WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010072-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: November 28, 1966
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Weekly Report
Prepared Exclusively for the
Senior Interdepartmental Group
Secret
44
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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No.
1878/66
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1.
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2.
Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.
. . . . .
. 3
4.
Soviet Arms Deliveries to Algeria . . .
. 4
5.
Taiwan - Burma - Communist China. . . .
. 5
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Although anti-Husayn demonstrations have sub-
sided, the-situation remains dangerous.
Palestinian antagonism toward the regime con-
tinues to be fueled, by the Cairo-based Palestine
Liberation organization as well as the Cairo and
Damascus press. Much of this propaganda now openly
attacks Husayn, whereas it initially concentrated
on Prime Minister Tal. Husayn probably will re-
place Tal in an effort to appease the dissidents,
but this is unlikely to occur soon since it would
appear to be too hasty a response to popular pres-
sure.
Neither the UN Security Council's censure of Is-
rael nor the acceleration of US arms aid to Jordan
appears to have had much effect. The arms aid does
not seem to have been dramatic enough in terms of
hardware and timing to impress the King, and the
Palestinian demonstrators have been less interested
in punishing Israel. than inventing their antipathy
toward the government.
Conspirators against Husayn. within the army are
still active and can be expected to try to make the
most of the present: turmoil. Whether this will sig-
nificantly improve their prospects'is uncertain.
Last week, the Jordanians captured the first arms
shipment from Syria to terrorist'depots in Jordan
since the 13 November Israeli raid. This develop-
ment suggests that the Syrians ahd'the terrorists
have not been deterred from further terrorist opera-
tions against Israel; they may also be preparing for
action against Husayn. Jordanian intelligence con-
tinues to receive reports pointing to attempts to
assassinate the King. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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4. SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO ALGERIA
The flow of Soviet arms into Algeria has caused
Morocco and Tunisia to continue to press the US for
arms.
Premier Boumediene disclaims any aggressive in-
tentions; nevertheless, the number and sophistication
of incoming weapons disturb his neighbors. This
month at least three Soviet ships have delivered ar-
tillery, radar equipment, and ammunition. Soviet air-
craft delivered late last month brought Algeria's in-
ventory to 27 IL-28 jet light bombers and 94 MIG
fighters. Substantial numbers of Algerians are re-
ceiving military training in the USSR and several
hundred Soviet instructors are conducting training
in Algeria.
Algerian military capabilities are limited by a
shortage of skilled technicians, a lack of operational
experience with large units, and inexperience in air-
ground tactical cooperation. The logistic system is
not up to sustained combat operations. The Soviet
training program should, however, begin to overcome
these deficiencies in a year or two.
Internal political considerations would probably
now inhibit aggressive action by the Algerian Army.
Its officers disagree on political ideology and ori-
entation, and their backgrounds tend to divide them
into such groups as former maquisards, French-trained
professionals, and Soviet-trained junior officers.
Furthermore, the army is increasingly being saddled
with civil administrative chores.
Algeria has serious border disputes with both
Tunisia and Morocco and minor incidents along both
borders sustain tensions. Algeria's nationalization
of mines in the undefined border area south of Mo-
rocco, together with its support for Spain over
Spanish Sahara, causes friction with Morocco. Boume-
diene, however, recently has taken steps to improve re-
lations with Tunisia. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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5. TAIWAN - BURMA - COMMUNIST CHINA
Chinese Nationalist plans to increase the activ-
ity of irregular forces in the Burma-China border
area, if carried out, could severely strain US-
Burmese relations,
Taipei military planners envisage a 5,000-man
force to be built up in two or three years using
existing groups augmented by refugees. The initial
mission of the force would be intelligence collec-
tion and harassment of Yunnan Province. A high-
level Nationalist team is preparing to go to the
border area to investigate prospects for this plan.
Military and diplomatic pressure has twice forced
the evacuation of irregulars to Taiwan. In 1954,
about 7,000 of the 15,000 KMT troops who retreated
to Burma after the Communist take-over in China were
evacuated. Nationalist attempts in 1960 to build up
the irregulars by airlifting 1,200 Special Forces
troops and supplies were defeated by Chinese Commu-
nist and Burmese forces. About 3,500 men were subse-
quently repatriated to Taiwan, but Taipei has con-
tinued to give some support to the remnants.
Taipei would face no insurmountable logistic
problems in providing a new irregular force with of-
ficers and arms. Last August two arms shipments were
airlifted to Luang Prabang and then packed overland
through Thailand. Taipei has many large long-range
aircraft, and a new airstrip on Pratas Island re-
duces the air distance to the border area by 250
miles.
Bangkok, in the past, has been concerned about
the Nationalists' lack of control over the irregulars.
In late 1965, however, the Thais and Nationalists
concluded an agreement for intelligence operations
into Southwest China.
Past irregular raids into Yunnan succeeded only
in provoking strong reaction from the Burmese, who
hold the US responsible for Taiwan's actions. (SE-
CRET) (Map)
-5- 28 November 1966
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Secret
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