THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 28, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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There have been no reports to confirm the agree-
ment outlined by Premier Ky that four of the dissent-
ing ministers will remain in the cabinet. The South
Vietnamese Government is attempting to resolve the
delicate issue of political prisoners still under de-
tention.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
South Vietnamese soldiers report killing 137 Viet
Cong in a day-long battle in the Mekong Delta prov-
ince of Phong Dinh (Para. 1). American soldiers par-
ticipating in Operation THAYER II in northern Binh
Dinh Province report light contact with elements of
the 610th NVA Division (Para. 2). Operation ALLENTOWN
ended on 27 October after a week-long sweep of rivers
and canals north of Saigon (Para. 3). A US ammuni-
tion depot near Bien Hoa exploded on 28 October (Para.
4). Weekly review of South Vietnam battle statistics
(Para. 5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
There have been no reports to confirm the agreement
outlined by Premier Ky on 27 October that four'of'the
d.issidei t ministers will remain in the cabinet. (Para.
1). The government has begun to resolve the fate of
political prisoners, which has been a delicate issue
for the past several years (Paras. 2-6).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
Itnere nave
been no reactions to hostile aircraFince 9 October
(Paras. 1-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: Eastern
European diplomats have recently been claiming that
there has been some give in the North Vietnamese po-
sition for settling the war (Paras. 1-2).
The North Vietnamese are at-
emp ing T-57-drum up support for the upcoming mock
"war crimes" trial sponsored by the Bertrand Russell
Peace Foundation (Paras. 7-8).
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VI. Other Major Aspects: 25X1
of northwestern North Vietnam snows construction o
permanent storage facilities along the Lao Cai - Yen
Bai road (Paras. 1-4).
South Vietnam Battle Statistics
1963 through 16-22 Oct 1966:
-Weapons and Personnel Losses
-Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents
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NORTH Dong Hoi
N VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
~_-- ,QuangTri
Sepone'
Hue
tP aravane
Ban Me
Thuot
PHNOM
PENH,
?
Qay Ninh
Operation > .
Phan Rang
QP ration
THAYER rI
O pera~tion
bl CII 263 SOUTH VIETNAM
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'Da Nang
28 OCTOBER
64421 10-66 CIA
0 25
50 75 100MIIes
0 25 50 75 1 0 5Forneters
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1. A new South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) drive in
the area of the Mekong River Delta has been successful
in its initial engagement with Communist troops. Three
ARVN battalions participating in Operation DAN CHI 263--
which began on 26 October in an area about 30 miles
southeast of Can Tho--reported killing 137 Viet Cong in
a day-long battle on 27 October. The ARVN force, which
included the crack 42nd and 44th ARVN battalions, en-
countered two guerrilla battalions of up to 1,200 men
in the rice fields of Phong Dinh Province.
2. US Army lst Air Cavalry Division troops re-
ported killing 13 Communist soldiers eight miles north
of Bong Son on 27 October as Operation THAYER II con-
tinued to sweep the northeastern section of coastal
Binh Dinh Province in search of elements of the 610th
NVA Division. Twelve enemy soldiers were captured in
the action. No American casualties were reported.
3. Operation ALLENTOWN, conducted by two battal-
ions of the US 1st Infantry Division, ended on 27 Oc-
tober following a, week-long sweep of rivers and canals
five to 15 miles north of Saigon in Binh Datong Province.
A total of 47 Viet Cong were reported killed and one
captured. Fifteen sampans were destroyed. One American
was reported killed and four wounded.
4. A US ammunition dump at Long Binh, about seven
miles north of Saigon, exploded on 28 October killing at
least two American military policemen and wounding more
than five others. Although Viet Cong guerrillas have
been active in this area, it is not yet known if a well-
placed mortar shell was not responsible for the blast.
Long Binh is a supply area for the US 1st and 25th Infan-
try divisions and is located near the huge American base
at Bien Hoa. A large hospital is also in the area.
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
5. The week of 16-22 October compared with the
week of 9-15 October:
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I. Viet Cong Incidents
Time At- Regimental Battalion
Period tacks size size
Time Company
Period size Harassment Terrorism
16-22 Oct 2 398
Time Sabo- Propa- Anti- Total
Period tage ganda Aircraft Incidents
9-15 Oct 26 20 153 608
II. Casualties
VC/NVA GVN
9-15 Oct 16-22 Oct
Killed
993
1,229
Wounded
---
-----
Missing/
Captured
748
606
TOTALS
1,741
1,835
9-15 Oct
16-22 Oct
189
339
504
623
85
89
778
1,051
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9-15 Oct 16-22 Oct 9-15 Oct 16-22 Oct
Killed 73 62
Wounded 432 394
Missing/
Captured 2 15
TOTALS 507 471
26
11
48
42
0
0
74
III. Weapons Captured
VC/NVA
Individual 356 Not
Crew-Served 26 Reported
TOTALS 382
244
331
3
3
247
334
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1. There have been no reports to confirm the
agreement of four of the seven dissident ministers
to remain. in the cabinet as outlined by Premier Ky
in a conversation with a US Embassy official on
27 October.
Previously, Premier Ky stated
that he would simply refuse to- ac'ceJbt' the- -resigna-
tions.of the four, and they they would not press the
issue futther. the
other three dissident minis ers-- an Trieu, and
Truong--will definitely be leaving the cabinet.
Their replacements, however, apparently are not yet
firm.
GVN Attitudes and Actions in Regard to Political Prisoners
2. The issue of political prisoners, a thorny
problem for Vietnamese governments, for the past
several years, appears to be headed towards partial
resolution. The government has decided that those
individuals who are still under detention as a re-
sult of the three most significant political upheavals
in recent years (November 1960, November 1963, and
the "Struggle Movement" Qf..1966) shall be tried, freed,
or given amnesty or reductions in sentences.
3. According to,'.a semiofficial press release,
the government plans to conclude-.as--soon as possible those
cases still pending before the courts. rn all
cases to be tried, as well as in cases already
adjudicated, amnesty or reductions in sentences will
be considered if it can be shown that the defendants
had acted in accordance with orders of their superiors
or within the framework of their duties. This
principle appears to be designed for those whose
major fault was being on the losing side, although
it may be extended to those who have been accused
or convicted of such tangible acts as physical
violence against other persons.
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4. No significant participants in the at-
tempted coup of November 1960 are known to be still
imprisoned, since most of those political prisoners
were released following Diem's overthrow in 1963.
Several former officials of the Diem regime have
recently been released. Saigon Mayor Van Van Cua
has acknowledged that "trial balloons" have been
floated concerning the possible release of Major
Dang Sy and Tran Kim Tuyen, ex-Diem officials who
were the subjects of particular Buddhist animosity.
5. The legal processing of large numbers of
minor participants in the "Struggle Movement" is
also expected to begin soon. Approximately 450 non-
commissioned officers and men are to be returned to
active military service, a number of other military
personnel will be arraigned before military courts,
and a number of civilian cases will be turned over
to the National Police for disposition. There is
a possibility that some less extreme Buddhist "strug-
glers" will also be released on 1 November.
6. Such actions by the government appear cal-
culated to console both Catholics and moderate Bud-
dhists and to generate some good will among these
elements toward the government. These actions may
also dispel charges of "police statism" leveled
against the government by its domestic critics, and
undercut the ability of aroused southern regionalists
to garner antigovernment sympathy from other politi-
cal elements.
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
2. One reason for the lack of North Vietnamese
reaction for several weeks is the generally poor
weather over North Vietnam which has decreased the
number of sorties flown by US strike aircraft. An-
other is that most of the US effort in the last few
weeks has been concentrated south of the 20th paral-
lel. North Vietnamese fighters have seldom attempted
to engage US aircraft that far south because of the
distance from their airfields and their lack of ef-
fective ground-control intercept capability in that
area.
3. In addition to the above factors, past ex-
perience has shown that the aggressiveness of DRV
fighters has come in relatively short and concentrated
bursts. In each instance, DRV losses have been out of
proportion to their successes.-in thwarting US strikes.
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port.
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. In a series of contacts with US officials
subsequent to the recent meeting of Communist lead-
ers in Moscow, East European diplomats have claimed
that there has been some give in the North Vietnamese
position on settling the war. As evidence of this
softening in the DRV position, some East Europeans
have claimed that the DRV is no longer insisting
that the Liberation Front be the sole representa-
tive of South Vietnam. Pressing this point, the
East European diplomats have strongly hinted that
if there was some give in the US position--specifi-
cally a cessation of the bombings--movement might
be advanced toward negotiations.
2. There is no hard evidence, to confirm
that there has-been any change in Hanoi's posi-
tion on this point. Publicly, Hanoi has continued
to reiterate its standard position on the role
of the Front. An article on the Manila Confer-
ence in the party daily Nhan Dan of 27 October, for
example, insisted that the US recognize the NFLSV
as the "sole genuine representative of the South
Vietnamese people."
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5. A Polish Foreign Ministry official at the
UN has informed a member of the US delegation that
a Polish party delegation will visit Hanoi. The
Polish officials stated'that'the trip is planned as
part of Warsaw's "continuing effort to persuade
Hanoi to seek a negotiated settlement."
6. It is clear from this series of consulta-
tions and visits that the Communists have made a
decision to demonstrate their support for North
Vietnam. Given Hanoi's cold response in the past
to suggestions that it soften its line on negotia-
tions, however, it is unlikely that any of these
delegations strenuously urged Hanoi to make any
real change in its demands.
Hanoi Urges Support for Mock War Crimes Trial
7. The North Vietnamese are attempting to
drum up support and enthusiasm among international
leftist groups for the upcoming mock "war crimes"
trial of leading US political figures sponsored by
the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.
8. No firm date has been set for the trial
nor has a definite location for it been established.
A preliminary committee is, however, scheduled to
meet in London on 13 November and will reportedly
reveal further details at that time. The extent of
North Vietnamese participation in the proposed trial is
not known although Hanoi might possibly send a dele-
gation of jurists or legal experts to provide evi-
dence on the alleged US "war crimes," if the "trial"
takes place in a leftist or neutral country.
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NORTHWEST QRV ROAD SERVED STORAGE SITES
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VI. OTHER MAJOr, ASPECTS
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permanent, in contrast to temporary construction
support facilities also found along the road. These
may be the first of many permanent facilities to be
built following the pattern of other new or improved
roads in northwest North Vietnam. The other roads
have been provided with storage sites, barracks, and
secure telecommunications lines.
2. The Lao Cai - Yen Bai road is probably being
built to supplement the parallel Lao Cai - Yen Bai rail
line. The additional capacity it will provide will be
useful for various military contingencies such as the
necessity to deliver aid through Yunnan Province in
China rather than along the primary routes from Ping:
hsiang.
3. Currently there appears to be little need for
a supplement to the rail line. Throughout the last
year or so, there has been less effort to repair bomb
damage to the Lao Cai line than to the Hanoi - Ping
hsiang Railroad. The latter is the normal route for
deliveries from China, and during the last year has
been kept open and improved despite frequent air at-
tacks.
4. Construction of the Lao Cai - Yen Bai Road
has been underway for about a year. Progress has
been slow compared to the pace of construction noted
for priority roads in Military Region IV or the Laos
panhandle, even though the project has probably been
assisted by Chinese engineers.
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Weapons Losses
Personnel Losses
(Excluding Wounded)
US Casualties to Date: Killed 5,547 Wounded 31,803
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Viet Cong Attacks
SEPTEMBER
86
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Viet Cong Incidents
16-22 OCT
~4 TOTAL
1? AA Fire
10 Propaganda
34 Sabotage
29. Terrorism
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