THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010059-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: November 22, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
State Department review completed
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Information as of 1600
22 November 1966
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I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Scattered contact between US and Communist forces
was reported on 22 November on three fronts: near
the DMZ in Quang Tri Province, in the central high-
lands of Pleiku Province, and in the jungled area
of War Zone "C" in Tay Ninh Province (Paras. 1-4).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Premier Ky appears to have ca med regional tensions
following the compromise cabinet reshuffle, but
there are still some lingering resentments (Paras.
1-3).
SAM support facility near Haiphong on 22 Novem-
ber (Para. 6).
North Vietnamese Military Developments:
US Navy aircraft successfully struc a
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Chi-
nese Foreign Minister Chen Yi reiterated Peking?s
hard line on Vietnam negotiations in a conversa-
tion with the French ambassador on 16 November
(Paras. 1-2). Politburo member Le Duc Tho will
head the North Vietnamese delegation to the Hun-
garian party congress (Para. 3)..
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VI. Other Major As ects: There are continu-
ing indications that bad weather and war-related
disruptions are contributing to a below-aver-
age rice harvest in North Vietnam (Paras. 1-3).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1.. Scattered contact with Communist forces was
reported on three fronts in South Vietnam on 22 Novem-
ber.
2. American troops of the ten-battalion oper-
ation PAUL REVtRE IV pursued regulars of the 1st North
Vietnamese Army Division (formerly the 630th) toward
the Cambodian border after several clashes. Air
strikes and artillery fire were directed at the en-
emy's withdrawal routes west of Pleiku city. A total
of 303 Communist troops have been reported killed
since 20 November, bringing the total to over 7-00
killed since this phase of the operation began on 17
October. In comparison, 90 Americans have been killed
and 364 wounded.
3. Operation ATTLEBORO--reduced to 13 US bat-
talions--continued to sweep War Zone "C'," the Commu-
nist stronghold in Tay Ninh Province. Seven Ameri-
cans were wounded when a command post of the US 25th
Infantry Division was hit by 20 mortar shells on 22
November. Other scattered skirmishes on 22 November
increased the enemy death toll to nearly 1,100 com-
pared to American losses of 108 killed and 390 wounded
since 14 October.
4. Near the DMZ in northernmost Quang Tri Prov-
ince, a US Marine company encountered an estimated
100-man Communist force on 22 November. US aircraft
struck the enemy positions with bombs and napalm.
Two Marines were killed and four wounded, while en-
emy losses were 25 :killed. Five enemy weapons were
captured. Eleven-week-old Operation PRAIRIE has re-
sulted in 1,268 Communist soldiers killed compared
to American casualties of 175 killed and 914 wounded.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. In the opinion of the US Embassy, regional
antagonisms raised during the recent cabinet crisis
have subsided for the time being. The appointment
of southerners to the posts vacated during the crisis
is at least a partial concession to southern interests.
The new ministers are, however, neither men of proven
ability or prestige. Responsible persons in the gov-
ernment and in business view the appointments to the
reorganized Economy Ministry as weak. The embassy
fears that it may be difficult to make and implement
necessary decisions with weakened and divided eco-
nomic machinery.
2. Although regional political wrangling in the
government appears to have quieted down, some antago-
nisms remain which have regional ramifications. One
of these is the continuing attempt by Au Truong Thanh,
the former southern economy minister, publicly to en-
hance his stature by having pamphlets favorable to
his position circulated around Saigon. The government
has reacted by attempting to discredit Thanh in at
least one GVN-controlled newspaper. Since the Minis-
try of Information rigidly censors the news media,
only those articles favoring the government have been
allowed to appear. The anti-Thanh articles strongly
reflect the work of police director Loan and, possibly,
Minister of Information Nguyen Bao Tri
3. Another possible source of trouble is the
increasing desire of Premier Ky's colleagues to have
favored individuals assigned to key GVN embassies
despite advice to the contrary from Minister of For-
eign Affairs Tran Van Do. This trend reflects civil-
ian-military regional animosities, and is liable to be
a significant irritant in the future.
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6. Improved flying weather in the northern: portion
of the DRV on 22 November enabled US Navy aircraft to
attack a major missile support facility and two SAM sites
near Haiphong. The storage and maintenance center for
the Soviet-supplied SA-2 missiles was bombed by ten A-4
attack planes. Early pilot reports estimated that 75
percent of the facility was destroyed. Two large fires
and several secondary explosions were observed. No dam-
age assessment was available on the two SAM sites attacked
because of smoke and dust which obscured the target.
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port.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi re-
iterated Peking's hard line on Vietnam nego-
tiations in a conversation with the French am-
bassador on 16 November. According to a senior
French Foreign Office official, who reported
Chen's comments to US officials on 18 November,
the Chinese foreign minister insisted that the
US must withdraw its forces from Vietnam and
"recognize the rights of the NLF" before nego-
tiations. Chen declared that China does not
consider a Geneva-type conference as an appro-
priate forum for discussing ways to end the,
conflict. Peking does not advocate settling
the Vietnam problem "by five or six world pow-
ers" but believes it "must be solved by partici-
pation of all nations, big and small alike."
Chen added that Peking would advise the North
Vietnamese not to agree to negotiations on the
basis of a US guarantee to withdraw its troops
because the US could not be trusted.
2. The preconditions to negotiations
posed by Chen reflect Peking's standard hard
line, as does his opposition to a Geneva-type
conference. The Chinese have previously in-
sisted that only the Vietnamese can settle the
Vietnam problem and have never before referred
to a solution "by all nations." If this wording
is not an incorrect transmission of Chen's com-
ments by the.French, it almost certainly reflects
a Chinese attempt to make their opposition to
any -negotiated settlement more palatable to
world opinion by dressing it in a more attrac-
tive wrapper. Peking has previously used the
same technique in calling for "all nations" to
agree to destruction of nuclear weapons.
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Hanoi Dispatches Third High-Level Delegation to East-
ern Europe
3. Hanoi radio announced on 21 November that
politburo member Le Duc Tho will head the Vietnamese
delegation to the Hungarian party congress. This is
the third high-level North Vietnamese delegation to
Eastern Europe this fall. Hoang Van Hoan attended
the Albanian party congress and Nguyen Duy Trinh was
sent to Bulgaria. Hanoi's current interest in Euro-
pean Communist affairs is in marked contrast to the
economy-minded attitude it displayed several years
ago when one DRV delegation attended four Eastern
European party congresses that were held at about
the same time.
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1. There have been a number of indications in
recent weeks that disruptions of the war and bad
weather were contributing to a below-average harvest
of the late rice crop in North Vietnam. The late
rice crop accounts for almost two thirds of the an-
nual rice output.
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last year, rice supplies over the next four to five months
will probably tighten. A major food crisis is not likely,
however. Any rice shortage could be made up with such
other foods as corn or by increasing food imports.
harvest came in a ! November Hanoi broadcast which re-
ported that the late rice crop had been 40 percent har-
vested and that it was "fairly good over vast areas."
This phrase is a standard euphemism which has previously
denoted a disappointing crop.
3. Total rice output for 1966 will probably be
less than the estimated 4.5 million tons for 1965, which
was an average year. With a smaller late rice crop than
T e latest indication of a poor
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