THE SITUATION IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010035-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: October 12, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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12 October 1966
No. 1693/,6
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE SITUATION IN THAILAND
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
12 October 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Thailand
SUMMARY
Thailand enjoys a variety of economic and po-
litical assets which augur well for its future
stability and independence. Guided by skilled and
resourceful economic leadership, Thailand has made
rapid economic progress in recent years and the pros-
pects are bright for even greater growth and develop-
ment in the future. In the political sphere, the
country has benefited from nine years of stable rule
by an autocratic but benevolent military oligarchy.
The status quo is threatened by a nascent Com-
munist insurgent movement inspired.and assisted by
Peking and Hanoi. Thailand's long history of inde-
pendence, the absence of a colonial experience, and
the actions of an aroused government, have so far kept
the insurgents in check'. There are, however, some
soft spots in the internal situation that could prove
troublesome over the long haul. In Bangkok, the
Thanom-Praphat government is enjoying its third year
of stable rule, but serious factional infighting,
during which the fight against the Communists would
almost certainly suffer, could flare up with little
warning. The present government's greatest weakness
in meeting the insurgent challenge, however, is simply
the fact that it does not have substantial popular
support.
NOTE: This is one of a series of memoranda produced
by CIA on those countries to be visited by
President Johnson, It was prepared by the Of-
fice of Current Intelligence and coordinated
with the Office of National Estimates and the
Office of Research and Reports.
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Economic and Political Prospects
1. No country in Southeast Asia is in a better
position than Thailand to withstand internal and ex-
ternal threats and to accomplish orderly economic
and political development.
2. Thailand's most tangible asset is its fun-
damental economic well-being. It has adequate land
for its population of 31 million and no serious land-
tenure problem. The annual economic growth rate of
six percent compares favorably with that of other
developing countries and is well ahead of population
growth. Although much of the wealth is centered in
the Bangkok area, economic progress is also being
made in the provinces where the government is moving
slowly but effectively to raise the standard of living.
3. Thailand also has significant political as-
sets. Spared colonization by a Western power, the
Thais exhibit few of the anti-Western biases of other
Asian peoples, and do not automatically give a sym-.
pathetic ear to arguments that the US represents a
new "imperialist" menace. A sense of Thai nationality
affects the thinking of the great majority of the pop-
ulation, even in the traditionally isolated and long-
mistreated northeast. Ethnic, linguistic, and reli-
gious differences exist but are not paramount political
issues.
The Political System
4. Thailand is ruled by a coterie of high-rank-
ing military officers. Drawing on the skills of
civilian experts and bureaucrats, the rulers have
provided generally good internal stability, continuity
in foreign policy, and competent economic guidance.
Autocratic without being despotic, conservative with-
out being reactionary, the ruling oligarchy has held a
firm grip on the governmental apparatus while avoiding
the doctrinaire mistakes and crippling mismanagement
prevalent in other Southeast Asian countries.
5. The government of Prime Minister Thanom has
been in power for almost three years. It has moved
vigorously in the economic and social spheres, encourag-
ing foreign investment, pushing farm improvements, and
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launching a wide variety of development programs in
the countryside. It has moved more slowly, however,
in preparing the way for orderly political change.
A "new" constitution which provides for free elec-
tions has been in the writing for eight years. The
Thanom government has been unwilling to have it pro-
mulgated, however, even though as written the con-
stitution would not seriously impair the oligarchy's
control over political affairs.
6. The government's failure to move actively
forward with political reform has been partly re-
sponsible for the development of an undercurrent of
dissatisfaction among intellectuals and students in
the capital. This is not an important factor at the
moment, partly because the articulation, of adverse
political opinion has been discouraged by the govern-
ment. It could become a serious problem in the future,
however, especially if the government fails to build
popular support in the countryside.
7. There is another area of potential political
instability. Although the military oligarchy has ex-
perienced several years free of serious factional in-
fighting, the death of Thanom or Deputy Prime Minister
Praphat, the emergence of significant policy or per-
sonality differences among the top leaders, or a grab
for power by junior officers could inaugurate a pro-
tracted period of political dislocation during which
the counterinsurgency effort against the Communist
terrorists in Thailand would inevitably suffer.
The Communist Insurgency
8. The Communists in Thailand are determined to
step up the pace of their subversion, although it is
clear that d. The
insurgents have
increased their propaganda activities in e north-
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