THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010081-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: December 2, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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op Secret
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
JCS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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Information as of 1600
2 December 1966
US aircraft struck several major targets in
North Vietnam on 2 December and pilots report
that bomb damage was heavy. Eight US aircraft
were downed over North Vietnam on 2 December.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Nearly 90 Viet Cong were killed early on 2 Decem-
ber during a four-hour engagement in southern Long
Khanh Province (Para. 1). Eleven Communist sol-
diere were killed in western Pleiku Province as
the nine-battalion US Operation PAUL REVERE IV
continued its reconnaissance and surveillance
mission near the Cambodian border (Para. 2).
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The mass i napin- episodes in the Mekong Delta
last month are part of the Viet Cong's continuing
efforts to indoctrinate large segments of the
population (Paras. 6-9). MACV has accepted
another North Vietnam regiment in its OB (Paras.
10-11).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent Assembly on 1 December began dis-
cussion of the form of government it will propose
under the constitution (Para. 1). The Directorate
has reportedly decided not to give in to the as-
sembly on a complete relaxation of the Directorate's
current powers of constitutional revision (Para. 2).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
US aircraft attacked targets in the Hanoi area
on 2 December inflicting major damage to POL stor-
age facilities (Paras. 1-5).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
VI. Other Major Aspects:
The Cambodian Government has issued its first offi-
cial response to recent South Vietnamese statements
regarding Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory (Paras.
5-7).
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 AN
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Units of the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
successfully engaged a Viet Cong battalion in Long Khanh
Province early on 2 December. The US force was on a
routine reconnaissance patrol along National Highway One
about 45 miles northeast of Saigon when it encountered
a 400-man Communist force. Tactical air strikes supported
the American soldiers with napalm, explosives, and straf-
ing. Viet Cong losses during the four-hour battle in-
cluded 88 killed and four weapons captured. American cas-
ualties have not been reported; however,,: press reports in=
dicate US casualties were light with just a few wounded.
2. Eleven Viet Cong were killed during a three and a
half hour skirmish between elements of the nine-battalion
Operation PAUL REVERE IV and an estimated company-size Com-
munist force in western Pleiku Province early on 2 December.
Seven enemy weapons were captured. Six Americans were re-
ported wounded. This long-term reconnaissance and surveil-
lance operation has been sweeping the western portions of
Pleiku and Kontum provinces in search of elements of the
lst NVA Division (formerly the 630th). Since the beginning
of this phase of the operation, 890 Communist soldiers have
been killed and 80 captured compared to 125 Americans killed
and 412 wounded.
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Mass Kidnapings in IV Corps by, the Viet Cong
6. The two mass kidnapings of civilians by the
Viet Cong in the delta province of Vinh Binh in No-
vember apparently were in line with past Viet Cong
tactics of forcibly exercising control over the ci-
vilian population.
7. According to the province chief, 30 of the
persons taken from one of the hamlets last month have
been allowed to return. These villagers reported
that they were given four hours of indoctrination
each day for 18 days.
8. Information' available to the province chief
indicates that the remainder of the villagers will be
held captive because the Viet Cong believe that the
presence of noncombatants in this Communist-controlled
area will protect it from B-52 strikes. The Viet Cong
may-also feel that the kidnapings of ,civilians will
frustrate the government pacification effort and pre-
vent establishment of more new life hamlets.
9. Mass kidnapings from government-sponsored
hamlets have not been reported elsewhere in the IV
Corps area. Kidnaping large numbers of people as
was the case in November is, however, unusual. It
is not clear from just the two incidents that the
Communists intend to continue large-scale kidnapings.
MACV Accepts Another NVA Regiment in OB
10. The 101st "C" Regiment (NVA), with a strength
of 1,500 men, has been accepted in the "possible"
category of the MACV order of battle. This unit, also
known as the Song Lam Regiment, has three battalions
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-(400 men each) and a headquarters element. It began
infiltrating to South Vietnam in January 1966 and
arrived-in March in, Thua Thien Province where it re-
portedly participated with the 95 "B" NVA Regiment
in the assault on the A Shau Special Forces Camp.
The 101 "C" unit apparently arrived at its present
location in Pleiku Province in II Corps in July 1966.
11. There are now a total of 21 North Vietnamese
Army regiments accepted in the order of battle along
with 13 Viet Cong regiments. Total North Vietnamese
strength in the order of battle now stands at 45,870
men.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. On 1 December, the Constituent Assembly be-
gan a preliminary discussion of the system of govern-
ment to be established under the forthcoming consti-
tution. A document favoring a straight presidential
executive over a modified presidential system was
presented to the assembly by a member of the drafting
committee. The document suggested that the concurrent
establishment of a bicameral legislature, an inde-
pendent inspectorate, an independent judiciary, and
a formal leader of an opposition party would check
the potential threat of a dictatorial president.
Nevertheless, the idea of a pure presidential system
provoked fear among some of the deputies of a return
to a situation such as existed under President Diem.
Several deputies argued for the inclusion in the future
government of a prime minister. This had been pre-
viously reported as an alternative to the straight
presidential executive. The assemblymen decided that
the executive issue was too complex to decide now
and voted to hold further discussions on the over-all
form of the government before voting on any one aspect.
2. According to a journalist's account which
quotes "usually reliable sources," the Directorate
has decided not to relax its present amendatory powers
over the draft of the constitution which the Con-
stituent Assembly will write. This decision will'be
formally announced to the assembly next week, the
journalist's report added. At stake is whether the
military rulers will be able to rewrite portions'of
the constitution which could have.a significant ef-
fect on their legal involvement in the next govern-
ment. The Directorate was petitioned by an assembly
committee on 18 November to amend the assembly's
establishing decree in order to limit potential
Directorate influence over the assembly's work.
There have been, however, no reports from members of
the inner government circle to suggest that they
would soften their approach on the question of con-
stitutional revision.
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POL
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Clearing weather enabled more than 200 US
Navy and Air Force aircraft to conduct a coordinated
attack on three major targets in the Hanoi area on
2 December. One of the targets was within five
miles of Hanoi proper. Bomb damage assessment pho-
tography is not yet available, but initial pilot
reports indicated that the raids were successful.
2. North Vietnam's two remaining major POL
sites at Ha Gia and Can Thon, which provide POL for
the airfields at Phuc Yen and Kep, were among the
objectives. Navy pilots reported black oily smoke
rising to 5,000-feet and many secondary explosions
after the raid at Can Thon. No details have been
received concerning the air force strike at Ha Gia.
The extensive vehicle storage and light industrial
area at Van Dien four miles south of Hanoi was also
hit by carrier-based planes, and pilots reported
"massive damage" with 95 percent of the bombs de-
livered on target.
3. Eight US aircraft were lost over North
Vietnam on 2 December. Four of the eight planes
lost are believed to have been lost in the attacks
on Ha Gia, Can Thon,and Van Dien. Coordination of
the timing of the air force and navy raids, plus
saturation of the air defenses in the Hanoi area,
probably aided in minimizing US losses. Navy pi-
lots participating in these strikes reported
sighting more than 25 SAM firings and heavy anti-
aircraft fire. Initial reports from the 7th Air
Force indicate that USAF pilots encountered numerous
SAMs and an unknown number of MIG aircraft.
4. In addition to the four planes lost during
the major strikes, two navy A4s are reported to
have been downed by SAMs in the Thanh Hoa area, an
air force F4C was lost to unknown causes while
2 December 1966
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escorting an EB-66 near Yen Bai, and an RF4C photo-
reconnaissance plane was reported as missing be-
tween Hanoi and Haiphong.
5. Hanoi and Peking radios charged on 2
December that US aircraft had bombed and strafed a
populated area of Hanoi. Peking called the raids
a serious new escalation of the war but neither Hanoi
nor Peking threatened specific retaliation. The
Communists claimed that 11 US aircraft were shot down
during the 2 December raids.
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1, There is nothing of significance to report.
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report,
2 December 1966
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IV, OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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2. Rumors that China will not permit use of its south-
ern ports for transshipments to the DRV have not been sub-
stantiated. To avoid congestion at Haiphong in June, and
immediately following US air attacks on petroleum facili-
ties there, three Soviet tankers delivered cargoes in China
for transshipment to North Vietnam. A Rumanian oil ship-
ment apparently was similarly transshipped via a south China
port in August.
3. During the past two months there has been no conges-
tion at the port of Haiphong, and Hanoi presumably has used
this time to clear out stockpiles which had accumulated in
warehouse areas near Haiphong during the March-September pe-
riod when Communist shipping was maintained at a high rate.
Despite sensitivity concerning the vulnerability of Haiphong
to air attack, it is likely that Communist ship arrivals will
increase again in coming months. The expected upswing will
in part reflect deliveries of aid materials negotiated dur-
ing Le Thanh Nghi's recent swing through the Communist coun-
tries.
4. Although reports imply that the aid Nghi procured is
military, a good deal of it undoubtedly consists of construc-
tion and transportation equipment which supports the North Viet-
namese war effort. This type of aid has been delivered pri-
marily by sea, although rail shipments of some vehicles have
already been scheduled for early 1967.
5. The Cambodian Government has issued its first offi-
cial response to recent: South Vietnamese statements regarding
Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory.
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6. An official communique--published in Phnom
Penh on 2 December-.-contains standard denials that
the Communists use Cambodian territory or that Cam-
bodia is violating its neutrality by actively sup-
porting the Viet Cong. The communique also calls
for an International Control Commission (ICC) in-
vestigation of statements made by South Vietnamese
Foreign Minister Tran Van Do that the headquarters
element of the Viet Cong 9th Division may have moved
into Cambodia during the allies' Operation ATTLEBORO
in South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province. It promised
that Phnom Penh would afford the ICC "all facilities"
to conduct its investigation.
7. The communique, and a subsequent message
broadcast on the Cambodian domestic service, portray
South Vietnamese statements as an attempt by the US
and South Vietnam to lay the groundwork for action
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