THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010048-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: September 19, 1966
• Content Type: IR

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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This document contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(12 September - 18 September 1966)
Section
Possible high-level replacements;
Buddhist activities.
Target and purpose; Security; Economic;
Land reform; Representative government.
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Currency and gold; Pork prob-
lems again; US-GVN economic discussions;
Wages.
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
South Vietnam Economic Indicators (graphs):
-Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
-Saigon Cost of Living Index
-Money Supply
-Foreign Exchange Reserves
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\ NORTH
?Dong Hoi
VIETNAM
??~ r Kontum?
?Sihanoukville
?Vinh Long
r Can Tho
SOUTH VIETNAM
SECRET
25 50 75 100Mdes
11 25 50 75 1611 Kilometers
Vung Tau III CORPS.
CaapitcI Military Zane
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I. POLITICAL SITUATION
In the wake of the election for a con-
stituent assembly, there was somewhat of a
slackening in the pace of political activity.
There were some indications that Deputy Pre-
mier Co and IV Corps commander Quan.g might
be replaced in the near future. The policy
and leadership of the Buddhist Institute
was also in a state of flux following the
unsuccessful election boycott led by mili-
tant Buddhists.
Possible High-Level Replacements
1. Now that the con.stituent:assemblya.elec
tion is over, the long-rumored replacement of Deputy
Premier Co and IV Corps commander Quang may take
place in the near future. According to a Vietna-
mese general officer, Premier Ky recently confronted
General Co with the accusation that Co was planning
a coup supported by two currently unassigned generals.
Coup rumors were circulating in. the capital just
prior to the 11 September election, but it is not
clear whether they had any validity or whether they
were spread by Ky's supporters to lay the groundwork
for a future move against Co. According to the
same source, Premier Ky reportedly stated earlier
this month that he had proof of plotting against
the government by IV Corps Commander.Quang.
2. Speculation concerning the removal of Co
and Quan.g was rife in late July and early August.
A high-ranking source close to Premier Ky stated in
early August that action would be taken against Co
and Quang "when the time was right"--a probable
reference to the postelection period.
Buddhist Activities
3. Following an unsuccessful election boycott
led by militant Buddhists, the leadership and policy
of the Buddhist Institute is once more in flux.
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After a leave of absence for some two months, moderate
Institute chairman. Thich Tam Chau returned to Sai-
gon on 15 September to resume active Institute leader-
ship, which has been exercised in his absence by an
acting chairman and a council majority of militants
close to Tri Quang. Chau, who publicly opposed the
official Buddhist election boycott, plans to attempt
to resolve differences between the Buddhist leader-
ship and the government, re-occupy the Institute
premises which have remained vacant since the raid
by government troops in July, and finally to ask for
the release of "struggle" prisoners still under de-
tention..
4. However, the militant council majority, still
apparently more responsive to the influence of Tri
Quang, showed no sign of relenting in-their opposi-
tion to the government last week. Acting Institute
chairman. Thich Thien Hoa declared his lack of faith
in the newly elected constituent assembly in a
public letter to the government on 15 September. The
next day, militant Tri Quang announced the ending of
his fast of more than three months but stressed that
this by no means signified the end of his opposition
to the Ky governmen.t. The announcement followed an.
order from the church's supreme aged patriarch to
Quang that he cease his hunger strike. In. a later
open letter, Quang again went on record against the
present military government and further accused the
US Government of intending to kill off the Buddhist
leadership.
5. On. the government side, there is no clear
indication of any intent to release the "struggle"
prisoners, which is the major issue remaining be-
tween. the government and moderate Buddhists, in the
near future. The government may, however, release
at least some of the Buddhist prisoners in conjunc-
tion with the probable release of a number of
Catholics held since the overthrow of the Diem re-
gime. In view of his pro-election broadcast on
11 September, it is also possible that Tam Chau may
have reached some kind of understanding with the
government.
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6. However, it is more doubtful that Tam
Chau will be able to deal successfully with the
Institute militants. The US Embassy has concluded
that a formal split in the United Buddhist Associa-
tion would be preferable to heavy militant pres-
sures on Tam Chau with the Institute likely thus
to come under the control of the militants whenever
a problem arose.
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II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
There has been considerable opti-
mism lately that the "military" war is
going well for the GVN. Recent severe
economic measures by the Saigon regime,
moreover, seem to have checked the pros-
pect of rampant inflation for the time
being. The GVN's ability to cope with
other incidental problems, such as Saigon
port congestion, at the advice of the
United States, is also cause for elation.
The recent successful election of a na-
tional constituent assembly, in addition,
is also a solid step toward the establish-
ment of representative national government.
Only the "pacification" of the rural pop-
ulace does not seem to have kept pace with
the other encouraging developments.
The following discussion is offered
as at least a partial explanation of the
slow pace of pacification.
Target and Purpose
1. The main pacification target at present is
the approximately 7 million rural people who do not
live in the urban areas or in the GVN-controlled
rural areas (technically referred to as the "se-
cure" hamlets.) The end object of pacification, when
shorn of the trimmings, is simply the satisfaction
of the basic aspirations of these 7 million people.
The most important basic aspirations--physical se-
curity, more income, low or stable cost of living,
land reform, and representative government--are
largely the same in South Vietnam as in any develop-
ing country. The progress that is being made in
revolutionary development must ultimately satisfy
most of these desires. A heavy and primary emphasis
must be placed on the provision of physical security,
after which the other desires can then be cared for.
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Security
2. The overall provision of physical security
for the average hamlet dweller has not improved ap-
preciably. The local security situation has, how-
ever, undergone numerous drastic alterations, some
of them for the better and some for the worse. It
is safe to assume that the peasantry, or Mao Tse-
tung's "sea," has recently seen and felt more of
the war in their hamlets and rice paddies than at
any time in, the last 12 years. The flow of over
1 million "registered" refugees from war areas to
the urban fringes since mid-1964 is a living testi-
monial to this. It is the rural peoples more than
any other sector of the civilian population that
have to bear the burden of the conflict. The influx
of approximately 400,000 non-South Vietnamese into
the country in the last three years has seriously
disrupted the social, economic, and local political
structure of the bulk of the population.
3. An examination of the allied force structure
of over 1 million persons reveals that a relatively
small percentage of them are tasked with providing
permanent daily security for the villagers. Basi-
cally, this is the job of the more than 300,000
South Vietnamese "paramilitary" troops. Most of
these troops, however, are utilized to guard key
military installations, logistic depots, and urban
centers or to react to small Viet Cong-initiated
actions. Of this rather large "paramilitary" con-
tingent, approximately 125,000 (present-for-duty in
May 1966) are Popular Forces, on whom the respon-
sibility of hamlet and village security falls.
There are a number of problems, however, which tend
to mitigate their effectiveness. The Popular Forces
suffer more killed than any other allied military
organization, including the ARVN. They also have
the highest desertion rate. The number of them
available for hamlet security is further lessened
by the proclivity of the provincial and district
military commanders to utilize them often for static
guard (non-hamlet) duties, much the same as the
Regional Forces.
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4. The only organization tasked solely with
the specialized function of implementing the rural
pacification effort is the Ministry of Revolutionary
Development, with approximately 30,000 field cadres.
About 25,000 of these perform a primary hamlet se-
curity and defense role. The dangerous burden of
local security also falls on the National Police.
However, of the roughly 50,000 police, less than
half are assigned to the provinces, the rest per-
forming duties in and around Saigon or in training
centers. Of the police in the provinces, most of
them are located in the province capitals. In
reality, the number actually performing services
for the rural populace is quite small.
5. In contrast, the number of Viet Cong "ir-
regulars," independent of Viet Cong regulars and
North Vietnamese soldiers, is at least 100,000, and
there is strong evidence that there may be as many
as 250,000 such irregulars.
6. By totaling the Popular Forces, the cadres,
and possibly 15,000 National Police, the number
available for hamlet security duties is about
170,000. It is possible, then, that the Viet Cong
"irregulars" are strong enough numerically to match
the GVN hamlet security forces man for man. Viewed
in this context, then, the personnel available to
satisfy one of the peasants' basic aspirations,
physical security, is woefully inadequate.
7. The economic situation of the average hamlet
dweller has clearly become more severe in the recent
period. In spite of the government measures de-
signed to stabilize the economy, the rural populace
has experienced a continuous rise in the cost of
living without a concomitant rise in wages or
purchasing power. This situation is liable to pre-
vail for some time. Even if the cost of living and
the working class consumer price index does stabilize
at its present level, they are still too high to
satisfy the financial needs of the peasantry.
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8. One of the measures that accompanied the
devaluation of the piaster, a 20-30 percent wage
hike for civil servants and military personnel, is
expected to have little, if any, effect on the vil-
lagers. Although the devaluation measures are also
effective outside of the Saigon area, other just as
meaningful economic areas of interest to the vil-
lagers are the local marketing facilities and the
intraprovince transportation facilities. The Viet
Cong grip on. both is quite strong in many areas.
The importance of open lines of communication can
be illustrated by the wildly fluctuating price of
pork in. Saigon during the past two months. The
simple destruction of one bridge between Saigon and
the delta during the recent election period resulted
in a drastic temporary price rise in. the Saigon
market. (See Economic Developments section)
9. The Viet Cong brand of economic warfare
has been annoyingly successful. The marketing of
foodstuffs by South Vietnamese villagers within a
province is precarious and very often subject to
taxation based upon the farmer's annual income or
rice yield. Foodstuffs marketed between provinces
and to the Saigon market are heavily taxed if the
line of communication happens to be open.. Only
about 40 percent of the country's road network is
considered secure enough to travel without constant
military protection. The Viet Cong interdiction
of the roads and railways has had an. extremely dele-
terious effect on the cost of living to the peasantry.
The en.emy's campaign to interrupt the once exten-
sive rice production for urban and overseas mar-
kets has been so successful that South Vietnam will
soon be importing 500,000 tons of rice for its own
consumption, whereas only a few years ago it ex-
ported rice.
10. The average hamlet dweller does not yet
have sufficient opportunity to own his farmland.
By and large, absentee landlordism still prevails.
Since nearly all of the rural populace is engaged
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in. farming, with a small number working ;in fish
ing, forestry, and mining, the peoples' desire to
own property is substantial. Some expropriated land
has been. distributed and the issuance of land titles
is gathering momentum, although there is still a
long way to go,
11. The Viet Cong fully recognize the importance
of land and agrarian reform, although they have been
somewhat slow and irregular in granting meaningful
concessions to the villagers under their nominal con-
trol. They have been relatively successful, however,
in exploiting the issue to the detriment of the
government in propaganda.
Representative Government
12. The average hamlet dweller does not yet
have representative governmental institutions.
Even the promulgation of a constitution, the possible
election. of a legislature, and the election. of a
president or the appointment of some other executive
body during the next year will not provide meaningful
forms of government to the villagers. Those measures
should go a long way in. providing a democratic frame-
work for the legislation and execution of repre-
sentative national policy. However, the peasant does
not see much further than his local hamlet or vil-
lage. Although in many areas there are elected
hamlet and village chiefs an.d representative local
councils to whom the local populace can turn, these
village chiefs cannot in turn realistically appeal
to the next higher echelon..
13. The key government representatives in the
provinces are, primarily, the chief of province and
the district chiefs. These are nearly all military
appointees. It would seem practical, in time of
war, that this should be the case. However, the
inequities of the military governor are well known.
in spite of the seeming practicality of the arrange-
ment. Until the province, district, village, and
hamlet chiefs can be elected, it is doubtful that
the peasantry will have the necessary channels through
which they can ultimately identify with their nation
and government.
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III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
Saigon retail prices were generally
stable or slightly lower in the week end-
ing 6 September, but rose sharply during
the following week primarily as a result
of shortages caused by Viet Cong activi-
ties during the election weekend. During
the week ending 12 September the over-all
USAID retail price index increased 16 per-
cent and food prices were up 21 percent.
It is expected that this recent upsurge in
prices will be short-lived since efforts
are being made to restore supplies. Prices
of imported commodities showed mixed trends
in the week ending 6 September, About half
the items sampled were moderately higher;
these prices were generally unchanged or
slightly lower on 12 September. During the
week ending 6 September the price of dol-
lars on the Saigon free market fluctuated
around 166 piasters, the rate of the pre-
vious week, and gold rose slightly--re-
portedly because of pre-election uncer-
tainties. These rates showed little change
during the following week.
The first of a series of US-GVN meet-
ings on the economic situation centered
primarily on topics of a technical na-
ture; the US Embassy hopes to gradually
upgrade the level of discussion at future
meetings. A uniform pay and classifica-
tion system for Vietnamese employees of
US agencies and contractors has been
adopted by the US Mission Council.
1. Saigon retail prices were generally stable
or slightly lower in the week ending 6 September,
but rose sharply during the following week. On 6
September the over-all USAID retail price index was
two percent below the previous week primarily because
of lower food p.'ices. Pork and rice prices continued
to fall as deliveries to Saigon increased. The
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price of chicken., which had risen sharply the week
before because of holiday purchases, moved down
again.
2. During the week ending 12 September, however,
the over-all USAID retail price index increased 16
percent with food up 21 percent and nonfood up one
percent. Higher food prices were caused by Viet
Cong destruction of bridges connecting Saigon with
the agricultural areas of the Mekong Delta. Hog
arrivals ceased during the election weekend of 10-11
September, and pork prices soared to a new high.
(See paragraph 6). Higher pork prices drove up the
prices of other protein foods. This recent upsurge
in prices is expected to be short-dived since efforts
are being made to restore supplies. (A table of
weekly retail prices in Saigon is included in the
Annex).
3. Prices of imported commodities showed mixed
trends in the week ending 6 September with higher
prices for nine items, lower prices for five, and
seven unchanged. With a decline in stocks of gal-
vanized sheet, prices of this imported product rose
10 to 15 percent. Wheat flour, some types of fer-
tilizer, rayon yarn, and newsprint also were higher.
USAID believes these increases may have resulted from
the anticipation by importers of a continued port
bottleneck and also from the nonavftilability of
credit. During the following week prices of im-
ported goods were generally unchanged or slightly
lower.
Currency and Gold
4. The price of dollars fluctuated slightly
around 166 piasters on the Saigon free market dur-
ing the week ending 6 September. Gold, on the other
hand, rose 12 piasters to 249 piasters--seven
piasters above the official rate of 242 piasters--
reportedly because of pre-election uncertainties.
With this price rise, speculators resumed gold pur-
chases, but wide fluctuations in the price of gold
are not anticipated. MPC (?crip) continued to move
down; the rate on 6 September was 113 piasters com-
pared with an official rate of 118. In Hong Kong,
the piaster-dollar cross rate was 177 piasters per
dollar on 6 September, about the same as the pre-
ceding week.
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5. These rates changed little by 12 September,
*hen prices of dollars and gold were 170 and 252
piasters, respectively. MPC (scrip) moved up two
piasters to 115 and the piaster-dollar cross rate
in Hong Kong fell from 177 to 172 piasters. (Graphics
on. monthly and weekly free market gold and currency
prices are included in the Annex.)
Pork Problems Again
6. Deliveries of hogs to .Saigon ceased during
the weekend of 10-11 September because of Viet
Cong destruction of several bridges and threats of
interdiction. It had been reported in late August
that'-the Viet Cong might attempt to disrupt the 11
September elections by cutting off shipments of hogs
and other commodities from the countryside. On 12
September the price of pork bellies was 180 piasters
per kilogram--the highest price ever reached--com-
pared with 80 piasters on 6 September. This shortage
of pork has driven up the prices of other protein
foods. The sudden rise in the price of pork is con-
sidered to be temporary, however, pending repair of
damaged bridges between Saigon and the Delta. De-
liveries of hogs had been running well in recent
weeks, and the normal consumption of the Saigon area
was being met. Almost 13,000 hogs arrived in Saigon
during the period 25 to 31 August, and deliveries
rose to more than 14,000 between 1 and 9 September,
compared with a weekly level of only 3,500 to 4,500
last July when the pork crisis first developed.
7. The first of a series of US-GVN meetings on
the economic situation. was held on 2 September under
the joint chairmanship of Minister of Economy Thanh
and US Assistant Deputy Ambassador Koren.. Discus-
sions at this first plenary meeting covered several
topics of a rather technical nature. Thanh used the
occasion to point out that although efficient opera-
tions are an important factor in a war situation.,
political and legal considerations--i.e., Vietnamese
sovereignty--cannot be neglected. Specifically,
Thanh was distressed by reports that the US had
signed contracts with foreign companies for third coun-
try:nationals without consulting the GVN.:.Simi1ar1y,
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Thanh complained that the GVN had not been consulted
on a program drawn up by the Department of Defense
for reducing the inflationary impact of military
personnel spending in Vietnam. In response, the US
reaffirmed its intent to respect Vietnamese sover-
eignty and promised to check into these complaints.
8. The group also discussed the port situation.
Thanh maintained that the Saigon port authority needs
more equipment to increase the rate of discharge.
When the US pointed out that the heart of the port
problem is the slow rate at which importers are re-
moving commodities, Thanh ended the discussion.. The
US gave a rundown on other commercial port develop-
ment projects which appeared to satisfy Thanh. The
latter then raised the possibility of a port being
constructed in the Mekong Delta for long-run develop-
ment of that area. Both sides agreed that naviga-
tional problems would require a serious survey for
such a project.
9. Next on the agenda was.the problem of pro-
cedural difficulties in implementing the commercial
import program. Thanh complained that Vietnamese
importers could not fathom the Office of Small
Business requirements of AID and requested a grace
period of a few more months. The US refused and
pointed out that USAID now is better prepared to
assist importers on these regulations.
10. The general impression of the US Embassy
is that representation of both the US and GVN at
this type of forum should be smaller and the sub-
jects should be limited to broader economic topics
such as GVN budget review or use of GVN foreign ex-
change holdings=-: An effort will be made by the US
to gradually upgrade the level of discussion. In
addition, the Embassy feels that these meetings may
serve the useful purpose of improving communica-
tions within the GVN.
Wages
11. In order to move toward uniform personnel
regulations for all US agencies and US contractors,
the US Mission Council has adopted a single pay and
classification system applicable to almost all
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Vietnamese employees of US civilian and military
agencies and their contractors and subcontractors.
The standard pay schedule adopted is the US forces
pay schedule as authorized last May. According to
US Mission estimates, adoption of this uniform pay
schedule will result in an average wage increase of
roughly 10 percent.
12. Adoption of the new pay schedule is subject
to consultation with Minister of Economy Thanh who
reportedly has some objections to the proposal. The
US Mission plans to point out the advantages of the
proposal to Thanh. For the first time there will be
a clear limit--which can be enforced by the Mission--
on wages. Presently, there are so many deviations
from the schedule that contractors find themselves
under pressure to raise wages. Secondly, the modest
upward adjustment under the schedule will bring
various pay scales in line with each other and thus
dampen widespread employee discontent which results
from variations in wages.
13. According to the Mission, the inflationary
impact of the uniform pay schedule will be much less
than that resulting from the rapidly mounting number
of new employees. Although RMK-BRJ is cutting back,
hiring by other US contractors and military and
civilian agencies continues to grow. The Mission
feels that the best anti-inflationary strategy is
to keep both pay rates and new employees down. to
reasonable limits.
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ANNEX
TABLE
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon a/
(In Piasters)
3 Jan
1966
16 Aug
1966
22 Aug
1966
29 Aug
1966
6 Sep
1966
Percent
Change
from
Month Ago
Percent
Change
from
Year Ago
Index for All Items b/
160
211
206
215
211
- 6
+ 81
Index for Food Items b/
169
216
211
222
215
- 8
+ 77
Of Which:
Rice/Soc Nau (100 kg.)
800
1,450
1,400
1,350
1,300
- 10
+ 44
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)
70
100
85
85
80
- 47
+ 33
Fish/Ca Tre (1 kg.)
110
170
160
180
170
- 11
+127
Nuoc Mam (jar)
50
85
85
85
85
0
+ 70
Index for Non-Food Items b/ 124
190
189
191
196
-0,2
+ 93
Charcoal (60 kg.)
440
600
590
620
660
+ 6
+ 74
Cigarettes (pack)
10
14
14
14
14
0
+ 40
White Calico (meter) 27
37
36
33
33
- 13
+ 43
Laundry Soap (1 kg.) 30
43
43
40
40
- 9
+ 90
a/ Data are from USAID sources.
6/ For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100.
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600,
,400
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
PIASTERS
PER US DOLLAR
31 A
237
GUST
167
1.1.LJ
I
1965
US $10 GREEN
1966 1967
GOLD Basis: gold leaf worth $35 per troy ounce
172
170
JUL AUG SEP
........
US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates (scrip)
6:1781
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010048-0
 Approved For ReI`Me 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00826A000010048-0
Saigon Cost of Living Index
(For Working Class Family)
1959=10p
~ _.___ _..?.~ ..e_.
~_~...
AUGUST
255
L LI L I
I I I I I I I L. 1
1.l L_L..t.J_L L.1 J_.L
~LJ_
BILLIONS OF PIA
S
4
31 JULY
62.1
-
..1 1 I_I I !
' J
.J-.1_.1L,
A-J-
South Vietnam Foreign Exchange Reserves
MILLIONS OF US
DOLLARS
264.4
TOTAL 31 JULY
16.8 1
247.6
t
..
wr_.
I
e
I
r
--~
I I I~sI 1 1 1
A 1 1 1 1~~.J~I
South Vietnam Money Supply
63782
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010048-0
 Approved For Relea's2006/03/1 7S:EIA RDP79T00826A00t9it6010048-0
Approved For Release 2006/03/gi;G,I 5 9T00826AO01200010048-0