THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010052-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: October 17, 1966
• Content Type: IR

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No. 0395/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
State Dept. review completed
DIRECTORATI OF INTELLIGENCE.
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This document contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION. IN.SOUTH.VIETNAM
(10 October - 16 October 1966)
POLITICAL SITUATION I
Cabinet crisis; Constituent Assembly
developments; Buddhist Institute Council
resignation anticipated.
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II
Revolutionary Development Cadres; More
Viet Cong reactions to the Chieu Hoi
program; Viet Cong defectors (Chieu Hoi);
Progress in the Revolutionary Development
program; Status of secured hamlets and
population as of 31 August 1966 (tables).
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Currency and gold; Pork situation;
Economic stabilization for 1967; GVN for-
eign exchange reserves; Pay raise for
merchant seamen; New plan to relieve port
congestion..
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
South Vietnam Economic Indicators (graphs)
-Monthly Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
-Weekly Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
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"'Savannakhet
SOUTH VIETNAM
1~ 25 50 75 100 Mites
1 75 7' 75 100 K,tometerc
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Premier Ky's cabinet problems have ap-
parently eased, but are by no means re-
solved. Six southern cabinet ministers
who have brought on the crisis have agreed
to postpone any further action until after
the first week in November, but remain dis-
satisfied with concessions offered by Ky
thus far.
The constituent assembly, reviewing
the work of its subcommittees, has run into
difficulty over one provision offered by
its rules committee. The election of as-
sembly officers, which is dependent upon
completion of a set of procedural rules,
may thus be postponed further.
The Council of the Buddhist Institute
has agreed to resign sometime prior to the
convoking of a National Buddhist Congress,
scheduled for 21 October.
1. Premier Ky's cabinet problems, recently in-
tensified by the proffered resignations of six
southern cabinet ministers, have apparently eased
for the time being, but are by no means resolved.
In recent discussions, the ministers did not find
concessions offered by Premier Ky fully acceptable,
but agreed--providing that they were not provoked--
not to force their resignations or take other action
until after the Manila Conference and the US con-
gressional elections in November.
2. The controversy, basically rooted in. north-
south regional animosities and sharpened by civilian.-
military differences, stemmed specifically from the
temporary arrest of a southern Health Ministry of-
ficial on 3 October by police director Loan, a
northerner. The immediate indignation of southern
ministers was temporarily assuaged by the resigna-
tion of Health Minister Nguyen Ba Kha, a northerner
accused of instigating the arrest.
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3. However, the issue flared again on 6 October
when a Vietnamese newspaper which generally expresses
the views of northerners portrayed southerners in an
unfavorable light. Six southern ministers, includ-
ing Deputy Premier Nguyen Luu Vien, subsequently sub-
mitted a joint letter of resignation, expressing
concern over the possible return of police state
methods and criticizing Premier Ky for failing to
consult more often with his cabinet.
4. Thus far, Premier Ky has suspended the news-
paper involved, and has appointed a southern Catholic
as the new health minister. He remains unwilling,
however, to censure or reduce the powers of General
Loan, whom the southerners are apparently determined
to force out of the government. Loan., recently pro-
moted by Ky following his major role in quelling
the "struggle" movement this spring, is reported to
be one leader of a group of field grade officers
known. as the "baby Turks." He and some of his close
associates apparently have been exerting various
types of pressure on southerners in addition. to the
one temporary arrest. Loan has always been closely
linked with Ky, but is capable of independent action.
5. The controversy is also particularly un-
fortunate because it pits Premier Ky and other
northern military officers against southern civilians,
the very group whose cooperation Ky has recently
been trying to enlist. Relations between the domi-
nant northern military leaders, who have a very
small population base in. South Vietnam, and the few
southern military leaders have been. precarious for
some time. In view of the residue of resentment
toward the Ky government in central Vietnam follow-
ing the "struggle" movement this spring, Premier
Ky has attempted to form an effective political al-
liance with southern civilian political elements by
increasing their influence in the cabinet. A break
with these southerners could thus pose a funda-
mental political problem for the northern military
leadership.
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Constituent Assembly Developments
6, During the week, the constituent assembly
continued to review the progress of its subcommittees
on credentials and rules. The validation of an addi-
tional 14 deputies brought the total of officially
certified deputies to 108. The US Embassy has com-
mented that of those remaining five or six may be
unseated by the assembly or the courts, who are also
ruling on protests of ele:ction.i:rr-egularities.
7. The rules committee, however, has had less
success in gaining the assembly's approval of its
work. Assembly debate became particularly heated
over one provision which declared that the purpose
of the assembly was to draft a constitution. The
assembly session on 13 October ended chaotically
when a vote dealing with this issue was obviously
miscounted by the acting secretary general. With
acceptance of the assembly's procedural rules
bogged down at least temporarily, the election of
assembly officers apparently will be put off accord-
ingly.
Buddhist Institute Council Resignation Anticipated
8. It appears that the Council of the Buddhist
Institute has decided to resign as a prelude to a
National Buddhist Congress believed to be scheduled
for 21 October. The decision for the council to re-
sign was at the initiative
of the mill-Cant is ,.ri uan.g curing a meeting of
the Institute on 11 October. Thich Tam Chau, also
present at the meeting, was reported to have agreed
both to demonstrate his good faith and also to make
it more difficult for the militant element of the
Institute to challenge the validity of the National
Congress.
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II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
Progress reports concerning the first
class of Revolutionary Development Cadres
from the Training Center at Vung Tau at
the end of three months in the field indi-
cate that their performance has generally
been effective, but some adjustments in
the over-all program are in order. Con-
tinued Viet Cong efforts to counter the
government Chieu Hoi program point up
their concern with desertions from their
ranks. Viet Cong defectors totaled 377
during the week of 6-12 October, the
second consecutive week in which the count
has gained. During the month of August,
there was a net gain of 67 secured hamlets
throughout South Vietnam,26 provinces reg-
istered over-all gains, nine showed no
change in the security situation, while in
eight provinces the security situation
deteriorated somewhat.
Revolutionary Development Cadres (RDC)
1. The first class of RDC's graduated from the
National Training Center of Vung -Tau had, as of the
end of August, been in the provinces for three months.
Limited evaluation regarding their effectiveness and
problems encountered during this period are now
available.
2. The program, in general, seems to be work-
ing well in 26 of the 43 provinces. In a majority
of the provinces where the program has been lagging
and ineffective the principal causes are attributed
to poor RDC leadership at the staff or operational
level and inexperienced or disinterested provincial
3. The government has taken several steps to
solve problems associated with the RDC's. During
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August, Min.ister of Revolutionary Development, Major
General Nguyen Duc Thang, conducted a series of con-
ferences in each of the four Corps areas. These
conferences were also addressed by Corps commanders
and attended by nearly all cadre group leaders who
showed great interest and enthusiasm. Similar con-
ferences were held for team leaders and staff elements
at the provincial level; in some instances these con-
ferences were attended by province chiefs. The general
theme of these conferences, as exemplified in the
Corps commanders' speeches, was that the RD effort is
more important than military operations, and the Viet-
namese must take charge of this program.for themselves.
The attitude of these military commanders for what is
essentially a civilian RD program is promising.
4. Additional conferences have been called for
some 900 province officials and RD provincial group
leaders to be held at the Vung Tau Training Center
in an effort to overcome the disinterest formed among
this level of officials for the RD effort. These
seminars will also work out RD leadership requirements
for 1967 and appropriate assignments for RDC groups,
as well as attempt to improve the over-all RD program
based on three months experience with cadres in the
field.
5. A summary of RD cadre programs by Corps
follows:
I Corps Tactical Zone
6. RDC programs through August had not been
notably effective, but some hope was held out for
future operations because of a greater interest in
the effort on the part of province officials in four
of the five provinces. This resurgence of interest is
held to be directly attributable in part to General
Thang's insistence on the importance of this program.
A direct result of this high-level interest is that
poorly performing RDC leaders are now being transferred
to other duties and administrative staff's are being
reorganized or replaced with cadre elements of proven
ability.
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II Corps Tactical Zone
7. Progress in this Corps is reported, over-all,
to be satisfactory, although some provinces are report-
ing problems of inadequate leadership at provincial
and district levels.
III Corps Tactical Zone
8. Six of 11 provinces in this Corps report
satisfactory performances by RDCs. In four of the
five provinces where RDC performance has not been
satisfactory, corrective measures have been taken
by provincial officials. In. some, cadres have been
released; in others, they have been warned that if
they do not perform as expected they will be released.
Sometime this month, 602 RDC group leaders and admin-
istrative RDC chiefs will attend a leadership course
at Vun.g Tau. It is believed that these measures, all
of which are to be monitored by General Than.g, will
tighten. up the RD effort throughout the Corps.
IV Corps Tactical Zone
9. Progress in the RD effort was reported in 12
of the Corps' 15 provinces. In this Corps, problems
of leadership and discipline of the cadres, as well
as premature deploymen.t of RDC personnel to meet quotas,
were evident. Increased interest by provincial offi-
cials in the programs may resolve these present prob-
lems. Again, it was the direct interest of Saigon,
as expressed by the presence of General Than.g, which
moved provincial officials off dead center insofar as
the Revolutionary Development Program is concerned.
More Viet Con.g Reactions to the Chieu Hoi Program
10. Two recently captured documents from Tay
Ninh Province point up the concern with which the Viet
Cong are viewing the stepped-up Chieu Hoi effort of
the GVN. One document captured in mid-September ana-
lyzes the causes of defection and suggests corrective
measures to be taken. Major factors which cause the
Communist soldier to desert are: personal indignities,
fear of combat and death, homesickness, and enemy in-
ducements. Additionally, the Viet Cong feel that their
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own management, leadership, and indoctrination prac-
tices contribute to defections. The remedies suggested
in this document include: daily indoctrination sessions
for cadre and soldiers,as well as for the families of
troops living in GVN-controlled areas. The elimina-
tion. of "'traitors" from Viet Cong agencies and units
was also cited as a goal. This document was issued
by the Current Affairs section of the Tay Nin.h Province
Committee.
11. The second document, originating with the
Tay Ninh Province Military Proselyting Section, in-
dicated that a total of 110,900 piasters had been.
given in cash awards to RVNAF deserters who had turned
in. their weapons to Viet Cong officials. The cash
award table used follows:
Machine gun or automatic rifle 2,000 piasters
Carbine or sub-machine gun 1,500 piasters
Pistol 800 piasters
Unfortunately, this document does not indicate the
time frame over which the funds were expended, which
would be a good indicator by which to gauge the suc-
cess of their program. Nevertheless, the total sum
expended is considerable and gives some indication.
of the extent to which arms selling is indulged in
by the government forces.
Viet Cong Defectors (Chieu Hoi)
12. The number of returnees to the side of the
govern.men.t for the week 6-12 October, according to
reports received from 37 provinces, totaled 377, an
increase over the previous week's total of 319. The
breakdown of returnees by Corps areas follows:
I Corps
II Corps
III Corps
IV Corps
377 (241 military)
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Defectors in 1966 through 12 October total 13,829
with the daily average now standing at 48.5.
Progress in the Revolutionary Development Program
13. A country-wide increase of 67 secured hamlets,
0.4 percent secured population, and 0.1 percent se-
cured area was recorded during August. The govern-
ment now controls 4,155 secured hamlets, 55 percent
of the population, and holds 11.5 percent of the land.
Net progress was noted in 26 of the 43 provinces and
two of the autonomous cities, while nine provinces
and one autonomous city reported no change in the
security situation. Over-all regression occurred in
eight provinces (Quang Tri, Kontum, Pleiku, Ninh
Thuan, Phu Yen, Quang Duc, Kien Phong, and Kien Giang).
In. eight of these provinces where regression occurred,
eight hamlets were downgraded to undergoing securing,
three to undergoing clearing and 24 reverted to Viet
Cong control. (See charts._on the following pages
for a breakdown by Corps of progress through August.)
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Status of Secured Hamlets and Population
As Of 31 August 1966 1/
National Priority Areas (NPA)
POPULATIONS (THOUSANDS)
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Aug
CY66 Aggre-
CY66 Goals 4/ gate
Aug
CY66
CY66 Aggre-
Goals 4/ gate
I Corps
Gains
1
5
.8
.8
Loss
0
0
0
27.2
Net
1
5
38
38
.8
-26.4
54.5
230.5
II Corps
Gains
5
35
10.3
43.7
Loss
0
0
0
0
Net
5
35
107
104
10.3
43.7
107.2
198.5
III Corps
Gains
22
45
34.6
115.1
Loss
0
31
0
46.3
Net
22
14
297
544
34.6
68.8
404.7
2,729.5
IV Corps
Gains
0
47
0
30.3
Loss
0
47
0
0
Net
0
0
91
254
0
30.3
137.3
467.1
TOTAL
Gains
28
1
32
45.7
189.9
Loss
0
78
0
73.5
Net
28
54
533
940 2/
45.7
116.4
703.7
3,625.6 3/
-NOTE: 1/ Heretofore, secured hamlets and population data reflected only
incremental progress and did not reflect regressions which oc-
curred during CY66. This report and future reports will reflect
Corps and country-wide net status.
2/ Total Hamlets in NPA--2,726.
3/ Total Population in NPA--5,648,500.
4/ Goals are determined by GVN. Other figures are US statistics.
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(2) Other than National Priority Areas
POPULATION (THOUSANDS)
CY66 (4) Aggre- CY66 (4) Aggre-
Aug CY66 Goals gate Aug CY66 Goals gate
I Corps
Gains 2 28 11.0 40.8
Loss 3 -27 4.8 25.4
Net -1 1 211 413 6.2 15--.4 229.9 696.5
II Corps
Gains 28 174 23.9 201.1
Loss 21 184 22.1 161.1
Net 7 -10 409 794 1.8 40.U 375.3 905.3
III Corps
Gains 8 91 5.0 119.9
Loss 0 0 0 6.1
Net _U 91 187 327 5.0 113.8 176.0 462.9
IV Corps
Gains 25 192 39.1 314.3
Loss 0 76 0 25.3
Net ^1I~ 517 1681 39-Z .u 559.9 2608.5 73
TOTAL
Gains 63 485 79.0 676.1
Loss 24 287 26.9 217.9
(3
Net n 198 Z ~ (2) 52.1 458.2 1341.1 4673.2
NOTE:
(1) See note 1 on 11-6 chart.
(2) Total non-NPA hamlets--8723.
(3) Total non-NPA population--9,415,000.
(4) Goals are determined by GVN. Other figures are US statistics.
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III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
Retail prices in Saigon declined for
the fourth consecutive week, but rice prices
continued to rise. On 10 October, the USAID
retail price index was at its lowest level
since 27 June. Prices, as measured by this
index, were 17 percent above the level pre-
vailing just prior to the 18 June devalua-
tion. Prices of imported commodities also
declined in the week ending 10 October and
gold and currency prices were essentially
unchanged.
The US and GVN signed a joint memoran-
dum of understanding which will govern a
common program of economic stabilization for
1967. The US and GVN also discussed measures
to make use of growing GVN foreign exchange
reserves. The US Embassy in Saigon has
drawn up a plan, which has Premier Ky's gen-
eral approval, to speed the flow of goods
through warehouses at the Saigon port.
Following a limited strike and a threat of
mass resignation, approximately 1,000 Viet-
namese merchant seamen recently received an
average wage increase of 25 percent.
1. Price movements in Saigon continue to be
generally favorable. The over-all USAID retail price
index declined two percent in the week ending 10 Oc-
tober because of a three-percent decline in the food
index; the nonfood index moved up one percent. Lower
food prices resulted primarily from a decline in the
price of fish. Pork and vegetables held steady. Rice
moved up for the fourth consecutive week because of
hoarding in anticipation of shortages resulting from
the Mekong floods. Rice prices are Row approaching
their 1966 highs. The slight rise in nonfood prices
stemmed from increases in the prices of firewood and
laundry soap. All other nonfood items sampled held
steady. (A table of weekly retail prices in Saigon
is included in the Annex.)
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2. The prices of most imported commodities
were generally steady or lower. Slight increases,
however, were recorded by rayon yarn, newsprint,
and some chemical products. The USAID index for
selected US-financed imports (6 July 1965 = 100)
stood at 173 on 11 October compared with 1760 a week
earlier.
Currency and Gold
3. Gold and currency price movements on the
Saigon free market also continue to be encouraging. On
10 October the price of gold was unchanged at 244
piasters per dollar. Dollars moved up 2 piasters to
171 and MPC (scrip) rose 1 piaster to 117. (Graphics
on monthly and weekly free market gold and currency
prices are included in the Annex.)
4. Sales of frozen pork imported by the GVN were
resumed during the week of 3 October following a week
of slaughtering live hogs. The amount of frozen park
disposed of averaged about 55 tons daily, or roughly
two-thirds of Saigon's normal consumption. Evidently,
.the remaining third of Saigon's requirements was met
by illegal slaughter of live hogs. The GVN had origi-
nally planned to continue sales of frozen pork during
the week of 10 October in order to clear the ship
holding the remainder of the original 1,500-ton shipment.
By 8 October, however, a backlog of 2,200 live hogs had
accumulated in the Saigon slaughterhouse. Suppliers
have approached Saigon authorities to permit slaughtering
during the week of 10 October, but the outcome of the
request is not,yet known.
5. Representatives of the US and GVN, meeting
in Washington, have agreed that the June 1966 stabili-
zation program has achieved notable success in improving
the economic situation in South Vietnam. They also
agreed that it is important to take measures now to
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preserve reasonable price stability in 1967 in order
that the joint US-GVN effort to strengthen the economy
of South Vietnam can move forward without creating
renewed inflationary pressures. As a result, the US
and GVN on 6 October signed a memorandum of under-
standing which calls upon the two governments to work
together on a common program of economic stabilization,
including the establishment of definite quantitative
targets, for 1967.
6. According to the memorandum, every effort
will be made in drawing up the program to limit the
inflationary gap in 1967 to the lowest level possible;
this gap appears now to be about 10 billion piasters.
In order to reach this goal, both sides have agreed to
work on the following problems: port congestion, lib-
eration and simplification of the import system in
order to facilitate the import of goods necessary to
maintain price stability, implementation of effective
budgetary controls over GVN and US expenditures in
Vietnam, enlargement of anti-inflationary resources
through improvement of customs and tax collection and
savings, maintenance of wage and credit control, in-
creased domestic agricultural and industrial output,
and improvement in the use of existing productive
capacity. To assure an adequate flow of goods into
the economy, the US agreed to continue to finance imports
to supplement Vietnamese resources.
7. In order to make the most out of the advan-
tages which result from the stabilization program, it
was also agreed to consider postwar reconstruction at
this time. Consequently, the memorandum provides that
both governments will undertake the following measures:
immediate implementation of those economic aid projects
designed to maintain present economic stability and to
establish the foundations for future development, and
creation of a joint study team to draw up a social and
economic reconstruction plan for postwar Vietnam and
to study measures for the future conversion of military
bases and port installations to social and economic
development uses.
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GVN Foreign Exchange Reserves
8. GVN foreign exchange reserves have increased
steadily since the US military buildup in South Viet-
nam. Swelled by the expenditures of US and foreign
troops and construction workers, expenditures for US
construction, and military piaster purchases, these
reserves amounted to $264 million in July 1966 compared
with only $118 million a year earlier. Moreover, it
is estimated that by the end of 1966, these reserves
will amount to $290 or $300 million. The US now feels
that these reserves should be reduced to a level of
roughly $200 million in order to prevent accumulation
of GVN reserves at the indirect expense of US aid,
relieve pressure on very tight AID funds, and apply
a larger proportion of aid to lasting development,
while at the same time protecting the GVN from politi-
cal attack or anxiety about future foreign exchange
availabilities.
9. This problem was discussed by US and GVN
officials at the recent economic meet3`ngs in Washington.
Although a definite agreement on GVN reserves was set
aside temporarily, the following measures were consid-
ered: (a) a transfer of certain commercial import
program (CIP) categories to the GVN import list, (b) an
assurance to the GVN that to the extent CIP financing
in FY 1967 as measured by actual licensing falls below
the level of 1966 as a result of GVN import financing,
the balance thus saved by AID Will be earmarked for
development projects, and (c) purchases by the National
Bank of Vietnam of US Treasury bonds of more than one
year maturity.
Pay Raise for Merchant Seamen
10. Following a limited strike and a threat of
mass resignation, approximately 1,000 Vietnamese mer-
chant seamen--members of the CVT-affiliated Sea Trans-
port Workers' Federation--recently received an average
wage increase of 25 percent. This wage hike, which is
retroactive to 1 September, was the first granted to
seamen since October 1965. The GVN Ministers of Labor,
and Transport and Communications were instrumental in
limiting the raise to 25 percent, about half of the
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seamen's original demands. A corresponding demand
by shipowners for an increase in freight rates reportedly
was denied on the grounds that it would be inflationary.
11. Since the devaluation in mid-June, several
other groups have received wage increases. These in-
creases have included the 20 to 30 percent raise for
GVN employees, a 7.5 percent increase for US Mission
employees, and a 17.5 percent raise for Vietnamese
construction workers employed by RMK-BRJ, the US con-
struction consortium in South Vietnam.
New Plan to Relieve Port Congestion
12. The US Embassy in Saigon has drawn up a plan
to speed the flow of goods through the warehouses at
the port of Saigon. In general, the plan calls for
penalty storage rates on goods stored longer than
15 days, issuance of a new decree delegating full
authority to the Port Director (General Lan) to con-
trol the cargo in the warehouses, and the removal
of cargo from the port warehouses by the Vietnamese
Armed Forces after 30 days at the discretion of the
Port Director. The Vietnamese Armed Forces could
either use the goods themselves or auction them to
raise welfare funds for military dependents. Maximum
use of US troops will be made in determining warehouse
procedures, verifying the arrival date, quantity and
location of goods, and helping the GVN to select the
cargo to be confiscated.
13. General Westmoreland presented this program
to Premier Ky who gave his general approval to the
proposals. The critical next step is to get Ky's
signature on a decree which would empower the Port
Director to control the cargo in the port. Such a
decree would give the Port Director authority to verify
the arrival and location of cargo, publicly post ware-
house inventories certified by GVN and US officials,
notify importers, and select cargo for confiscation
after 30 days.
14. Meanwhile, the embassy is working on measures
to simplify customs procedures and to bring the com-
mercial banks into the picture, since the banks have a
good deal to lose if the goods are confiscated. The
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 embassy believes that once the import community
understands Premier Ky's intentions to clear out
the warehouses with US help, the importers will
start moving their goods. It is also possible
that the banks will bring pressure on the importers
once the banks know when the goods arrived and where
they are located.
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Approved For%BWIease 2 CMPC& DP79T008 01300010052-4
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon a/
(In Piasters)
Index for All Items b/
Index for Food Items b/
Of Which:
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg)
Pork-Bellies (1 kg)
Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg)
Nuoc Mam (jar)
3 Jan 19 Sep 26 Sep 3 Oct 10 Oct
1966 .1966;. 1966 1966 1966
160 219 212 209 202 c/
169 227 219 c/ 214 c/ 204 c/
800 1,320 1,370 1,400 1,450
70 100 85 85 85
110 180 170 160 140
50 85 85 85 85
Index for Nonfood Items b/ 124
Of Which:;
Charcoal (60 kg)
Cigarettes (pack)
White Calico (meter)
Laundry Soap (1 kg)
192 190 c/ 191 c/ 194 c/
440 600 590 600 600
10 14 14 14 14
27 33 32 32 31
30 40 40 40 44
a/ Data are from USAID sources.
F/ For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100.
F/ Preliminary.
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,!~L'G'RLl
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 Approved For Arfease 2004/09/15 : CIA-RDP79T008260401300010052-4
1965 1966 1967 AUG SEP OCT
-4=ie==
GOLD Basiszgotd Leaf worth $35- per tray ounce
US $10, G..REEt
rn Wang; Kongt calculated!tsy reference to,
PIASTER-US DOLLAR CROSS RATE- the exchange rates to the Hong Kong dollar
US $10.' MPC Military' Payment Certificates- (scrip)
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
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j i.,?L..