THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 7, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
NSA review completed
R
Top Secret
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The assassination of Tran Van Van--an outspoken
critic of the Ky regime--apparently by the Viet Cong,
may ;be calculated to draw suspicion to the regime it-
self and exacerbate regional frictions.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Opera-
tion SUTTER, conducted by US Marines in Quang Tin
Province, ended on 6 December with a total of 13 Commu-
nist soldiers reported killed (Para. 1). A South Vietnam-
ese search-and-destroy operation in the Mekong Delta was
responsible for killing 12 Viet Cong on 6 December
(Para. 2). A South Vietnamese outpost about 18 miles
northwest of Saigon was overrun with five South Vietnam-
ese reported killed (Para. 3). Two explosive charges
were found and disarmed early on 7 December at an
ammunition dump on Tan Son Nhut Air Base (Para. 4). The
VC radio has called Operation ATTLEBORO the "bitterest
defeat" yet suffered by the US (Paras. 5-7).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Tran Van Van, a prominent southern member of t e Con-
stituent Assembly, was assassinated early on the morning
of 7 December by an alleged Viet Cong terrorist (Paras.
1-4).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
North Korean pilots flew over North Vietnam oree
again on 5 December (Paras. 1-3). MIG-17 interceptors
are reported to have fired air-to-air missiles on 4
December (Para. 4).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Chinese
Communists claim that they will send political
advisers to Vietnam unlikely to be fulfilled (Paras.
1-3).
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VI. Other Major Aspects: Trains bringing aid
deliveries to North Vietnam may have begun using
recently completed standard gauge rail lines to
Kep (Paras. 1-3).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1, The one-battalion US Marine Operation SUTTER,
which was conducted in an area about 10 miles west of
Chu Lai in Quang Tin Province, ended on 6 December.
Communist losses for this seven-day operation were
13 killed, one captured and six suspects apprehended.
American casualties were one killed and 14 wounded.
2. South Vietnamese Operation CUU LONG 116, a
one-day search-and-destroy operation in the Mekong
Delta province of Dinh Tuong, resulted in Viet Cong
casualties of 12 killed, nine captured, and 12 sus-
pects detained; Only one South Vietnamese soldier
was reported wounded.
3. Five South Vietnamese soldiers were killed
when their outpost in Binh Duong Province about 18
miles northwest of Saigon was overrun late on 6 De-
cember. Friendly losses also included one soldier
missing and six weapons lost. Viet Cong casualties
are unknown,
4. Viet Cong guerrillas apparently have at-
tempted another terrorist assault on the huge Tan
Son Nhut Airfield northwest of Saigon. Two 62-pound
explosive charges discovered at a base ammunition
dump were disarmed early on 7 December,
VC Radio Reports on Operation
5. The Communist Liberation Radio on 2 Decem-
ber offered a commentary on the recently concluded
US operation ATTLEBORO, calling it the "bitterest
defeat" yet suffered by the US. The broadcast made
extravagant claims of US casualties, asserting that
"more than 3,000" were killed "or destroyed." The
commentary went on to boast that the "liberation
forces" would follow up on this "victory" with
other similar successes.
7 December 1966
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6. The broadcast said that the Communists
should expect further such US operations as
ATTLEBORO and offered some analysis of how the
Communists plan to cope with them. The radio
report suggested that the Communists do not in-
tend to meet such operations head on, but plan
to look for soft spots in nearby areas which can
be exploitec while US forces are tied down in a
large operation. The commentary claimed that
during ATTLEBORO, when the US"was locked up north
of Tay Ninh," many successes were gained in near-
by provinces.
7. The aim of the Communists, according to
the broadcast, should be to "lure the enemy out
of his bases" so that the Communists can attack
and destroy him. The commentary asserted that
the key to victory over such large-scale opera-
tions will be the Communists' ability to coordi-
nate guerrilla attacks with mobile attacks.
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1 Tran Van Van, an outspoken critic of the
Ky regime in the Constituent Assembly, was shot to
death in his car while en route to an assembly ses-
sion on the morning of 7 December. One of two al-
leged assassins was captured when he fell off a
motorcycle from which the fatal pistol shots were
fired; the other man is reported to have escaped.
Appearing later at a National Police press confer-
ence, the 20-year-old captured terrorist said he was
sent into Saigon a week ago by the Viet Cong on an
assassination mission.
2. If the killing was indeed a Viet Cong plot,
as seems likely, the VC picked their target well.
Van was a southern activist in the assembly and
was one of the men acting as a thorn in the side of
the northern-oriented Ky regime during the recent
cabinet crisis. The Communists may have calculated
that the murder of a major critic of the Ky govern-
ment would draw suspicion to the regime itself
and further exacerbate regional factions.
3. It has been evident that the Communists
are well attuned to the nuances of political bicker-
ing between groups inside and outside the Saigon
government, For example, during such periods of
tension as the antigovernment "struggle movement"
last spring, the cabinet crisis this fall, and the
recent removal of General Quang from IV Corps,
newscasts from the Viet Cong and Hanoi have done
their utmost to agitate the opposing parties by
siding with Ky's opponents, Moreover, the Viet Cong
publicly threatened, prior to the 11 September
elections, that they would assassinate candidates
to the assembly.
4. Before learning of Van's death during its
morning recess, the assembly heard the recommenda-
tions of the constitution drafting committee on
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the organization of the future government. The
committee was in favor of a popularly elected presi-
dent and vice president, a bicameral legislature,
an inspectorate, and a nine-member supreme court.
It also recommended the election of province chiefs
and mayors, but had not yet reached a decision on
whether to recommend the inclusion of a prime minis-
ter. The views of some of the other committee mem-
bers were presented previously.
5. Following a brief assembly meeting, the
deputies agreed to reconvene on the afternoon of
7 December in order to draft a resolution de-
nouncing the murder of Van.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1, North Korean pilots were in the air again
over the DRV on the morning of 5 December. At least
17, possibly 19, North Korean pilots flew but of Phuc
Yen Airfield probably in MIG-15/l7 aircraft. The
majority of their radio transmissions were in Korean.
2, The flight activity was mainly formation
practice by flights of four aircraft. Although com-
munications mostly concerned instructions for main-
taining formations, references were made by the pi-
lots to clearing their guns shortly after takeoff.
One of the pilots also made an isolated reference
to a practice firing. It would be a logical pre-
caution for these aircraft to be armed in the event
of an encounter with US aircraft.
3. That the planes were armed is not necessarily
an indication that North Korean pilots are preparing
to enter combat at this time. In fact, one flight
on '5 December was instructed to return to Phuc Yen
when US strike- i'rcraft were noted operating north-
west of that field. The activity of the 5th seems
to be a continuation of that noted since the Koreans
began their familiarization flights on 22 November.
MIG-l7s Reported to Have Fired Air-to-Air Missiles
4. Additional information on the 4 December
air engagement between DRV MIG-17 interceptors and
US Air Force F-105s indicates that the MIG-17s were
armed with air-to-air missiles (AAMs). Two of the
MIGs were reported to have unsuccessfully fired
their missiles at the US fighter/bombers. This is
the first good evidence that other than DRV MIG-21
aircraft are armed with AAMs.
7 December 1966
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
7 December 1966
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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I There is
little likelihood, however, that the North Vietnamese
want or will accept assistance from the Chinese Com-
munists in "political matters" or in "war strategy."
The North Vietnamese have long insisted on maintain-
ing a middle position between Peking and Moscow in
political matters and are unlikely to abandon this
position by accepting Chinese political advisers.
3. It is also unlikely that Hanoi would be
responsive to Chinese advice on war strategy. The
North Vietnamese have made a point of asserting
their independent contribution to the concept of
"people's war." A common theme in the writings
of North Vietnamese leaders, whether moderates or
militants, has been the need for Hanoi to develop
its own independent line and to avoid blindly
following the advice or experience of foreigners.
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NORTH VIETNAM: Railroads
New standard transloading
Dual gauge ''?~"'
third rail added Mong C
Tien Yen P`
Possible new Oo '
\transloading
Hoa
,.Binh ?
LAO S
65061
CIA
25 50 7S
STATUTE MILES
7 DECEMBER 1966
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1. The North Vietnamese may have begun to
receive additional large rail shipments over the
recently impro:ved rail system in the northeastern
part of their country.
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The addition o
a third rai to the meter-gauge line between Ping-
hsiang and Kep enables the line to carry both meter-
and standard-gauge cars. In addition, an entirely
new standard-,gauge railroad has been constructed be-
tween Kep and Thai Nguyen. Standard-gauge trains
from China may now be traveling as far south as Kep
before their contents are transloaded to cars with:meter-
gauge trucks, although the old transloading station
at Ping-hsiang is probably ?till also in use.
3. The new standard--gauge lines in North Vietnam
make it possible for trains bringing aid deliveries
to carry heavier loads. It also may enable North
Vietnam to draw upon China's railroad car and locomo-
tive inventory in case of need.
7 December 1966
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Top Secret
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