne exports attributable to the bombing through April 1967 was about
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$20.2 million,* as shown in the following tabulation:
Thousand US $
Apatite
Cement
Coal
Total
2nd quarter
665
192
0
857
3rd quarter
1,043
324
0
1
367
4th quarter
1,554
395
0
,
1,949,
Subtgtal
'3,262
911
0
4,173
1s
t quarter
1,554
205
0
1,759
2n
d quarter
1,554
40
1,
476
3
071
3r
d quarter
1,457
244
2,
192
,
3
893
4t
h quarter
1,554
243
1,
060
,
2,857
6,118
733
4,
729
11,580
1967
1st quarter
1,554
199
1,
273
3
026
April
518
113
835
,
1,466
1
1,452
1,956
6,
837
20,245
*Estimated dollar equivalents at f.o.b. prices.
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Seaborne exports of apatite ceased
abruptly after the interdiction of the Hanoi-Lao Cai
rail line in July 1965 and when stockpiles at Hai-
phong became exhausted early in August. It is pos-
sible, however, that some apatite has been exported
by rail from the mines near Lao Cai to China. Al-
though known seaborne exports of cement declined af-
ter the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program,
no direct connection between the program and the
decline can be determined. It is possible that ce-
ment has been exported to China without being detected.
Coal shipments decreased rapidly after the coal-process-
ing facilities at Cam Pha, North'Vietnam's major coal
port, were damaged in April 1966, and huge stockpiles
were drawn down. After a slow recovery to over half
the pre-strike level, exports declined sharply again
in March and April 1967. This decline apparently
resulted from the combined effects of damage to the
Hon Gal powerplant, which supplies power for both
the Hon Gai and Cam Pha port areas, and direct dam-
age to coal-processing facilities. Seaborne coal
shipments in April were the lowest recorded in the
last 16 months.
C. Military Damage
The damage to military target systems through
April 1967 is-estimated at $67.6 million (see
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the chart, Figure 2). Losses of aircraft and damage
to barrack complexes comprised most of the damage,
each accounting for 29 percent of the total. The
damage inflicted on military targets has had no sig-
nificant impact on North Vietnam's military capabili-
ties. The ammunition depots are the only military
target system to have been attacked in depth. Yet
the loss of about 70 percent of ammunition storage
capacity has had no measurable impact on the avail-
ability of ammunition. No other military target
system has lost as much as 25 percent of its pre-
strike capacity. Although 24 percent of the capacity
of barrack facilities has been destroyed, most of
the barracks.attacked had been inactive by the end
of 1965, the years when they were first attacked.
Despite the air attacks the North Vietnamese have
been able to strengthen and improve the capability
of most military target systems since the bombings
started. Fighter aircraft facilities in North Viet-
nam are still sufficient to meet requirements. The
inventory of SAM sites and radar and communications
facilities has increased markedly since the'bombinas
started. Although fighter aircraft losses have in-
creased in recent months, the fighter inventory has
been maintained at about its level at the end of 1966.
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1. Barracks
North Vietnam had a total barracks capacity
for about 443,000 men at the beginning of the bombing,
of which JCS-targeted barracks had a capacity for
182,000 men.' About 75 percent of the JCS-targeted
barracks had been attacked by the end of April 1967,
with a loss of capacity -- either destroyed or in-
active -- for about 107,000 men. This loss represents
about. 24 percent of the total barracks capacity in
North Vietnam, compared with nearly 23 percent at the
end of 1966 and about 18 percent at the end of 1965.
In addition, non-targeted barracks also have been struck
under the miscellaneous armed reconnaissance program,
but the loss of capacity resulting from this program
cannot be estimated.
Air strikes against JCS-targeted barrack
complexes during the first four months of 1967 ex-
ceeded the total flown during all of 1966. The return
from these strikes has been disappointing, yielding
damage of only $1.3 million compared with $2.5 mil-
lion in 1966 and about $16.0-million in 1965. The de-
creasing returns reflect the fact that/most of the
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strikes are against already damaged or inactive com-
plexes.
The loss of both. targeted and non-targeted
barracks capacity in the outlying areas -- primarily
in the southern part of the country, along the border
of Laos, and in the northwestern provinces -- undoubt-
edly is causing much inconvenience. Damage to barrack
complexes in these areas has not been repaired and the
remaining barracks have usually been vacated. The
troops apparently are being quartered with civilians in
nearby villages, in tents, or in other makeshift shelters
in the surrounding area. The North Vietnamese have
had sufficient time to adjust to the loss of barracks
in these areas, however, and the housing problem probably
is less inconvenient-now than it_was-at.the end-of 1965.
2. Airfields
No significant change in the capability
of targeted airfields in North Vietnam has occurred
since 1965, when as a result of air strikes, about 19
percent of airfield capacity was judged to be destroyed
or inactive. This estimate does not include the re--
suits of the April strikes against the airfields at Kep
and Hoa Lac, because of the lack of photography with
which to make a reliable damage estimate. The confirmed
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damage to date is estimated at only $0.4 million. The
attacks on airfields have probably had only a limited
military or economic impact. Although the airfields at
Kep and Hao Lac both had jet handling capabilities,
their complete loss would not seriously impede North
Vietnam's capability to mount air operations.
In fact, fighter aircraft facilities in
North Vietnam, which were inadequate at the beginning
of the bombing, have been expanded significantly --
even outpacing the MIG inventory. The gradual ex-
pansion of the basic airfield and control apparatus
apparently has been tailored to specific air defense
needs to counter the Rolling Thunder. prograrti. At
least four airfields -- Hanoi/Gia Lam, Phuc Yen, Hai-
phong/Cat Bi/Kien An -- could support MIG operations at
the end of April 1967, and an additional airfield
under construction at Bai Thuong will be able to ac-?
commodate jets when it is completed. The airfields
at Kep and Hao Lac also had jet capabilities at the
end of March but their present status is unknown.
North Vietnam now has the capacity for expanding
the MIG inventory and preparing for more aggressive
air operations. In the event of attacks on the ma-
jor airfield at Phuc Yen, the North Vietnamese can
still s)stain a fighter force, although less effec-
tively,, in the Hanoi area.
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From July 1965 through April 1967, approxi-
mately 450 air strikes were directed against SAM in-
stallations in North Vietnam. The assessment of the
effects of these strikes has been severely limited by
the lack of post-strike photography.
The following tabulation reflects the
minimum damage estimated to have been inflicted on
SAM facilities:
1965
1966
J
an
-7 May
1967
Total
SAM Facilities
Firing sites
310
900
130
1,340
Support facilities 1,600
170
300
2,070
Total
1,910
1,070
430
3,410
The attacks on the SAM sites have not sig-
nificantly affected the total number of active SAM bat-
talions, which have increased steadily and by spring
1967 totaled from 28 to 32 units. In addition, the
number of prepared or pre-surveyed sites now totals
at least \162.
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By 7 May 1967, over 2,250 SA--2 missiles had
been fired at Allied aircraft, resulting in the destruc-
tion of 55 airplanes (43 confirmed and 12 probable)
and 29 reconnaissance drones.
4. Naval Bases
By the end of April 1967, nearly 20 per-
cent of North Vietnam's naval base support facilities
were destroyed or inactive, compared with about 15 per-
cent at the end of 1965. The cumulative cost of repair
for the damage inflicted is estimated at nearly $1.6
million. It is doubtful that the damage to the naval
bases has seriously affected the operations of the
small North Vietnamese navy. Restoration of the dam-
aged facilities can be accomplished quickly and
without foreign assistance.
5. Radar*
North Vietnam expanded its radar system
considerably during the first four months of 1967.
At the end of April the country had over 160 known
early warning and ground control intercept radars
at 60 sites, compared with 149 known radars at 50
sites at the end of 1966. Five of these sites are
JCS-targeted because of their strategic locations
along the coast.
* Excluding radar associated with SAM sites.
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During 1965-66 the targeted sites at
Hon Matt and Hon Nieu were totally destroyed, those
at Vinh Son and Bach Long were damaged, and there
was no significant damage to the site at My Duc.
The cumulative cost of damage to these sites is
estimated at $2.6 million. The destroyed site
at Hon Nieu'was reactivated during the first quarter
of 1967, and the sites at Vinh Son and My Duc were
strengthened appreciably by the deployment of ad-
ditional early warning, searchlight control, height-
finding, and fire control radars. There were no
known attacks against these radar sites during Janu-
ary-April 1967.
6. Communications
North Vietnam's telecommunications system
remains operationally intact not only because rela-
tively few facilities have been targeted and attacked,
but also because of large-scale imports of equipment.
In fact, the overall capabilities of the system may
have been improved since the beginning of the Rolling
Thunder program. Radio facilities have been ex-
panded and the message-handling capacity of the wire-
line system has been increased. In addition, the
North Vietnamese have taken steps to reduce the po-
tential effects of air strikes on the telecommunica-
tions system. Newly constructed open wirelines are
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being placed from 150 to 600 yards away from rail-
roads and highways, telephone poles are being
;pre-positioned along wireline routes, and a blast wall
has been constructed around the radio broadcasting com-
plex at Me Tri.
By the end of April 1967, the cumulative
cost of the damage inflicted by air strikes amounted
to only about $185,000, of which about $105,000 oc-
curred during 1965 and about $80,000 during 1966. No
confirmed damage was inflicted on the system during
the first four months of 1967.
7. Supply and Ordnance Depots
Four.of North Vietnam's JCS-targeted mill-.
tary supply and ordnance depots were attacked during
January-April 1967, two for the first time. The most
significant strike during the period was against the
Thai Nguyen Army Supply Depot North which serves the
area north of Hanoi and represents nearly 4 percent
of the total national capacity.
Only about 17 percent of North Vietnam's
supply and ordnance storage capacity was destroyed
or inactive as a result of air strikes through April
1967. The damage inflicted is estimated at about
$5.0 million. Except for the depot at Thai Nguyen
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and those at Vinh and Yen Bai (which were struck
prior to 1967), the depots attacked are of rela-
tively minor importance to the North Vietnamese Army.
However, the functions that were performed by these
depots are essential to maintain the infiltration
system in support of activities in South Vietnam and
Laos. The requirement to operate from a dispersed
logistics base has probably resulted in increased
management problems and reduced efficiency.
8. Ammunition Depots
During January-April 1967, five JCS-tar-
geted ammunition depots -- Hon Gai, Vinh Yen, Haiphong,
Bac Giang, and Cam Ly -- were attacked for the first
time, and the ammunition depot at Phu Qui was re-
struck. The cost of restoration of the depots at
Hon Gai and Haiphong is estimated
$.100,000. each.
There was no loss of capacity at the Phu Qui and Bac
Giang depots, and there is no information available
on which to base an assessment of damage inflicted on
the Vinh Yen and Cam Ly depots. By the end of April
1967, at least 70 percent of the capacity of North
Vietnam's JCS-targeted ammunition storage facilities
had been destroyed or was inactive. The cumulative
cost of the damage inflicted through April is esti-
mated at about $4.9 million.
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The loss of ammunition depots has been in-
convenient to the North Vietnamese and probably has
resulted in temporary delays in distribution. The
loss apparently has not, however, caused prolonged
shortages of ammunition in the areas where the de-
pots are located. More than 60 percent of the tar-
geted depots (all of which have been attacked) are
inactive, and airstrikes during the past year appar-
ently have not significantly affected the overall
storage of ammunition in North Vietnam.
9. Naval Craft
The destruction of eight North Vietnamese
naval craft* has been confirmed as of April 1967:
four Swatow-class'gunboats in 1965 and three PT boats
and one SO-1 subchaser in 1966. The cost of these'
losses is estimated at $3.8 million. The small North
Vietnamese navy currently is estimated to include
12 Swatow-class gunboats, 13 PT boats, 3 SO-1 sub-
chasers, and 4 unidentified naval craft.
*Excluding the 8 and 10 naval craft destroyed by
the Pierce Arrow attacks in August 1964 following the
Gulf of Tonkin incidents.
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10. Aircraft
The North Vietnamese lost 17 MIG-21's
and?29 MIG-1?7's through April 1967 from attacks.by
US aircraft. Eleven MIG-21's and 8 MIG-17's were de-
stroyed during the first four months of 1967. The
cost of all aircraft losses is estimated at $19.4
million, of which $10.4 million is attributed to losses
during January-April 1967. The MIG inventory of 30
April 1967 included 16 MIG-21's and 87 MIG-15/17's.
Thirty-two MIG-15/17's were still being held in China.
The North Vietnamese have replaced all but those air-
craft lost during the latter part of March and April.
North Vietnam's air force has taken an increasingly
aggressive role in air defense systems when.vital
targets are attacked, and it. apparently plans to keep
the jet fighter inventory at least at the present level
or increase it in the future.
Miscellaneous Targets of Armed Reconnaissance
Most of the damage resulting from the armed
reconnaissance program has been discussed in earlier
sections of this memorandum under the major cate-
gories of targets. Pilot reports, however, have in-
dicated a variety of miscellaneous targets -- prin-
cipally transport and military facilities -- as de-
stroyed or damaged and which cannot be included in
the major target categories.
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Because of the nature of air operations, it
is difficult to provide a definitive evaluation of
the results of air strikes based on pilot reports.
There is some double-counting in the reports and a
tendency for pilots to overestimate the amount of
destruction or damage inflicted. In addition, the
description of the targets is usually imprecise.
The cost of damage can thus be based only on an as-
sumed level of damage to a typical target in each
category. With these limitations in mind, the total
cost of replacement or restoration of the miscel-
laneous targets destroyed or damaged by armed recon-
naissance strikes is estimated at about $7.8 million,
,as shown in the following tabulation:
Million US $
1965
1966 January-
April 1967
Total
Economic facili-
ties and equip-
merit
N.A.
1.2 0
.2
1.4
Military facili-
ties
0.7
3.1 2.
6
Total
0.7
4.3 2
.8 7.8
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E. Manpower Effects
The effects of the Rolling Thunder program on
North Vietnam's manpower resources are twofold --- the
loss of manpower as casualties to air strikes, and
the diversion of substantial amounts of manpower to
tasks associated with air defense and civil defense
programs and to repair, reconstruction, dispersal,
and transport programs.
1. Casualties
Preliminary estimates of casualties for
the first quarter of. 1967 demonstrate the stepped-
up rate of the Rolling Thunder program. The monthly
casualty rate increased from an average of .2,200
during 1966 to 2,800 in early 1967 (see Table 3).
Markedly greater armed reconnaissance strikes in
heavily populated Route Package IV were chiefly re-
sponsible for the increase in the casualty/sortie
ratio from 0.32 in 1966 to 0.40 in January-March
1967. In addition, fixed targets selected for ini-
tial strikes in early 1967 were situated in heavily
defended areas of greater civilian population density.
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North Vietnam: Estimated Casualties 1965 - March 1967
First Quarter
1965 1966
1967*
Total
Civilians
Fixed targets
2,000 900
300
3,200
Armed reconnaissance
4,000 18,100
6,000
28,100
Subtot
a
l
6,000 19,000
6,300
31,300
Military
Fixed targets
4,3Q0 400
700
,.'
5,400
Armed reconnai
s
sance
2,900 7,300
1,300
11,500
Subtot
a
l
7,200 7,700
2,000
16,900
Total
13,200,26,700
8,300
48,200
*Based on preliminary data.
The estimates ofca,sualt-ies resulting from
the bombing of North Vietnam are subject to unknown and
conceivably large margins of error. Information from
Hanoi has generally been of little value in estimating
casualties. Two recent reports, however, make us
reasonably confident that our estimates are of the right
order of magnitude. The first report, a detailed state-
ment from Hanoi, "Report of US War Crimes in Nam Dinh
City,".released a number of statistics and allegations
concerning the US bombing of Nam Dinh during 1965-66.
The information presented in this report seemed to be
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accurate when measured against detailed studies made
on the basis of post-strike photography. The casualties
claimed by the North Vietnamese were also consistent
with independent casualty estimates made by this
Agency, using Nam Dinh as a pilot study. A second
report in late April 1967 indicated
that only 20,000 North
Vietnamese had been killed by the US bombing from
August 1964 to date. This statement closely corres-
ponds to our own estimate. We have previously esti-
mated on the basis of COMINT and other sources
that about 40 percent of the total casualties are
killed and the remainder wounded. On this basis
we would estimate that slightly more than 19,000
.of the total casualties through March 1967 were killed,
Although the monthly rate of casualties
continues to increase and to be heavily weighted
with civilians, the total casualties are small in
relation to total. population. Civilian casualties
continue to be primarily those involved in war-sup-
porting activities such as the repair of bomb damage
and the operation in maintenance of logistic supply
lines.
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2. Diversion of Manpower
Air strikes against North Vietnam have
required the services of 575,000 to 700,000 in-
dividuals -- about equally divided between full-time
and part-time workers.
Th
ousan
d Persons
Task
Full-Time
Part-Time
Lac repair and reconstruction
72
100 to 200
Transport and dispersal
100 to 120
25
Civil defense
--
150
Air defense
83
25 to 30
Coast defense
20 to 25
Total 275 to 300 300 to 405
Most of the full-time workers repairing LOC's are de-
ployed in the four Route Packages south of Hanoi which
have borne the brunt of the Rolling Thunder program.
In addition to these Vietnamese workers, up to 34,000
Chinese engineering troops are employed north of Hanoi
to repair and reconstruct the two rail lines to China.
Additional 19,000 North Vietnamese workers are esti-
mated to be in the Laotian Panhandle expanding and re-
pairing the infiltration corridors to South Vietnam.
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Although the total manpower requirements
stemming from the air war may have limited somewhat
North Vietnam's capability for sustained large-scale
operations in South Vietnam, and to some degree con-
tributed to a shortfall in agriculture, the diversions
have not placed a relevant ceiling on North Vietnam's
ability to infiltrate troops into South Vietnam. For
example, the full-time requirement for 172,000 to
192,000 civilians for LOC repair and transportation-
dispersal operations is only about 4 percent of the
estimated 4.3 million males in the 15 to 49 age
group. Only in relatively lightly populated but
heavily attacked Route Package I does the labor
force required to counter the bomb damage account
for a significant -- up to one-fourth -- share of
the labor force. In this area substantial numbers
of laborers have probably been imported from other
areas of North Vietnam to repair roads and speed
the transport of goods.
Most of the workers perform only manual
labor requiring no special skills, and they can easily
be recruited from city evacuees, farms, and fishing
villages with a minimum of dislocation to the economy.
Other tasks such as the operation of construction
machinery, bridge repair, bypass construction, and
rail repair do require higher skill levels. Permanent
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crews to perform these types of functions impose
a burden on the economy in two important ways. Be-
cause personnel possessing modern skills such as
heavy equipment operation are in short supply in
North Vietnam, a step-up in the bombing spreads a
thin resource even thinner. Second, the logistical
needs of the full-time construction personnel place
an additional requirement on North Vietnam's economy
for food, housing, medical services, and the like.
In addition to skilled and unskilled full-
time workers, part-time personnel are used on a
stand-by basis to repair,LOC's, transport supplies,
and serve as civil defense workers. Typically these
jobs -- such as repair of craters or transloading
a boxcar -- require a low-skill worker and are es-,
sentially of a "one shot" nature. The temporary
absence of such laborers from their primary jobs
for several hours or days causes small losses to
the economy.
Although the total number of and the skill
requirements for full- and part-time workers are
well within tolerable limits, the shortage of ex-
perienced cadre to plan, coordinate, and direct the
ambitious and imaginative system of countermeasures
which North Vietnam has devised is a more serious
problem. The need for experienced and aggressive
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cadre in the North competes directly with the need
for military cadre in the South. The neutralization
of North Vietnam's modern industrial facilities will
probably free some of this scarce talent, but ac- .
celerating needs for.. technologically`skilled person-
nel for operating repair services, transportation
crews, and civil defense programs will probably in-
tensify the shortage. On the other hand, after
more than two years of bombing, the North Vietnamese
are much more experienced at countermeasures
formerly, and as long as morale remains high and
imports of necessary equipment continues, North Viet-
nam will not be faced with a crippling shortage of
labor, either skilled or unskilled, unless losses
in the South increase sharply.
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II.- Effectiveness of Countermeasures
The major effect of the air attacks against North
Vietnam has been to force Hanoi to cope with extensive
disruption to normal economic activity. The greatest
effort has been required in the fields of transporta-
tion and distribution, in order to keep supply lines
open to the South and to maintain the distribution of
/essential economic and military supplies. A consider-
able effort has also been required to maintain the es-
sential level of output from North Vietnam's limited
industrial capacity in order to counter the effects
of air attack and to sustain a capability to support
.,the war in the South. These programs have forced
significant reallocations of manpower and rapid-in-
creases in the flow of military and economic aid from
Through the skillful and sometimes ingenious use
of a number of countermeasures the North Vietnamese
have met with considerable success in withstanding
the pressures of US air power. These countermeasures
are discussed in the following sections.
A. Civil Defense
The North Vietnamese have developed an ex-
tensive civil defense system characterized by in-
creased precautions to minimize casualties, an ex-
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tensive shelter system, the dispersal of large parts
of the urban population, and radical adjustments in
school, work, and marketing hours to avoid large con-
centrations of people during daylight hours.
During the third quarter of 1966 there was an
intensified program to refurbish and to expand the
shelter system. According to the North Vietnamese
press, some 55,000 shelters were built in Haiphong
during one 10-day period. In the city of Vinh it is
claimed that every family has its own shelter. Al-
most every area of the country reports the construc-
tion of thousands of shelters and many kilometers of
trenches. Although the number of shelters and pro-
tective facilities cannot be quantified, a new in-
tensification of the program during the first quarter
of 1967,
make it obvious that the program is ex-
tensive.
In addition to the shelter program, North
Vietnam has vigorously pursued a program of urban
evacuation and industrial dispersal.* Urban evacua-
tion was accelerated after the air strikes on petro-
leum storage facilities near. Hanoi and Haiphong in
*Industrial dispersal is discussed in C.
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mid-1966 and has acquired a new momentum after the
strikes in these areas during the past months. Most
cities appear to have evacuated a substantial por-
tion of their population.
the North Vietnamese press agree that Hanoi and
Haiphong have probably evacuated half their popula-
I
tion. Ninety percent of the population of Hai Duong
city is reported to have been evacuated, and only
2,000 of Thai Binh's 19,000 residents are reported
to remain. Nam Dinh reportedly has reduced its popu-
lation of 95,060 to 20,000 or 30,000.
The urban evacuation that has been achieved
probably approximates the desired level. In fact,
recent North Vietnamese newspaper accounts of evacu-
ation appear to be more concerned with the problems
encountered in resettling than with encouraging fur-
ther evacuation. Unsanitary conditions, separations
among families, and a cool reception by residents
in resettlement areas, continue to have an adverse
effect on evacuees. Moving people out of cities,
the mayor of Hanoi has conceded, is less a problem
than providing them with supplies, housing, schools,
.and means for earning a livelihood. Despite the
difficulties of the program, the reduction of urban
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populations is regarded by the regime as a. prudent
measure and has been credited with limiting the num-
ber of casualties.
The North Vietnamese population is apparently
well disciplined and responsive to civil defense measures.
The intensification of US air attacks has meant,
however, that routine activities have become in-
creasingly disrupted. In an attempt to minimize
the disruptive effect of air raid alerts--reported
to number as many as 18 a day--North Vietnam has
modified alert procedures for port workers in Hai-
phong and Hon Gay.
the city. In some instances
Similar steps have been taken in Hanoi to reduce the
harassing effect of air raids. Reportedly, no alarm
is sounded in the capital city until hostile air-
craft have entered within a 20- to 30-km. radius of
air raid alerts have coin-
cided with the first bursts of AAA or the sound of
exploding bombs.
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B. Air Defense Countermeasures
During the past three years the Hanoi regime
has developed North Vietnam's air defenses from a
relatively rudimentary state into a complex, sophisti-
cated system. The system now includes an integrated
network of radar sites, interconnected by filter
centers and communications facilities, and a wide-
;spread deployment of SAM missiles, MIG aircraft, and
conventional antiaircraft guns. The number of AAA
guns of all calibers increased from about 1,200 in
February 1965 to about 6,000 two years later.
Since the introduction of the Soviet-sup-
plied surface-to-air missile system into North Viet-
nam in mid-1965, at least 162 SAM sites have been
constructed. SA-2 missile battalions currently are
deployed in from 28 to 32 of these sites, with the
remainder of the sites adding to the over-all flexi-
bility of the system. North Vietnam's radar order
of battle has increased in size from 24 pieces of
equipment in 1962 to 434 pieces in February 1967.
Electronic equipment of higher quality and sophisti-
cation has added further to the coverage provided.
North Vietnam's current inventory of about 100 MIG
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aircraft* apparently is not substantially higher
than a year ago. Stepped-up employment of MIGs in
their air defensive role, however, has been noted
in recent periods in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Al-
though enemy aircraft have not yet inflicted major
losses on US air forces, their presence has posed
a threat which has sometimes caused US pilots to
jettison ordnance short of the assigned targets.
The growing threat presented by North Viet-
nams air defense system is illustrated by defensive
activities encountered by US forces while carrying
out attacks against the Hanoi Transformer Station
during a nine-day period in April and May of this
year. Enemy air defense operations over this tar-
get, which is about seven miles north of Hanoi, in-
cluded multiple surface-to-air missile firings, har-
assing flights of MIGs, and heavy antiaircraft fire.
US forces,.made up of a minimum of 56 strike air-
craft, suffered damage amounting to five aircraft
lost; one mission was forced to abort short of the
target; and several aircraft had to jettison their
ordnance in order to react to MIG attacks.
_____*'_Including approximately 30 MIGs believed to be
filling a reserve role at bases in Communist China.
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As shown in Table 4, the primary cause of US
losses over North Vietnam is conventional ground
fire. However, the threat imposed by SAM missiles
presumably accounts indirectly for an unknown per-
centage of these losses because it forces US air-
craft to fly at lower altitudes lying within the
range of the AAA guns.
Combat Losses of US Aircraft over North Vietnam,
by Cause
.1965-April 1967..
....................................... ......
Cause Number Percent
Ground fire/other 453 a/ 86
SAM 54 b/ 10
MIG 20 b/ 4
`100
a. An additional nine GVN aircraft were lost to
ground fire in 1965.
b. 'Including possible/probable downings from
these causes.
In view of the buildup in the enemy's air
defense system, US losses over North Vietnam have
remained surprisingly low, and the over-all ratio
actually has declined as the hostilities have pro-
gressed. The lower trend in US losses has been es-
pecially apparent since the spring of 1966. A
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comparison of US loss ratios by year for operations
over North Vietnam is given below.
Total Losses as a
Attack Combat Percent of Total
Year Sorties Losses a/ Attack Sorties
1965 25,940 173 0.67
1966 82,170 284 0.35
1967 b/ 20,550 52 0.25
a. Excluding operational losses due to equipment
failure.
b. January-March.
There are some indications, however, that the
favorable decline in the loss ratio may be reversed if
there is a major escalation in the number of US attacks
against the northern areas of North Vietnam. The loss
rate for the recent attacks on targets in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area is 3.7 percent compared with the 1967
average for all areas of about 0.25 percent. About 40
percent of US combat losses during 1967 to date were
over Route Packages V and VI, although only about 9
percent of total attack sorties were flown over these
areas. These route packages are defended by almost
67 percent of the enemy's inventory of 37 to 57-mm.
guns"'and more than 90 percent of the inventory of 85
to 100-mm. guns. Furthermore, an increasing threat
from SAM defenses is apparent from the following tabu-
lation, which gives SAM missiles fired by North Viet-
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nam per. 100 attack sorties flown over Route Packages
Attack Missiles
Year and Month Sorties a/ Fired P
Missiles Fired
er 100 Sorties
March-April 900 64
7.1
May-June 770 65
8.4
July-August 2,900 389
13.4
September-October 2,350 144
6.1
November-December 2,030 384
18.9
January-February 1,130 394 ?.
34.9
a. Rounded to the nearest 10.
As shown above, in the first two months of this-
year, almost 35 SAM missiles were launched by the North
Vietnamese for every 100 attack sorties flown over the
northern route packages by US air forces., The effec-
tiveness of the SAM response to US attacks should be
increased by the recent indications that Soviet per-
sonnel have assumed more control over SAM operations.
C. Decentralization of Industry
Although North Vietnam asserted the importance
of local industry and called for its continued growth
long before the country was subjected to US bombing,
the country's main industrial objective before 1965
was to establish a. heavy industrial base consisting
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of large capital-intensive plants. The advent of US
air strikes in 1965 forced an admitted reversal of
these priorities and resulted in a renewed and sharply
increased emphasis on local industry, which was to be
expanded through the dispersal of industry from po-
tential urban target areas as well as through the
construction of small facilities supplied with new
;equipment.
Dispersal of existing facilities report-
edly began early in 1965, just before the start of the
Rolling Thunder program. It is estimated that most dis-
persal has involved those facilities--small factories
and cooperatives--with easily moved. machines and eas-
ily divisible production processes. Dispersal has
been applied both to facilities in urban areas and to
those near probable targets in the rural provinces.
The extent of dispersal_of even small fa-
cilities in 1965 and 1966, however, is unclear. Several
conflicting reports have been received on dispersal of
industry in Hanoi and Haiphong, some suggesting al-
most total economic dispersal of industry, others em-
phasizing the large numbers of facilities still op-
erating. The mayor of Hanoi, in an interview with
a Czechoslovak reporter in January 1967, said that,
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although several enterprises were evacuated from
the city, there were still more than 200 industrial
enterprises of various sizes remaining. The North
Vietnamese press also has periodically criticized
the slow pace'of dispersal. On the other hand,
there is little doubt that many small facilities
a
have been dispersed, and the movement probably
has been stepped up since the heavy raids in the
vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong in the spring of
Only two large industrial facilities--both
textile plants which accounted for about 75 percent of
the national-weaving capacity--are known to have
been extensively dispersed. Evacuation of the Nam
Dinh Textile Mill probably began even before it
was unintentionally damaged by an air strike in
July 1965, and all spinning and weaving equipment
probably was dispersed by the spring of 1966. Pho-
tography confirms the absence of equipment in a
sizable area of the plant. North Vietnamese films
show that the 8 March Textile Mill in Hanoi also
had a large part of its capacity removed by early
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1966. The Hanoi Engineering Plant is the only
large plant reported to have dispersed'some equip-
ment, but this plant also has had new equipment
installed at the original site.
North Vietnam's heavy industrial plants
generally are not easily dispersed because of tech-
I
nological considerations and/or because of the
size of equipment involved. Photography has even
shown recent construction activity at the 8 March Tex-
tile Mill in Hanoi, at the Hanoi Chemical Fertilizer
Plant, and adjacent to the Hanoi Engineering Plant.
This activity remains unexplained and conceivably is
not associated with industrial expansion: The psychio-
logical. effects of ' the recent strikes near urban
areas cannot be discounted, however, and a determined
effort may be under way or in planning to disperse
parts of heavy industrial plants--perhaps machine
shops from the large engineering plants and batch
operations at the large chemical plants--which may
not have been affected heretofore. Nevertheless,
such industrial processes as the blast furnace op-
erations at Thai Nguyen, chlorine production at Viet
Tri, and the kiln operations at the Haiphong Cement
Plant still would not lend themselves to dispersal.
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Little is known about the locations to
which the evacuated equipment is taken. Most North
Vietnamese commentary refers to movement to the "coun-
tryside." The return to Hanoi at night of many
evacuees from the city suggests that the facilities
dispersed from the city may not have been moved very
far. Some facilities, however, have been moved to
;the mountainous northwest, reportedly to take ad-
vantage of the power potential presented by the
presence of numerous small streams. This movement
also fits in with North Vietnam's longstanding in-
terest in settling and cultivating the land in the
northwest. Several locations have been reported
as sites for dispersed equipment from the Nam Dinh
Textile Mill, ranging from neat Nam Dinh to 50 to
100 miles distant. Caves, jungle, and other natural
protection or camouflage are utilized whenever pos-
sible in order to provide maximum protection against
air attack.
On balance the decentralization program
probably has been successful from North Vietnam's stand-
point. Efficiency of production and some pro-
duction per se certainly has been lost in the evac-
uation process as well as in the installation of
equipment in less than ideal. circumstances. Prob-
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ably more important, though, has been the accelerated
establishment of new machinery and repair shops,
new food-processing facilities, new irrigation fa-
cilities, and new handicrafts which have added to
the economy of the rural areas without detracting
from the economy elsewhere.
I
D. Countermeasures on Lines of Communica-
ti.on (Ls) 1. Construction and Repair Activity
The main effect of the Rolling Thunder
program against lines of communication in North Viet-
nam has been a strenuous and successful effort by
the North-Vietnamese to keep all important transporta-
tion routes open to traffic. Besides diversifying
the means of transport to include greater use of
inland waterways and porter trails, the North Viet-
namese have constructed multiple bypasses at road
and railroad bridges on all important stream cross-
ings, built alternate roads, and upgraded the rural
road system to provide alternatives to heavily bombed
routes. The program of countermeasures has had equal
priority on LOC's in North Vietnam and the Laos Pan-
handle and has been accomplished at relatively low
cost because of a willingness and ability to use
primitive methods and materials. The net effect in
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terms of logistic supply capability has been to make
North Vietnamese transport more flexible than before
the bombing by offering more choices of possible
crossings and routes by which to supply the Communist
war effort in'South Vietnam. Added routes, moreover,
further reduce a rather low average daily tonnage re-
quirement per LOC.
The success of the North Vietnamese in
II
outpacing the damage inflicted on LOC's by air strikes
can be measured by the change in the number of bypasses
built over stream crossings.* A comparison of the
period from the start of the bombing through Sep-
tember 1966 with the period from October 1966 through
April 1.967 shows that the average number of separate
bypasses for damaged bridges increased from 0.98 to
1.15 per highway bridge and from 0.51 to 0.86 per
railroad and combination railroad/highway bridge.
In addition., the Communists are in a less vulner-
able position because they have had time to put in
alternative crossings even at points not yet struck.
In addition to the construction of bypasses, the
North Vietnamese often repair the original bridge
if the damage is not too extensive.
Bypasses include temporary bridges, fords/culverts,
ferries, and pontoon and cable bridges.
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Greater speed in repairs during 1966-
67 can be directly attributed to an extensive de-
velopment of bypasses and to a variety of deception
techniques. To augment traditional bypasses such
as fords, ferries, and timber bridges, more use was
observed in 1966 of prefabricated movable spans,
I
steel cable bridges, and camouflage. The use of a
variety of multiple stream crossings suggests that
the only effective way for air strikes to render a
crossing unserviceable is to destroy the original
bridge and all bypasses simultaneously--a very
difficult and costly tactic.
A slightly different but equally ef-
fective pattern of countermeasures emerges in the
Laos Panhandle where an interdicted bridqe or ford
is usually bypassed by a construction of a short
road around the entire chokepoint. Crossings that
have been repeatedly bombed take on a cobweb pattern
of bypass roads, of which one is serviceable most
of the time.
New road construction and the upgrading
of rural roads and trails also provides the North
Vietnamese with additional supply routes to coun-
teract the effects of the bombings and reduce the
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tonnage per road. In North Vietnam during 1966, a
system of alternative roads was built to bypass the
main coastal route 1A between Thanh Hoa and Quang
Khe, while a new border crossing road into Laos
was built as a supplement to route 15 through Mu
Gia Pass. The pattern of road construction in the
Laos Panhandle during the 1967 dry season has em-
(phasized many short bypasses around heavily inter-
dicted points on the existing road system that was
so greatly expanded during 1966. The extension of
route 922 east into the A Shau Valley of South
Vietnam has been the most strategically important
?new road built thus far in 1967 and the first time
a part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail has been made into
a motorable road across the border into South Viet-
nam,
2. The Manpower Involved in Countermeasures
The most important resources employed
by the North Vietnamese in their countermeasures on
lines of communication have been mass labor and lo-
cal materials. Although the air attacks have forced
the diversion of many North Vietnamese workers to re-
pair LOC's, their ability to simultaneously continue
production in the limited industrial sector and de-
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velop alternate LOC's indicates that the diversion
has not caused serious dislocations in the economy.
It is estimated that up to 1.25,000 workers and Chi-
nese engineering troops, the latter north of Hanoi,
are currently engaged in the full-time repair of
LOC's in North Vietnam and in the Laos Panhandle
(72,000 North Vietnamese, up to 34,000 Chinese en-
!gineering troops north of Hanoi, and 19,000 NVA/PL
in the Laos Panhandle). The use of part-time workers
primarily from the agricultural sector has added at
least 1.00,000 to 200,000 additional day laborers for
road, rail, and bridge repair work as needed.
3. The Effectiveness,of Bombing Bridges
The bombing of bridges in North Vietnam
has been unsuccessful in reducing the flow of men
and material-toward South Vietnam. Moreover, bridge
targets have been very costly in,terms of planes lost
and, have been effectively and quickly bypassed when
they were destroyed.
A sample of 48 JCS-numbered bridges has
been analyzed in detail to determine the effective-
ness of bombing bridges in North Vietnam as a tactic
to interdict traffic. Since the start of the Rolling
Thunder program in February 1.965, the US and the
South Vietnamese have bombed 48 out of a total of
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61 JCS bridges in North Vietnam. During the numerous
strikes and restrikes against these bridges, at
least 35 planes were lost.
The North Vietnamese have been able to
offset the effects of bomb damage to bridges by
constructing multiple bypasses for every chokepoint
bridge in the country. They have been able to build
!96 separate bypasses for 45 JCS bridges within the
immediate vicinity of the 45 JCS-targeted bridges
or, an average of slightly more than two bypasses per
bridge. A single bridge is a very difficult target
to destroy by aerial bombardment, and construction
.of multiple bypasses at a crossing site further re-
duces the probability of effectively interdicting
a LOC. The following tabulation shows a breakdown
of the North Vietnamese countermeasures used to by-
pass 45 JCS bridges:
..... ......
Type 'of Bypass
Number
Alternative bridges
24
Pontoon bridges
15
Cable bridges
9
Ferries
30
Fords
18
T
otal 96
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The construction of multiple bypasses,
in addition to ensuring a flow of traffic for the
North Vietnamese, greatly increases the cost of the
bombing program to the US. In general it takes as
many sorties and as much ordnance to interdict by-
passes as to interdict the original bridge.* The
cost to the US of bombing, therefore, increases at a
much more rapid rate than the cost to the North Viet-
namese because the majority of the bypasses are low-
cost expedients which can be repaired rapidly.
E. Contingency Planning
Along with reacting to existing bomb damage,
the North Vietnamese have, since the inception of the
bombing, developed contingency plans ---- countermeasures
taken before bombing occurs --'to cope with escalation
and shifts in emphasis of the Rolling Thunder program.
zf it is assumed, for example, that 10 tons of
supplies each day are moving over a LOC containing one
bridge, past performance suggests that one hit on the
bridge will be scored and traffic interdicted if 47
bombs are dropped. The average ordnance load carried
by aircraft over North Vietnam is just under two tons.
If the load consists of 500-pound bombs, it takes ap-
proximately six sorties to interdict a bridge. To
interrupt the same 10 tons of traffic which can be
handled by three possible crossings--the original
bridge or each of two separate bypasses--14l bombs in
the 500-pound class must be expended and 18 sorties
flown.
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These contingency plans are difficult to separate from
other reactions to existing bomb damage, and thus often
not easily recognizable. In addition, contingency plans
and countermeasures to existing bomb damage must com-
pete for the same scarce resources.
The nearly complete civil defense evacuation
,system in Hanoi and Haiphong and the elaborate system
of bridge bypasses are examples of ambitious contingency
planning. A civil defense shelter program is nearly
complete in Hanoi, despite the capital's relative im-
munity from air attack. In addition, a full half of
the populations of Hanoi and Haiphong are believed to
have been evacuated. A number of unstruck North Viet-
namese bridges have highway and rail bypasses already
in place in anticipation of future possible strikes.
Before the Hanoi Highway and Rail Bridge over the
Canal des Rapider was struck in late April,
piers for a bypass span had been in place for a num-
ber of months, and bridge decking was stored on the
river bank. A 7.3-mile rail bypass and rail ferry
skirts the unstruck Hanoi "Doumer" Bridge
Despite an ability to transport an adequate
level of supplies to the South with its existing al-
though constantly attacked transportation network,
North Vietnam has continued to expand the capacity
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of the network. For example, the Dong Dang Rail Line
has been dual gauged and extended from Kep to Thai
Nguyen. An alternative road network to Route 1 A
is nearing completion south from Thanh Hoa. Presum-
ably Hanoi is preparing for the contingency that the
US will greatly escalate the LOC campaign or mine
Haiphong harbor, necessitating the use of this ex-
tra capacity.
In other areas, Hanoi's contingency plans have
been less ambitious because of the strain placed on re-
source availability by countermeasures to existing
bomb damage. Although small portable diesel electric
power generators were received from the TJSSR in small
numbers during 1964 (22 in 1964), purchases did not
pick up to their present high rate until the US had
begun attacking thermal powerplants in the. southern
route packages in mid-1965. Although partial dis-
persal of several textile mills and some handicraft
industry took place in 1965, other major, unstruck
plants appear to be in full operation despite their
vulnerability.
Some dike and road interdiction contingency
plans appear to have been put into operation.
mesh for repairing breaches has been reported in
storage along dikes. Piles of stone and earth have
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been observed along roadsides; local village "volunteer"
crews are ready to fill crater holes.
F. Imports and Foreign Aid as Countermeasures
1. Economic Aid
The sharp and continuing rise in eco-
nomic aid to North Vietnam in the form of imports
!from the other Communist countries has been an im-
portant countermeasure to the bombing effort in
North Vietnam. This aid has risen from an annual
average of $50 million to $75 million for 1955-64
to an estimated $150 million in 1965 and $275 mil-
lion in 1966, and it seems to be increasing again
.in 1967. Most of the aid extended through 1964 was
for North Vietnam's economic development program.
The more recent aid agreements"make it clear that
the Communist countries have implicitly guaranteed
to finance the economic losses incurred by North
Pact countries had pledged $1 bil-
lion to support Hanoi's war effort seems an indi-
cation of the effort that the Communist countries
seem willing to make.
The value of this aid can be seem prin-
cipally in.the rise in imports in 1965 and. 1966,
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particularly the rise in imports of those goods sup-
porting the war effort.
The Communist countries have provided
substantial quantities of equipment for transporta-
tion, construction, power, communications, and main-
tenance programs. Furthermore, machinery and equip-
ment apparently have been made available for both
new and continuing aid projects which are not mili-
tary associated, although this category of aid goods
seemed to decline in 1966, and seems likely to de-
cline even further in 1967.
There have been sharp increases in im-
ports of machinery and equipment -- machine building
shops, repair shops, small manufacturing enterprises,
vehicles (road, rail, and water), heavy transport
and roadbuilding equipment, machine tools, small
diesel generators, and volumes of spare parts -- all
related to-the repair and replacement of parts in the
transportation and power sectors of the economy and
to repair and reconstruction programs. The power
sector is particularly dependent on diesel genera-
tors because the regular electric power industry
has been so heavily damaged by the bombing and be-
cause of the decentralization of industry. Tele-
communications imports are another valuable but
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small-volume category, with most military communi-
cations equipment supplied by Communist China, prob-
ably by rail.
Petroleum products are an extremely large
volume import -- imports by sea increased to 200,000
tons in 1966 compared with 170,000 tons in 1965. Early
1967 reports show another large increase. Petroleum
imports are essential to the transportation, con-
struction, and power sectors of the economy, par-
ticularly to the power sector since it has become
so dependent on diesel generators.
Almost all iron and steel products must
be imported because North Vietnam makes no steel,
although it does produce pig'iron at the Thai Nguyen
iron and steel complex. Products related to the war
effort, such as barges, POL storage tanks,. pontoons,
building members, possibly bridge trusses, and other
structured shapes, are fabricated at Thai Nguyen and
possibly at other locations. Most of these metal
products come from the USSR and Japan by ship, al-
though Communist China probably ships some steel
products by rail. Imports of these metals by sea
during 1966 were double the volume in 1965.
Bulk foodstuffs imported by sea have
increased sharply in late 1966 and early 1967. This
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increase parallels the reports of losses of rice pro-
duction in North Vietnam in 1966, and it may also
reflect internal distribution problems. Food im-
ports could become important if the seeming food
shortage worsens. Another factor in the food sup-
ply has been the large and increasing imports of
. i
fertilizers. Maintenance of the food supply may
be more difficult if the fertilizers are not re-
ceived and distributed properly.
nam's economy, however, makes it less vulnerable
than its dependence on imports might suggest. The
.economy of North Vietnam is still basically one of
subsistence agriculture, with an essential self-suf-
ficiency in food, although continuation of the
shortages reported in late 1966 could bring about
a critical situation if imports are cut off. Denial
of imports to North Vietnam otherwise would have
minimal effect on the nonindustrial economic organ-
ization generally. Even the loss of transport equip-
ment could be compensated for in the domestic econ-
omy by the extensive use of manpower for the trans-
portation of necessary goods.
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2. Military Aid
In addition to increasing their deliver-
ies of economic goods, the USSR and Communist China
responded to the Rolling Thunder program by increas-
25X1
ing sharply the levels of military assistance,
Deliveries of military equipment, which
previously had been on a very small scale, reached
an estimated
been at a slightly higher rate than that observed
during 1966, and may increase even more during the
Deliveries in the first quarter of 1967 have
Chinese military aid programs follow
well-established lines which reflect the capabilities
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of the donors. The USSR has provided heavier and
more advanced equipment such as antiaircraft guns,
radar, tanks, artillery, SAM systems, and most of
the advanced fighter aircraft. The Chinese have
been the major suppliers of trucks, small arms
ammunition, and equipment for ground forces.
In addition to deliveries of military
equipment, the USSR and Communist China have pro-
vided military advisers and technicians to North
Vietnam. The Chinese contribution in this area is
far greater than that of the USSR. At the end of
1966 an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 Chinese support
troops were in North Vietnam working on the con-
struction, repair, and defense of transportation
facilities. In contrast, the number of Soviet mili-
tary technicians was between 2,500 and 3,000 during
1965 and currently is estimated at from 1,000 to
1,500.
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III. Prospects of an Effective Bombing Program
A. The Success to Date
The objectives of the bombing program are
stated currently to be two-fold:
1. To limit or raise the cost of sending
men and supplies to South Vietnam.
2. To make North. Vietnam pay a price for
its aggression against the South.
To the extent that any degradation of enemy
capabilities or any penalties imposed on his aggres-
sive conduct in South Vietnam are indicative of
successful achievement of US objectives, the US
bombing program must be judged to.be meeting with
some success. But the degree of success is limited.
The bombing program has undoubtedly raised the cost
and increased the burdens of maintaining the aggres-
sion in South Vietnam. These exactions appear to be
within acceptable limits to the Hanoi regime. Given
a continuing flow of economic and military aid from
Communist China and the USSR, North Vietnam remains
capable of maintaining and supplying its forces in
South Vietnam at both present and higher levels of
combat. The price of its aggression, with the
exception of manpower losses, is being assumed by
its Communist allies.
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Despite the increased weight and broadening
of the air attack, North Vietnam has increased its
support of the insurgency in South Vietnam. There
was a three-fold increase in the level of personnel
infiltration;in 1966 and additional thousands of
troops have been positioned in and around the DMZ.
The f:Low of material supplies to the VC/NVA forces
in South Vietnam during the current dry season is
at least equal to and may well exceed the volume
made available last year.
The North Vietnamese economy has suffered
increasing damage, but this has had no decisive
effect on the attitude of the regime toward the war,
nor has it caused a deterioration of popular morale
to the point where the regime has lost the support
of its people. The performance of the domestic
transportation system exceeds that achieved before
the Rolling Thunder program; imports both by sea
and by rail have moved to increasingly high levels.
Deficiencies in domestic food supply are being met
by the USSR and Communist China and food shortages
have not attained serious proportions. The vital
petroleum storage system, as currently dispersed,
has survived the destruction of more than 85 per-
cent of its major bulk storage capacities, and
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petroleum stocks have been maintained at essentially
early 1966 levels. The neutralization of 70 percent
of the country's electric power generating capacity
has created severe shortages of power and disrupted
much of North Vietnam's modern industrial economy.
It is unlikely, however, that the loss of electric
power can have a significant impact on military
operations.
B. Outlook
The outlook for marked success in achieving
the current objectives of US bombing programs is
11
not bright. The US bombing program had by the end
of April attacked 173 targets or more than 70 percent
of the targets on the JCS list. About 20 of these
targets received only minor damage, so that their
pre-strike-capacity is relatively intact. These
targets and the 69 unstruck targets are grouped, by
category, as follows:
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Target System
Bridges
Airfields
Military barracks headquarters
and storage depots
Powerplants
Locks
Industry
Mineable areas
Miscellaneous
Total
Number
28
7
In addition, there are seven non-targeted industrial
facilities that are significant to the North Viet-
namese economy and its war-supporting a.ctivities.-
The returns that can be realistically ex-
pected from the neutralization of the remaining
economic, military, and land transport JCS targets
is small. The two most promising target systems --
locks and mineable areas -- have been unacceptable
to date on humane grounds or because of the political
problems their neutralization would create. The
enemy's success in countering attacks on bridges
and in sustaining traffic movement is too well cata-
logued to warrant further discussion. Attacks on
military installations would have only limited ef-
fects. Many of these facilities are inactive, and
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contingency plans to counter their loss are undoubt-?
edly well developed. Even if North Vietnam were
denied complete access to its airfields, this alone
would be unlikely to significantly alter the regime's
attitude toward the war since it would have only a
marginal effect, through increasing costs, on the
flow of men and supplies to the South.
The neutralization of North Vietnam's re-
maining industry would extract a high price in terms
of the elimination of the results of years of eco-
nomic development, loss of foreign exchange earnings,
and the displacement of the urban labor force, and
would add to the burden of aid from other Communist
countries. There is no apparent reason why such
losses would force Hanoi to the negotiating table.
The loss of its modern industrial sector is appar-
ently a tolerable burden in a country that has an
overwhelmingly agrarian economy. The contribution
of North Vietnam's modern economy to the war effort
is small and its loss can be countered as long as
essential economic and military supplies can be
obtained from the USSR and China.
The greatest possible impact on Hanoi would
result from a US strike program which would include
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mining the major ports and inland waterways, to which
the remaining JCS transport targets, other than the
locks, would make a useful addition. It has pre-
viously been estimated that such a program would be
a matter of serious concern to the Hanoi leadership.
Some import programs would have to be forgone and
problems of supply and distribution would be acute.
However, even this program's successful execution
would be unlikely to dampen down the continued move-
ment of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the
South.
C. Costs to the US
The US would probably pay increasing costs --
both political and military -- in choosing any of the
available options for escalation of the air war. The
political costs in terms of both domestic US and
international reactions would vary with the options
chosen. US aircraft losses on the recent strikes in
the Hanoi-Haiphong area have been at a rate of more
than ten times those experienced during the 1966
campaign and in attacks on more isolated targets dur-
ing 1967. The preponderance of the targets yet un-
struck or warranting restrike are in the more heavily
defended areas of North Vietnam.. Almost 90 percent --
$6 targets -- are in Route Packages 4, 5, and 6. Of
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these, eight are in Route Package 5, 69 are in Route
Package 6, which includes Hanoi and Haiphong, and
nine targets are in the buffer zone along the Chinese-
North Vietnamese border.
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STAT
FORM
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5 4 101 WHICH RELACES
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