THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 8, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
NSA review completed
Top Secret
8 December 1966
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The Liberation Front has announced the appoint-
ment of a permanent representative to Hanoi. The
announcement also contained an optimistic account of
Communist prospects in the South.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
American troops swept a Viet Cong stronghol imme-
diately after a B-52 raid and report finding a complex
of bunkers and trenches (Para. 1). A total of 11 Viet
Cong were killed on 8 December by units of the US lst
Infantry Division taking part in Operation BISMARK in
Binh Duong Province (Para, 2), A Viet Cong base camp
and associated supplies were discovered by American
troops in Operation CHARLESTON south of Saigon (Para. 3)
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: It
is too early to ascertain what repercussions may result
from the incident involving the mayor of Saigon and
US Military Police on 8 December (Paras. 1-2). Radio
Hanoi put the blame for the killing of Constituent As-
sembly member Tran Van Van on Ky and Thieu (Para. 3).
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V. Communist Political Developments: A Liberation
Front communiqud has claimed great victories over the
US in recent months (Paras. 1-2). The announcement
also stated that a permanent Liberation Front representa-
tive to Hanoi has been named (Paras, 3-4).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Road construction has been
noted in the Dien Bien Phu area of North Vietnam (Paras.
1-3).
Ap
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't:Svannak het
Demilitarized Zone
.Qua.Qg Tri
1 t Attopeu
GULF OF
SIAM
IV CORPS
s0
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 25 50
7550 75 IOOMiles
1 Kilometers
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1. US soldiers moved into an area about 25
miles north of Saigon immediately after a predawn
B-52 raid on 8 December and reported killing'eight
Viet Cong. The area was laced with trenches,
bunkers, and automatic weapons positions, and is
believed to be the site from which the Viet Cong
have launched many of their attacks on Saigon.
Nine Communists were captured and 127 Viet Cong
suspects were apprehended in the operation,
2. Eleven Communist soldiers were killed on
8 December by elements of the US 1st Infantry Di-
vision participating in Operation BISMARK in Binh
Duong Province. Enemy losses included 14 captured
and 88 suspects detained. No American casualties
were reported.
3. Other units of the US 1st Infantry Divi-
sion taking part in Operation CHARLESTON in the
Rung Sat Special Zone ten miles southeast of Saigon
located a Viet Cong base camp on 8 December. Dis-
covered in the area were two sampans, cases of hand
grenades, claymore mines, medical supplies, more
than 20 weapons, and a large quantity of ammunition.
Six Viet Cong have been killed since this search-and-
destroy operation began on 27 November.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. It is not clear what repercussions may re-
sult. from the "arrest" on 8 December of Saigon mayor
Colonel Van Van Cua by US Military Police. Premier
Ky stated that he had ordered a "blackout" of the
event,_presumably referring to Vietnamese news
services.
2. This is not the first time Cua has been in-
volved in a notorious incident. On at least one
previous occasion, he detained and intimidated a
Vietnamese businessman for personal reasons, His
action in that case was similar to that of General
Loan who detained a subcabinet official, thus
setting off the recent cabinet crisis. Both inci-
dents were used by dissident southern ministers
as ammunition against the Ky government which re-
lies heavily on the power of police director Loan
and his colleagues.
Hanoi Reaction to Tran Van Van Assassination
3. Radio Hanoi on 8 December accused Ky and
Thieu of sending "agents into the streets to shoot
Tran Van Vary." The Hanoi broadcast cited Western
press accounts of the killing, which suggested
that the conflict between northerners and south-
erners might be sharpened as a result of Van's as-
sassination.
4.
or had done the shooting. Later in the day, however,
the suspect admitted ata press-conference that he
had been a Viet Cong agent for some three years,
and had been sent to Saigon to assassinate Van.
the murder suspect apprehended by the police
denied during questioning that he was a Viet Cong
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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3. A Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman as-
serted on 5 December that the 30 November "incident"
was another US "war provocation" against China, and
a People's Daily Commentator article added on 6 De-
cember that the US regards China as its "greatest
enemy" and wishes to "strangle" China "by all means
including war." The Chinese reaction, however, did
not threaten any Chinese countermeasures and re-
stated Peking's position that a Sino-US war would
be the result of a US attack, not a Chinese initia-
tive.
8 Decembei- 1966
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Liberation radio announced on 7 December
that the Front held a central committee meeting on
4-5 December. According to the announcement, the
delegates were given an optimistic report on the
military situation--which covered both the earlier
1965-66 dry season "counteroffensive" and the current
1966-67 winter-spring campaign, As in all other re-
cent Viet Cong propaganda, guerrilla warfare was
extolled as having been largely responsible for
these ""victories." The delegates were told that not
only had the Viet Cong lost no ground in either of
these campaigns, but also that they had made signifi-
cant gains in the northern part of the country--in
Quang Tri and Thu Thien provinces, There was some
hint, however, of problems,, particularly in food pro-
duction.
2.. The conference appears to have concentrated
on the need to increase the Front?s popular base.
Several paragraphs were devoted to the theme of
strengthening and enlarging the "united front of
all patriotic forces" against the Americans. The
broadcast appealed several times to all "patriotic
Vietnamese" to forget their religious, nationality,
and political differences in the interests of work-
ing together for national independence.
3. A statement at the very end of the trans-
mission announced that the Front had named a permanent
representative to Hanoi. Although Front members oc-
casionally appear in the DRV as visitors and the
clandestine traffic between North and South Vietnam
is extensive, the Vietnamese Communists have always
been reluctant to acknowledge any official liaison
on a permanent or continuing basis between Hanoi and
the Front. Although the Front has had overseas rep-
resentatives throughout the Communist world and in
a few free world countries for as long as four years,
the Front has until now shied away from any overt
association with Hanoi,
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4. The status of the new Front representative
is not indicated in the 7 December broadcast, but
it is possible that he will have the same semi`
diplomatic status as overseas Front represents
tives'have:'inother countries The usual practice
is to accredit the Front official to a nonofficial
organization. In North Vietnam, the mass organiza-
tion which-has always been used to communicate of-
ficially and openly with the Front is the North
Vietnamese Fatherland Front.
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LAOS-DRV BORDER: ROAD CONSTRUCTION
Ngh1a Low Yen Be
ram
Dinh
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Photography I Ireveals the 25X1
beginnings of a new road connection between the
region of the DRV southeast of Dien Bien Phu and
northern Laos.
2? The photography showed that the southern
portion of deteriorated Route 190 had been restored
and that some work may have recently been performed
to repair Route 44A up the Laos border. From a
point four kilometers south of the Laos/North Vietnam bor-
der, there was a six-kilometer cut for a new road
that may be extended to Samneua which is already
a major center serving trucks entering Laos by way
of Route 6/65.
3. The new connection with Laos--judging by
its location--is designed to provide a shorter
route between Samneua and Dien Bien Phu and other
regions of northwest North Vietnam as well as to
open new routes within North Vietnam for supplying
the war effort in northern Laos. Up to now, all
truck-borne supplies for this purpose have been de-
livered by way of Routes 6/65 and 7, which connect
respectively with the delta area and the southern
provinces of North Vietnam.
8 December 1966
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Top Secret
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