THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010049-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: November 18, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.
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I resence of one oc-
cupied North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile site close
to the DMZ. In South Vietnam reports continue to be
received that General Quang has been removed from
his command of IV Corps.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Only scattered skirmishes were reported as Operation
ATTLEBORO continues sweeping the area north of Tay
Ninh city (Para. 1). Viet Cong guerrillas penetrated
the Long Binh ammunition depot and detonated an ex-
plosive charge which caused a fire, but no personnel
injuries (Para. 2). Communist units in South Viet-
nam may be experiencing leadership problems accord-
ing to the interrogation of 96 captured prisoners
(Paras. 5-8). Weekly Review of South Vietnam battle
statistics (Paras. 9-10).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The military generals of the Directorate have eased
General Quang from his delta command, but Premier
Ky did not mention the fact when he announced a new
cabinet line-up today (Paras? 1-3). The Constituent
Assembly is still discharging its lesser tasks while
waiting for preparation of the "basic principles"
of the constitution to be completed (Paras. 4-5).
The North Vietnamese Army journal on 15 November
provided an analysis of the Communist view of the
war in South Vietnam (Paras. 3-7).
Military Developments:
presence of
two SAM sites within 10 miles of the DMZ (Paras. 1-2).
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V. Communist Political Developments: North
Vietnamese vice premier and politburo member Pham
Hung has been relieved of his duties as chairman
of the premier's Board of Finance and Commerce and
from his post as chief of the State Price Commission
possibly to assume greater party duties (Paras. 1-3).
25
South Vietnam Battle Statistics
1963 through the week of 6-12 Nov
-Weapons and Personnel Losses
-Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents
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NORTH Ong Hot
VIETNAM
C Saravane (, QUANG NAM s^'
QUANG TEN halo
THUA THIS 4'
PLEIKU / I Agi Nhon
USA/ARVN
OPERATION
AITLEBORO
PHNO1
PENH
PHUOC
LONG
Q u
QUANG
NGAI
LAM SON 318
PHU
eo.
BON
DARLAC
*Ban Me
\ Thuot
TUYEN
Da Lat?
DUC
,?J
QUANG DUC
BINH,
TUYi
PHU
YENJ
KHANH
HOA
NINH
THUAN
0 r? T DOC ._ AN ~INH"' TUY 6
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 25 50 75 100 Wes
0 25 50 75 160 Kibmeters
64699 CIA 1 94 1P6 1 11 25
DEMARCATION LINE ARM
OPERATION
.1ua g Tri
7 Sepone'QUANG TRI
`;ft Hue
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Only scattered skirmishes between elements
of the 19-battalion allied force of Operation AT-
TLEBORO and Communist troops north of Tay Ninh city
have been reported on 18 November. Troops of the
US 1st Infantry Division, combing areas near the
Communist War Zone "'C," located another Viet Cong
base camp which contained a large hospital building
and a tunnel complex. Other units found 15 enemy
bunkers nearby. Three American soldiers were killed
and ten wounded as a result of two clashes early to-
day. A total of 20 Viet Cong bodies were discov-
ered, bringing the cumulative total of enemy sol-
diers killed since this operation began on 14 Octo-
ber to 1,006.
2. Viet Cong guerrillas last night staged an-
other attack on the large American ammunition depot
at Long Binh, 13 miles northeast of Saigon. This
is the second such attack in three weeks. The guer-
rillas penetrated the barbed wire defenses and the
increased security patrol, which included guard
dogs, and planted satchel charges near a stack of
105-mm. howitzer ammunition. One of the charges
started a fire which burned nearly four hours.
There were no casualties reported; however, 1,165
105-mm. artillery rounds were destroyed.
3. A South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) platoon re-
ported heavy contact with an estimated battalion-
sized Communist force yesterday about 25 miles
northwest of Chu Lai in Quang Tin Province. The
ARVN platoon was later reinforced by two ARVN com-
panies. Allied artillery and tactical air strikes
were called into support the friendly troops. A
total of 37 enemy soldiers were killed during the
one-hour engagement. ARVN casualties were 18 killed,
11 wounded, and six missing.
4. The four-battalion South Vietnamese Army
Operation LAM SON 318 ended yesterday in Quang Tri
Province near the DMZ. A total of 163 Communists
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were killed and six captured in this operation which
began on 2 October. Allied casualties were re-
ported as 38 ARVN and one American killed and 261
ARVN and five Americans wounded.
Reports of North Vietnamese Leadership Problems
5. MACV has reported indications--based on the
interrogation of some 96 captured Viet Cong or North
Vietnamese prisoners--of possible leadership prob-
lems among VC/NVA units in South Vietnam. One of the
problem areas cited by the prisoners was the loss of
confidence in squad-level leadership. The most com-
mon reason for this was a lack of experience and
training. Enlisted men were apparently being pro-
moted to cadre positions without receiving the requi-
site training. Cadre were also reported to be weak
in command and combat efficiency.
6. Another reported problem area was the fric-
tion between North 'Vietnamese and South Vietnamese
cadre. Some of the prisoners reported that heated
arguments were conducted constantly between the
two groups.
7. A third general problem area was the lack
of qualified replacements to fill leadership posi-
tions. Some prisoners reported that the'noncommis-
sioned officer training of replacements had been
reduced. One corporal, for example, had re-
ceived only three months' military training prior
to infiltration. There were also reports of South
Vietnamese conscripts being assigned without mili-
tary training to North Vietnamese units. Their
lack of training and high desertion rates were, in
turn, having a detrimental effect on the combat ef-
fectiveness of the NVA units.
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8. There have been intimations for some time
that VC and NVA units have been faced with these
types of leadership problems. The evidence used by
MACV in this particular analysis, however, is not
yet available in Washington for independent analysis.
Efforts are being made to obtain these reports.
Increase in Viet Cong Incidents
9. A summary of enemy activity for the week
ending, on 12 November shows the total number of Viet
Cong = initiated incidents increased from 569 for the
previous week to 694. This total is above the weekly
average for October. Viet Cong attacks and ambushes
increased last week after an unusually low number of
incidents the previous week. The pattern remained
the same as in previous weeks with the Viet Cong
continuing to concentrate their attacks on squad
and platoon size Regional Force and Popular Force
units and outposts. Most of the increase in harass-
ments and terrorism can be attributed to mortar and
small arms harassment of outposts.
10. The week of 6-12 November compared with 30 Oct-5 Nov:
I. Viet Cong Incidents
Time At- Regimental Battalion
Period tacks size size
30 Oct-
5 Nov
6-12 Nov 21 0 1
Time Company
Period size Harassment Terrorism
30 Oct-
5 Nov I) 347 33
6-12 Nov 7L 459 36
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Time Sabo-
Period tage
Propa-
ganda
Anti- To
Aircraft Inci
tal
dents
30 Oct-
5 "Nov
21
12
149
6-12 N
ov
20
18 14G 6
94
VC/NVA
GVN
30 Oct-5-'Nov.
6-12 Nov
30 Oct-5 Nov
6-12 Nov
Killed
893
1,525
113
237
Wounded
---
-----
268
556
Missing/
Captured
199
193
11
66
TOTALS
1,092
1,718
392
859
30 Oct-5 Nov 6-12 Nov
Killed 127 126
Wounded 605 810
Missing/
Captured 8 16
TOTALS 740 952
Apo
III. Weapons Captured
VC/NVA
GVN
30 Oct-5 Nov
6-12 Nov
30 Oct-5 Nov
6-12 Nov
Individual
287
Not
47
127
Crew-Served
18
Reported
2
1
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30 Oct-5 Nov
6-12 Nov
8
21
14
45
0
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1. General Dang Van Quang has been eased out
of his job as the commander of IV Corps by the other
military members of the ruling Direc -
ing to Bui Diem--Ky's right-hand man ff:!f 25X1
25X1 Diem, presumably ac ing in an o -
ficia capacity, told an embassy officer today that
Quang will head a newly created planning and develop-
ment,ministry. That assignment could lessen the po-
litical impact of his dismissal while still provid-
ing him with a high-level function. Diem said that
Major General Nguyen Van Manh, the commander of the
23rd Division in the central highlands, will assume
Quang's corps command. Manh, a southerner, was the
choice of Chief of State Thieu 25
25X1 These and other proposed shirts in e
mi i ary command structure, however, have not been
publicly announced by the government and they could
undergo further alterations before they become offi-
cial.
2. Premier Ky did officially announce the line-up
of his revised cabinet on 18 November, but he gave no
indication that key military officers had been re-
assigned. The list of new cabinet members, all of
southern origin, came as no surprise, and parallels
press accounts of the changes during the past few
days. As rumored, the work of the Ministry of Econ-
omy and Finance is to be split between a new Ministry
of Commerce and a new Ministry of Industry. Deputy
Premier Nguyen Luu Vien, one of the more influential
southern ministers who temporarily resigned over north-
south differences, will retain his Cultural Affairs
Ministry, according to Bui Diem.
3. The status of four other strategically placed
government functionaries, General Nguyen Duc Thang,
Bui Diem, Dinh Trinh Chinh, and police director Loan,
is still in limbo. All four have been the subject of
debate lately, especially by the militant southern
politicians, and they may still be moved into less
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controversial positions. An earlier report that
Thang would move to the chief of staff job on the
Joint General Staff was .quashed by Bui Diem, who
said that the generals decided to drop the idea.
Constituent Assembly Developments
4. Official Constituent Assembly activity has
tapered off. The first plenary discussion of the
"basic principles" of the constitution is expected
to take place during the week of 27 November. In
the meantime, the assembly deputies will invite a
member of the Directorate to brief the assembly on
the results of the Manila Conference and the "sit-
uation in country," presumably a general over-
view of government plans and accomplishments. Dur-
ing the 17 November session, the deputies approved
a rather large final quarter budget which will
cover the cost of several automobiles and provide
for substantial salaries for them. It is not clear
whether some government office must now take final
action on the assembly budget.
5. At least one of the deputies, Chairman
Chau of the constitution drafting committee, thinks
that Chief of State Thieu will take a soft enough
stand on Article 20 of the controversial government
decree law to satisfy the assemblymen. Chau be-
lieves that the government will reduce the vote
needed by the deputies to override the government
revisions from two-thirds to an absolute majority.
A recent press release claims that the Directorate
has agreed to consider the assembly's desire to
make some amendments of the decree law. However,
there is no indication that the 12-man assembly com-
mittee that is delving into the issue has confronted
the government, with its proposals.
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0 o.
-lu
0
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V
? Demilitarized Zone
ong Ha
ang Ti
LAOS
0
? SITE (Occupied)
SAM SITE (Unoccupied)
Pakse
-1 ampassak
STATUTE M LES 100
o H INAN
Pa o
b7An
Quang Ngai0
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
I
the presence of two North Vietnamese SA- missi e sir-es
within ten miles of the Demilitarized Zone. One of the
sites is occupied with a surface-to-air missile (SAM)
firing unit.
2. A pilot reported on 18 October that the
North Vietnamese had deployed SAMs in this area. On
that occasion at least one SA-2 was fired at two US
Navy pilots
e occupie site
a threat to US air operations, including B-52 strikes,
in the vicinity of the DMZ.
DRV Analysis of the War in South Vietnam
3. A 15 November, article in the DRV Army news-
paper Quan Doi Nhan Dan offered a conventional effort
'ko analyze e mil tary situation in South Vietnam.
The article assured its readers that there were limits
to US. power and perseverence in the Vietnam war and that
those limits had almost been -reached.
4. In effect, it promised that, if Communist
forces in the South can continue to hold out, their
victory will be assured. After making the usual as-
sertions that the US could not impose a military solu-
tion on South Vietnam because of the: contradictions of
its political position, the author pointed out alleged
deficiencies in manpower, tactics, weaponry, and morale
which he felt necessitated the defeat of America's
"panoplied expeditionary troops."
5. The article asserted that the US had almost
exhausted its resources of combat forces available for
service in Vietnam. It noted that of the eight US divi-
sions not currently committed to overseas assignments,
six were trained and equipped only for European opera-
tions, and the remaining two were not combat ready. The
author stated that the end was in sight in terms of US
troop deployments to South Vietnam. He further asserted
that public outrage in the US would prevent the expan-
sion of the military manpower base by increased drafts
or mobilization of the reserves.
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6. In discussing US tactics, the DRV military
journal a-lleged,that American forces in,South Vietnam
are essentially following the same course as the French
and that their efforts would come to the same result.
The author discounted the effects of US-air power in
both South and North Vietnam and went on to assert that
the current allied ground campaign cannot suppress guerrilla
forces which have the will for an indefinitely prolonged
campaign.
7. The Quan Doi Nhan Dan article conceded US supe-
riority in firepower and military equipment, but asserted
that while these advantages could give an appearance of
preserving the situation in South Vietnam they could not
defeat the Viet Cong. The author pointed out that in a
war without conventional fronts US military power cannot
be brought to bear on lucrative objectives and thus could
not be counted on as a decisive factor.
8. Finally, the DRV reporter asserted his belief
that mounting US losses in Vietnam and increasing iso-
lation from its traditional allies would force the Amer-
icans to abandon its efforts and leave the field to the
Communists. He repeated the usual DRV line that both
the US military and the American people are "afraid of
a long war" and could not bear the war of attrition
that the VC/PAVN forces were prepared to wage.
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V. COMMUNIS' POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Hanoi radio announced on 14 November that
Politburo member and Vice Premier Pham Hung had
been relieved of two governmental responsibilities--
chairman of both the premier's Board of Finance and
Commerce and the Commission for State Prices. No
reason for his loss of these duties was given.
2. This move could indicate that Pham Hung has ?
been assigned more important responsibilities which
leave him little time for routine management of
government economic affairs. Pham Hung has been
the regime's top financial planner and it is pos-
sible that he may have become increasingly preoc-
cupied for over a year with the massive reorgani-
zation and mobilization of the North Vietnamese
economy to meet the stepped-up requirements of the
war effort. The announcement that the party had
reached down into the ranks of the alternate cen-
tral committee members to replace him in these jobs,
tends to support the thesis that the regime cannot
afford, under wartime conditions, to use a man of
Pham Hung's abilities in a largely administrative
post.
3. It is also possible that Pham Hung may
have assumed more important party responsibilities.
In the party, Pham Hung is the number two man in
the important party secretariat. In view of the
continuing indications that party First Secretary
Le Duan, who heads the secretariat, has become less
active, the possibility cannot be dismissed that
Pham Hung may have assumed increasing duties either
in the secretariat or elsewhere in the party appara-
tus.
18 November 1966
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Weaponsk Losses
3000
2000
1000
Viet Cong/PAVN
GVN/US/other Free World
SEPTEMBER
5,286
751
I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I 111
6 -12 NOV
no
128
2 NOV
8
see OCT NOV
1966
US Casualties, to, Date: Killed 5,866` Wounded 33 71;0 Captured 79 Missing 371
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SEPTEMBER
no I
-PersonnIz' sses
(Excluding Wounded,
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Viet Cong Attacks
A
Viet Cong Incidents
(Excluding Attaaks)
1963 1964 1966 1966
1967
21 TOTAL
19 Less than Campeny
~~
0 ! ! '! ~ompany and QNS.r
673 TOTAL,
1401AA P9,re
1
18 Prgppgpnd4
20+ota9e
36 Terroriirn
SEP OCT NOV
1966
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Top Secret
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