THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 9, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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`r-O Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
OSD review completed
NSA review completed
Top Secret
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9 December 1966
Extensive improvements are being made to the
North Vietnam portion of the rail line linking Hanoi
with Yunnan Province in China.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
A "huge explosion on the Saigon River was caused
by security guards firing on a floating mine near
a strategic bridge northeast of Saigon (Para, 1).
A Popular Force outpost in the Mekong Delta was over-
run early on 9 December with 21 South Vietnamese re-
ported killed and 13 wounded (Para. 2). COSVN has
urged subordinates to take measures to prevent de-
sertions (Paras. 3-6). The Viet Cong have increased
their propaganda effort throughout South Vietnam
since August (Paras. 7-8).
man ou
Vietnamese prisoners have been reported being moved
toward: Cambodian territory by two Viet Cong com-
panies (Paras. 13-14). Weekly review of South Viet-
nam battle statistics (Para. 15) .
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
There is no evidence thus far of any publicly---a7-
verse political reaction to Tran Van Van's assas-
sination (Paras. 1-3).
Intercepted
communications reveai tnat some North Vietnamese
pilots have recently been moved from Phuc Yen to Gia
Lam Airfield (Paras. 3-5).
OSD review completed
1
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V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
VI. Other Major Aspects: Extensive improve-
ments are being made to the Lao Cai - Hanoi rail-
road (Paras. 1-4).
South Vietnam Battle Statistics
1963 through the week of 27 Nov - 3 Dec 66
- Weapons and Personnel Losses
- Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents
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1 s4 Demilitarized Zone
~
.QI]gng Tri
Sepona T,71
Hue'
1,1A THIEN \
~- - a Nang
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RIJANG TIN Lai
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C NGAI 1
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f ? /'P Kontum+
Pleiku.
Tonle\
LAMB ODI
PHN OD
PENH
'Ban Me
Thuot
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TH VIETNAM
9 DECEMBER
25X1
Bien
-tioe r,~t wanLoc1 uv
NORTH
Dong Hoi
VIETNAM
N
Sou
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Bridge security guards patrolling a strategic
bridge over the Saigon River about three miles northeast
of Saigon on 9 December fired on a suspected floating
mine. A "huge explosion" resulted, but initial reports
listed no casualties and indicate little damage was caused.
2. A company-size South Vietnamese Popular Force
outpost, located 115 miles southwest of Saigon in the
Mekong Delta province of Chuang Thien was attacked and
overrun by a Communist force of unknown size early on 9
December. Friendly losses included 21 killed, 13 wounded,
and 22 missing. Also lost were 31 rifles and various pieces
of communications equipment. Enemy casualties are unknown.
Viet Cona Concern Over Desertions
3. The Viet Cong Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB)
of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the supreme
command authority for the Viet,Cong in South Vietnam, has
recently revealed concern over desertions from its ranks
and the success of the allied psychological warfare program.
6. The Communists apparently are becoming increasingly
concerned with the effectiveness of the allied psychological
warfare effort. An indication of the effectiveness of
the campaign is that this year 17,726 defectors had re-
turned to government control as of 30 November, with an all-
time high monthly total of 2,505 returning during the month
of November.
9 December 1966
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Viet Cong Propaganda- Efforts Increase Since August
7. Communications activity on the Viet Cong
Liberation News Agency (LNA) network since August
1966 indicates that the Viet Cong have increased
their propaganda efforts throughout South Vietnam.
8. During the months of September and Octo-
ber, a substantial increase in the volume of propa-
ganda disseminated by the main office of the LNA
was noted. Most of this information was directed
to all National Liberation Front organizations in
the country in an apparent attempt to raise the
morale of the Viet Cong and also to gain additional
support from the Vietnamese populace.
9 December 1966
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US and ARVN Prisoners Reported Moving Toward. Cambodia
13. Early in December, two Viet Cong companies
were moving 16 American and 31 South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) prisoners from an area in Binh Duong Province
to Cambodia, according to a MACV report. They re-
portedly will remain there while American operations are
being conducted in their former base area. The Ameri-
can prisoners were dressed in black pajamas, locally
made canvas shoes, and had long hair and beards. Their
hands were tied and they appeared to be very heavily
guarded.
14. Although the reliability of the report was
not indicated, it is questionable that the Viet Cong
actually plan to establish a prisoner camp in Cambodia.
Previous reports from escaped captives have indicated
that the Viet Cong do move prisoner camps occasionally
to avoid possible confrontation with allied military
manuevers.
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
15. The week of 27 November - 3 December compared
with 20-26 November:
I.
Viet Cong Incidents
Time
Period
At-
tacks
Regimental
size
Battalion
size
20-26 Nov
22
0
1
27 Nov -
3 Dec
13
0
0
Time Company
Period size Harassment Terrorism
20-26 Nov 0 350 33
27 Nov -
3 Dec
2 285
9 December 1966
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Time
Period
Sabo-
tage
Propa-
ag nda
Anti-
Aircraft
Total
Incidents
20-26 Nov
35
18
225
683
27 Nov -
3 Dec
29
19
170
II.
Casualties
VC/NVA
20-26 Nov 27 Nov-3 Dec
20-26 Nov 27 Nov- ec
Killed
1,422
1,181
159
139
Wounded
-----
------
428
373
Missing/
Captured
133
162
41
14
TOTALS
1,555
1,343
628
526
US
FREE WORLD
Nov 27 Nov-3 Dec
20-26 Nov 2 Nov-3
Dec
Killed
143
43
26
8
Wounded
703
521
51 3
9
Missing/
Captured
TOTALS
848
570
81 4
7
III. Weapons Captured
VC/NVA
GVN
20-2
Nov 27 Nov-3 Dec
20-2
Nov 27 Nov-
Dec
Individual
369
Not
183 10
2
Crew-Served
31
Reported
0
2
183 10
4
9 December 1966
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1. The Constituent Assembly has recessed, prob-
ably until Monday, 12 December, after having discussed
steps to be taken in the wake of Tran Van Van's assas-
sination. The assembly appointed a 20-man committee
to plan Van's funeral, instructed another committee
to cooperate with government agencies investigating
the case, and asked the Saigon city council to change
the name of Tu Do Street to Tran Van Van Street. it
also drafted a communique denouncing the crime, which
was attributed to "antidemocratic elements" rather
than to the Viet Cong specifically. Assembly chair-
man Phan Khac Suu, however, was quoted in the Vietnam
press as directly blaming the Viet Cong.
2. Premier Ky made a nationwide radio address
the evening of 9 December relating to Van's assas-
sination. He recounted past political murders by
the Viet Cong, and eulogized Van as one who had op-
posed the Diem regime and had many achievements in
protecting freedom.
3. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong's Liberation Radio
has echoed Hanoi's reaction on Van's death by de-
liberately misconstruing Western press speculation
on non-Communist political repercussions to impli-
cate the Thieu-Ky regime in Van's murder.
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Bac Can ~
Tuyen Quang
,-Phu Tho
702
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Battalion-size units of the 324th and 341st !visions
are still believed to be south of the Demilitarized
Zone. They may, however, only be engaged in a recon-
naissance or information gathering role. Nevertheless,
their presence there has been confirmed by MACV as
recently as early November, when two battalions of the
341st Division were known to be in Quang Tri Prov-
ince.
DRV Pilots Shifted to Gia Lam
3. The DRV Air Force may have transferred 25
of its estimated 124 combat-ready jet pilots to Hanoi/
Gia Lam Airfield in mid-November, according to SIGINT
reports. The pilots are believed to have come from
Phuc Yen Airfield, North Vietnam's principal fighter
base located about 15 miles northwest of the capital.
Hanoi/Gia Lam is situated directly across the Red
River from Hanoi and has customarily been used for
air transport operations. Twelve MIG-15/17 fighters
are known to be based at this airfield at present.
4. Gia Lam - based fighters have been active
during the past week in attempting to oppose US air
strikes in the Hanoi area. It is possible that the
DRV Air Force has transferred some of its fighter
strength from Phuc Yen to Gia Lam to effect a dispersal
of forces and to provide a better defense for the cap-
ital. Transfers of this sort have occurred on a
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smaller scale in the past when targets in the imme-
diate area of Hanoi have been threatened.
5. It is also possible that the transfer of
the North Vietnamese pilots may be connected with
the arrival of the North Korean pilot contingent at
Phuc Yen. The 25 DRV pilots are believed to have moved
to Gia Lam between 15 and 24 November; the 21 Koreans
believed to be at Phuc Yen were first noted flying
on 22 November. Base-loading factors or operational
considerations could also explain the shift in person-
nel.
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IV. O'HER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
9 December 1966
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
port.
9 December 1966
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Nmwl%WW
---a-_"mg-m ing
"Rng-hsvang
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1. Extensive improvements are being made to
the Lao Cai - Hanoi Railroad, apparently to ready it
as an alternate line for rail deliveries from or
through China.
2. Photography of 6 November reveals that
curves at at least ten locations on this 170-mile
line are being reduced and that five bridges hit
by US attacks have been recently repaired. This
activity contrasts with previous comparative neglect
of the line. Since US attacks began, the most ex-
tensive railroad repair and improvement projects
have been on the Hanoi - Ping-hsiang Railroad, which
has handled virtually all rail deliveries from
China. The roadbed has been improved and alternate
bridges have been added to the Ping-hsiang line and
a third rail has been laid over half its length to
enable use of standard-gauge equipment.
3. The neglect of the Lao Cai line has prob-
ably been because of the relative unimportance of
the Lao Cai Railroad as a supply line from China
until the Kuei-yang - Kun-ming Railroad in China was
completed--although not fully operational--in early
1966. Until then, the Lao Cai Railroad was not
connected to the main Chinese railroad system and
could conveniently handle only supplies originating
from Yunnan Province, an undeveloped area of China.
in addition, the Chinese logistics troops who are
believed to be performing most work on railroads
in northern North Vietnam have until recently been
occupied in improving the Ping-hsiang Railroad.
4. There does not seem to be an urgent need
for an alternate rail supply line at the present
time since the Ping-hsiang line is estimated to be
handling prevailing levels of aid deliveries with-
out strain. The preparation of alternate transport
facilities has, however, been a long-apparent policy
of the North Vietnamese.
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4 - o
US Case ties to qte 1 I& 15i Wounded 35 6$1 Captured 91
Viet Cong
GVN
Viet Cong/PAVN
GVN/US/other Free World
OCT NOV D
1966
Missing 370
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SECRET
200
4- -
OCTOBER
105
1963 1964 1965 1,966 1967
Viet Cong Attacks
Viet Cong Incidents
(Excluding Attacks)
0 I11111iii11I11111 11111 111111111 LLUI
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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