THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 2, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009l03/09 CVA-RDX9T00026AOOApj1;A;1134-j 1 f
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~arromn~im~
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
2 October 1966
NSA review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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administrative affairs recently told the press that
village elections will be held in government con-
trolled areas early next year (Para. 6).
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_IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance
report.
V-. Communist Political Developments: North
Vietnam continues to attack the upcoming Manila
Conference (Para. 1).
Czec support for North Vietnam's
policy toward he war was stated in the joint com-
muniqu4 issued at the conclusion of Premier Lenart's
six-day visit to Hanoi (Paras. 8-10). Hanoi's warm
treatment of Communist China's National Day, matched
against the Czech-DRV communique shows North Vietnam
at its best in straddling the Sino-Soviet dispute
(Paras. 11-13). Peking restated its support for
North Vietnam in the usual terms on its National
Day (Para. 14).
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NORTH Dong Hoi
`.'~ VIETNAM
1 Rivgr
*Pakse
Attopeu
SOUTH VIETNAM
North Vietnamese
Viet Cong
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1. US combat forces participated in 14 of
33 ground operations of battalion size or larger
conducted in South Vietnam during the period 1-2
October.
2. The heaviest fighting of the weekend
occurred in coastal Binh Dinh Province where ele-
ments of the US 1st Air Cavalry on 1 October en-
gaged an estimated 300 Viet Cong/North Vietnamese
Army troops during the opening phase of Operation
IRVING approximately 31 miles north of Qui Nhon.
In the three-hour battle that ensued, 110 Commu-
nist troops Were killed and six captured, as
against US casualties of three killed and three
wounded.
3. Operation IRVING was initiated on 1 Oc-
tober in the Phu Cat Mountain area of Binh Dinh
Province. It is a largq, combined search-and-
clear operation with five US, four Korean, and
four ARVN battalions participating. Operation
THAYER, a search-and-destroy operation initiated
by the US lst Air Cavalry Division on 12 September
in the same general area, has been temporarily
suspended to permit assignment of its four participat-
ing battalions to Operation IRVING.
4. In northernmost Quang Tri Province, US
Marine task force elements continued to press Op-
eration PRAIRIE against elements of the 324B North
Vietnamese Army Division just south of the De-
militarized Zone (DMZ). However, no major engage-
ments were reported. Cumulative Communist casual-
ties in the two-month-old Marine offensive currently
stand at 943 killed, in contrast to American
losses of 132 killed, 523 wounded, and one missing.
5. Shortly after midnight on 2 October, a
South Vietnamese Navy Landing Craft (LCM), support-
ing Operation BATON ROUGE was sunk by a Viet Cong
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command-detonated mine. The incident occurred
about 16 miles south-southeast of Saigon on the
Long Tau River (but not in the main channel which
serves the Saigon port). Of those aboard the
LCM, ten US and five South Vietnamese were
wounded and three US are missing.
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Viet Cong Military Tactics in Ninh Thuan Province
continuous defeats in large-
sca e mi 1 ary operations and the superior strength
and firepower of allied/GVN forces have forced
Viet Cong military forces in Ninh Thuan Province
to adopt a more defensive military stance. They
reportedly have been ordered to avoid large-scale
engagements whenever possible and stick to guer-
rilla-type warfare. They are to retreat imm6diately
following an action, apparently to avoid excessive
casualties.
secret base areas in Ninh Thuan are no longer con-
c;ntrated in battalion or regimental strength,
but rather are divided into squads, platoons,
and companies,which are dispersed to avoid air
strikes. The Viet Cong are also reportedly trans-
ferring their secret base area installations from
mountainous regions to lower, more thickly forested
spots, again in an effort to avoid air strikes.
7: Viet Cong forces in
Viet Cong "Fall-Winter Campaign" in Quang Nam and
Quang Tin Provinces
as provided information on alleged Viet
ong offensive plans in.Quang Nam and Quang Tin
provinces during the 1966 rainy season.
1966 in a secure area of Quang Nam Province to dis-
cuss the upcoming offensive: plans. The strategy
is based on the principles set forth in "General
Policy Directive 12," an order reportedly issued
by North Vietnamese Army General Vo Nguyen Giap
as a result of a decision of the Lao Dong Party
central committee in Hanoi.
a meeting was held on 4-5 September
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9. The plan calls for the main offensive to
be delivered in southern Quang Nam, south of the
Thu Bon River, and in northern Quang Tin provinces.
It was pointed out that the fall rains in the area
will help neutralize US air power. The tactics
will emphasize intensified guerrilla activity in
the rear areas of allied forces. Scattered at-
tacks will be made on outposts, particularly those
manned by GVN local troops and paramilitary forces,
whose morale and combat effectiveness are con-
sidered inferior.
10. US military posts in the area, including
the US Marine complex at Chu Lai, will also be at-
tacked, both for psychological reasons and to pin
down the forces stationed there, thus preventing
their deployment elsewhere in a mobile reaction,
capacity. Relief forces attempting to reinforce
outposts under siege are among principal friendly
elements targeted for ambush operations.
11. The secondary theater of operations will
be in northern Quang Nam Province, especially in
the area around Da Nang city and Da Nang Air Base.
As a preliminary objective, the Viet Cong hope to
gain possession of the rice harvest in this rich
rice-growing area. Prior to the opening of the
military offensive in northern Quang Nam, Viet
Cong forces will assume an essentially passive
stance. Action in the secondary theater will fea-
ture the shelling or ground harassment of US artil-
lery bases and GVN concentrations in the area.
12. A possible tactical innovation outlined
in "General Directive 12" for inclusion in the
over-all strategy of the "Fall-Winter Campaign"
was a plan for the increased use of guerrillas in
place of regular forces during the opening phase
of a military operation. Guerrillas will be used
to attack outposts and to prepare the way for at-
tacks.,by regular main force units. "Gene er&1 Direc-
tive'.12" also stressed the necessity of having
trenches and emplacements for artillery and for
antiaircraft weapons completed by 16 October.
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13. According to MACV's Order of Battle, the
Communist 620th Division with three subordinate
regiments (total strength 5,600) is accepted as
operating in the Quang Tin--Quang Nam area. In
addition, the North Vietnamese Army 95 "B" Regi-
ment (strength 2,000) is accepted as operating
in southern Thua Thien Province near the Quang
Nam border.
ja Vitt Cong colonel on 29
September told a meeting of young recruits that
Communist China will send one division to South
Vietnam in early November 1966. If the Viet
Cong officer made such a statement, it was un-
doubtedly to encourage the recruits to believe
that the Vietnamese Communists are not facing
the US alone. There is no evidence to indicate
that Peking has any intention of sending combat
troops to South Vietnam in November or any time
in the near future.
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1. In working sessions on 30 September and 1
October, the Constitutent Assembly generally avoided
adoption of any controversial measures affecting its
relations with the government. At the same time,
however, there was a tendency in the assembly to
diverge somewhat from its sole legal function of
drafting a constitution,
2. Three subcommittees were created. Two of
these on rules and credentials, are in accordance
with the Constituent Assembly decree law, which pro-
vides that procedural rules must be adopted and that
the credentials of at least two thirds of the depu-
ties be certified before the election of assembly
officers and other business can be conducted. A
25-man credentials committee was chosen by lot on
30 September. Some 23 deputies whose seats are being
contested were barred from membership on the committee.
The courts have already convicted two deputies of
election irregularities, and unless the decision is
overruled on appeal, their election will be invali-
dated.
3. The 15-man rules committee was elected by
the assembly during the afternoon session on 30
September. Although the more prominent deputies
did not contest seats on this committee, the elec-
tion did serve to some extent as an initial test
of regional and bloc loyalties.
4. The third subcommittee created by the
assembly will deal with the question of relief for
flood victims in the delta region, and represents
the assembly's determination to concern itself with
issues not directly related with consitution draft-
ing. Another similar measure taken by theeassembly was
the adoption of a resolution urging the government--to
release `political prisoners now under detention.
Although the question of political prisoners is com-
plex and delicate, an attempt to avoid controversy
with the government was made in the wording of the
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resolution, which left to the government the decision
as to which individuals and groups merited amnesty.
The US Embassy has commented that the government,
which is working on this question in various ways,
may well have given prior approval for the resolu-
tion.
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Village Elections
6. Nguyen Van Tuong, the government's commis-
sioner for administrative affairs, told newsmen on
1 October that plans are being made to held elections
for village councils and hamlet chiefs in government-
controlled areas between February and March of next
year. Between 700 and 800 of the country's 2,550
villages will probably be affected. At present,
both hamlet and village leaders are appointed by
the province chief. After the elections, the elected
village council would have new legislative powers
and would choose their village chiefs.
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an
GxUra
or inary congress of the unified Buddhist Z,.ssocia-
tion would definitely be held on 21 October. The
congress will determine future Buddhist policy towards
the government and attempt to settle the current im-
passe between moderate and militant elements of the
Buddhist Institute.
2 October 1966
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1. A North Vietnamese merchant ship
attempt to pass itself off 'as a
French merchantman. On 19 September a ship which
identified itself as the Roland and which used a
calisign included in the international callsign
block allocated to France, passed two messages--one
in English
I- E6
the Vietnamese Ocean Shipping Agency (VOSA) in Hai-
phong.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. North Vietnam is continuing its propaganda
drum beat against the upcoming N.anila conference.
Hanoi's party daily on 1 October charged that the
"first and main purpose" of the Manila conference
is "to push ahead the US aggressive war in Vietnam."
The party daily also included the familiar theme
that the Manila conference only demonstrates that
despite the "heavy defeats" suffered by the US in
Vietnam, it "still refuses to give up its "bloody
gamble and is proposing new war ventures." The
article concluded with the usual prediction of ulti-
mate Communist victory.
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DRV-Czech Communique
8. The joint communique issued 1 October as
a result of the 23 to 29 September visit of a Czech
party and government delegation to Hanoi contained
no hint of any change in the DRV attitude toward
the war. It reaffirmed, in explicit language, Czech
support for Hanoi's adamant stand,on a political
settlement.
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9. The Czech delegation, headed by party pre-
sidium member and Premier Jozef Lenart, also signed
"appropriate" agreements for continued Czech aid to
the DRV for both economic and military purposes.
The Czech delegation reaffirmed as well the pledge
made at the July 1966 Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest
to allow Czech volunteers to come to Vietnam, "if
requested" to do so by Hanoi.
10. The DRV accepted an invitation by the Czechs
to send a friendship delegation to Prague. The date
of this trip is to be agreed upon "in due course."
Hanoi-Peking Relations
11. The visit by a top-level Czech delegation
is the latest in a series of efforts by both Moscow
and Hanoi since the overthrow of Khrushchev to firm
up their relations. Hanoi has moved quickly, how-
ever, to demonstrate that the visit by the Czech dele-
gation did not signal any change in its basic policy
of balancing its relations between Peking and Moscow.
On the occasion of Communist China's National Day,
1 October, virtually the entire North Vietnamese
politburo attended a reception in Hanoi at the Chi-
nese ambassador's residence. The impressive North
Vietnamese turnout was led by Ho Chi Minh and in-
cluded the party first secretary Le Duan, Premier
Pharr Van Dong and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap,
among others. Premier Pham Van Dong's speech at the
reception stressed the close relations between the
two countries and praised the "'all-sided" support
provided North Vietnam by Peking.
12. The most pro-Chinese member of the North
Vietnamese politburo, General Nguyen Chi Thanh, did
not appear at the Chinese ambassador's reception in
Hanoi--he is reported to be in South Vietnam direct-
ing the war effort, He did manage, however to give
voice:'indirectly to his great admiration for Peking.
The Viet Cong magazine, Liberation Troops, written
by Thanh's staff, published an editorial greeting
the Chinese anniversary enthusiatically. The edi-
torial stated that "the Vietnamese people in general
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and the South Vietnamese people in particular" are
"deeply grateful" for the :lessons passed on to
them by the Chinese, "especially concerning the
revolutionary spirit of resisting the imperialists
and feudali'sts to the end. "
13. Thanh recently authored an article charg-
ing that certain unnamed Vietnamese Communist leaders
had favored reverting to a more defensive military
posture in the face of the US combat buildup in South
Vietnam, Thanh undoubtedly shares the Chinese Com-
munist attitude that only continued offensive mili-
tary pressure against the US will enable Hanoi to
achieve its goal of ultimate control over all of
Vietnam.
14, Chinese Communist comment on Vietnam during
National Day ceremonies merely rehashed familiar
themes. Defense Minister Lin Piao devoted relatively
little attention to Vietnam during his major address
at National Day festivities in Peking, reaffirming
Chinese Communist support for Hanoi in standard terms.
2 October 1966
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