THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 6, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
State Department review completed
NSA review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
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Top Secret
6 December 1966
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I 6 December 19 6
Copy No.
HIGHLIGHTS
Constituent Assembly delegates appear to be
evenly divided on the issue of a presidential
system as they prepare to vote on the principles
of the constitutional form of the future South
Vietnamese Government,.
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Allied forces in South Vietnam made only
light contact with the Viet Cong.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Twenty-two Communist soldiers have been reporte
killed by US Marines in Quang Nam Province (Paras.
1-2). A CIDG force discovered a Viet Cong bivouac
and training area near Tay Ninh city and seized
30,000 Communist uniforms (Para. 3).
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subordinate to the Viet Cong 165A Regiment (Paras.
4-5). During a short period in early December 2,500
refuges fled VC-controlled areas in Kien Giang Prov-
ince (Paras. 6-8).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Constituent Asserbly delegates, scheduled to vote on
the principles of the future government on 7 December,
appear evenly divided between those favoring a straight
presidential system and those preferring a presidential -
prime ministerial system (Para. 1). A plan to reorgan-
ize village and hamlet administrations is awaiting
Premier Ky's approval (Para. 2). Friction among polit-
ical, party leaders in I Corps could develop into trouble
for important government programs in the area (Paras.
3-5).
III. military Develo ments in North Vietnam: North
Vietnamese MIG-21s have increased their use of air-to-
air missiles since 2 December. (Paras. 1-3).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments: The
Chinese are rotating their AAA units in Vietnam (Paras.
1-4).
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V. Communist Political Develo ments: I -J 25X1
I I Peking s
assistance to Vietnam will be ou a aras. 1-2).
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Savannakhet
Demilitarized Zone
?QUang Tri
Hue \
J\---/ /`.` Kontum?
SOUTH VIETNAM
Y ! Y 25 '50 75 100 M"
0 25 50 75 160 Klometers
VIETNAM 1
L
?Phuoc Vinh
L I~~~F
S
Nh
an
on
ut
lrfieid
Xuan Loc
Nang
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1. Elements of the one-battalion US Marine
Operation MISSISSIPPI, a search-and-destroy opera-
tion being conducted in Quang Nam Province, re-
ported killing eight Communist soldiers and cap-
turing 19 others., American casualties were three
killed and 17 wounded, Fifty-five tons of rice
have been seized in this operation since 28 November.
2. Patrols in the Da Nang area reported killing
an additional 14 Viet Cong, No US Marine casualties
were reported.
3? A three-company South Vietnamese Civilian
Irregular Defense Corps (CIDG) force, following up
a US B-.52 strike, seized 30,000 Communist uniforms
at an enemy bivouac and training area 20 miles north-
west of Tay Ninh city in Tay Ninh Province early on
6 December. The captured clothing included both
khaki uniforms and the black pajama-like garb worn
by Viet Cong guerrillas., The CIDG force will bring
out.2,000 of the uniforms and destroy the remainder.
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a portion of the attack was 25X1
conducted by two Viet Cong platoons subordinate to
the 165A Viet Cong Regiment which has been operating
in. the Saigon area.
5m The terrorists left their base camps south-
west of Saigon on 2 and 3 December and, after as-
sembling near the western edge of the city, departed
for the airfield late on 3 December. Some of the
Viet Cong penetrated the base perimeter through a
drainage ditch at a construction site northwest of
the main runway.
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Refugees Flee VC Areas in Kien Giang Province
6. During the short period of 2-5 December,
2,500 refugees are reported to have fled from a Viet
Cong base area located in the Hon Chong Mountain area,.
35 wrd les northwest of the province capital from Rach
GiF,.Jn Kien Giang Province. The refugees, according
to a MACV report, left the base area as a result of
the combined pressures of air strikes end an intensive
allied psychological warfare campaign. The. refugee
group includes about 1,200 children.
7. Although the refugees expressed dissatisfaction
with Viet Cong control techniques, they are anxious to
return home to begin their rice harvest. An exodus of
this magnitude demonstrates that VC control of the popu-
lation can be effectively challenged by a carefully pre-
pared and executed psywar campaign. A follow-up psycho-
logical operation is being planned to exploit fully
this situation.
8. In addition to the refugees, 64 Viet Cong de-
fectors came under government control. Included in the
defector group were one noncommissioned officer, a tax
collector, and several cadre.
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Approv
1. The Constituent Assembly postponed its
session of 6 December until the 7th in order to give
its delegates one more day to consider their posi-
tions on the form of the constitutional government.
The US Embassy has reported that the delegates ap-
pear evenly divided between those favoring a straight
presidential system and those preferring a combined
presidential - prime ministerial_system. Some dele-
gates have implied that government pressure is being
exerted for the latter system. Those critical of the
government interpret this pressure as an ill-disguised
attempt to provide a means to perpetuate the Thieu-Ky
partnership.
Village and Hamlet Elections
2. A plan to reorganize village and hamlet ad-
ministrations is awaiting Premier Ky's approval. The
plan will promote self-government by reinstituting
elected village councils of six to 12 members, de-
pending upon the size of a village's population. The
councils will have power over the village budget,
taxes, land transfers, public services, and internal
legal matters? Each council will have a three-year
term and will choose a village chief--who will be a
salaried administrative official--from among its mem-
bership. At the hamlet level, there will be an
elected hamlet chief, plus a deputy if the size of
the hamlet population warrants one. The elections
are not yet scheduled, but are expected sometime dur-
ing the spring of 1967 for approximately 800 villages
and 4,000-5,000 hamlets where security conditions are
satisfactory.
Nationalist Party Squabbles in I Corps
3. Friction between the Dai Viet and VNQDD
parties in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces is a
current subject of major interest among knowledge-
able Vietnamese in I Corps. In general, Dai Viet
supporters predominate in the two northern prov-
inces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, while VNQDD mem-
bers are stronger in the other three I Corps provinces
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of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. The focal
point of the friction appears to be in Thua Thien,
where six VNQDD-oriented district chiefs have com-
plained to the I Corps commander of alleged discrim-
ination by Dai Viet members among police and Revo-
lutionary Development groups. Other, somewhat un-
related friction among VNQDD factions has also been
reported in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces.
4. The interparty squabbling has involved con-
siderable speculation about the political orienta-
tion of major government officials in I Corps,
especially I Corps commander General Lam. General
Lam himself claims that he favors neither party,
Generally,
however, Lam is forced to deal with both parties
depending upon their local strength in each prov-
ince. General Lam has stated that his major con-
cern is to keep party differences within reasonable
limits, and to avoid a serious shooting incident
which would almost certainly involve US/GVN cadre
teams.
5. Thus far, Dai Viet - VNQDD differences
have taken the form of extensive maneuvering by
party leaders for control of local government func-
tions and various government progr'am's reaching into
the countryside. These leaders appear to realize
that an outbreak of violence would only be costly
for all involved. Nevertheless, an assassination
or other violent incident remains a possibility which
could touch off a major conflict between the parties,
with serious effects on Revolutionary Development
and other government programs in the area.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. North Vietnamese MIGs have fired more air-
to-air missiles (AAMs) in combat since 2 December
than in any previous period in the war. So far
nose of the missiles is known to have succeeded in
downing a US aircraft. The increased rate of mis-
sile firing suggests, however, that the DRV Air
Force may now be prepared to oppose US strikes with
AAMs on a regular basis.
2. US pilots reported sighting air-to-air
missiles on Communist aircraft over North Vietnam
as early as April 1966. It was not clear at that
time, however, whether the weapons sighted were
AAMs or unguided air-to-air rockets. Four pilot
sightings in July added to the evidence that the
DRV possessed some typ' of air-to-air missile and
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firmed the use of AAMs on MIG-21 aircra since
that time, additional pilot reports and communica-
tions intercepts have suggested that the DRV Air
Force has been supplied with both the AA-1 ALKALI
beam-rider and the AA-2 ATOLL heat-seeking missile
systems.
3. Microphone characteristics and pilot sight-
ings of the air engagements of 2,4, and 5 December
combine to show that AAMs launched at US aircraft
were fired by DRV pilots flying MIG-21s. This ad---
vanced Soviet-built fighter can fire either AA-1
or AA-2 missiles.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Chinese Communist antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) units have apparently been rotated again in
northern North Vietnam. Around 24 October, an ele-
ment E: I of the army 65th AAA Division re-
placed the AAA division in the Yen Bai 25X1
area of northwest North Vietnam, and on 1 December
the air force 101st AAA Division moved into the Lang
Son area of the northeast DRV apparently to replace
the air force 103rd AAA Division,
2. This activity follows a pattern set in
February 1966 when the 103rd replaced an unidentified
arm AAA division at Lang Son, and 25X1
I Ireplaced a suspect army AAA division 25X1
at Yen Bai.
3, Of the six Chinese AAA units that have ro-
tated in and out of North Vietnam, only three--the
CCAF 103rd and 101st AAA Divisions and the element
of the 65th AAA Division--have been firmly identi-
fied. The other three units apparently represent
composite AAA organizations or units that were not
known to exist prior to their arrival in North Viet-
nam.
4. Since early 1966, seven to ten different
types of communications facilities have been identi-
fied serving Chinese tactical AAA operations in North
Vietnam, Most of these facilities are active in the
northwest DRV, and are apparently concentrated in
the Yen Bai area,. The others are apparently operat-
ing in the general Hanoi-Haiphong-Kep area of the
northeast DRV, Recent intercepts from these facili-
ties indicate that AAA visual observation posts may
be more specifically located at Kep Thai Nguyen, and
Haiphong. This suggests that the Chinese AAA divi-
sion, operating in the northeast DRV has a much more
extensive area of responsibility--from Lang Son to
Hanoi to Haiphong--than the unit in the northwest
whose primary mission apparently is to defend the
Chinese airfield construction project at Yen Bai.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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c
is planning to ,in
tics support to North Vietnam
Peking
n had already decided to double the:amoun
Ch'
i
aid to Vietnam next year. In addition to food and war
materials, Peking will dispatch personnel to assist
Hanoi technical and political matters and war strat-
egy. he only way to settle the
Vietnam con ict was the complete destruction of
US forces in Vietnam.
The Chinese are convince hat the US plans to co t f
its escalation of the war. Peking is probably
planning to increase the level of its logistics sup-
port for North Vietnam next year to encourage Hanoi
to resist a negotiated settlement of the war.
6 December 1966
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