AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (THROUGH 12 SEPTEMBER 1964)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010035-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: September 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

S^3p'o3/cc. ~~ F
Approved For Relep,Pe 2004/12/01 :CIA-RDP79T00826AOQi~,~00010035-4
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(THROUGH 11 SEPTEMBER 1966)
SEPTEMBER 1966
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA?
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION
25X1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING DOD DIR 5200,10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
ARCFIIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
Hpprovea ror fteiease zuu4i~ziu~ : c:iH-KUNry i uutszsHUU~zuuu~uus5-4
~,~7~~/
 Approved For Rele~ 2004/12/01 :CIA-RDP79T00826A00~;{~0010035-4
WARNING
This document contains information aiiE~ctin?; the national
ceiense of the United States within the r~eanin~ of the
:I~s~ionag;e haws, Title 1$, U.S;C. Sections '7~3 a.nd '7~4.
The transmission or revelation of its c ontents in any
manner to an unauthorized pex?son is ~rc3hihited by law.
Approved For Release 2004/12/01 :CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010035-4
 Approved F~~F~~g 2004[1~/01~ O R E I G N~ D I S 5010035-4
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH
VIETNAM THROUGH 12 SEPTEMBER 1966
SUMMARY
1. (S~NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam in August and early
September continued at a high level with particular emphasis on dis-
persed POL storage sites, lines of communication (LOCs) and trans-
portation equipment. The campaign against North Vietnamese POL has
continued to be a slow and grinding effort to reduce the remaining
bulk and dispersed storage capacity, and this effort has succeeded in
making it more difficult and costly for the North Vietnamese to import
and distribute POL. Continued discovery of additional dispersed POL
storage sites indicates that the dispersal program is still in progress
and will probably make it possible for North Vietnam to defer any
serious reconstruction of the majox? bulk facilities. There is no evi-
Bence yet of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand,
with recent imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary operations.
2. (S~NFD) Air strikes against all modes of transportation in
North Vietnam increased during the past month, but there is no evidence
of serious transport problems in the movement of supplies to or within
North Vietnam. The regime's recent claim that most transportation
routes remain open appears to be valid. The status of the five major
rail lines in North Vietnam has improved somewhat over last month. Only
two rail lines are known to be interdicted for through service, although
rail and truck shuttle service continues between and around interdicted
points. Destruction and damage of transport equipment, especially
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locomotives, trucks, and barges, continued at a high level during
the past month. A heavy program of road interdiction also continued
in August and early September, particularly in the North Vietnamese
Panhandle. Nevertheless, a high level of truck traffic continues to
be observed, with the bulk of vehicle sightings located south of
Thanh Hoa.
3. (S~NF'D) There is no evidence yet that the air strikes have
significantly weakened popular morale. The raids, however, have
caused mounting disruption in the routine of the civil populace, and
observers in Hanoi have reported continuing shortages in certain food
commodities.
~+. (S~N~'D) Air strikes continue to depress economic growth and
have been responsible for the abandonment of some plans for economic
development, but essential economic activities continue. The increas-
ing amounts of physical damage sustained by North Vietnam are in large
measure compensated by aid received from the Communist countries. In
recent weeks, a North Vietnamese mission signed new agreements for
additional unspecified grants of economic and technical assistance
from Communist countries, and probably has or will receive additional
commitments. The measurable damage to the economy caused by the air
strikes now stands at some 125 million dollars, an increase of almost
20 million dollars over those losses recorded a month ago.
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Effects on Militar Targets
1. (S~NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam in August and
early September continued at a high level with particular emphasis
on dispersed POL storage sites, lines of communication (LOCs) and
transportation equipment. Rainy weather over the northern portion
of the country limited air strikes in that area during the latter
part of August and the first part of September. The campaign against
North Vietnamese POL has continued to be a slow and grinding effort
to reduce the remaining bulk and dispersed storage capacity. This
effort has been effective in making it more difficult and costly for
the North Vietnamese to import and distribute POL. Strikes were made
during August against nine major and over 200 dispersed POL storage
sites. As of 12 September 1866, about 78 per cent of the JCS targeted
POL storage capacity had been destroyed. Continued discovery of
additional dispersed POL storage sites indicates that this dispersal
program is still in progress and will probably make it possible for
North Vietnam to defer any serious reconstruction of the major bulk
facilities.
2. (S~NFD) The capacity of the Haiphong POL facility has been
reduced to barely 10 per cent of its original level, and the facility
is unusable as anoff-loading terminal for oceangoing tankers. Soviet
tankers, nevertheless, continue to arrive in North Vietnamese waters.
The tanker BUGURUSLAN arrived in late August. The receiving points
for the BUGURUSLAN's cargo of almost 11,000 M.T.s of diesel oil and
3
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motor gasoline, which is being discharged into barges, are unknown.
The tanker MOSKOVSKIY FESTIVAL is scheduled to arrive in the Haiphong
area about 18 September with almost 11,000 M.T.s of gasoline and
diesel fuel. In addition, general cargo ships carrying POL and other
cargo continue to be received at or are en route to North Vietnam.
Rail imports of POL into NVN from China are estimated to be continuing,
probably at an increased rate. Imports of POL by other means, sucYi as
coastal barge and craft, and to a very limited extent by air, have
probably occurred.
3. (S) No evidence of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam has
been noted, and it must be assumed that stocks on hand and recent
imports have been adequate to sustain necessary operations. How long
this condition will continue is not clear, but high priority activities
such as military transport, SAM support, and aircraft operations will
be sustained at the expense, if necessary, of other POL consuming
functions.
~~-. (S~NFD) Air strikes against all modes of transportation in
North Vietnam increased during the past month, but there is no
evidence of serious transport problems in the movement of supplies
to or within North Vietnam.. The North Vietnamese, with Chinese engineer-
ing help and the diversion of a large labor force to the task, have
provided sufficient transport capacity to meet the essential needs
of the economy and to continue logistic support for the military
effort in the South. The regime's recent claim that transportation
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routes for the most part remain open in spite of fierce bombing
and strafing appears valid. In addition, rail construction continues,
almost 200 kilometers of road have been built or reconstructed and
inland waterways are being improved. The regime also claims that
mechanized transport has increased, and-that the number of repair
shops and plants for building transport eguipment is being doubled.
5. (S~NFD) Rail transportation continues to be the most
important form of transport in terms of ton-kilometers, although the
use of water and truck transportation appears to be increasing. The
status of the five major rail lines has improved somewhat over last
month. Only two rail lines (Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Vinh) are known
to be interdicted for through service, but rail and truck shuttle
service continues between and around unusable bridges. The remaining
three lines (from Hanoi to Dong Dang, to Haiphong, and to Thai Nguyen)
probably are operable for through service. The important Hanoi-
Dong Dang line appeared to be interdicted at the Dap Cau railroad
highway bx?idge during August. Ample time had elapsed for the repair
of the original bridge or for completion of construction of the
railroad bypass bridge in the area, but August photography showed
the original bridge unserviceable and a section missing from the
bypass bridge. The North Vietnamese, therefore, may have floated
a bridge section into place at night and removed it during the day,
thus providing limited through service on this critical line. An
initial readout of 11 September photography, however, indicates that
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the original Dap Cau bridge has now been repaired. Destruction and
damage of transport equipment, especially locomotives, trucks, and
barges, continued at a high level during the past month. Imports
of trucks and barges continue, however, and recent information
reveals that the North Vietnamese plan to increase imports of rail-
road equipment from Communist China. The North Vietnamese freight
car inventory may have already been significantly supplemented if
the use of Chinese standard-gauge rolling stock has become possible
on part of the Hanoi-Dong Dang line. Sufficient time has elapsed for
this rail line to have been converted to dual-gauge from the Chinese
border to the Kep area, although it is not yet possible to confirm this.
6. (S) A heavy program of road interdiction -- concentrated in
the North Vietnamese Panhandle -- continued in August and early
September. Photo analysis of some of tYie more effectively cratered
road segments indicates that longer delays in restoration are being
experienced. In some instances the North Vietnamese have completely
abandoned cratered segments in favor of alternate routings. Bridge
strikes were well above the high level attained in the previous
period. A sharp increase has been noted in the installation of
cable supported bridging over destroyed spans. The employment of
ferry facilities continues, however, to be the principal alternate
means of restoring service at the larger interdicted stream crossings.
7. (S) A relatively high level of truck traffic continues
to be observed. Nearly 2,250 vehicle sightings were recorded during
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August with the bulk of these located in the region south of Thanh
Hoa either in truck parks or moving in small groups along the high-
ways. This current total is greater than the previous Y~igh reported
in July. Although vehicles are still detected along segments of
Route lA., the main north-south coastal route, emphasis on selected
interdiction points has forced the use of inland detours and a shift
of more of the traffic load onto a less capable interior network.
Cumulative vehicle loss totals are shown in Tab A.
8. (S~ The number of watercraft struck during August set a new
record. Significant activity continued on inland water routes west-
ward from Haiphong and southward from Hanoi. Strike activity against
inland water routes was well dispersed over all waterways with the
heaviest effort concentrated on the Intracoastal waterway between
Vinh and Thanh Hoa. Active utilization of southern inland routes
and contiguous coastal waters continued, however, particularly in
the Dong Hoi vicinity and southward.
9. (S~ Despite the increased intensity of US air strikes during
this period, Hanoi retains the capability to continue support of
activities in South Vietnam and Laos even at increased combat levels
and force structures. Moreover, the armed forces of North Vietnam
continue to expand and the infiltration of men and material into
South Vietnam and Laos continues at a high rate. Nevertheless, it
is estimated that the North Vietnamese capability for overt aggression
has been limited by US air actions.
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Leadership and Public Reactions
10. (S~NFD) Despite the intensification of the US bombings of
North Vietnam to record levels in the past month, there. continues to
be no evidence that the morale of the DRV populace has been affected
to the extent that it could influence the Hanoi leadership's deter-
mination to continue the prosecution of the war. The anniversary of
North Vietnam's national day on 2 September provided the forum for
the Hanoi leadership to reassert its belief in an ultimate Communist
victory in Vietnam. Delivering the major address at a rally marking
the occasion, Premier Pham Van Dong called upon the Vietnamese people
to practice "to the highest degree" economy in production, fighting,
consumption, manpower, and material "so as to have abundant reserves
for protracted fighting."
11. (S~NFD) The bombing raids have, none the less, caused
mounting disruption in the routine of the civil populace. Eye
witness observers in Hanoi have reported continuing shortages in
certain food commodities and that the evacuation of the city is
moving slowly. They have also reported no evidence of herding the
populace out of the capital. In fact, people were apparently return-
ing to the city at night to protect their property or because there
were no accommodations for them in the countryside. One source has
also reported that various ministries of the government have been
dispersed over widely spaced areas thereby markedly decreasing the
efficiency of government functions.
8
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Effects on the Economy
13. (S~NFD) Air strikes continue to depress economic growth
and have been responsible for the abandonment of some plans for
economic development, but essential economic activities continue. The
increasing amounts of physical damage sustained by North Vietnam are
in large measure compensated by aid received from the Communist
countries. This aid, which totaled roughly X1.5 billion in 1955-1965
and at least $350 million in 1965 alone, probably has been significantly
augmented in 1866. In addition, a North Vietnamese mission recently
signed new agreements for additional unspecified grants of economic
and technical assistance from Communist China and North Korea, and
probably will receive or has already received f7zrther commitments
from the USSR and East European countries. The composition of the
forthcoming economic aid may reflect Hanoi's need for material for
the restoration of economic facilities destroyed or damaged in air
attacks as opposed to earlier economic assistance which was directed
mainly to new development. The delegation sent by Hanoi to seek
foreign aid was the second such mission in 1966 and the third in
slightly more than a year. The first two missions obtained loans
and grants from the USSR, all the Communist countries of Eastern
9
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Europe, except Albania and Yugoslavia, and from China and North Korea.
1~+. (S~NFD) There is as yet no evidence that the loss of
petroleum or petroleum facilities has had a measurable .effect on the
economy. The-need for North Vietnam to institute a new method for
storage and distribution of petroleum, however, has not only increased
the costs of the supply of petroleum but also has placed an additional
burden on the already severely taxed management and manpower resources
of North Vietnam. About 3+,000 tons of petroleum products have been
discharged in China for the North Vietnamese since the concentrated
bombing of petroleum facilities began in June. An indeterminate
quantity of this petroleum -- probably less than half -- has been
delivered to North Vietnam by rail and possibly by coastal watercraft.
15. (S~NFD) The measurable damage to the economy caused by
the air strikes now stands at some 125 million dollars, an increase
of almost 20 million dollars over these losses recorded a month ago
and almost double those at the end of 1965. Damage to transportation
equipment, the Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant, and naval craft accounted
for some 75 per cent of the measurable damage inflicted in the
current reporting period which saw the heaviest damage of any month
since the air strikes began. Total reported damage to transportation
equipment in 1966 is now estimated at 19.2 million dollars or more
than the cumulative losses for 1965 and 1966 in any other category.
16. (S~NF'D) Direct losses caused by air strikes against
economic and military facilities and equipment measured in terms of
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estimated reconstruction or replacement cost are now estimated at
some 109 million dollars as shown in the tabulation below:
Economic Facilities and E uipment
Military Facilities and Equipment
Million
~ Million
Targets
Dollars
Targets Dollars
Railroad~Highway Bridges
1~
Barracks
16.x+
Reconstruction
15.~-
Temporary Repairs
3.1
2~
Ammunition Storage
1+,5
Transportation Equipment
25.1
3~
Supply Depots
3.2
Railroad Yards and Ports
1.0
Radar and Communications
1.1
Electric Power Plants
11.5
Naval Bases
0.8
Petroleum Storage
SAM Sites
2.0
Facilities
2.3
~+~
Aircraft
10.7
Manufacturing Facilities
2.1
Telecommunications
Airfields
p,1~
Facilities
0.2
Naval Craft
Miscellaneous Targets of
8.2
Total 60.7 Total x+8.3
l~ The estimate in this category is incomplete because of inadequate
post-strike photography.
2~ Includes 2.1 million dollars expended to date on temporary repairs
and 1.0 million dollars required to provide temporary repairs for
structures damaged but not yet restored to operable condition.
3~ Excludes destruction and damage to trucks in Laos. The estimated
value of damage and destruction to transportation equipment in
North Vietnam is based on pilot reports and may be somewhat overstated.
~+~ Excludes destruction and damage to support facilities and contents
of petroleum tanks.
Measurable indirect losses amount to about 16.2 million dollars made
up of losses of foreign exchange earnings of 12.7 million dollars,
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 Approved Fd~~:~OQ~~f+ 1 ~1~,~~f~~1~8~~110035-4
and losses in the 1965 fall rice crop of 3.5 million dollars. In
addition to these measurable losses, there are many other losses and
costs to the economy and the military establishment which cannot be
assigned values. These would include the loss of production and
lower productivity of labor resulting from the dispersal of industry,
time lost from work as a consequence of civil defense measures, and
loss of production caused by shortages of electric power.
17. (S~NFD) All sectors of the economy have shared in the
difficulties produced by the bombing. In August the regime admitted
that "the US imperialists have created difficulties for the economy
in general and light industry in particular." Air strikes have un-
doubtedly contributed to shortfalls in the spring rice crop and to
problems encountered in the planting of the fall rice crop. Although
the regime claims that industrial production in the first seven months
of 1966 met state plans, and that production in heavy industry
increased since the beginning of the bombing, the failure to announce
data on either plans or output suggests that growth was, in fact,
limited. Lagging production in light and local industry is evident
in a recent government statement regarding the importance of this
segment of industry which placed emphasis on accomplishments in
196+ rather than 1965 or 1966.
18. (S~NF'D) The recent attention devoted to the increased
employment of women, particularly in the agricultural cooperatives
and. the militia, indicates that the manpower problem in North Vietnam
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is becoming more troublesome. Tens of thousands of women allegedly
have learned agricultural skills since 1865, thus helping to alleviate
a problem which is in large part the result of the diversion of
labor to repair and reconstruction activities and dispersal problems
associated with the bombing. Hanoi continues to devote an extremely
large portion of its manpower and materiel resources to the construction
and maintenance of lines of communication and there continue to be
reports of shortages of both men and materiel. These shortages are
considered to be primarily caused by poor management practices and
by problems of distribution. To further supplement the labor supply
the regime is trying -- apparently with limited success -- to make
greater use of unskilled workers from the peasant and urban population.
Other measures embarked upon to relieve the tight labor situation
include increased training and the increased use of agricultural
implements. The latter step, in turn, is hindered by the shortage
of skilled workers needed for the production of labor-saving
implements.
19. ( S~N.E'D ) The damage -- valued at about ~+. ~+ million dollars --
inflicted in August by two restrikes against the Uong Bi Thermal
Power Plant will prohibit operation of the plant for at least one
year. Complete restoration of the generating facility will require
a minimum of two years. Uong Bi. supplied some 20-25 per cent of
the electricity consumed in both Hanoi and Haiphong. Both cities
will now be forced to rely primarily on power supplied by older
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plants which are subject to intermittent breakdowns.
20. (S~NFD) Seaborne trade continues to be hindered as a
result of the air strikes. Petroleum products arriving, by sea totaled
about 12,000 M.T.s in August compared with an average of over 20,000 M.T.s
a month in the first half of 1866. The greater part of the petroleum
arriving in August represents the contents of one Soviet tanker. Sea-
borne exports from North Vietnam in August totaled 63,000 tons com-
pared with an average monthly volume of 106,000 tons in the first half
of this year. Coal shipments were considerably below normal volumes
as a result of earlier bomb damage to facilities at Cam Pha and there
were no shipments of apatite, largely because of rail interdictions
between the mines and the port. Seaborne imports of miscellaneous
general cargoes, however, continued at a high level, and this volume
of general cargo deliveries together with frequent interruptions of
port operations by air raid alerts, resulted in many Soviet ships
waiting three weeks to complete unloading. The normal unloading time
had previously been about one week. A record low number of foreign
ships -- 22 -- called at North Vietnamese ports in August, compared
with an average of 4~+ calls a month in 1965 and 33 in the first seven
months of 1966. Part of this reduction in shipping can be attributed
to the effects of the bombing on North Vietnam's export capability.
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RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS a/ THRU 12 SEPTEMBER 1966 TABLE 350
Targets
Total Tar ets
Struck
Fixed Tar
ets
/
g
c
No.
Barracks 443 man
d/
Targeted
No ~ti %
62
No ~'~
d/
%
No.
Attacks
b/
Strike
Sorties
Ammo De ots 112.6 MT
POL Stora e ~~ 131.9 MT
Su 1 De ots 10550s ft
Power Plants 187 KW
18
13
26
19
39.63
96.7
NA
38.6
94
1
45
13
11
17
33
75.7
NA
.19.0
216
52
52
50
2344
1155
478
599
Maritime Ports 7
8 ST/D
10
..
8
46.6
26
240
.
RR Yards 33.7 ST/D
Ex losive Plant 1 MT
4
1
95
78
100
5
2
1
28
19
100
17
18
3
219
139
28
Airfields 23
4
12
359
Naval Bases 15
Brid es 883
Commo Install 45
Radar Sites 50
SAM Sites 130
3
46
2
15
47
16
195 e
2
65 e
62
213
2407
15
413
338
Locks & Dams 91
2
2
10
Ferries 34
11
7 _
44
Total orties: 9,207 Results f
Armed Recce Sorties Destroyed Damaged
64,345 Vessels 2,909 4,760
Vehicles 2
065 1
8
,
,
70
%~ POL Storage Excludes Dispersed Storage. RR Stock 1,184 1,503
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined as more accurate
information becomes available.
b/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this
summary assigned to principal target.
c/ National capacity in .1,000`s where measurement shown.
d./ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked and road and rail cuts made.
g/ Per cent inactive due to dismantling or abandonment of facilities as a result of air
strikes.
(~~) These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and
struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets. (i. e., barracks,
supply and ammo depots).
NOTE: For comparative purposes.
US worldwide ammo storage capacity is 6,936,000 metric tons (CONUS 5,719,000 MT).
US worldwide military POL storage capacity is 15,452,000 MT; national US commercial
capacity is 15.1,325,000 MT; approximate average $ value of 1 MT of POL products is $28.
US worldwide military supply depot covered storage space is 137,.100,000 sq. ft.
(CONUS 121,300,000 sq, ft.).
Total kilowatt capacity of power plants serving metropolitan areas: New York - 7.6
million; Chicago - 6 million; Washington (DC and Md/suburbs only) - 2.4 million.
CCCCCcpp TT TAB A
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~ N 1' FFCC I VV,I`V~ VV~~~~
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA/CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
DEFENSE
SECDEF
2
Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA)
2
Cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis)
2
Cys
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
1
Cy
TREASURY
1
Cy
USIA
1
Cy
AID
1
Cy
NASA
1
Cy
NSA
5
Cys
STATE
12
Cys
AEC
1
Cy
FBI
1
Cy
NIC
1
Cy
ACDA
1
Cy
CHAIRMAN,
JCS
1
Cy
DIRECTOR,
JOINT STAFF
1
Cy
J-1
1
Cy
J_3
2
cys
J-4
1
Cy
J-5
1
Cy
J-6
1
Cy
SACSA
1
Cy
NMCC
3
Cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF
2 Cys
DCSOPS
1
Cy
ACSFOR
1
CY
ACSI
1
Cy
ACSI-CI
1
Cy
ACSI-Eastern
1
Cy
STAG
1
Cy
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2
Cys
DNI
1
Cy
OP-921E
1
Cy
OP-922Y1
1
Cy
OP-922Y2
l
CY
OP-92B1
1
Cy
AIR FORCE;
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
ACSI/USAF 1 Cy
AFNINDI 3 Cys
AFNIEBB 1 Cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation) 1 Cy
AUL (Air UnCCivT Library) ^ p 1 Cyn ` ~ M
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 Approved For Rele~ 2004/12/01 :CIA-RDP79T00826A001~d0010035-4
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT
G-2
1 Cy
1 CY
CINCPAC
2
Cys
CINCPACAF
~
CY
CINCUSARPAC
1
Cy
CINCPACFLT
1
CY
COMUSMACV
2
Cys
7AF
1
Cy
CINCLANT
1
CY
CINCSTRIKE
1
Cy
CINCSAC
1
CY
SAC 544
1
Cy
CINCTAC
1
Cy
AFSTRIKE
1
Cy
CONTIC
1
Cy
CINCALCOM
1
Cy
CINCEUR
1
Cy
CINCUSAREUR
1
Cy
CINCUSAFE
1
CY
CINCNAL'EUg
1
Cy
CINCCONAD
1
Cy
CIp,
D IA
125
Cys
DTADR
1
~Y
DIADD
1
Cy
DIAAP
1
CY
SC-1
1
CY
XX
1
Cy,
AP-2
1
Cy
AP-2A3
2
Cys
AP-2F
4
Cys
AP-1
1
Cy
AP-1C3
1
Cy
AP-1H2
1
Cy
CO-2C
1
CY
JT
1
Cy
CI
1
CY
AP-1R2
1
CY
AP-1R3
1
Cy
AP-1T
2
Cys
J S
1
Cy
Approved For R~I~T~F4:,~1QCI~-~R76~~>~A~~1~~1~35-4
 ~ ~1~04/'r,~ V ' ~ V I(C 1 V IV26LT1-3J [ M~
Approved For Release 2004/12/01 :CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010035-4
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~