THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: December 12, 1966
• Content Type: IR

Approved Fori3olease 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79~ST0010019-9 25X1
12 December 1966
No. 0403/66
Copy -No.
1.48
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
11W SITIIA"PION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
State Department review completed
USAID review completed
1)IRFCTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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GROUP 1
Enaluded From a, omotic
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized parson is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
FXCLDDFD FROM AL TOMATIC
DOvNCItADINC AND
DF IAUSI F'ICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(5 December - 11 December 1966)
Sect ion.
POLITICAL SITUATION I
Constituent Assembly member assassinated;
Other Constituent Assembly developments;
Directorate rejects assembly proposals;
Several ambassadorial changes likely
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II
Refugees flee Viet Cong areas in Kien
Gian.g; Revolutionary Development in.
An. Gian.g; Land reform; Hamlet security;
Viet Cong defectors (Chieu Hoi)
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Curren.cy and gold; Provincial
prices; Joint US-GVN economic meeting;
GVN views on rice policy; Credit policy,
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
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. POLITICAL SITUATION
Official developments on the politi-
cal scene in South Vietnam last week were
overshadowed by the assassination of a
prominent member of the Constituent Assembly.
The killer has admitted Viet Cong connec-
tions, and there is no evidence to suggest
that he is anything other than an. enemy
terrorist. The assembly postponed further
substantive sessions because of the inci-
dent. Earlier in the week, the ruling
Directorate had met and decided to reject
an assembly proposal which would have
limited the Directorate's power to amend
the draft constitution. The decision.,
however, has not yet been. formally con-
veyed. In other developments, on.e of Pre-
mier Ky's personal assistants told the US
Embassy that several Vietnamese ambassa-
dors will be replaced or moved to other
posts.
Con.stituen.t Assembly Member Assassinated
1. Work in the Constituent Assembly came to a
halt last week following the assassination. of Tran
Van Van., one of the assembly's most prominent critics
of the Ky government. Van. was en route to an assembly
session on. the morning of 7 December when two men on
a motorcycle fired the fatal pistol shots into his
car. One of the killers was captured shortly there-
after by the Vietnamese police; the other man
escaped.
2. the alleged
assassin at first denied being a member of the Viet
Cong. Under subsequent police interrogation, however,
he admitted belonging to a section of the Viet Cong
Regiment for the Liberation of the Capital. He claimed
to have been. forcibly recruited for the assassination
task three months ago, trained at a base camp in Binh
Duon.g Province, and sent into Saigon. a week prior to
the killing. Although the terrorist denied firing the
fatal shots, the police reportedly found that his hands
showed traces of gunpowder and that his pistol had
fired a bullet retrieved from Van's automobile.
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3. If the killing was indeed a plot of the
Viet Con.g, as seems likely, the choice of Van as
the target would seem a good one from their point
of view. He was one of the leading southern
activists in. the assembly and a thorn in. the side
of the northern-oriented Ky regime during the recent
cabinet crisis. The Communists may have calculated
that the murder of a major critic of the Ky govern-
ment would draw suspicion to the regime itself and
further sharpen the conflict between northerners
and southerners.
4. A day after Van's death, Radio Hanoi and
the Viet Cong radio in South Vietnam accused Ky and
Thieu of "sen.ding their agents into the streets" to
murder him. The broadcasts cited Western press re-
ports speculating that southern antipathies toward
the government might be aroused and bring political
turmoil. US officials in Saigon, however, have dis-
counted internal political implications in the killing,
and there has been. no reported adverse reaction from
southern assemblymen. The Viet Cong had threatened
publicly, prior to the 11 September elections, that
they would assassinate candidates for the assembly.
Other Constituent Assembly Developments
5. The assembly will hold its next substantive
session. early in. the week of 12 December. Before
adjourning because of Van's murder, it did hear some
recommendations on the organization of the future
govern.men.t put forth by the constitution-drafting
committee. Those recommendations were similar to
the ones presented earlier by other committees ad-
vocating four in.depen.den.t government branches- an
elected president, a bicameral legislature, a
judiciary, and an inspectorate. Although the deputies
are generally in agreement, they are still divided
about equally on whether to include a prime minister
in the system. They also appear to be in favor of
providing for elected province chiefs and mayors under
the new constitution..
6. Several committee members who were assigned
to study selected aspects of a future constitution
argued that the present administrative system is not
responsive to regional and local needs. They maintained
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that too much power has been vested in the hands of
the corps commanders to the detriment of the province,
village, and city officials. Moreover, they characterize
the presently appointed government officials at the
province level and lower as generally ineffective
either because they are military officers with little
administrative experience or because they are under-
paid.
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7. The committees also recommended instituting
a strong system of checks and balances on the govern-
ment through the following provisions. The legislature
should have the right to vote on. the national budget,
to approve high-level appointments, and to question.
the executive. The inspectorate an.d the judiciary
should be allowed to check on the abuses of power.
The people and the press should have the right to
criticize openly the execution of national policy.
A legal opposition and a system of political parties
should be formalized. The head of state should be
limited to one four-year'term in office. Neither the
executive head of state nor the national assembly
should have the constitutional right to dissolve the
other.
Directorate Rejects Assembly Proposals
8. The Directorate has decided to reject pro-
posals which would have changed seven articles in, the
basic charter of the Con.stituen.t Assembly. The pro-
posals were submitted to the Directorate on. 18 Novem-
ber by a 12-man delegation of assembly leaders. One
of the most controversial clauses in. the charter,
Article 20, empowers the Directorate to amend
draft; constitution before it becomes law.
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Several Ambassadorial Changes Likely
9. Prime Minister Ky has officially requested
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replace Vu Van
Thai, the present ambassador to the United States,
with Bui Diem, one of Ky's close civilian advisers,
The United States has accepted the nomination. Ambas-
sador Thai now is in Saigon., but no date has been set
for Diem's departure for Washington.
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several. other Vietnamese ambas-
sadors will be replaced or shuffled in the near
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Other posts affected include Laos,
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Tunisia, Malaysia, and
the United Nations observer. some
of the n.ew ambassadors will be generals who do not
presently have significant positions in the military.
11, the ruling
generals have been pressuring the Foreign Affairs
Ministry to assign persons whom they favor to ambas-
sadorial posts. Tran Van Do, the ministry head, has
registered several complaints to Ky about the alleged
military interference.
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 Ii. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
Some 2,500 refugees and 64 defectors
returned to GVN control in Kien Giang Prov-
ince after an intensive psychological war-
fare campaign, backed up with air strikes.
Although Revolutionary Development continues
to progress favorably in An Giang Province,
many problems remain; the principal one is
the Hoa Rao political, structure which domi-
nates the province and is resistant to change.
Land reform efforts may receive new impetus
under a new program to allocate funds for a
.four-pronged approach to improving land
tenure conditions for the farmers. Although
impressive gains were reported by the GVN
in the number of hamlets secured in October,
the embassy notes that many of these may
represent only paper gains.
Refugees Flee Viet Cong Areas in Kien Giang
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1. In December approximately 2,500 refugees have
fled a Viet Cong - controlled area in the Hon Chong
Mountain area, some 35 miles northwest of the province
capital of Rach. Gia, Kien Giang Province. The refugees
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largely as the result of the combined pressures
o air attacks and an intensive, carefully coordinated
allied psychological warfare campaign. The refugee
group included about 1,200 children.
2. Although the refugees expressed dissatisfac-
tion with Viet Cong control techniques, they are anxious
to return to their home areas to begin harvesting their
rice. An exodus of this magnitude demonstrates that
Viet Cong control of the population may be effectively
challenged by a carefully prepared and executed psywar
campaign. A follow-up psychological operation is re-
portedly being planned to exploit this situation more
fully.
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3. In addition to the refugees, 64 Viet Cong
defectors came under government control in Kien Giang.
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Revolutionary Development in An Giang
4. An Giang Province, according to a 10 November
embassy report, is today clearly the most prosperous
province in the delta region, but much work remains to
be done to implement fully all aspects of the Revolu-
tionary Development program. The principal reason for
this somewhat dark view of the situation in the province
is the _; tight hold maintained by the Hoa Hao power
structure on the affairs of the province and apparent
Hoa Hao reluctance to a change in the status quo.
5. Hoa Hao power in the province is not monolithic,
but rather fractionalized among several elements. While
mutually competitive, these factions Will unite in the
face of any challenge by US advisers, the GVN, the Viet
Cong, or any other outside intruders. In An Giang,
the three principal factions are: the Central/Hoa Hao
Church organization; a local group headed by the prov-
ince chief, Lt. Col. Ly Ba Pham; and another element
led by "Colonel" Nguyen Van Hue, the chairman of the
Province Council.
6. One of the chief failings of the RD program
in the province, according to this report, has been in
efforts to implement the GVN land reform policy. This
program, it seems, will be very difficult to initiate
here. For example, although extensive aerial photography
has been conducted to determine the province's cadas-
tral structure, the province chief, Lt. Colonel Pham,
has, "refused to discuss" the uses to which this informa-
tion may be put. Although recent decisions may have
largely negated information relating to the land reform
program contained in this embassy report (see Land
Reform below), even a concentrated GVN effort may
o jr din the shoals of regionalism and factionalism.
7. Another aspect of RD in which progress is apt
to be slow is public health. A new and we~l-equipped
dispensary exists, but is headed by an inadequately
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trained former practitioner of oriental medicine
whom the people, because of their mistrust, will not
patronize. -Consequently, a resident medical assistant
and two nurses remain idle. The main source of medical
care at the present time is US and third-country pro-
grams, such as the MEDCAP and MILPHAP teams which have
made a large impact on the population. Improvement
in public health facilities in An Giang and the entire
delta region would be a significant contribution to
the well-being of the peasants who in other respects
are relatively well off. The GVN would stand to gain
an easy and impressive psychological warfare victory
by instituting a well-founded medical program for An
Giang--a service which the Viet Cong are wholly ill
equipped to provide.
8. The seven Revolutionary Development Cadres
(RDCs) teams are working rather rapidly and well in An
Giang, spending only two or three weeks in each hamlet.
This rapid pace is possible because the security situa-
tion is generally good in An Giang. Paradoxically, this
situation gives rise to another problem--underemployment
of the greater part of the normal 59-man RDC teams.
Two-thirds of each team's members carry arms and are
responsible for providing security for remaining team
members fulfilling census-grievance and other duties.
These armed elements are now largely idle, although
they have been employed in flood relief work.
9. Several criticisms have been voiced about the
RDC teams in An Giang, as in other parts of the country.
Specifically, they have been called "cowboys" from
urban areas not adapted to work in the countryside.
Also, they are not recruited from the areas in which they
are to work; they are often poorly motivated, trained,
and led, and indifferent to local village traditions or
to village elders. Furthermore--and this may be the
reason for much of the criticism of the RDCs--village.
and hamlet officials are not paid as well as the RDCs.
10. Although the over-all situation in An Giang
is good, there has been no radical: departure from the
ways of the past.. The people do not appear to demon-
strate any greater loyalty to or love for the GVN, and
the traditional Hoa Hao power structure which commands
loyalties remains intact.
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11. Priority emphasis is reportedly being given
by the GVN and the US to the implementation of all
existing GVN land tenure policies in An Giang Province,
according to the recent embassy reporting. Other
selected areas will also receive increased attention.
In order to assist the program in getting under way,
some VN$30 million in counterpart funds has been al-
located for the following projects:
a. Distribution, with full titles, of
former French-held, expropriated, and
squatter lands;
b. Investigation, updating, and renewal
of tenant-landlord contracts;
c. Establishing: (1) positions of village
land officer/registrar and (2) village
agricultural committees;
d. Special assistance to An Giang by means
of counterpart-funding and use of phbto-
grammetry for preparation of title
descriptions, land use and capability
studies, and an integrated agrarian
development plan for a 6,000- to 7,000-
hectare tract.
12. During the past year there have been several
instances--accompanied by great fanfare--where land titles
were presented to these tilling the soil, but these
seemed to be mainly for propaganda purposes. The new
program appears to be a serious, concerted effort to
solve one of the most difficult problems facing any gov-
ernment in Saigon--the effective redistribution of land
to peasants who have spent many years cultivating it
without anything tangible to show for their efforts. An
effective land reform program could go a long way toward
undercutting Viet Cong support among the peasants and
winning them over to the GVN cause.
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Hamlet Security
13.
there was a net increase of secured hamlets
throughout the country during October. Although
this figure is an impressive One, the embassy be-
lieves it should be accepted only with caution.
There are indications that some of these hamlets
are secured on paper only, and that the GVN
statistics represent an effort by local officials
to meet previously established goals. There was
a corresponding increase of 1.4 percent in the se-
cured population, raising the total to 56.8 per-
cent of the population--or 8,541,400 persons--
living in secured areas.
Viet Cong Defectors (Chieu Hoi)
14. The total of returnees to government con-
trol in 1966 rose to 18,190 as of 7 December. Dur-
ing the week of 1-7 December there were 464 returnees,
according to GVN statistics. A breakdown. of this
week's returnees by Corps Tactical Zone follows:
I Corps 63
II Corps 280
III Corps 44
IV Corps 77
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The week ending 5 December was high-
lighted by a sharp rise in Saigon retail
prices, partly because of lower deliveries
of rice and protein foods to Saigon. As
a result of this increase, retail prices
are now at their highest level of the
year with the exception. Of the peak that
was reached during the September elections.
Prices of imported commodities, on the
other hand, declined slightly, and free
market gold and currency prices showed
only small variations. An. embassy analysis
of provincial prices during July-October
shows that these prices are generally
well above those in Saigon, but the degree
by which the two sets of prices vary has
diminished.
US and GVN officials held their sixth
joint economic meeting at which Minister of
Finance Kien reported that the GVN had de-
cided to permit importers to postpone pay-
ment of customs duties in an attempt to
ease the importers' need for credit. The
US prefers an expansion of the commercial
banks' capacity to extend credit to im-
porters--a proposal which Governor Hanh
has approved. A US-GVN subcommittee on.
pork has recommended removal of the offi-
cial price ceiling on. pork, provided cold
storage facilities are constructed to hold
reserves of pork. Discussions with senior
GVN economic officials indicate general
agreement with the US-suggested increase
in. the government price of rice but dis-
agreement with the US proposal for estab'--
lishin.g GVN rice buying stations.
1. Retail prices in Saigon rose sharply during
the week ending 5 December, partly because of lower
deliveries of rice and protein foods to Saigon.
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Both food and n.on-food items were higher, resulting
in a gain of seven percent in the over-all USAID re-
tail price index. This index is now at its highest
level of the year with the exception of the peak
reached at the time of the September elections. The
food index rose eight percent, largely because of
soaring rice and pork prices. On 5 December the
price of the type of rice used by the working class
reached a new 1966 high of 1,700 piasters per 100
kilograms, or 36 percent above the level prevailing
just prior to the June devaluation. The price of
pork bellies rose to 130 piasters per kilogram--an
increase of more than 50 percent above the previous
week---reportedly because demand for pork increased
while deliveries to Saigon were lower. Beef, fish,
and chicken. also were higher. The n.on.-food index
was three percent above the previous week, largely
because of higher prices for charcoal and calico.
Heavy pre-Tet purchases of calico caused an. 18 per-
cent increase in. the price of this commodity. (A
table of weekly retail prices in Saigon is included
in the Annex).
2. Prices of imported commodities, on. the
other hand, were slightly lower as measured by the
USAID price index for selected US-financed imports.
Con.den.sed milk and wheat flour were lower as the
market continued to be well supplied, and sugar was
unchanged. Fertilizers, chemicals, and rayon yarn
edged up slightly. A similar slight upward price
movement was recorded by construction. materials be-
cause of increased demand occasioned by the start
of the new construction season.
Currency and Gold
3. Free market prices for dollars and MPC
(scrip) moved up slightly during the week ending
5 December. Gold, on the other hand, declined
again., reportedly because of an. expectation of a
further reduction in the official sale price of
gold an.d the continuation. of tight cash conditions.
Currency price quotations for 5 December have not
yet been. reported.
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4. The embassy has just completed a series of
price indexes for each of the four regions of South
Vietnam based on price reports received for the
period 30 June - 31 October 1966 from selected prov-
inces within each region.. Although these indexes
are relatively crude and in some cases based on in.-
complete reporting, they show three rather significant
trends: (a) with the exception of Region IV, pro-
vincial prices generally are well above those in
Saigon.; (b) after the initial post-devaluation in-
crease in prices, provincial prices have generally
not increased significantly and in some cases have
declined. and (c) the degree by which provincial
prices exceed those of Saigon has diminished during
the period studied.
Joint US-GVN Economic Meeting
5. US and GVN officials recently held their
sixth joint economic meeting, which was co-chaired
by Acting Minister of Industry Ton. and USAID Di-
rector MacDonald. On the question of credit to im-
porters, Minister of Finance Kien reported that,
quite apart from the issue of bank credit, the GVN
had decided to give authority to the Director of GVN
Customs to permit importers to postpone payment of
their customs duties. Importers will put up real
estate as collateral. Kien and Ton believe that this
liberalization. will be sufficient to satisfy the
importers' complaint of a lack of customs credit and
will assist in. speeding up the flow of goods through
the port.
6. Kien also proposed that port congestion. be
relieved by using importers' declarations as the
basis for the assessment of duties instead of check-
ing all imported goods. Spot checks would be made
to encourage honest declaration. Ton and Kien. again
expressed the view that the advent of the dry season
will induce importers to clear construction materials
through the port.
7. The pork subcommittee set up at the fifth
US-GVN economic meeting submitted recommendations on
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pork policy. This subcommittee, which is composed
of US and GVN economic officials, agreed that the
present ceiling price on hogs in Saigon does not
and cannot effectively control pork prices. Conse-
quently, the group recommended that this ceiling
price be eliminated in order to increase deliveries
of hogs from the delta and lower pork prices in Sai-
gon. The subcommittee felt, however, that controls
should not be removed until means of indirect supply
can. be set up. For this purpose, the group recom-
mended the construction. of a 2,000-ton capacity
freezing plant to hold frozen stocks for use in
stabilizing prices and providing emergency supplies
in case of acute shortages. Among other measures
recommended by the pork subcommittee were: importa-
tion of live hogs from Thailand to meet Tet require-
ments, importation of 500 tons of frozen. pork,
measures'to reduce losses from hog cholera, importa-
tion of pure-bred swine for breeding, and the estab-
lishment of new feed mills. The US promised to de-
termine promptly whether USAID could finance a cold
storage plant.
GVN Views on Rice Policy
8. Separate discussions on rice policy with
several senior GVN economic officials--including
National Bank of Vietnam Governor Hanh, Minister
of Commerce Thien An., and Acting Minister of In-
dustry Ton--indicate a general agreement with the
US-suggested increase in the government price of
rice and the necessity of announcing a new higher
rice price promptly. At the same time, however,
these GVN officials do not agree with the US pro-
posal. for establishing GVN rice buying stations.
Moreover, they all expressed the opinion that an-
noun.cemen.t of a new GVN rice policy will depend
largely on. Premier Ky's approval in view of pos-
sible adverse political reactions from the urban
consumer.
9. Governor Hanh feels that there should be
a sharp increase in. the rice price paid to the
farmer in order to increase production and demon-
strate GVN concern for the farmers' welfare. Hanh
stated that although the GVN would be running
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certain. political risks in the urban areas, the new
rice policy should be a clear break with the present
policy of trying to conciliate noisy urban consumers
at the expense of the silent peasant. With regard
to the US suggestion for GVN rice buying stations,
Hanh stated emphatically that the GVN is incapable
of conducting buying operations because such a sys-
tem would be too enticing for those who wish to make
personal gains. As an alternative, Hanh suggested
the extensive use of information leaflets to in.form
the farmers of a new government price. He also felt
that a liberal credit policy should be established
to finance rice purchases at a new government-sup-
ported price. According to Hanh, the greatest prob-
lem will be ensuring the security of the rice moving
from the delta to Saigon..
10. Minister of Commerce Thien. An and his staff
generally agree with Hanh?s views, especially his
opinion. that the GVN is unable to operate buying
stations. Thien An stated that the low pay of and
lack of discipline among GVN officials precluded
such an operation. In spite of the possible po-
litical repercussions of higher rice prices, Ministry
of Commerce officials feel that they should make a
technically and economically sound proposal to
achieve higher prices for producers. In their view,
the questions to be considered are: (a) whether and
to what level prices should be raised, (b) whether
the market in domestic rice should be liberalized
or new higher prices should be set, and (c) if the
market is liberalized, what would be the best way
to avoid excessive price increases and supply short-
ages. Thien An evidently feels that a free market--
without price or other controls--would be the best
solution.
:L1. As a result of these GVN views, the US
Mission is examining the possibility of dispensing
with the GVN buying station aspect of the US plan.
The GVN proposal to increase credit to finance rice
purchases also will have to be examined in terms of
the impact of this credit on. the inflationary gap and
over-all price level.
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Credit Policy
12. The US Embassy reports that failure to move
immediately to expand the capacity of commercial
banks to provide credit for imports could well cause
a serious financial crisis and result in irreparable
damage to the proposed stabilization. program for
calendar year 1967. Vietnamese commercial banks are
almost fully loaned up and cannot obtain funds to fi-
n.an.ce imports as they arrive. Unless these banks
make credit available immediately, importers will
be forced to go to the money lenders or simply leave
their goods in. the port, thus adding to the already
critical port congestion. Moreover, until additional
credit is available, all current income of the im-
porters will be needed to move goods already in the
port. Consequently, importers will be unable to
cover advance deposits and taxes on new import
licenses with the result that serious shortages of
commodities will develop by next spring.
13. It appears that it was possible for the com-
mer ial banks to finance the heavy commitments they
made in July and August at the encouragement of the
National Bank of Vietnam (NBVN) only because of an.
accounting bottleneck which resulted in the NBVN's
being four months behin.d in ..:.t$ billing of. the,.
commercial banks. This mix-up, however, has now
been cleared up, and the banks need funds. The NBVN
has been. hampered in formulating a proper credit
policy because of the incorrect assumption, that the
volume of credit outstanding on the day of devalua-
tion last June had only to be increased to accommo-
date for the change in the exchange rate plus the
anticipated increase in imports. The IMF also used
this method to arrive at its estimates of tolerable
credit limits. Both the NBVN and the IMF, however,
evidently overlooked the fact that as rapid infla-
tion. manifested it5Olf in 1965, wholesalers began. to
take over financing of high profit imports in. an. ef-
fort to corner supply. Since the devaluation, how-
ever, black market prospects--except for a few com-
modities--are dim, and wholesalers no longer have
the cash to continue financing importers. As a re-
sult, the amount of credit to be made available for
imports should make allowance for the volume of im-
ports previously financed outside the banking system.
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1.4. According to embassy calculations, a minimum
of roughly 10 billion piasters of additional credit
must be made available before mid-January. Such an
expansion. Of credit to the importing sector will, not
have a significant inflationary impact because credit
'to importers involves payments to the NBVN rather
than creation. of demand deposits. Moreover, about
95 percent of all credit currently supplied by the
banks in. Vietnam is for financing imports--the major
anti-?in.flation.ary weapon. Although a definition of
credit by en.d-use is somewhat tenuous, the Vietnamese
banking and business community seems to concur in this
95 percent estimate. In. addition., US officials feel
that an. expansion of bank credit is a much more pro-
ductive and direct approach to combating the shortage
of funds for imports than other plans such as the GVN
deferred customs duties scheme, which will only
satisfy part of the importers' need for credit,'while
temporarily reducing GVN revenues.
1.5. On. 3 December, the US economic counselor
met with Governor Han.h of the NBVN, who agreed that
steps must be taken to expand credit. Han.h thought,
however, that an additional 10 billion piasters of
credit was probably too much. Nevertheless, on 5
December Han.h called a meetin.g of commercial bankers
and informed them he was prepared to make more credit
available for imports. Specific details on Han.h's
announcement are not yet available.
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WEEKLY RETAIL PRICES IN SAIGON a/
3 Jan
1.4 Nov
21 Nov
28 Nov 5 Dec
1.966
1966
1966
1966 1966
Index for All Items b/ 160
Index for Food Items b/ 169
230
236
226 c/ 243 c/
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg.) 800
1,650
1,600
1,600 1,700
Pork Bellies (1 kg.) 70
110
85
85 130
Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg.) 110
150
180
140 150
Nuoc. Mam (jar) 50
85
85
85 90
Index for Non-Food Items b/ 124
202
197
195 c/ 200 c/
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Charcoal (60 kg.) 440
650
620
630 650
Cigarettes (pack) 10
14
14
14 14
White Calico (meter) 27
35
35
34 40
Laundry Soap (1 kg.) 30
45
32
40 40
a.
b.
Data are from USAID sources.
For all indexes, 1 January 1965
= 100.
c.
Preliminary.
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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010019-9
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