THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 6, 1966
• Content Type: IR

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Approved Fo Release 2006/03/17: CIA-Ri E"6AT01200010017-4 4160 02
6 September 1966
No. 0389/66
Copy No.
151
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
USAID, ARMY, NAVY, State reviews completed
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
A} p oved For Release 2006/03/17 . ""SECRAFT
GROUP I
4xcluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
 Approved For 9alease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T0082601200010017-4
This document contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010017-4
 Approved F elease 2006/O9E-G19T00 001200010017-4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(29 August - 5 September 1966)
Preparations for constituent assembly
election; Viet Cong antielection effort;
The Buddhist attitude; Tri Quang; Possible
postelection changes in military and police
organizations; The "march North" theme.
Materials, commodities, and transportation;
Security situation during July; Viet Cong
defectors (Chieu Hoi).
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Currency and gold; Credit;
Proposed US-GVN meetings on the economy;
Labor problems; Views of the Saigon
French community; Death sentence for
speculation.
ANNEX: South Vietnam Economic Indicators (graphs):
-Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
(Monthly and Weekly)
Approved or Release 7-4
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 Approv 10017-4
I. POLITICAL SITUATION
Political developments in South Viet-
nam continue to center largely on govern-
ment efforts to assure a large voter turn-
out on 11 September in the face of signif-
icant Viet Cong attempts to disrupt the
election. There are indications that mili-
tant Buddhists may press for government
concessions in return for an election en-
dorsement.
Among other developments, several re-
ports reflect the possibility of signifi-
cant changes in the structure of the mili-
tary establishment after the constituent
assembly election. These reports suggest
that the influence of police director Colo-
nel Loan is increasing.
Preparations for Constituent Assembly Election
1. The US Embassy has reported that voter
awareness of the constituent assembly election
on 11 September is high, largely as a result of the
most effective public information program the govern-
ment has conducted to date. The populace is not dis-
playing much enthusiasm perhaps partially because of
lackluster campaigning thus far and partially because
of the memory of national elections under the Diem
regime which resulted in few meaningful improvements.
The embassy has pointed out, however, that significant
campaigning under way in Saigon and other urban areas
is not obvious to Western observers unfamiliar with
Vietnamese life. Meanwhile, reports from the provinces
indicate that local officials expect a sizable percent-
age of the electorate to vote and believe that dis-
ruptive efforts by the Viet Cong and adherents of the
Buddhist Institute will not be very successful.
Viet Cong Antielection Effort
2. Nevertheless, the Viet Cong appear determined
to make the election a major confrontation with the
government. Their radiobroadcasts are concentrating
on an.tielection propaganda, with approximately half of
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Liberation Radio's broadcast time on 29 August de-
voted to such diatribes. The levels of Communist
terrorism and harassment have not risen appreciably
since the beginning of the formal campaign on 26
August. However, Viet Cong radio commentaries have
attempted to gain maximum impact from a number of
seemingly routine military actions by describing them
as a part of the Viet Cong effort to frustrate the
election. As election day approaches, the govern-
ment will carefully deploy regular army troops in ad-
ditionto the: Regional and Popular Forces to counter
widely reported Viet Cong plans to attack candidates,
voters, and polling places..
3. Buddhist Institute militants and Catholic
Father Hoang Quynh's "Front of All Religions" have
agreed in principle
to press jointly for two major government concessions
in return for a "reasonable endorsement" of the elec-
tion. One demand is for the release of all political
prisoners, including Buddhist participants in the
recent "struggle" movement and Catholics associated
with the former Diem regime. Spokemen for the ma-
jority of Catholics in the Saigon area also have been
pressing the government for a statement of intention
regarding Catholic political prisoners prior to the
election. The other demand is for public statements
by Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu expressing
intent to withdraw from political positions within
the next several months. Ky has already made such
statements of intent, and Thieu reportedly did so on
2 September, but it is unclear if the Buddhists will
regard this as satisfactory.
4. Buddhist moderates, in conversations with
US Embassy officers have appeared
uneasy over the parallel between a antielection
stance Of the Buddhist Institute and that of the Viet
Cong. northern
refugee u is s in a Saigon area an southern Bud-
dhists in the delta may largely ignore the institute's
call for a boycott. These attitudes, and other con-
siderations, may have influenced the reported decision
of the militant Buddhists to attempt to gain satis-
factory government gestures in return. for an election
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1
endot ewer t::. T:he m co jaded that h?: i.r
baoy?coti7 , tsides Iinnk! witi the=
t: Coin , would g'z su i i i is i .I political
gain regardless of the size of the voter turnout,
Additionally, it might deny the Buddhists effective
representation should the constituent assembly
eventually be transformed into a parliament.
Tri Quang
5. The press has reported that the Buddhist
Institute's acting chairman, Thich Thien Hoa,dis-
patched telegrams on 1 September to President John-
son, UN Secretary General Thant, and international
Buddhist groups asking prayers for Tri Quang, whose
life was said to be in danger after 85 days of fast-
ing.
6. Tri Quang has by no means publicly committed
himself to suicide should the government fail to meet
Buddhist demands. It is possible, however, that he
may prefer martyrdom to the public derision which
might ensue if he were forced to end his fast ignomin-
iously. Quang's death would create some immediate stir
among the Buddhist faithful and might encourage many
otherwise prepared to vote on 11 September to abstain.
It is doubtful that, barring a major election fiasco,
Quang's demise would have a long-term impact on the
political scene.
Possible Postelection Changes in Military and 'Police
Organizations
7. The Armed Forces Council, composed of all
general officers and division commanders, has been
meeting in the delta city of Can Tho both to review
the status of the election campaign and to discuss
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 Approved 7-4
the reorganization of the police and military
structures
with regard to
e reorganization, National Police Director Colo-
nel Loan declared on 26 August that there would be
a decentralization of the military establishment at
both the corps and division levels. Loan. also
stated that the Regional and Popular Forces--now
paramilitary forces--would be dissolved, with the
Regional Force being absorbed by the army and the
Popular Force by the police. However, final council
decisions on the reorganization, as well as on plans
for the turnover of the government to civilian
authorities next year, reportedly were to await
future meetings.
9 25X1
I Ithe government
is planning to remove Generals Loc and Quang as com-
manders of II and IV Corps, respectively after the
election. the 25X1
ousting of ese two generals has frequently been
rumored in the past. Discussion by the Armed Forces
Council of "decentralization" at the corps level,
moreover, would lend substance to the likelihood of
early replacement of Loc and Quang who have frequently
been accused of exploiting the currently broad authority
accruing at the corps level. Ouster of two corps com-
manders has also previously been reported to be a goal
of the so-called "baby Turk" element of middle-
grade unit commanders of whom Colonel Loan is a
prominent spokesman, f7 I 25X1
the projected military reorganization may
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indicate the growing influence of Loan, Ky's former
air force deputy and a self-styled ardent reformer.
The "March North" Theme
10. Renewed emphasis on the theme of invading
North Vietnam cropped up late last week in South
Vietnamese government circles. General Thieu told
the press on 2 September that such a course might be
necessary to force Hanoi to cease its infiltration
of men and materiel into the South. His remarks
closely followed a communique issued by the advisory
Peoples Military Council (PAC) which recommended the
same action in the light of North Vietnamese viola-
tions of the Demilitarized Zone. The US Embassy re-
ports that the PAC, normally restricted to advising
the government on social, economic, and political
matters, was specifically requested by Premier Ky to
consider this matter. The embassy concludes that Ky
used this device to obtain a show of support for his
own similar statements quoted in a US publication
earlier this summer, which drew unfavorable foreign
reaction.
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 App - 010017-4
Minister of Revolutionary Develop-
ment General Nguyen Duc Thang has pared
down the revolutionary development goals
for 1966 by 9 percent in order to maintain
a more realistic balance for the remainder
of the year. The status of countrywide
transportation and commodity distribution
problems provides little cause for opti-
mism in the near future, especially in the
delta area below Saigon. The over-all se-
curity climate for pacification efforts
during July was characterized both by a
significant increase in Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Army strength and by a decrease
in enemy-initiated incidents. Communist
defectors numbered 261 during the week of
20-26 August.
Materials, Commodities, and Transportation
1. Since the inception of the re-emphasized
pacification effort after the February Honolulu Con-
ference, one of the major problems.has been the ir-
regular flow of commodities and the shortage of con-
struction materials within the provinces. During
July, the situation was reported as follows for the
various regions (civilian term for corps areas):
2. Region I. Problems with the distribution of
commodities in all but one province revolved around
either the lack of trucks or the lack of parts for
them when they broke down. Another factor in the prob-
lem has been the preference of the truckers to work for
US military and civilian contractors rather than to
carry USAID-supported materials.
3. Region. II. The shortage of construction
supplies general y plagued private commercial con-
struction, resulting in damaging price increases.
Cement, reinforcing bars, roofing materials, and
lumber were in the shortest supply. With the excep-
tion of the area around Qui Nhon City in Binh Dinh
Province, road travel and truck transportation out-
side the various provincial capitals remained ex-
tremely hazardous.
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4. Region III. Although officials were unable
to discern a pa ern affecting the flow of commodi-
ties in Region III, they noted isolated cases of in-
adequate truck facilities and gasoline shortages.
In addition, the destruction. of a bridge in Long An
Province cut off an estimated 180,000 persons from
their markets in Saigon.
5. Region IV. The lines of communication in
Region IV were :Further eroded during July because of
the priority given to road harassment by the Viet
Cong. This method of disrupting assistance to the
peasantry has been one of the most successful tactics
to date in the enemy's economic warfare strategy.
National Highway 4, the major route to the delta
from Saigon, has physically deteriorated due to the
lack of crushed rock for maintenance. USAID efforts
to increase both the delivery and the quantity of
crushed rock and sand have so far met with little
success.
Security Situation During July
6. I Corps: Although Viet Cong-initiated inci-
dents decrease in number, the influence of a con-
tinued buildup of enemy forces, especially in the
northernmost provinces, pervaded the atmosphere in
I Corps. With the exception of the national priority
area in Quang Nam Province, US and ARVN troops were
occupied almost entirely with the recently infiltrated
North Vietnamese Army 324B Division., the strength of
which was estimated at approximately 9,400 men. Ac-
cording to MACV, that division's plan to establish
control over the central portion of Quang Tri Prov-
ince has been effectively thwarted for the time being.
However, there are now indications that elements of
the division, which retreated back into the demili-
tarized zone, are returning to QuangTri. This
development, along with recent analyses that the
northern I Corps provinces might 'become a major
battlefield area in the near future, means that the
environmen.t:forthe work of the revolutionary develop-
ment cadres could change adversely. However, the
long-term US pacification search-and-destroy opera-
tion MACON in. Quang Nam Province is opening up land
communications for the first time between Da Nang and
the An Hoa industrial complex inland.
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7. II Corps: Enemy strength also increased
during Ju y in I Corps, despite multibattalion
allied search-and-clear operations aimed at large
enemy concentrations. Allied units enhanced the
pacification-Security environment within their op-
erational areas in Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Khanh Hoa,
and Ninh Thuan. provinces. There was no reported
change in either enemy-initiated incidents or enemy
strength in. the national priority area in Binh Dinh
Province. However, in Tuyen Duc Province, which has
been relatively peaceful in the past, there were
two kidnap 'ings and an influx of anti-American,
English-language Viet Cong propaganda leaflets.
S. III Corps: There was no significant change
reported in enemy strength in III Corps during July.
The security environment in the region's national
priority area (NRA) reportedly registered some im-
provement as a result of allied operations during
July. Viet Cong incidents there generally declined,
with the exception of parts of Gia Dinh Province
where enemy-initiated attacks were mounted apparently
to take advantage of the propensity of ARVN units to
follow an established pattern of activity every day.
Outside the NPA, no significant contribution to revo-
lutionary development was reported from the South
Vietnamese Armed Forces in III Corps. The pacifica-
tion atmosphere in Binh Long Province was adversely
affected by eight instances of misdirected air and
artillery strikes which fell on friendly hamlets or
vehicles. Prompt gratuity payments were made to the
victims' families. In coastal Binh Tuy Province, a
spate of Viet Cong incidents led MACV officials to
conclude that an active campaign was under way to
thwart, government efforts to consolidate the hamlet
structure already in secure areas.
9. IV Corps: The over-all security situation
in IV Corps, including the national priority area of
An Giang Province, did not change significantly in
July from the previous months. Enemy strength was
carried at approximately the same as the June total.
Significant ARVN victories over the Viet Cong in Vin.h
Long and Kien. Hoa provinces during July resulted in a
noteworthy decrease in enemy-initiated incidents there.
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Viet Cong Defectors (Chieu Hoi)
10. Communists defected during the week of 20-
26 August in the following numbers:
I Corps 21
II Corps 106
III Corps 77
IV Corps 57
Total 261 (174 military)
The 1966 total through 26 August now stands at
12,106 returnees. There were three North Vietnamese
Army soldiers and 13 cadre-level Viet Cong among last
week's group of defectors. In their continuing ef-
fort to improve the Chieu Hoi program, US and GVN
officials recently indicated some of the problems to
which they will devote priority attention. Included
among them are the provision of adequate medical help,
the expansion of vocational training, and the pro-
vision of more employment opportunities for the
returnees.
I 25X1
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 Appro
The economy continues to show signs
of stability. Prices of both domestic
and imported commodities were slightly
lower or stable in the week ending 22
August. The USAID retail price index
was 1 percent below the previous week.
Free market rates for dollars and gold
rose slightly but are still well below the
rates that prevailed during the past two
months. Minister of National Economy
Than.h has confirmed in writing his earlier
verbal agreement to create a joint US-GVN
economic discussion group and rice study
group and has proposed topics of discussion
for the initial meetings of both groups.
In. spite of bankers' argumen.ts for an.
increase in bank financing of business,
Governor Hanh of the National Bank of Viet-
nam insists on a restriction of credit dur-
ing the remainder of 1966. The possibility
of another major labor dispute has arisen
because of plans by RMK-.BRAS, the American
construction consortium, to reduce its
work force by as much as 25 percent. South
Vietnam's special court for economic crimes
has sentenced a Vietnamese businessman to
death for speculation. in imported refriger-
ators.
1. Retail prices continued to decline in the
week ending 22 August. The over.-ailUSAID retail
price index was 1 percent below the previous week.
Prices of most food and nonfood items were slightly
lower or stable. The food index declined 2 percent,
primarily because of lower prices for fish, pork
bellies.,and two varieties of rice. Between 22 and
26 August, however, the price of pork rose moderately
in spite of increased arrivals of hogs at the Saigon
slaughterhouse. As a result of higher pork prices,
fish and other meat also rose. Prices of nonfood
items in the week ending 22 August were steady with
the exception of charcoal and calico, both of which
declined.
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1
2. Prices of imported commodities generally
followed a similar pattern., with most items either
steady or slightly lower. The only exceptions were
condensed milk and sugar, the prices of which rose
apparently because of difficulties in distribution
rather than actual shortages. Most iron. and steel
products were lower as were chemicals and newsprint.
Currency and Gold
3. Free market rates for dollars and gold rose
slightly above the new 1966 lows reached on. 19 August,
but are still well below the rate that prevailed dur-
ing the past two months. The price of dollars rose
by two piasters on 22 August to 160 piasters per
dollar, whereas the price of gold was 225 piasters,
or 12 piasters above the rate on 19 August. MPC
(scrip) rose six piasters to the official rate of
118. Between 22 and 26 August, the price of dollars
and gold moved up again to 172 and 242 piasters,
respectively. These increases apparently resulted
partly from market reaction to the extremely low
levels reached in the previous week and partly from
an anticipation of disturbances in. connection with
the forthcoming elections on. 11 September. (Graphics
on monthly and weekly free market gold and currency
prices are included in the an.n.ex).
4. More details have become available on the
tight credit situation reported last week. On 21
August, Governor Hanh of the National Bank of Viet-
n.am (NBVN) held a meeting with members of the bank-
ing community and informed them that the increase in
bank financing of business during the second half of
1966 would be limited to 4 billion piasters. Hanh
noted that he was disturbed by the increase of 2
billion piasters in bank financing which has already
taken place since the devaluation in June. Estimates
prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had
allowed for an increase of only 3 billion piasters
for the second half of 1966.
5. The bankers requested that no such ceiling
be put on financing of imports and that redicount
ceilings with the NBVN be raised to cover an estimated
25X1
Appr 0017-4
 Appro
maximum need for 10 billion piasters in new import
credit. The US Embassy estimates that the need for
new import credit could range anywhere between. 8 and
15 billion. piasters depending on assumptions about
import arrivals and on the terms of the loans. Gover-
nor Hanh was not impressed with the bankers' contention.
that, since new import loans are offset by simultaneous
counterpart deposits which leave the money supply un-
affected, import financing is not inflationary. In
reply to the bankers' argument that importers may not
apply for new import licenses if credit is unavail-
able, Hanh responded that importers can liquidate in-
ventories, cash in. their gold holdings, or recall their
capital sent abroad. While it is difficult to evaluate
Hanh's argument--mainly because of a lack of informa-
tion on the current level of inventories--the US Em-
bassy comments that Hanh may have other reasons, such
as a commitment to the IMP, for restricting credit.
6. As a result of Hanh's position, the bankers
subsequently agreed among themselves to curtail credit
expansion. by a series of measures such as increasing
the advance deposit required on import letters of
credit and refusing loans for anything other than im-
ports. A good test of actual credit needs will be
the rate of import licensing during the next few weeks.
Proposed US-GVN Meetings on the Economy
7. On. 22 August, Minister of Economy Thanh sent
Deputy Ambassador Porter two letters confirming an
earlier verbal agreement to create a joint US-GVN
economic discussion. group and a rice study group.
Thanh suggested in these letters that the first meet-
ing of the economic group be held on 2 September to
discuss: problems at the Saigon port and other ports;
the defense, maintenance, and repair of strategic
routes of communications; procedural difficulties in
the use of US commercial aid funds; and assistance
for the production of corn and pork, and for a live-
stock feed factory. With regard to rice, Thanh has
suggested that the newly formed rice study group dis-
cuss methods to increase production., estimates of rice
imports during 1967, and the harvest, storage,an.d
sale of rice.
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nrnynnuira LR7QTOO
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8. Since the settlement a month ago of the
major strike threat against RMK-BRJ (the American
construction consortium in South Vietnam), there have
been no large-scale walkouts. A series of small
strikes has continued, however, primarily because
workers feel that wages are inadequate in view of
the high cost of living. The possibility of another
major labor dispute has now arisen because of plans
by RMK-BRJ to cut back its. total work force--which
consists of Americans, Vietnamese, and third-country
nationals--by as much as 25 percent during the next
two months. RMK-BRJ reportedly plans to have an
over-all--:reduction of 12.5 percent in motion by
1 September and another 12.5 percent by 1 October.
This would result in a total reduction of roughly
13,000 employees, of whom 10,000 probably would be
Vietnamese. Although no final decisions on this
work force reduction have yet been made, rumors al-
ready have begun to spread among Vietnamese workers.
9. According to RMK-BRJ and the US Navy office
supervising the consortium, the layoffs are necessary
because orders for construction have not measured up
to the immense construction capability established by
RMK-BRJ in. South Vietnam. Since no additional orders
are expected before the beginning of 1967, the con-
sortium feels that the only alternative is to slash
the monthly cash o'tput;of $14 million for payroll and
related costs.
10. The initial reaction of the US Embassy is
that many of the Vietnamese workers can be re-employed
over a relatively short period of time by other US
employers, depending in part on the geographical
spread of the discharges. Nevertheless, the layoffs
will have repercussions in this pre-election period.
The US Embassy is attempting to persuade RMK-BRJ to
cushion the shock by improving liaison with other US
employers so that the discharged Vietnamese workers
can. be given first priority elsewhere. It is also
urgi,ng.the consortium to inform employee representa-
tives of the reasons for the discharges and to assure
them that RMK-BRJ will do its best to help the em-
ployees find other employment. A suggestion by the
US labor attache that the number of discharges be
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lessened by reducing the present ten-hour day to
eight hours was rejected by RMK-BRJ on the grounds
that it is economically unfeasible and that at one
site, where an eight-hour schedule was introduced, the
Vietnamese workers promptly went on strike.
Views of the Saigon French Community
11. A US Embassy survey of the Saigon French
community disclosed a widely held belief that recent
GVN economic measures have been effective in halting
the serious decline in the economic situation. French
officials and businessmen noted that some prices of
commodities are falling and black market rates have
fallen spectacularly. Many felt that GVN success in
this area was due to the efforts of Minister of Econ-
omy Thanh. Although there were some complaints about
specific situations, such as delays in getting non-
military goods unloaded at the Saigon port, there ap-
peared to be no indication of any organized French ef-
fort to criticize the recent economic measures or to
predict a further serious deterioration in the economic
situation.
Death Sentence for Speculation
12. On 29 August, South Vietnam's special court
for economic crimes sentenced a Vietnamese business-
man to death for speculation in imported refrigerators.
The accused was tried in absentia and a warrant has
been issued for his arrest. The trial and subsequent
execution of a local Chinese merchant by this same
court last March resulted in a marked slowdown of
business activity in the important Chinese segment of
the Saigon business community.
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SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Monthly Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
JANUARY 1964 - JULY 1966
2964 0J FMAMJJAS0NDJFMAMJJASOND
f-5 1966
Weekly Free Market Gold and Currency P
3 JANUARY 1966 - 22 AUGUST 1966,
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?Z?LD (Saigon) - "Piaster price per US dollar of gold calculated on
the basis of gold leaf as worth $35 per troy ounce.
US $10 GGREE'N (Saigon)
,PIASTER-DOLLAR 'CROSS RATE - Piaster-dollar exchange rate in Hong
to the Hong Kong dollar.
Q'S $i`OMPC (Saigon:) - Military Payment Certificates (scrip).
(Hong Kong) Kong calculated by reference to the
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