THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010056-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: September 23, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~anomnr~un~
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
23 September 1966
State Department PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
review completed FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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t?O!' SECRET
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23 September 1966
North Vietnam has rejected an ICC request that
Hanoi allow the ICC to reinstitute patrol activities
in the northeastern sector of the Demilitarized Zone.
The North Vietnamese statement asserted that only
the US and the Saigon government had sabotaged the
status of the DMZ. Hanoi has also rejected the US
peace proposal made at the United Nations yester-
day by Ambassador Goldberg.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
South Vietnamese Army troops have successfully re-
pulsed a two-battalion enemy attack in coastal Binh
Dinh Province (Para. 1). US soldiers participating
in Operation THAYER in Binh Dinh Province reported
light casualties in two attacks by Communist forces.
(Paras. 2-3). South Korean forces ended Operation
SU BOK in Binh Dinh Province and began Operation
DEUL KUK HWA in the same general area (Paras. 4-5).
US Operation HUNTSVILLE ended yesterday in Binh
Duong Province (Para. 6). A group of 10 North Viet-
namese prisoners have provided some interesting,
and in some cases consistent,answers to a series
of questions on supply shortages, morale, and when
the war might end (Paras. 7-12) . The weekly review
of South Vietnam battle statistics (Para. 13).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The military Directorate members espoused a hands-
off policy toward the constituent assembly pro-
ceedings (Paras. 1-2). As an interesting aside
to the assembly elections, the eight provinces
with the lowest voter turnout per total population
were all in the delta below Saigon (Paras. 3-4).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: North
Vietnam has rejected the ICC request that Hanoi
allow the .1CC to reinstitute patrol activities in
the northeastern sector of the Demilitarized Zone
(Paras. 1-4). Hanoi has also rejected as "hypo-
critical" the US peace proposals made yesterday
at the United Nations by US Ambassador Goldberg
(Para. 5).
23 September 1966
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' Sarsnnakhef
NORTH Cnone NO,
VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
T7 i ,aeang Try
J
1
A
Sararane
HammoId
Ar Khe,
.ui,N, hon
*Ban me
Thuot
PHNOM
PEHHO
sVinh tong
t'Can The
U 25 50 75 100Miles
0 .. 25T5 50 75 100 K Iometers
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1. Elements of the South Vietnamese 22nd
Division reported driving back successive waves
of attacks early on 23 September by an estimated
two-battalion Viet Cong force 30 miles northwest
of Qui Nhon in coastal Binh Dinh Province. The
South Vietnamese force, participating in opera-
tion BINH PHU 27, was supported by US Air Force
C-47 "Dragon Ships" and armored personnel carriers
with.'heavy.'machine guns A US lst Air Cavalry
unit has been deployed in an attempt to block
the enemy escape. Initial casualty reports show
friendly losses as six killed and 30 wounded.
Communist losses are reported as 137 killed and
47 weapons captured.
Operation THAYER
2. Elements of the US 1st Air Cavalry Divi-
sion participating in multibattalion search-
and-destroy Operation THAYER engaged an esti-
mated company-size enemy force on 22 September
in an area about 30 miles north of Qui Nhon in
coastal Binh Dinh Province. The enemy unit em-
ployed automatic weapons and mortars in probing
US defenses prior to the engagement. Ameri-
can losses during the two and a half hour bat-
tle totaled eight killed and eight wounded.
Communist losses are unknown.
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3. One American was killed and 25 injured when
Hammond Airfield, located about 23 miles northwest
of coastal Qui Nhon, was attacked by an enemy force
early on 23 September. An estimated 20 to 30 rounds
of 60-mm. mortar fire landed on the airfield which
is being used in support of Operation THAYER. Re-
action forces, supported by flareship aircraft were
unable to locate the enemy force. Fifteen heli-
copters were damaged; only two, however, sustained
major damage and all are repairable.
South Korean Operations
4. A two-battalion security and rice harvest
protection operation conducted by the South Korean
Capital Division in an area along the coast of
Binh Dinh Province ended on 22 September. Opera-
tionStU BOK, which began on 26 March, resulted in
299 Communists killed, 33 captured, 132 suspects
detained, and 220 weapons captured. South Korean
casualties totaled 23 killed and 84 wounded.
5. Four battalions of the South Korean Capital
Division began a new search-and-destroy operation
named DEUL KUK HWA on 22 September about 15 miles
north of Qui Nhon in the same general. area as Op-
eration SU BOK. Six Communist battalions with
a combined strength of 2,100 men are reported to
be in the area. No contact with the enemy has been
reported.
6. Operation HUNTSVILLE, a search-and-destroy
operation conducted by the 3rd Brigau.e of the US
1st Infantry Division, ended on 22 September. This
operation, which began on 20 September, resulted
in eight Viet Cong killed, seven captured, and 53
suspects detained. Five Americans were wounded in
the sweep which took place 12 to 15 miles northeast
of Saigon in Binh Duong Province.
Prisoner Interrogations
7. A group of 10 North Vietnamese prisoners,
consisting of four captured naval officers and six
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soldiers captured in South Vietnam, have provided
some interesting and in some cases consistent
answers to a series of questions. The questions
concerned VC/NVA shortages in critical supplies,
the morale of Communist forces, and the reasons
for VC/NVA avoidance of large-scale engagements
with US forces.
8. Concerning shortages of ammunition, med-
ical supplies or food, the naval officers stated
that they had heard of no shortages, while the
personnel captured in South Vietnam indicated that
there was a lack of food and medical supplies.
There was, however, no indication that the shortage
was sufficient to affect seriously the VC/NVA oper-
ational capabilities.
9. The prisoners captured in South Vietnam
stated that air interdiction had reduced the
quantity of supplies, particularly food, being
brought into South Vietnam. Air strikes also re-
portedly increased the time it took troops to in-
filtrate by two months, according to one source.
In response to a question as to why VC and North
Vietnamese forces avoided large-scale combat,
those personnel captured in South Vietnam indi-
cated that their tactics were to engage only units
smaller or equal to their own in size. They were
also warned to avoid bringing on air strikes.
10. All six of the prisoners captured in South
Vietnam voiced the opinion that the VC could not
win the war and that they probably would not sur-
vive the fighting. When asked if they felt like
"hunted animals" facing certain death, the pris-
oners captured in South Vietnam avoided the term
"hunted animals" but stated their belief that they
would die in the South.
11. The question of how to induce wholesale
surrender of VC/NVA forces drew a variety of re-
sponses ranging from destroying of the Central
Office for South Vietnam to convincing the troops
in South Vietnam that the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment had surrendered. The most realistic answers
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included assuring that VC/NVA forces understood the
Chieu Hoi program so that they would not be afraid
to turn themselves in to the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment. Another prisoner suggested increasing
antiguerrilla efforts since it was the guerrilla
forces that made it difficult for soldiers to turn
themselves in. Still another answer was to appeal
for the surrender of an encircled enemy unit be-
fore launching an attack.
12. The most interesting question asked was
"when will the North Vietnamese Army end the war
of liberation?" The general opinion of all the
prisoners was that the war would last for a very
long time.
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
13. The week of 11-17 September compared with
the week of 4-10 September:
I. Viet Cong Incidents
Time
Period
At-
tacks
Regimental
size
Battalion
size
4-10 Sept
11-17 Sept
27
26
0
0
0
2
Time
Period
Company
size
Harassment Terro
rism
4-10 Sept
1
360 32
11-17 Sept
3
600 50
Time Sabo- Propa- Anti- Total
Period tage ganda Aircraft Incidents
4-10 Sept 21 29 98 567
11-17 Sept 40 42 192 950
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II. Casualties
Killed
Wounded
Missing/
Captured
TOTALS
4-10 Sept
11-17 Sept
1,187
228
111
1,415
833
4-10 Sept 11-
17
Sept
174
17
2
488
42
4
34
5
3
696
US
FREE WORLD
4-10 Sept
11-17 Sept
4-10 Sept 11-
Sept
Killed
71
96
3
3
Wounded
450
583
17
18
Missing/
tured
Ca
8
0
0
p
20 21
III.
Weapons Captured
VC/NVA GVN
4-10 Sept
11-17 Sept
4-10 Sept 11-1
7 Sept
Individual
367
Not
105 1
84
Crew-Served
30
Reported
4
7
TOTALS
397
109 1
91
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. At a meeting of the military members of
the Directorate on 22 September, it was agreed
that the Directorate should "dictate" neither the
manner in which the constituent assembly proceeds
with its work nor its decisions. The members
did not discuss the possibility of implementing
Article 20 of the assembly founding decree which
grants them the power to revise the constitution.
It was previously reported that some of the as-
sembly members are considering waging a battle to
annul Article 20 soon after the assembly convenes
on 27 September. The responsibility of fielding
items brought to the attention of the Directorate
by the assembly was assigned to Secretary General
Pham Xuan Chieu and Minister of Information Gen-
eral Nguyen Bao Tri.
2. In the opinion of a high-ranking South
Vietnamese military officer, the postelection
euphoria is exaggerated and will have no lasting
effect on the general populace. Although the
success of the voter turnout has had a f&vorable
effect on high-ranking government officials and
some politicians, the officer termed it "ridiculous,"
to expect that the average military or civilian
government functionary will move out of his lethar-
gic and corrupt ways. He concluded that the great
problem of South Vietnam is that most people "do
not care."
Other :Postelection Developments
3. According to the US Embassy, an early gov-
ernment estimate that election irregularities were
relatively insignificant and few in number has not
changed. US officials have no reason to doubt the
government's estimate.
4. Voting statistics revealed that the eight
provinces with the smallest actual voter turnout in
comparison to their total population were all in
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the delta below Saigon. The total vote for each of
the eight provinces was below 20 percent of the total
population; one registered as low as 11 percent. The
low vote probably reflects the degree to which the
rural populace has been cut off by Viet Cong "ir-
regulars" as well as southern peasant apathy toward
national issues. In any event, the low turnout un-
derscores the delicate security situation that has
prevailed in the delta for several years, but which
has taken a back seat, publicly, to enemy develop-
ments in the highlands and the northern provinces.
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
port.
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port.
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
23 September 1966
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. North Vietnam on 23 September turned aside an
ICC request that Hanoi allow the ICC to reinstitute the
patrol activities of ICC Mobile Team 76 in the north-
eastern sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In an
official letter to the ICC, the North Vietnamese Liaison
Mission stated that the ICC's appeal to both North and
South Vietnam asking respect for the DMZ and for cooper-
ation with Team 76 "does not correspond with objective
reality in the Zone; therefore, it is not conducive to
appropriate settlement of the present situation in the
Zone."
2. The North Vietnamese statement asserted that
the "facts" show that only one side--"that of the United
States and the Saigon puppet administration'--has "sab-
otaged" the status of the DMZ and hindered all normal
activities of the ICC.
The North Vietnamese position
is consistent with the past or Vietnamese
that its hands are clean and that the ICC should con-
demn the US and GVN. Hanoi has consistently rejected
any efforts at de-escalation of the war which even
obliquely imply that North Vietnam, as well as the
US/GVN, has been guilty of any transgressions of the
1954 Geneva agreements.
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Hanoi Rejects US Peace Pro osal
5. North Vietnam has rejected as "hypocritical"
the US peace proposal made by Ambassader Goldberg at
the UN on 22 September. In a 23 September VNA broad-
cast, Hanoi employed well-worn propaganda themes in
claiming that such US peace talk was designed "to
cover up the US scheme to expand and prolong its ag-
gression in South Vietnam." The broadcast also con-
demned Goldberg's proposals as an attempt "to get
the UN to interfere in the Vietnam issue" and reit-
erated Hanoi's long-standing opposition to any UN
action on the question of the Vietnam war.
23 September 1966
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Ma
et Cong Attacks
Viet o m Incidents
(GAWMg A tacIts.)
AUGUST
2337
1,,9163 , 1964 11
II lLei
x965
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Weapons Losses
Viet Cong
GVN
AUGUST
1298
I - I
AUGUST
6781
Personnel Losses
(Excluding Wounded)
Viet Cong/PAVN
GVN/US/other Free World
1399 '
,1,LJIi i i J i l l
i. L 1!.! ~1!J~,~_ i_l.!. ! 1.!,.1 L A 1! ,!_J ! 1
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
1000
11-17
Sept
.! _! -L, 4 LL1.11 I,. -11
JUL AUG SEP
1966
US Casaaalt1es to Hate: Killed 5080 Wounded 28723 Captured 74 Missing 308
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