THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 9, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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lop Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
State Department review completed
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9 November 1966
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Information as of 1600
9 November 1966
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The Constituent Assembly voted today to demand
that the government amend the law on constitutional
development, particularly that part which gives the
government the power of veto over the assembly's
actions.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
A large Communist tunnel complex was located today
north of Tay Ninh city as US forces continued to
sweep the area near War Zone "C." Only light-con-
tact was reported with enemy forces (Paras. 1-4).
South Vietnamese Operation LIEN KET 68 ended today
in Quang Nam Province (Para. 5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent Assembly today decided to seekamend-
ment of the government's Decree Law 21 and to impose
a one-month time limit on achieving an acceptable
change (Paras. 1-2
Moderate Institute chair-
man Tam Chau has recently been attempting to solidify
his position (Paras. 6-7). The influx of refugees
into friendly areas continues to constitute a major
problem for the government (Paras. 8-12).
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III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: An-
other report that the Chinese are interfering with
the transport of Soviet aid to North Vietnam has
been received (Paras. 1-2).
V. Communist Political Developments:
high, that evacuation has slowed own, and that air
raid warnings are less frequent (Paras. 1-4). Viet-
namese Communist representatives in Moscow reportedly
have restated their independence from both Moscow and
Peking (Paras. 5-6).
i
morale is still
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VI. Other Major Aspects: Poor weather and other
factors have hampered the flow of North Vietnamese
trucks in the southern DRV and Laos since mid-Oc-
tober (Paras, 1-4).
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.,\ NORTH D\ng Hot
\`~ VIETN\\
, DEMARCATION LINE
PHUOC
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LONG
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Bien
Hoa
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KIEN \
PHONG
,QUANG TRI
VINH
BINH
CHUONG
THIEN
AN
XUYEN
TUYEN
Da Lat'
BINH
TUY'
0 25 50 75 100Miles
0 25 50 75 l00 Kilometers
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0. PHU
BON
DARLAC
Ban Me
\ Thuot
BINH
THUAN'
*Q;J~ Nhon
KHANH
HOA C
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1. Only light, sporadic ground fighting was re-
ported in Tay Ninh Province today where 14 US battal-
ions continued Operation ATTLEBORO's sweep of the area
near the Viet Cong stronghold known as War Zone "C."
About ten miles north of Tay Ninh city, US forces lo-
cated a Communist tunnel complex containing nearly
100 bodies. The complex also contained a-regimental
command post and a mine factory containing 450 clay-
more mines.
2. There has been a significant increase in the
number of Communist casualties reported as US troops
continue to search the battle area following the heavy
action of 4-6 November. Cumulative enemy losses now
show 853 killed and nine captured as compared with
American losses of 85 killed and 340 wounded.
3. US officials in South Vietnam have speculated
that this six-day battle in Tay Ninh Province may have
halted part of a planned Viet Cong winter offensive,
according to press reports. A captured document re-
portedly indicated that a buildup of men and supplies
in the province by the Viet Cong was part of an offen-
sive planned for the "cool" season, which begins about
mid-November.
4. Nearly 7,000 Communist troops are still be-
lieved to be active in Tay Ninh Province. The Viet
Cong 9th Light Infantry Division is known to have been
operating in and near War Zone "C" recently. There
have also been many reports during the past week of
the movement of men and supplies on the various high-
ways and supply routes that crisscross the province.
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5. South Vietnamese Operation LIEN KET 68
ended yesterday in Quang Nam Province. This five-
battalion operation began on 5 November and resulted
in 125 Communist troops killed. Friendly casualties
were 70 killed and 92 wounded, including one American.
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1. The Constituent Assembly today voted--unani-
mously--to seek amendment of the government's Decree
Law 21, which prescribes constitutional development,
and--by a majority--to impose a one-month time limit
on achieving a satisfactory change. The assembly
plans to discuss a course of action during its 10
November session, and it now appears likely that a
small delegation will be appointed to meet with gov-
ernment leaders while the assembly begins work on
the constitution.
2. Regarding the decree law, the US Embassy
has commented that the assembly is unlikely to be
happy with anything less than at least partial modi-
fication of Article 20, the government's veto, and
Article 21, which limits the assembly to drafting a
constitution. Government leaders, on the other hand,
oppose any significant change in the decree law, es-
pecially the veto provision. There may be some flex-
ibility in the assembly's position, since the embassy
also reports that a majority of the delegates still
appear to recognize the need to avoid a head-on clash
with the government.
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Buddhist Developments
6. There have been no recent reports on the
prospects for another special Buddhist congress to
resolve the split in the leadership of the Buddhist
Institute:' Two separate Institute chairmen, moderate
Tam Chau and militant. Thien Hoa, continue to function
independently of one another. Tam Chau has recently
taken steps to consolidate his position by naming
four new`.commissioners and by appointing a delegation
to accompany him to the eighth World Buddhist Fellow-
ship convention in Bangkok from 6-11 November. Prior
to his departure, Chaau accompanied a visiting Japanese
Buddhist leader in a call upon Premier Ky, and issued
a press statement praising Ky as a supporter of the
Buddhist faith in Vietnam.
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The Refugee Situation
8. The government of South Vietnam continues to
be plagued by the influx of refugees into areas un-
der its control. The refugee flow, which has been
swelling since July 1964, has created serious fi-
nancial, social, and security problems for the GVN,
many of which have so far defied adequate solution.
Combat operations in populated areas, a desire by
the people to flee from Communist-controlled terri-
tory, and natural disasters are among the factors
causing this influx.
9. As of 31 August, a total of 1,361,288 per-
sons, as compared with 784,351 on 31 January 1966
had been processed as refugees by the GVN. Of this
number, 592,660 still remain in temporary shelters,.
an increase of 50,1313 since 31 January 1966. Per-
sons in temporary shelters are essentially wards of
the government, supported by a daily monetary dole
plus some additional gifts of food:and clothing
from various public and private agencies.
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SOUTH VIETNAM:
Refugee Distribution
g Tri
Demarcation Line
Refugees in temporary shelters
Less than 5,000
5,000 to 8,000
8,000 to 20,000
More than 20,000
,Refugees in Corps
(shown in blue)
0
T.HUAN.
YEN
H U A:i
ll CORPS
482, 93 9
TOTALS as of 31 August 1966
1,361,288 refugees
536,953 resettled refugees
231,675 refugees returning to native villages
592,660 refugees in temporary shelters
20,238 : `.
IE Rte G NAM
85,882
QUANG
153,303`:
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10. In addition to`those listed as being in
"temporary shelters," refugees are further cate-
gorized as "resettled" or "returned to home vil-
lages." There are 536,953 in the "resettled"
category and 231,675 in the "returned" category.
The resettled refugee is given a one-time payment
that now is the equivalent of about US $30.00.
11. The continuing rise in the number of refu-
gees in temporary shelters is indicative of a de-
cline in the security situation, and of the GVN's
inability to cope with the resettlement situation.
On the other hand, the flow of refugees back to
their home villages is an indicator of the govern-
ment's control of the countryside. Less than one
tenth of the refugees have so far returned home.
12. Although every province in South Vietnam
has some refugees, the distribution is quite un-
even. About 51 percent of the refugees processed
through 31 August were handled in I and II Corps
zones. These two corps also have the bulk of the
refugees who are still in temporary shelters, some
424,615 out of a nationwide total of 592,660. Some
338,700 of the unsettled refugees in I'and II Corps
are concentrated in five of the provinces. Binh
Dinh Province reportedly has 153,000 refugees in
temporary shelters. In the last two years the Com-
munists had made extensive inroads in this province,
although recent allied military operations have
deeply shaken their position.
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port.
1. There is-iiothing of significance to re-
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1.
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transportation bottlenecks in China had prevented
two thirds of the military aid from Soviet bloc
countries from being shipped to Vietnam. No time
frame is mentioned. This story may have originated
with the Russians. The Chinese, however, are al-
most certainly still harassing delivery of Soviet
bloc aid although indications are that the aid is
getting-through. In addition, there have been re-
ports that the transportation of millions of Red
Guards has slowed movement of freight in China,
2. The claim that only one third of Soviet
military supplies had been dispatched is similar to
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nese, on the other an , c arge in May that the
Soviets had used only one third of the freight cars
made available in the first quarter of 1966,
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countries a asced China to open a port between the
North Vietnamese border and the Luichow Peninsula.
The Chinese reportedly refused, demanding that
Haiphong be used. The Chinese have accused the So-
viets several'times of being afraid to send mili-
tary aid to Vietnam via the sea route.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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characterized the people as optimistic and rela-
tively relaxed. He claimed that food shortages
in Hanoi are not serious, that the city has
fewer air raid alerts, and that evacuation
measures have reduced the city's population by
one third and government offices by almost one
half.
2. AFP re-
ports out o Hanoi in October citing poor har-
vest prospects and food shortages should be
qualified. I Imain-
tain that there are no prolonged oo s ortages
and
Vietnamese people are capable ot .ig ening
their belts occasionall without "getting up-
set." Morale is high,
and the people accept i icu ies wi g o
heart."
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regime currently is giving i e attention
to either the construction of air raid shelters
or to air raid drills in Hanoi. As of 4 No-
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air raid warning in the capital city for three
weeks. The evacuation which was undertaken
with such energy last July also has petered
out. About 300,000 people have been. evacuated,
another 300,000 remain in the city, and 400,000
still live in the suburbs. Every day, however,
thousands of people who have been evacuated re-
turn briefly to their homes to check up on them
and to collect valuables left behind.
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morale
was high, that the people were determined to fight
on to final victory, and that rice and other food
supplies were more than adequate.
4. Other reports received recently reinforce
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DRV Relations with Peking and Moscow
5. The North Vietnamese and Liberation Front
representatives in Moscow have bluntly restated, the
independence of the Vietnamese Communists from both
Peking and Moscow, according to the Egyptian ambas-
sador to the USSR. The-Egyptian told the US ambassa-
dor in Moscow that the DRV representative had told
him that "some people say that the Soviet Union could
influence us toward. peace talks. We will decide this
for ourselves." The DRV representative further stated
that "some people say China is pushing us to continue
fighting. This is something we can decide for our-
selves. No people can push another whole people into
war, if they do not want it."
6.. The Vietnamese Communist diplomats were also
quoted to the effect that "some people say the matter
(the war in South Vietnam) can be settled with Hanoi.
This is not true, It cannot be settled without, the
NFLSV." This has also been a common theme of Vietnam-
ese Communist propaganda aimed at ensuring the partici-
pation of the Front. in any conference.
9 November 1966
Approvo
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 VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Road maintenance and traffic in the south-
ern part of North Vietnam and in the Laos panhandle
may have been disrupted during the last three weeks
by bad weather, air attacks, and other causes.
3. It is unlikely that established roads,
which are usually designed to resist flooding, have
been extensively damaged. However, temporary bridg-
ing and other water-crossing facilities used to re-
place bombed-out bridges are highly vulnerable to
flooding. There has been no indication that truck
traffic through MR-IV has been critically affected
by the weather or by other causes, although uncom-
pleted segments of new roads are reported to have
suffered heavily.
4. In the Laos panhandle, weather also has
contributed to a delay in resumption of truck
traf-
fic all the way to the South Vietnam border.
F in average of a dozen trucks
coming Into Laos through Mu Gia pass between
late September--when the rainy season there nominal y
ended--and mid-October.
little traffic in the a - .
heavy mist and rain, suggest-
ing that a temporary worsening of the weather was
responsible crop in truck traffic.
little effort has been made to
repair the damage to roads in the southern part of
the panhandle. Until these roads are repaired, through
truck traffic from North Vietnam to the South Viet-
namese border cannot resume. This type of traffic
resumed in mid-November.in 1965.
9 November 1966
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