THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: October 6, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
: f(0WMnL"---1
THE SITUATION I N VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
6 October 1966
NSA review completed
State Department review completed
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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HIGHLIGHTS
The major North Vietnamese communications com-
plex which has been emerging since May in and around
the Demilitarized Zone now appears to be fairly
well established. This complex--the largest formed
to date for the war in South Vietnam--is capable
of directing and supporting multidivisional forces
in the northern part of South Vietnam.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
US Marines captured a strategic hilltop overloo ing
key infiltration routes on 5 October in an area
just south of the DMZ. (Para. 1). South Vietnamese
forces, operating in conjunction with US Marines
south of the DMZ, have reported heavy contact with
a large enemy force..(Para. 2). Allied troops par-
ticipating in Operation IRVING in -coastal Binh Dinh
Province continue to tighten their encirclement of
enemy forces (Paras. 3-4). One battalion of Aus-
tralian soldiers began Operation CANBERRA, a search-
and-destroy operation in Phuoc Tuy Province (Para. 5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
In sessions on 5 October, the constituent assembly
reviewed the work of its three subcommittees (Paras.
1-2). Meanwhile political maneuvering within the
assembly continues with no significant power blocs
yet evident, although some of the well-known depu-
ties are considering teaming up for the forthcoming
election of assembly officers (Para. 3). Continued
Viet Cong infiltration, harassment, and terrorism
may seriously threaten the Vietnamese textile in-
dustry, the largest private employer in the Saigon
area (Para. 4). A recent assessment by US Consulate
officials concludes that the "struggle" movement in
the Hue area could resume its antigovernment activi-
ties should its former leaders return (Para. 5).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
The major North Vietnamese communications complex
which has been emerging since May in and around the
DMZ is discussed (Paras. 1-4).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is not -King of signif a ce to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: North
Vietnam is ma 1.ng a concerted effort to prevent the
Vietnam question from being brought before the cur-
rent session of the UN General Assembly (Paras. 1-3).
The Liberation Front office in Warsaw has been
staffed (Para. 4) .
6 October 1966
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A US Marine company, part of the six-bat-
talion Operation PRAIRIE, charged through heavy
machine gun and grenade barrages late on 5 October
to capture a strategic hill overlooking key Commu-
nist infiltration routes just south of the DMZ.
Hill 484--so named because of its height in meters--
was the last hill along a four-mile ridge the marines
have been clearing for 15 days, Three Americans
were killed and 16 wounded during the final two-
hour assault yesterday. Ten Communist bodies and
five weapons were found in the captured bunkers
atop the hill.
2. Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, South
Vietnamese forces reported heavy contact with an
estimated three-battalion enemy force on 5 and 6
October in an area about ten miles northwest of
Dong Ha, just south of the DMZ. These forces,
participating in the six-battalion South Vietnamese
Operation LAM SON 318, are operating in conjunc-
tion with US Marine Operation PRAIRIE. US tactical
air strikes, artillery, and naval gun fire missions
have supported the friendly forces. A US Marine
reaction force is also ready to assist, if needed.
Initial reports show friendly casualties as 26
killed (one US) and 194 wounded (five US). Known
enemy losses include 21 killed and one captured.
Activity in Binh Dinh Province
3. South Vietnamese troops fighting along-
side American paratroopers reported that 66 Viet
Cong guerrillas surrendered en masse on 6 October
rather than face almost certain death. The VC
surrendered to allied forces conducting Operation
IRVING near the coast in central Binh Dinh Province.
The three-sided allied drive continues with the
South Vietnamese on the west, helicopter-borne US
lst Air Cavalry Division units pressing down from
the north, and troops of the North Korean "Tiger"
Division pushing up from the South.
6 October 1966
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IItSavannakhet
VIETNAM
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Pleiku.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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4. Elements of the 12th North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) Regiment have been identified as part of the
enemy force engaged in this area of Binh Dinh Prov-
ince. This regiment is subordinate to the combined
NVA/Viet Cong 610th Division which operates through-
out this province.
5. One battalion of Australian soldiers began
Operation CANBERRA early on 6 October, This search-
and-destroy operation is being conducted in an area
of Phuoc Tuy Province, about 30 miles southeast of
Saigon. A 450-man Viet Cong battalion is reported
to be in the area.
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POLITICAL.DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. In morning and afternoon sessions on 5
October, the constituent assembly reviewed the
work of its three subcommittees to date. The
credentials subcommittee reported that it had
found the cases of 94 of the 117 assembly depu-
ties in order thus far, with 23 cases left to con-
sider. Earlier reporting indicated that there
were 23 contested seats, and it may be that the
committee has left the controversial and more
time-consuming cases until last. After the com-
mittee for flood relief reported that it had raised
264,000 piasters ($2,245) thus far, the assembly
voted to regularize the status of the committee,
and endorsed its activities. The assembly also
decided during the morning session to redraft its
messages to the United Nations, to allied nations,
and to the soldiers and people of South Vietnam.
2. During the afternoon session, the work of
the rules committee was the major subject. of dis-
cussion, with the assembly finally instructing the
rules committee to draft the; procedural rules in
entirety before submitting them for assembly dis-
cussion. The deputies also requested the acting
assembly chairman to take up with the government
the matter of obtaining better facilities for the
assembly. The assembly was to reconvene on the
morning of 6 October, but no reports on this ses-
sion have yet been received.
3. With the constituent assembly off to a
slower start than was anticipated, the election
of assembly officers is not now expected until the
week of 17 October at the earliest. Meanwhile,
political maneuvering among the delegates continues
with no significant alliances yet evident. There
is evidence, however, that some of the well known
deputies--and major contenders for the top assembly
posts--are now beginning to assess their respective
positions, and to work toward a compromise which
would result in a combined slate of two or more of
the top contenders. In particular, Dr. Phan Quang
Dan recently indicated that he was considering
6 October 1966
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giving up his aspirations for the chairmanship and
running for assistant chairman or secretary general
on a slate headed by either former chief of state
Phan Khac Suu or Saigon businessman La Thanh Nghe.
Earlier, Nghe had stated that he was working on the
idea of a combined slate with Dan as secretary gen-
eral and perhaps influential southerner Tran Van
Van as a candidate for chairman of the important
constitution drafting subcommittee.
Saigon Area Textile Industry Continues to be Viet
Cong Target
4. Continued Viet Cong infiltration, harass-
ment, and terrorism may seriously threaten the Viet-
namese textile industry, the largest private employer
in the Saigon area. On 3 October, the Chinese manager
of a medium-sized fishnet factory was assassinated,
the sixth terrorist attack directed at the textile
industry during the past year. The Viet Cong had
also attempted to infiltrate the workers in this fac-
tory last summer, and similar attempts have been made
at the two largest textile factories in the capital
area. Management personnel at these two factories
continue to express concern over the effects of Viet
Cong infiltration and harassment. Owing to .he large
number of Chinese involved in the industry, Chinese
community leaders in Cholon have pointed to govern-
mental unconcern for the welfare of the Chinese as
the main reason for the continuing lack of security
in the industry.
Current Assessment of the "Struggle Movement" in
I Corps
5. Despite the failure of its recent antielec-
tion campaign, the "struggle" organization in the
Hue area is intact and continues to operate, accord-
ing to a recent assessment prepared by US Consulate
officials. At present, the organization is opera-
tionally very weak, largely due to the absence of most
of its former leaders. The assessment concludes that
should Tri Quang and other leaders, such as several
of the Hue University professors, return, the struggle
movement could well resume its activities. Other
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have, however, indicated considerable activity by
progovernment officials in identifying lower ranking
members of the "struggle" movement. Presumably
the information which has been developed on the
organization would be put into quick use should
agitation resume.
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1. The major North Vietnamese communications
complex which has been emerging since May in and
around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) now appears to
be fairly well established, according to a current
NSA assessment. The description of this complex
given below provides some idea of the magnitude of
the Communist effort in this area as well as the
extent of the threat it poses to Allied forces in
northern South Vietnam.
2. The DMZ complex is controlled by three
major elements--the High Command at Hanoi, the
headquarters of North Vietnam's Military Region IV,
and a "Front" formation which appeared in July.
The "Front," which appears to be modeled on the
classic North Vietnamese tactical headquarters,
controls at least two North Vietnamese divisions--
the 324 B and the 341st. The latter is still be-
lieved to be located north of the Demilitarized
Zone. These units have an estimated total strength
of more than 15,000 men. Aside from these two di-
visions, there are a number of other unidentified
entities which are subordinate to one of the three
controlling headquarters mentioned above. It has
not yet been possible to determine the size of
these units but they are believed to number at
least two regiments.
3. Communist elements in the DMZ area also
appear to have logistic support functions. This is
suggested by certain distinctive communications
characteristics, including communications links
from the DMZ to the major Communist staging area
near Tchepone in Laos. Other military functions
which may be included in this complex include
antiaircraft artillery and liaison with at least
two other Viet Cong/NVA "Fronts" located farther
south in South Vietnam.
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4. The picture that emerges from this complex
is that of a major North Vietnamese headquarters--
easily the largest formed to date for the war in
South Vietnam--which is capable of directing and
supporting multidivisional forces in the northern
part of South Vietnam.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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Appi
1. North Vietnam is making an effort to prevent
the Vietnam question from being brought before the
current session of the UN General Assembly. On 6 Oc-
tober the party daily Nhan Dan, in a lengthy com-
mentary on Secretary General Thant's three-point
proposal for settling the ,-7ar, insisted that the
UN, since it is controlled by "US imperialism," had
no right whatsoever to interfere in the Vietnam
issue. While agreeing with point one of Thant's
proposal--calling for a"cessation of the bombings--
the commentary criticized points two and three--
reduction of military operations and negotiations
by all interested parties--claiming that they made
no distinction between the "US aggressors" and the
Vietnamese victims of that aggression," and ignored
that the NFLSV is the "sole, genuine representa-
tive of the South Vietnamese people." The article
called upon all "impartial" UN members to condemn
the US and to demand that the Vietnamese Commu-
nist terms for a settlement of the war be accepted
by the US.
2. The Nhan Dan article appears to be a di-
rect rejection of a recent effort by a group of
neutralist members of the UN to develop a plan to
permit the General Assembly to record support for
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of the Vietnamese.
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NFLSV Mission in Poland Staffed
4. The NFLSV has staffed its permanent mis-
sion in Poland, according to a 5 October Warsaw
broadcast. The office, which was established in
November 1965 is accredited to the All Poland
Committee of the National Unity Front and is the
11th staffed Front mission abroad. Offices in
Bulgaria and Rumania, also agreed to last year,
have yet to be staffed.
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