THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TODAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 12, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TODAY
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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C O N T E N T S
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. General Deployment of Forces . . . . . . 4
Division Alignments . . . . . . . . . . 4
III. Capability as Effective Fighting Force 8
Leadership in Combat. . . . . . . . . . 9
Employment of Forces. . . . . . . . . . 10
Effectiveness in Large-Unit Operations. 12
IV. The Manpower Problem . . . . . . . . . . 14
Desertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Defections to Viet Cong . . . . . . . . 16
V. Changeover to Pacification Role . . . . . 17
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
12 December 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The South Vietnamese Army Today
Summary
Plans are under way to shift the South Viet-
namese Army (ARVN) away from large-scale offensive
operations against Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army
main force units and employ it largely as a force
to support pacification activities. The problems
and characteristics of the ARVN as it exists today
will to some extent determine its performance in
this mission. This study sets forth some aspects
of the ARVN's current status and reviews many of
its more important problems on the eve of its re-
assignment.
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the Office
of Research and Reports, the Office of Na-
tional Estimates, and the Director's Special
Assistant for Vietnam.
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1. Up to the present, neither the sharply
increased level of US military assistance nor the
large-scale commitment of US combat troops to South
Vietnam appears to have resulted in a significant
improvement of the over-all operational posture or
combat performance of the South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN).
2. The inclusion of major ARVN elements in the
planning and execution of combined operations with
American forces has, to some degree, improved the
morale and aggressiveness of certain ARVN units, in-
cluding two of the three divisions based in the
western half of III Corps. In much of the rest of
the country, however, ARVN combat performance has
been generally unsatisfactory or, at best, marginal,
with the result that US and third-country deploy-
ments have been required to counter major Communist
thrusts in most critical areas.
3. During the past year, the ARVN's forces
have been most effective in the IV Corps area south
of Saigon, largely because Viet Cong main forces in
this region have been weakened by sizable cadre and
combat troop withdrawals to the III Corps and else-
where.
4. While there has been a generally favorable
trend during 1966 in terms of the number of ARVN units
considered combat effective,* the over-all capability
of the regular army has, nonetheless, continued to be
adversely affected by a number of important factors.
Among them has been the general expansion of Communist
military resources in the I, II, and III Corps Tacti-
cal Zones. The ARVN is unable, in many instances,
to engage Communist main force units in the field on
equal terms because of understrength units and in-
ferior firepower. Another problem has been the
ARVN's training. It is considered poor in quality and
* o 1 - September 1966, 130 of ARVN's 158 maneuver
battalions were rated by US advisers as combat ef-
fective, 24 marginally combat effective, and four
combat ineffective.
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often oriented more toward conventional warfare than
toward counterinsurgency methods and tactics. The in-
sufficient number of qualified, aggressive and highly
motivated officers and NCOs is reflected in frequent
tactical blunders in conducting both large and small-
unit operations.
5. The desertion rate of all component services
of South Vietnam's armed forces, especially that of the
ARVN, continued to rise throughout much of 1966. Al-
though the rate has declined somewhat in recent months,
it is problematical whether the induction system of
the armed forces can continue to keep pace with losses
from desertions and combat casualties.
6. On balance, the ARVN is considered generally
capable of maintaining internal security in most major
population centers, in a few outlying areas, and along
certain lines of communication. It is considered
wholly incapable, however, of prolonged effective re-
sistance by itself to the military threat posed by
intensified North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infiltration
and combat activity. It is also questionable whether
the ARVN could cope alone with the Viet Cong, were
Allied and North Vietnamese combat units to be with-
drawn from South Vietnam.
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ARVN - rder o Batt e
GULF OF
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UUANG DUC
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HIGH COMMAND,
GENERAL RESERVE,
GUARD BRIGADE
PHU
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LOCATION OF
MAJOR UNITS
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1. The 284,633-man. ARVN is the predominant
force within. the South Vietnamese military estab-
lishment and comprises about 90 percent of the
personnel strength of the regular armed forces.*
ARVN forces are deployed by corps zones north to
south. For purposes of military command, admin-
istration, and logistics, the corps are further
subdivided into division. tactical areas. Approxi-
mately 34,000 ARVN combat troops, including 22,700
in the 1st and 2nd Divisions, operate in the five
northernmost provinces of South Vietnam which
form the I Corps area. Some 30,000 regular army
troops, 19,500 of them subordinate to the 22n.d
and 23rd Divisions, are based in the central high-
lands and central coastal provinces of II Corps.
2. The heaviest concentration of ARVN units
is in the III Corps area, where nearly 50,000 com-
bat troops, including 34,400 attached to the 5th,
10th, and 25th Divisions, are deployed in an. arc
screenin.g Saigon. and its suburbs on the north,
northwest, and northeast. About 38,000 combat
person.n.el, 31,000 of whom are organized under the
7th, 9th, and 21st Divisions, are stationed in. the
IV Corps southern delta area below Saigon., Finally,
the 8,500-man Airborne Division, reinforced by five
South Vietnamese Marine battalions, composes the
ARVN General Reserve headquartered in. the Saigon
Capital Special Zone.
Division Alignments
3. The present pattern of ARVN deployment has
existed for the past two years, the sole major
*major ARVN combat uni s presently include four
corps headquarters, ten infantry divisions, one
airborne division, one Guard Brigade, one separate
infantry regiment, four separate infantry battalions,
seven separate artillery battalions, nine armored
cavalry squadrons, one Ranger group headquarters,
20 Ranger battalions, and two Special Forces groups.
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exception being the creation. of the 10th Division
in III Corps late in 1965.
4. In 1963 and 1964, two ARVN divisions--the
9th and 25th--were moved from Quan.g Ngai and Binh
Dinh provinces to reinforce the delta because of
concern. over the deteriorating security situation
there. These redeployments, which brought the
number of ARVN divisions stationed in the southern
III Corps and IV Corps region to four, significantly
improved the government's military posture in the
delta.
5. Subsequently, the Viet Con.g began. to skim
off cadres and combat elements from their main
force units in the delta to permit expansion. Of their
regular force structure in the III Corps area. The
withdrawals lowered the combat effectiveness of the
Viet Cong main forces in the IV Corps. Communist
regulars were largely obliged to disperse and revert
to small-unit operations in. conjunction with local
force battalions. For this reason the ARVN has
generally held its own in. the delta over the past
18 months, although large Communist forces remain
there and the area still serves as a source of man-
power and food for enemy units elsewhere.
6. Following the redeployment of the 9th and
25th ARVN Divisions to the delta in 1964, the
security situation in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh
provinces went rapidly downhill. During the past
year, however, the deployment of US Marines to Chu
Lai and of South Korean forces to Qui Nhon has
tended to stabilize the military situation in. Quang
Ngai and Binh Dinh. Offensives by these and other
allied units in the area, culminating in. the recent
highly successful Operation IRVING, have substan-
tially reduced the Communist threat, at least in
Binh Dinh Province.
7. The 1st and 7th ARVN Divisions, based in
Hue and My Tho, are generally considered the best
of the major South Vietnamese units apart from the
airborne and ranger outfits. Until six months ago,
the l.st Division was more or less holding its own.
against Communist main forces in Quan.g Tri and Thua
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Thien provinces. The influx of North Vietnamese
regulars into the northern part of I Corps, how-
ever, was of necessity met by US redeployments.
It is questionable, moreover, whether the 1st
Division has fully r?covered from the heavy in-
volvement of some of its units and officers on the
side of antigovernment elements in this spring's
political upheaval in I Corps.
8. The ARVN 7th Division has executed a
number. of successful operations over the past two
years which have kept Viet Cong main force units
largely off balance in Viet Cong Military Region. 8
(the northern Delta area immediately below Saigon).
The division has had a number of able commanders
and played a key role in supporting the government
against coup attempts in 1964-65.
9. The 5th and 25th Divisions, based in the
III Corps provinces of Binh Duong and Hau Nghia,
were for some time acknowledged as the least effec-
tive major ARVN units. However, both divisions
have displayed signs of general improvement in the
last six months. The greatest single factor in
improving tactical efficiency, pacification prowess,
troop welfare, and morale of these divisions has
been their inclusion in combined operations with
US 1st and 25th Infantry Division forces in the
area. The division commanders are developing a
higher degree of confidence as a result of their
direct relationships with American commanders in
the planning and execution of joint operations.
10. Since no major US tactical elements are
permanently assigned to Long Khanh Province, the
10th ARVN Division (based at the provincial capital
of Xuan Loc) has not had a similar stimulus for
improvement. This appears to be the major factor
in the continued lack of progress in this unit as
compared with others in III Corps.
11. In. the provinces adjacent to Saigon, and
in the Capital Special Zone itself, political as
well as strategic considerations play a major role
in governing the disposition and effectiveness of
ARVN units. The screen of ARVN forces around
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Saigon. is designed to block any major Communist
military effort against the capital as well as a
possible movement on. the city by coup forces from
distant corps areas. Regular army units operating
in. the capital area thus must be loyal to the
government in. power. Therefore the zone commander
and the commanders of the airborne division., the
marine brigade, and the guard brigade which are
headquartered in Saigon. and make up the ARVN
general reserve and the palace guard, are selected
as much for their political reliability as for
their demonstrated effectiveness in combat.
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III. CAPABILITY AS EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE
1. For a number of years, the performance of
ARVN combat units in the field vis-a-vis the Viet
Cong has been adversely affected by the nature of
the training they have received, first from the
French during the Indo-China War and then from the
US after 1954. In essence, ARVN units have been
trained to fight a conventional-type war in a
counterinsurgency environment. This, of course,
would apply as well to the great majority of US
combat troops presently in South Vietnam, who are
on the whole outperforming enemy main force units
chiefly through the application of conventional
warfare techniques. The basic difference, however,
lies in the mobility and in the massive logistics-
support base available to American combat forces in
the field--helicopters, tactical aircraft, heavy
artillery, and naval gunfire. US forces, therefore,
enjoy an enormous firepower and quick-reaction
capability over any Communist unit, a capability
which is simply unavailable to most ARVN units on
any comparable scale.
2. The large number of automatic weapons avail-
able to a main force Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) unit gives it an overwhelming superiority in
firepower against the average ARVN infantry unit
equipped primarily with M-ls and carbines.* The bulk
of the Viet Cong main forces in III and IV Corps, as
well as NVA units in I and II Corps, are equipped
* ARVN units have been supplied mainly with US arms
and military equipment, most of which is of World
War II design and manufacture. In addition to the
usual inventory of small arms and automatic weap-
ons, the regular army's heavy weapons include mor-
tars (60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch), rocket launchers
(3,.5-inch), recoilless rifles (57-mm.), and howitzers
(75-mm. self-propelled and pack, 105-mm., and 155-mm.).
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with the modern 7.62-mm. family of small arms, 75-mm.
recoilless rifles, 12.7-mm. and 7.92-mm. AAA machine
guns, and B-40 rocket launchers. Faced with such
superior firepower, ARVN units are generally very
wary of closing with the Viet Cong, and rely heavily
on artillery and air support in situations where
close-in combat is almost mandatory to achieve satis-
factory results.
3. Individual ARVN battalions are also often
unable to meet Viet Cong/NVA main force units on
numerically equal terms. As of September 1966, the
average present-for-duty strength for the 158 ARVN
maneuver battalions was 458, or 63 percent of the
authorized strength of 714. Beyond this, the limited
mobility capability of the ARVN, and its continuing
requirement to provide security for populated areas,
tends to reduce even further the actual number of
troops available for offensive operations. For ex-
ample, many infantry and ranger battalions are fre-
quently unable to put more than 250 to 300 men into
a field operation, compared with 400 to 600 men in a
Communist main force or provincial battalion. This
numerical disadvantage is quite evident to ARVN
troops as well as to their commanders, and hence
limits their confidence and willingness to take risks.
4. US ground forces, on the other hand, have a
more substantial capability. In September, the pres-
ent-for-duty strength of the 66 US combat maneuver
battalions in South Vietnam (48 US Army, 18 USMC)
averaged 92 percent. The authorized strength of a
US Army infantry battalion in South Vietnam is 837
and that of a US Marine infantry battalion 1,200.
American units are thus able to field a much larger
combat force in the same number of battalions than
their. ARVN counterparts. This permits them to en-
gage enemy forces on a unit-for-unit basis on numer-
ically favorable terms.
Leadership in Combat
5. As in any army, ARVN combat effectiveness
is directly related to the capability of the unit
commander. During the first nine months of 1966,
leadership in 22 to 35 percent of ARVN's 158 bat-
talions was rated by US field advisers as unsatis-
factory or marginal. Such factors as the rapid
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expansion of the force structure necessitated by
the acceleration of enemy military activity, the
lack of an adequate base of experienced leaders,
especially junior officers and NCOs, the preoc-
cupation with political maneuvering at the senior
officer level, and the frequent command changes in
top echelons, have all contributed significantly
to the leadership problem. The ARVN also has a
tendency to overstaff its headquarters elements at
the sector, regimental, divisional, and corps level
with an inordinate number of junior officers and
NCOs, many of whom have reportedly paid for the
privilege of avoiding combat duty.
6. The importance of good leaderhip is clear.
The 9th ARVN Division, for example, has had a good
combat record largely because it has consistently
had effective and efficient leaders. A number of
ARVN regiments have had poor combat records except
during the tenure of one specific commander; others,
such as the 42nd and 47th Regiments, based in Bac
Lieu and Phu Yen :provinces, have had a succession
of able commanders under whom they performed credit-
ably, only to deteriorate under a bad one,
Employment of Forces
7. During the past few years, the most prev-
alent type of combat activity engaged in by ARVN
units of battalion strength or larger has been the
search-and-destroy operation. The great majority
of these operations have been conducted independently
of other allied forces, and have been controlled by
a sector, regimental, or divisional headquarters
element. When ARVN units have participated in joint
search-and-destroy operations with US and third-
country combat forces, their role has often been
limited to one of support--such as serving as a
blocking force along enemy withdrawal routes. Bat-
talibn-size and larger ARVN forces also have engaged
in operations designed to protect rice harvests or
clear and hold territory for pacification, and in
road--clearing and local security.
8. There have been a number of basic weaknesses
in the conduct of large-scale ARVN operations. In
the first place, many of the mUltibattalion ground
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sweeps have not been adequately coordinated with the
general pacification objectives in the local sector
and thus have failed to produce lasting results.
Secondly, as has already been noted, the relative
inferiority in ARVN infantry unit firepower vis-a-
vis the Viet Cong has resulted in an overdependence
upon preparatory artillery fire or tactical air
strikes against known or suspected enemy positions
prior to the start of an operation. In many in-
stances, the enemy, forewarned by the preliminary
action, has been able to elude government forces.
9. A third and often fatal weakness reflected
in many large-scale operations has been the depend-
ence of participating ARVN units on the presumed
security provided by vehicular convoy deployment to
a battle area. In many operations, ARVN units are
completely roadbound; they often refuse to venture
into enemy territory except in large truck convoys
accompanied by equivalent numbers of armored person-
nel carriers and other armored vehicles. Such units
have often become prime targets for annihilation by
enemy ambush units. A classic example was provided
in the November 1965 ambush of the ARVN 7th Regiment
in the Michelin Plantation area of Binh Duong Prov-
ince, in which government regulars sustained more
than 700 casualties in less than two hours.
10. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
tactical plans for ARVN large-unit operations are
normally based on attainment of terrain objectives,
and success determined on the basis of executing the
prescribed maneuver plan, rather than on the basis
of destruction of the enemy force in the area. In
addition, these operations are usually planned to
terminate at nightfall, thus enabling participating
units to return to their cantonment areas either to
spend the night with their families or to perform
static security duties. This is frequently done at
the cost of breaking a potentially fruitful contact
with the enemy.
:tl. Operating in a strength of three companies
or less, ARVN forces have also participated in nu-
merous "small-unit actions," usually with reinforce-
ment from Vietnamese paramilitary units. These
actions are normally of very short duration, involving
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for the most part routine day or night patrol
activity or the establishment of ambush sites
along known or suspected enemy lines of commu-
nication.
12. In small-unit operations, ARVN forces
can generally be faulted for their lack of ag-
gressiveness, and for their failure to direct
these actions toward the neutralization of Viet
Cong capabilities to interfere with pacification.
In addition, ARVN small-unit operations often
suffer from the absence of clear, coordinated
patrol and ambush plans. Very often, participat-
ing units will establish tactical patterns easily
detected by enemy forces, e.g., utilizing the
same ambush site for several consecutive nights
or traversing by the same paths and roads while
on reconnaissance missions.
Effectiveness in Large-Unit Operations
13. A general idea of the combat effective-
ness of the ARVN can be derived from an examination
of some of the statistics associated with ARVN op-
erations and by a comparison with similar statistics
on US military activities in South Vietnam. The
comparison is not intended to play up US combat
proficiency vis-a-vis the ARVN. It does, however,
provide a general reference point from which to
evaluate ARVN operations. As noted in the preced-
ing pages, the ARVN suffers from manpower, leader-
ship, and ground and air support problems which are
not experienced in the same degree by US units. It
is unlikely, therefore, that the ARVN could ever
hope to achieve the level of combat effectiveness
of US units.
14. ARVN maneuver battalions spent about 30
percent of their available time during the first
nine months of 1966 engaged in large-unit actions,
while US units spent about 48 percent of their
available time in similar operations. Numerically,
nevertheless, the ARVN conducted more large opera-
tions than did US forces. ARVN actions, however,
were substantially shorter in duration, averaging
5.4 battalion days per operation compared with
22.8 for US forces. Often, the longer operations
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in Vietnam yield better results, since the enemy
is forced to commit himself to combat through the
continued tactical maneuvering of the two sides.
15. About 38 percent of the ARVN's large-
unit operations during the first nine months of
1966 resulted in contact with the enemy. This
was a substantial decline from 1965, when the
rate of contact during similar actions was about
44 percent. US units contact the enemy in about
90 percent of their large-unit operations. The
over-all ARVN/enemy kill ratio was 1 to 3.2 on
large operations. The US/enemy kill ratio was 1
to 5.4. ARVN forces captured an average of 2.2
enemy soldiers per month per battalion, as compared
with 4.2 enemy soldiers per month per US battalion.
Finally, ARVN forces took an average of 2.3 enemy
weapons per month per battalion and US forces an
average of 9.3 per month per battalion. The latter
figures do not include weapons taken from overrun
enemy supply caches.
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IV. THE MANPOWER PROBLEM
1. During 1965, a modest manpower buildup was
achieved by the South Vietnamese Army despite increasing
desertions and battlefield losses. The number of in-
fantry-type battalions increased from 123 at the end of
1964 to 133 by the fourth quarter of 1965, while per-
sonnel strength increased from 220,400 to 267,900.
2. However, while ARVN forces increased nu-
merically from 278,000 at the end of the first quarter
of 1966 to 284,633 during the third quarter, the rate
of growth has tapered off sharply. The drop may be
attributed in part, at least, to the growing inability
of the South Vietnamese armed forces induction system
to keep pace with losses in the regular army accruing
from desertions, combat casualties, and other manpower
attrition factors.
3. The nearly continuous rise in military deser-
tions, dating from at least 1962, constitutes the most
serious manpower problem in all the component forces--
regular, regional and popular--of the South Vietnamese
armed forces (RVNAF). The monthly average of desertions
increased from approximately 9,500 in 1965 to about
11,300 during the first half of 1966. At this rate, pro-
jected total desertions for 1966 should exceed 135,000--
the highest annual total on record.
4. Moreover, for the first time, the number of
desertions in the ARVN or regular army this year com-
prises more than half of the total desertions reported.
The average monthly desertion rate per 1,000 personnel
in the ARVN has risen sharply from 8.3 and 14.2 in 1964
and 1.965, respectively, to 18.3 for the period 1 January -
30 June 1966. Most of 'the deserters in all components
were conscripts.
5. The ARVN reported a total of 43,617 personnel
losses for the first half of 1966, 35,387 of whom were
dropped from the rolls as deserters. Desertions among
officers and NCOs have risen from 116 and 656, respec-
tively, during 1965, to 117 and 941 for the first six
months of 1966. Desertions are heaviest from the Air-
borne Division.
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6. A number of factors have contributed to the
continued high level of desertions. One factor is that
much of the army rank and file, like the population
in general, lacks a positive commitment to the govern-
ment. Political turmoil, such as the 1966 "struggle
movement" in I Corps, has also played a role in accel-
erating the pace of military desertions.
7. Another cause of desertions has been the
increase in Viet Cong combat strength and firepower,
which has resulted in increased physical danger for
ARVN troops during contacts with enemy main force
units. Other factors include the lack of attention
on the part of unit commanders to personnel manage-
ment and troop welfare problems, the absence of an ef-
fective disciplinary program, and the lack of prospects
for discharge from military service for many indi-
viduals.*
8. The dissatisfactions which lead to low morale
and heavy desertions within the enlisted and conscripted
ranks can often be traced to low pay rates, inadequate
dependent housing, concern over the welfare of families,
infrequent rotation of units in isolated outposts, and
inadequate medical care of the wounded. Among junior
officers, there is considerable dissatisfaction because
rewards, in the form of assignments, honors, and pro-
motions are more often than not predicated on political
considerations rather than merit.
9. A solution to the desertion problem has been
of major concern to the South Vietnamese military com-
mand, and a number of significant steps have recently
* Many reserve officers and NCOs, for example, have
been on "emergency" active duty since 1950-51 with
no real prospects for release. Similarly, few con-
scripts are released at the end of their two-year
active duty obligation.
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been undertaken in the hope of reversing the trend.*
It is too early to tell whether the problem will be
diminished over the long run by these measures. How-
ever, total RVNAF desertions for the month of June (9,873)
were about 1,500 less than the monthly average for the
first half of 1966, while those for July and August
were approximately 3,000 less. In fact, the August de-
sertion total (8,108) was the lowest recorded for any
month of 1966.
Defections to Viet Cong
10. How many of the South Vietnamese deserters
defect to the Viet Cong is unclear.
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there are con-
siderable numbers of ex-RVNAF soldiers in Communist ranks.
Some are defectors, others are deserters who have been
conscripted by the Viet Cong after their return home.
The percentage of former GVN soldiers is probably much
higher in Viet Cong irregular units than in main force
units. The percentage in the latter, however, seems
likely to rise as the Viet Cong's need for manpower out-
weighs the risks involved in taking in their former
In June, a comprehensive law providing stiffer penal-
ties for deserters and accomplices, including capital
punishment for those crossing over to enemy ranks,
was adopted. At the same time, legislation providing
a substantial pay raise and other benefits (such as
PX and dependent housing privileges) for all military
and civil service personnel was put into effect.
Other corrective measures include the adoption by
military authorities of modern techniques of deserter
investigation and apprehension, and-the development
of a long-range and comprehensive military leadership
improvement program. Finally, a series of major
security operations conducted in the Saigon area by
the ARVN General Reserve and the National Police have
yielded excellent results. Several thousand deserters,
draft dodgers, AWOLs, and civilians without proper iden-
tification papers have been rounded up.
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V. CHANGEOVER TO PACIFICATION ROLE
1. The new mission. of ARVN in. the Revolutionary
Development (RD) program will be, first, to clear
areas of whatever organized Communist forces may be
present to disrupt the securing of hamlets, and
second, to reassert a GVN presence among the people.
How successful ARVN will be in. this transition is
still uncertain. In. the IV Corps Zone, for example,
where ARVN has not been. supported by US ground units,
it has done little more than. hold its own against
the Viet Cong.
2. Some indication of the number of ARVN units
which will be committed to the pacification. support
role is provided in preliminary reports on the change-
over. In. I Corps, the 1st ARVN Division will commit
two maneuver battalions to each of the corps' two
provinces; in. other words, four of the division-!s
12 maneuver battalions initially will support RD.
In. the 7th Division's tactical area, which covers
the delta provinces of Go Cong, Kien Hoa, and Din.h
Tuong, five of the division's maneuver battalions
are initially to be committed to the RD effort.
3. The effect the new mission will have on the
morale and efficiency of ARVN officers and men is
difficult to judge at present. It may be some time,
in fact, before a definite trend can be discerned.
Since the ARVN's mission will be to keep Viet Cong
units at bay so that RD activities may be carried
on., the ARVN may be involved in even more combat than.
it presently carries out. It is possible that the
new mission. will result in fewer casualties, but
this depen.ds to some extent on. how the Viet Cong
react.
4. If the Communists decide, for purely psycho-
logical reason.s, to concentrate their efforts against
ARVN units engaged in RD support, casualties could be
high and might adversely affect ARVN morale. Also,
the Viet Cong may be expected to try to portray the
ARVN as playing a secondary role in. the war, in the
hope of fomenting ill feeling between. the ARVN and
other allied forces. There is evidence in Viet Cong
radio propagan.da that such an. effort is already
under way.
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5. The effect of a pacification. support role
on. ARVN desertions is problematical; but in any
event, it seems unlikely that the redirection alone
will be a critical factor in. the desertion rate.
6. The probable reaction. of the rural populace
to the ARVN's presence in. the pacification picture
depends in. great part on. ARVN's performance. The
main. mission of ARVN will continue to be one of com-
bat rather than on.e of greater contact with the
rural. population., but the shift in. mission. from
search-and-destroy to clear-and-hold operations
will probably increase contacts with the rural popu-
lation. in. the future. Although these condition.s
will multiply the opportunities for the abuses and
pillaging by ARVN which have been so prevalent in
the past, there is now an. opportunity for a closer
sense of identity to develop between. the ARVN and
the people. The critical factor of troop behavior
will depend largely upon the ability and willingness
of ARVN troop commanders to maintain, close troop
discipline. In. areas where troops are well led,
properly disciplined and behave correctly, they may
be expected to be an asset to the RD effort, but
the reverse will be the case if units involved do not
meet these standards. Because of the importance
of harmon.ious relations between. the ARVN and the
populace, it is essential that command and troops
committed to pacification. be aware of the need to
present a favorable image to the people with whom
they deal. A program is already under way in
Saigon. to provide the necessary reorientation of
those units which will be committed to the support
of the RD effort.
7. In the final analysis, the success of the
new ARVN mission. is likely to depend, to a consider-
able exten.t, upon. the degree to which it is under-
stood and accepted by individual ARVN field com-
manders. Political repercussions could be felt,
for example, if the present divisional structure is
not carefully integrated into the plan.n.in.g of the
new mission., or if division anal corps commanders
feel that their prerogatives are being diminished
under the new concept.
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8. Top GVN military planners are apparently
mindful of these problems in giving their backing
to ARVN's supporting role in revolutionary develop-
ment. Chief of State General Thieu has reportedly
indicated that there will be a need to reshape the
outlook of many senior officers and that this ef-
fort will be undertaken. The chief of the Joint
General Staff, General Vien, has also made a point
of stressing his own. full commitment to the RD
support mission by sending a command letter to his
subordinates. Moreover, ARVN leaders have made
plans for the training in. Saigon. of teams from all
ARVN divisions concerning the new mission.. These
teams are to return to their parent divisions and
initiate similar training programs down to battalion.
level.
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SECRET
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 Approved For Refeao
12 December 1966
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MEMORANDUM TALKING PAPER
'EMO TITLE: The South Vietnamese Army Today
1. The subject memo reviews the activities of the
ARYN during the past two years, evaluates its effective-
ness as a combat force and discusses current problems
and future prospects. The ARYN comes through in the
memo as a mediocre fighting force at best. This judg-
ment, however, is solidly backed with facts and statis-
tics onARYN past performance. The memo also compares
ARYN fighting prowess with US combat performance, point-
ing out that this is dose to provide a frame of reference
and not to denigrate the ARYN or brashly play up US
performance.
2. The memo discusses the upcoming shift of ARVN
activities into the field of pacification, pointing out
the morale and organizational difficulties that may
emerge during the changeover. The memo takes the posi-
tion, %owever, that ARYN may well make a substantial con-
tribution to pacification if the changeover is well
planned and organized by the SYN authorities.
3. The memo was suggested, as you know, by
4. Because of the nature of the content, the dis-
tribution, perhaps, should be worked out with the DDI.
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