THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010037-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: December 20, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Rase 2007/03/06: CIA-R00100826AWffiW3CGrbt
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
NSA review completed
i ARMY review(s) completed.
Top Secret
20 December 1966
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500010037-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500010037-9
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500010037-9
 App
Information as of 1600
20 December 1966
25X1
HIGHLIGHTS
The Viet Cong attacked a CIDG Special Forces unit
northwest of Saigon near Tay Ninh city on 19 December.
I. The Military Situation iq South Vietnam: No
significant contact with the enemy has been reported in
any of the 28 large-scale allied ground operations cur-
rently in progress (Para. 1). A South Vietnamese CIDG
Special Forces unit sustained moderate casualties on 19
December when attacked by a Viet Cong force of unknown
size near Tay Ninh city (Para. 2). Intercepted Viet
Cong communications continue to reflect serious concern
over the possibility of additional major allied ground
operations against the Communists' War Zone "C" in
Tay Ninh Province (Paras. 3-5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: During
its 19 December session, the Constituent Assembly dis-
cussed the method of selection of provincial officials
under the new constitution (Paras. 1-2).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: North
Korean pilot-s continue to increase the tempo of their
training (Paras. 1-2).
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: No direct com-
ment yet from Hanoi or the Liberation Front on US appeal
to U Thant (Paras. 1-2). Peking continues to protest
the bombings of the Hanoi area (Paras, 3-4).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Non-Communist reaction
to the air strikes in the Hanoi area (Paras. 1-5).
App
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
10 9
 Approved For Fase 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T008261500010037-9
Tay NIWNnh
Njnng .11
X11 CORPS
Capital Special Zone
SOUTH VIETNAM
65170 CIA
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010037-9
 App
1. US combat forces are participating in 13 of
the 28 battalion-size or larger allied search-and-
destroy operations currently in progress. No major
contact with the enemy was reported in any of these
operations on 20 December.
2. Communist forces of unknown size attacked
a Vietnamese CIDG Special Forces unit operating ap-
proximately 59 miles northwest of Saigon near Tay
Ninh city on 19 December. The assault featured
heavy mortar and small-arms fire and lasted for more
than two hours. South Vietnamese casualties were
six killed and 16 wounded. Enemy losses included
one killed and one captured. A government reaction
force failed to re-establish contact with the attackers.
Over Allied Incursions Into War Zone "C"
Viet Cong Communications Reflect Continuing Concern
3. Enemy communications intercepted since late
November 1966 have reflected increasing Viet Cong
concern and anticipation of further major allied
ground operations against their long-time jungle
preserve--War Zone "C"--in northern Tay Ninh Prov-
ince.
4. In several recent messages, the Military
Intelligence Bureau of the Viet Cong's Central Office
for South Vietnam (MIBC/COSVN) has expressed seri-
ous concern to subordinates in Tay Ninh and adja-
cent Binh Duong Province about the possibility of
allied forces again conducting large-scale sweep
operations--similar to Operations ATTLEBORO and
BIRMINGHAM--against War Zone "C". For example, on
29 November the MIBC informed a subordinate in the
Tay Ninh - Binh Duong border area that "the enemy
is determined to destroy our base camp in War Zone
'C' this year." In this message, and in several
others passed to additional subordinates on 9, 10,
and 19 December, MIBC ordered recipients to employ
App
25X1
 Ap
Proved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A0015000100~
every means for keeping "the enemy" under surveillance
and to report immediately any indication of the con-
centration or movement of allied forces at outposts,
along Routes 1 and 13, and along air routes in their
respective tactical areas of responsibility.
5. There are no major allied ground operations
currently in progress in or near War Zone "C" in Tay
Ninh Province. According to MACV, the relatively un-
expected and unplanned large-scale commitment of US
troop reserves to the highly successful recent Op-
eration ATTLEBORO (14 October - 25 November) forced
the postponement of a major US operation, originally
scheduled for December, which had the objective of
clearing War Zone "C." That operation, now intended
as a follow-up to ATTLEBORO, is presently scheduled
for January 1967 at the earliest.
25X1
A0proved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001500Q10037-9
 App
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. During its 19,December meeting, the Con-
stituent Assembly debated the problem of providing
constitutional guarantees for the election of pro-
vincial officials. The deputies agreed in general
that it would be desirable to guarantee the election
of village chiefs and members of the provincial,
municipal, and village councils in the constitution.
There was considerable disagreement, however, on
whether to establish this method for choosing prov-
ince chiefs and mayors. Those arguing against the
election of important provincial and urban officials
included several Catholic deputies and a prominent
military deputy, who were probably reflecting the
viewpoint of other military members of the assembly.
Those in favor of elected provincial leaders were
reportedly the small, militant Southern Renaissance
Bloc, the Hoa Hao religious sect, and several deputies
from the Greater People's Bloc.
2. The province chief, almost always a military
officer, has become an extremely powerful individual,
answering only to the military commander of his
respective corps area or to the Saigon authorities.
The military establishment probably sees the increas-
ing number of assembly appeals for more local au-
tonomy as further steps toward eroding military
authority.
20 December 1966
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00150001003T
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500010q
III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. North Korean pilots in North Vietnam
were noted practicing air intercepts for the
first time on 18 December. They were observed
in the same role on 19 December. On 18 December
they were noted also for the first time, working
with North Vietnamese pilots.
2. On both days, North Korean pilots were
airborne while US aircraft were in the Hanoi
area. Aircraft piloted by North Koreans came
within 1,000 feet of a US aircraft on 19 December
after being told by a ground controller to drop
their fuel tanks. Intercepted communications did
not indicate any intent by the North Koreans to
engage the US aircraft.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001500Q10037-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500019037-9
port.
1e There is nothing of significance to re-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500010037I
 Ap
Proved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO0150001003
V.... COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Neither Hanoi radio nor the Liberation News
Agency has yet mentioned the US appeal to UN Secre-
tary General U Thant on 19 December to help get
talks started on a cease-fire, An Algiers domestic
raidobroadcast,. however, reported that the Libera-
tion Front representative in Algiers did comment on
the US proposal in a press conference on 19 December.
According to the broadcast the Front official char-
acterized the US initiative as a "manuever designed
to halt the heroic Vietnamese Liberation struggle."
He is reported to have said that the new appeal
aroused no interest at the UN because it contained
nothing new.
2. Only three days ago, a Liberation Front
representative speaking in Oslo made a special
point of telling his Norwegian audience that the
Front did not accept U Thant's earlier three-point
program as a basis for a solution to the Vietnam
problem;. When press representatives reminded him
that a recent local Norwegian leftist demonstration
(which the Front offcial had previously commended)
had supported U Thant's plan, the Vietnamese com-
mented: '"If that is the case we must talk to our
Norwegian friends and explain our views."
Peking on the Bombings in the Hanoi Area
3. Peking continued its propaganda campaign
on the US bombing near Hanoi with a People's Daily
editorial on 20 December marking the sixth anni-
versary of the founding of the Liberation Front.
Asserting that the Chinese have made all prepara-
tions to take such actions "as they and the Vietnam-
ese" deem necessary at any time to "attack jointly"
the US "aggressors," the editorial concluded with
a warning that should the US expand the war, the
Chinese "will resolutely meet the challenge and
go to war."
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500010
25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001500g10037-9
4. The wording "attack" the Americans and
"go to war" are a variation on Peking's standard
formulation and have apparently been employed to
make the Chinese response appear more forceful
without actually increasing Peking's commitment
to aid the Vietnamese. The editorial, however,
does not: go beyond previous Chinese statements
to send men "if needed" and continues to imply
that the Chinese will not take the initiative
in provoking war with the US.
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010031-9
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500010037-9
25X1
Non-Communist Reaction to Air Strikes in Hanoi Area
1. Reaction in the non-Communist world generally
has reflected. concern that the US might have escalated
the war by its air strikes in the Hanoi area. The
concern, however, has appeared to be more directly
related to the threat of escalation than to Communist
claims of widespread civilian casualties. The British
press has given the story prominent play but no general
pattern of commentary has emerged. In Parliament, left-
wing Laborites closely questioned Foreign Secretary
Brown, pressing him to disassociate Britain from the
"bombing of population centers." The foreign secretary
handled the questions in general terms and reaffirmed
his confidence that the US is only attacking military
targets.
2. The bombings story has caused increased un-
easiness in the Scandinavian countries, particularly
in Sweden. The press, already basically unsympathetic
to the US position in Vietnam, has criticized the most
recent bombings as a dangerous escalation of an al-
ready explosive situation.
3. Reaction in Africa has been confined to a
few press articles and radiobroadcasts. These, however,
have been generally condemnatory in tone, even in
normally moderate states.
4. No Japanese reaction has been noted on the
bombing of the Hanoi area on 13 and 14 December.
Earlier in December, however, a sense of uneasiness
was apparent when the Japanese press began to step up
its coverage of Vietnam. The press implied that air
strikes near Hanoi indicated that the US had decided
to escalate the bombing of North Vietnam.
5. In Algeria, some 300 demonstrators broke
into the US Embassy grounds on 20 December to present
a petition of protest to the US ambassador. The embassy
20 December 1966
Apprc
25X1
 App
was not damaged and the group withdrew peaceably.
In addition, the formation of an Algerian Commission
to Investigate US War Crimes was announced on 20
Decemberm~.. The 13-man commission is headed by one
of the members of the Algerian Ruling Revolutionary
Council.
20 'December 1966
25X1
Apo
 Top S I ? t For R ase 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79T00826061500010037-9
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01500010037-9