ASSESSMENT OF ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONSHIPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010034-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: December 19, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

SECRET
25X1 Approv d For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010 34-2
No. 1701/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 December 1966
MEMORANDUM
Assessment of Algerian-Moroccan Relationships
Summary
Moroccan concern over the possibility of an
attack from Algeria has led it to search for arms
and military assistance. Although it seems unlikely
that the Algerians intend, or would be able, to
mount any large-scale military operation against
Morocco during the next several years, the concern
in Morocco is nonetheless real.
Rabat is unhappy with the US refusal in August
to sell it some $12-14 million worth of arms. How-
ever, so long as some US aid continues and some al-
ternate Western arms sources are found, this seems
unlikely to lead to a deterioration in US-Moroccan
relations to the point, for example, that US use of
the base at Kenitra would be jeopardized.
State Dept., OSD reviews completed
Note: a memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current in-
telligence and coordinated with the Office
of Research and Reports and the Office of
National Estimates.
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The continuing flow of Soviet arms into
Algeria has increased the nervousness of its neigh-
bors--Morocco and Tunisia--both of which are in-
volved in territorial disputes with Algeria. In
addition to the potential military threat which
they see in a wall-equipped and well-trained Alge-
rian army, authorities in Rabat and Tunis fear that
the revolutionary socialists in Algiers may seek
to undermine their own regimen. Both have sought
significant now quantities of US military assist-
ance.
2. The Algerian Government, for its part, ad-
mits that the humiliation its army suffered at the
hands of the Moroccan forces during border hostil-
ities in October 1963 provided the impetus for the
present military buildup, but it disclaims any ag-
gressive intentions. It claims that its policy is
to have a small but technically competent and well-
armed strikfnq force which would deter any poten-
tial attacker.
3. The Algerian Government has evinced a path-
ological fear of external aggression. I,ast spring
and summer,, Algerian officials clearly believed re_.
current rumors to the effect that the US had con-
cluded base agreements with both Morocco and Tuni-
sia with, the object of "+eticirc.ing" Algeria. Re-
peated denials by America;,, Moroccan,, and Tunisi
fficials seemed to quiet their fr
A.lger,ian. Intentions and Car.~abilities
4. Conclusion H of NIE 60-66, The
(Morocco, Algeria, 11uniaia), 5 May 1M,
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"Despite the tensions among the Maghreb states, none
is likely to mount a deliberate major armed attack
against a neighbor during the period of this esti-
mate" (the next two or three years). American of-
ficials in Algiers do not believe that any Algerian
official, even among leftist leaders, contemplates
military aggression against Algeria's neighbors. In
contrast with the military display of the 1 November
1965 parade on the anniversary of the outbreak in
1954 of the rebellion (when for internal reasons
the Boumediene regime felt a need to show its
strength), the 1 November 1966 parade subordinated
its military section to its civilian and party
units. Although the army is the basis of support
for Boumediene and has a major voice in policy mak-
ing, the regime is not militaristic. Military men
in uniform are rarely seen, and the army partici-
pates in implementing economic and political reforms
as well as in backstopping the police services. more-
over, Boumediene--as well as Hassan and Bourguiba---
hass shown marked restraint in handling recurrent
border problems.
5 Although the amount of Soviet military
equipment received is impressive in quantity, type,
and sophistication and in far in excess of Algeria's
defense needs, there are a number of significant
limitations on Algeria's military capabilities. A
major training program under way for some time should
begin to remedy some deficiencies in a year or two,
but Algeria still suffers a shortage of skilled
technicians for the operation, maintenance, and re-
pair of equipment, a lack of operational experience
with large units, and inexperience in air/ground
tactical cooperation. It also lacks an effective
logistic and supply system capable of supporting
sustained corset operations of any magnitude.
6. Political considerations also probably im-
pair the effectiveness of the 62,000-man Algerian
Army. The single most important long-term problem
faced by the army, aside from the deficiency of
human talent, is its lack of homogeneity. Its of-
ficer corps is an amalgam of: (a) officers, many
of them former officers or noncommissioned officers
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 out 9t
and 140rveo k
terior " arty
relatively at
litiaa and
r i s (c
Arary whose p 'Ufpsi -ra1 .ckggr
have little e tir;s t.- of their late c vvr-
aim to th, . s tis raiiiat mau l and (d) 'new army"
officers trained abroa nip is e a awe, wastly
is the MM and t. u VAR. It has been .i m
C~O; i s t w f oth'i ewer the Lievitablo frictions
rise asp:< these gaup and h aqt nil
7 to create a ao etu ona r2 xf aaia al
argue:.
arate group
nambers of
in the major.
6, f ie of sap-
erase.. Porn
erior' ax are probably still
army officers. They ta;.-,e
mat pri e in their role during the lion
they are at a serious Ueac vantage LA a am-: arny
because of t%eir weak educational and p f aiczai
qualifications. An a gla ce t tend tr. 41`al3
back on perecs l rolsti shi . Professionally
traixwol offi r , on tts t toter band, have develop-,ad
a arommon interest is aniurir^ that vano nt is
based on merit r .tr r th x '*rnactLona.'4
th4 aster. Within f i
ra and infi be
balance of ~owar
a -Y a rr il1aa and the Fresh-trairred
bly too early to count thu
ata+ for Aid
fore" are ller an
h tie of Algeria, but th br
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i .*ti has undoubtedly bewi
`aiat pass, aa4 ?tiara
still relatively r nior,
 aslite
f providing
tpabi1ities wmald
Ap
1.0
frM P
few yam however
seta to $4 aal
=mthe age a
tot c:s
ailitAury equiMsnt, it allec Gaily age to
Core to V - l s ai si oT 1d Algeria is w .
S has provided x -co with little
el.
of Wifts to oattxesas, however
military assist to Morocco
abut $25 million. It was substantially IftOr4a"d
is 1965, 'a ; o a y in gran t-sal. agr ant of $11
ail lion was signed, chiefly for 12 r-5 aircraft.
i gan in Uavw r 1966, and will con-
cluded in 194r,. In Hay 1966, King assan seq 3 l
parvwd4sicm to pu=hum from the US $12-$14 million
worth of military alit-went, chiefly tans and anti-
tank weapon R. =a rawusst was denied in I ist 1 466
a modest scads in 1960, and has so far t
of
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47,000-mm araq
an loyal King
at . Morocco
a Algerian ins io
might solicit
.e in late
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can Ram
-;i , ? rt .
CV- aeJ accepted r the vat rna
Ucri, is generally stable. ltt
rumd is to put idle isl
c d alc new industries to
ate purchasing power
stop u
c r-Ainta.ins a nonaligned stance, but
aster oriented.. Alth -$h its re'
the past several Years,
iat the latter are. about
t inulnct
hi -laval
ut be has been
sets with
tC $ions re-
ding the r,.t 4 al threat from Al ria, ire can be
; c ad to solicit Ar and econcmLia aasistanca from
likely scurce at will surely at least raise the
question of arvs with President Jerson wh a he visits
ttie
t evil ly the close relati h
or Tasca with fno Hassan vil.l w-I
k-: t a bra finds alternate so, :es for
is aid. This will not rascesser
bitterly disapintod with the
arms rest,
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1960 militarv r iii
o support for Via T -t
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