THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 5, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
5 September 1966
State Department review PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
completed FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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5 September 1966
HIGHLIGHTS
Despite press stories that Buddhist monk Tri
Quang is near death, he was well enough on 2 Sep-
tember to hold a three-and-a-half hour conversa-
tion with a US official. Tri Quang was able to
walk at that meeting, and the official felt that
he did not appear likely to die in the near fu-
ture from his fasting.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
A 20-minute VC mortar attack on the 1st Air Cav-
alry Division's Camp Radcliff killed four and
wounded 61 while hitting 77 helicopters (Para. 1).
Activity in I Corps was highlighted by an engage-
ment during Operation MACON (Paras. 2-3). II
Corps was fairly quiet over the weekend (Paras.
4-5). US forces in Operation TOLEDO have uncov-
ered numerous base camps in III Corps area (Paras.
6-7). A major battle was fought in IV Corps
over the weekend resulting in some 276 Viet Cong
killed in action (Paras. 8-9). VC are reported
planning to infiltrate Tan Son Nhut Airfield
(Para.-10). A major arms cache in Da Nang has
been uncovered (Para. 11). The recently de-
fected Viet Cong has reported
on friction in the ranks o the Vietnamese Commu-
nists (Paras. 12-13).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
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ments highlight the problems of leadership which
remain unresolved (Paras. 4-5). Thich Tri Quang's
health and resolve to live are still in question,
although he was reported quite strong on 2 Sep-
tember (Paras. 6-9). The constitutional assembly
elections, less than a week away, will have a base
of 5,288,512 registered voters upon which to draw
(Paras. 10-13).
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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Six US aircraft were lost over the weekend as US
fighter/bombers flew more than 1,200 sorties
against targets in North Vietnam (Paras. 1-2).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
Communist China's protest that US aircraft-sank
a Chinese Communist freighter on 29 August raised
no new threats of Chinese military counteraction
(Paras. 1-2).
. Communist Political Developm n s?
num er ot o serva-
ions on life in Hanoi
(Paras. 4- The North Vietnam-
s mission now touring the bloc signed a free
aid agreement with North Korea and has moved on to
Moscow (Paras. 6-9).
5 September 1966
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SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
5 SEPTEMBER
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25 50 75 1. n Kilometers
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I. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Viet Cong forces on 3 September launched
a 20-minute mortar attack against the 1st Air Cavalry
Division's Camp Radcliff near An Khe in the central
highlands. Four US soldiers were killed and 61
wounded by the barrage. In addition, 77 helicopters
were hit. Five were destroyed and 61 damaged. Forty-
three of the damaged choppers will reguire a week
or more of maintenance. The remaining 11 are con-
sidered flyable. A reaction force dispatched after
the attack was unable to find the attackers.
I Corps Activity
2. The only significant activity in I Corps
over the weekend occurred on 3 September during the
conduct of Operation MACON. An aerial observer
spotted some 50 Viet Cong in an area about 18 miles
southwest of Da Nang. Artillery and air strikes
were called in to support a US Marine battalion
which was pursuing the VC. Results of this engage-
ment were one marine killed and 18 wounded, as
against Viet Cong casualties of 32 killed. The
cumulative results of Operation MACON to date are
315 Viet Cong killed and 3 captured while US casual-
ties stand at 19 killed and 73 wounded.
3. Three other major operations--PRAIRIE,
PAWNEE (US) and POLE STAR (ROK)--continued without
significant contact. In addition, a new operation,
nicknamed EL PASO/LIEN KET 56, began on 4 September
in an area centering about 39 miles south southeast
of Da Nang. This search-and-destroy operation has
a total of five battalions committed--two US and
three South Vietnamese.
II Corps Activity
4. II Corps remained fairly quiet over the
weekend with only one significant engagement re-
ported on 2 September. Contact on that date in Op-
eration JOHN PAUL JONES resulted in 20 Viet Cong
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killed, one captured and 83 suspects detained. Two
US soldiers were reported killed. Cumulative re-
sults of this operation which began on 21 July and
terminated on 4 September now stand at 20 US killed
and 118 wounded. Enemy casualties total 262 killed,
41 captured and 391 suspects detained. In addition,
some 90 crew-served and individual weapons have been
captured.
5. Two other major operations under way in II
Corps--PAUL REVERE III and SU BOK (ROK)--continued
without significant contact. A new Operation, nick-
named SEWARD, began on 4 September in the same gen-
eral area as JOHN PAUL JONES. Operation SEWARD has
the mission of protecting the rice harvest in an
area about 20 miles in depth along the coast from
about 30 miles north to about 25 miles south of Tuy
Hoa. Four US battalions will participate under the
control of the 101st Airborne Division's 1st Brigade.
Two North Vietnamese regiments--the 18B and the 95th
--and a Viet Cong battalion are reported to be in
the area with an estimated troop strength of about
4,400 men. The only other significant activity con-
cerned elements of the 101st Airborne Division who
were providing security for a South Korean base under
construction. These forces engaged an unknown size
enemy force some 19 miles north of Nha Trang, kill-
ing some 27 Viet Cong and capturing 27 others. US
casualties were four killed and 15 wounded.
III Corps Activity
6. In Operation TOLEDO, elements of the US
173rd Airborne Brigade uncovered five base camps
with numerous trenches, foxholes and bunkers in a
post-B-52 strike about 35 miles east southeast of
Saigon. Thus far, no enemy resistance has material-
ized. A quantity of weapons, food, radios and am-
munition has been captured. Cumulative casualties
for TOLEDO to date stand at six US soldiers killed
and 35 wounded while enemy losses total 11 killed,
ten captured and 24 suspects detained.
7. Two new operations have begun in III Corps
areas. One search-and-destroy operation, nicknamed
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BATON ROUGE, began on 3 September about 23 miles
Southeast of Saigon. The two battalions are search-
ing for an enemy amphibious engineer battalion num-
bering some 400 men which is reported to be in the
area. The other new search-and-destroy operation--
KIPAPA--began on 30 August and was expanded on 4
September to three battalions. This operation is
emphasizing the location and destruction of tunnels
and fortifications in an area centered some 24 miles
northwest of Saigon.
IV Corps Activity
8. One major battle was reported on 3 Septem-
ber when ARVN troops in Operation DAN CHI 261 engaged
an estimated Viet Cong battalion about 140 miles
southwest of Saigon. Results of this engagement
were 18 ARVN killed and 91 wounded. The Viet Cong
lost 276 killed (body count), 11 captured and 86
individual and crew-served weapons captured. Cumu-
lative results to date for Operation DAN CHI 261
now stand at 18 ARVN killed and 91 wounded while
Viet Cong casualties total 360 killed and 26 cap-
tured. Some 12 tons of arms and ammunition have
also been captured, including 178 individual and
crew-served weapons.
9. In Dinh Tuong Province on 4 September, ele-
ments of the ARVN 7th Division conducting Operation
CUU LONG 23/12 made contact with an estimated pla-
toon to company sized VC force. Results of the en-
gagement were one ARVN soldier wounded while 29 VC
were killed and three VC suspects taken.
Reported Threat to Tan Son Nhut Airfield
10. Two armed Viet Cong were apprehended by
ARVN intelligence near Tan Son Nhut Air Base on 2
September. The captives stated they were from the
Viet Cong D-30 unit and that two platoons of some
60 Viet Cong, armed with mortars and grenade
launchers, were planning to infiltrate the Tan Son,
Nhut area in three-man teams.
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Major Arms Cache in Da Nang Uncovered
Da Nang security of-
ficials on 3 September confiscated a large amount
of arms, ammunition and other materials from a
terrorist cache in Da Nang city.
disclosed the locations of sev-
era sma arms caches.
Friction Reported Among Vietnamese Communists
Icontirmed that there is friction within
the ranks of the Vietnamese Communists. For the most
part, this friction stems from the fact that the
North Vietnamese cadre were aggressive and disci-
plined whereas the South Vietnamese Communists were
lazy.
13. I Inative South Vietnamese Com-
munist cadre who had gone to North Vietnam in 1954
and had infiltrated back into the south are now regi-
mental, divisional, and COSVN cadre. However, since
their combat experience in the war against France
had been limited to squad or platoon level leader-
ship, they were unqualified for their assignments.
if all North Viet-
namese cadre were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the
Communists would have to return to guerrilla warfare.
However, even if North Vietnam withdrew its cadre,
the South Vietnamese Com-
munists would continue to fight, "because they have
no choice."
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Elections for the constituent national as-
sembly are less than a week off and continue to
dominate most aspects of political life in the ur-
ban areas. Rural dwellers are also feeling elec-
tibn pressure, but primarily from the Viet Cong,
who are increasingly stepping up their previously
announced physical as well as political opposition
to the election process.
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Recent Buddhist Institute Machinations
4. Buddhist Institute leaders are still hav-
ing difficulty coordinating an agreed position with
respect to the elections. With Thich Tri Quang
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fasting in a private clinic, Thich Tam Chau on "sick
leave," and Thich Thien Minh mending from his grenade
incident, the former deputy chairmen, Thich Thien Hoa
and Thich Phap Tri, have not effectively filled the
leadership void. Phap Tri, the Institute representa-
tive to the antielection "Front of All Religions,"
was quoted during an interview with a Vietnamese cor-
respondent as hoping that a reconciliation with the
government would allow the Institute to participate
in the elections.
5. In another interview on 4 September, Thien
Hoa is reported to have lashed out at the United States
and the "dictatorial junta." Without clarifying the In-
stitute position on the elections, Hoa claimed that
two thirds of the candidates were backed by the mili-
tary. He compared recent government actions--such as
the arrest and detention of thousands of lay and cler-
ical Buddhists and statements by GVN leaders on invad-
ing North Vietnam--to those of Hitler. Hoa claimed that
the "ambitious tactics" of the Americans were turning
more South Vietnamese people into Viet Cong. Hoa also
labeled the Ky-Thieu government as a "puppet" of the
Americans.
Thich Tri Quang
6. Assessments of Tri Quang's health and the
degree of his intractability over the last few days
vary as they have throughout the period of his fast,
which began on 8 June. According to a press account of
5 September, he might cease his hunger strike soon at
the request of the monks who initially approved it.
This possibility, however, has been discounted in the
latest official reports from Saigon.
7. A US official who held a three-and-a-half
hour conversation with Tri Quang on 2 September found
him still sustaining himself on fortified liquids and
strong enough to walk. During the course of the talk,
Tri Quang reiterated the pitch he made during the early
days of the "struggle movement" in Hue for US support.
He specifically asked for the replacement of Ky and
Thieu with a provisional government, in exchange for the
all-out support of the Buddhists and the Front of All
Religions for the elections.
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8. Tri Quang said that he had no desire to
die but that he was willing to do so if US policy
did not change. The US official felt that Tri
Quang did not appear likely to die in the near
future from the effects of his fast. However, the
official believed that the possibility of the
monk's self-imposed death did exist if he
should reach the point where he felt his death as
a "martyr" would contribute more to the Vietnamese
struggle movement.
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Election Developments
10. The final tally of persons registered to
vote next Sunday is 5,288,512, which represents a
12.7 percent increase over those registered for the
May, 1965 provincial elections, according to the
government's Special Commissariat for Administra-
tion.
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12. Government tactics to lessen interference
with the electoral process were reinforced on 29
August by the issuance of an amended decree law.
Persons found guilty of interfering with the right
to vote will be sentenced to a prison term or to
hard labor. General Linh Quang Vien, the minister
of security, in a televised interview on 3 Septem-
ber, outlined the GVN precautions that will be
taken to safeguard the voters. According to a
press report, he also empowered province, village,
and hamlet chiefs to replace voter registration
cards that had been stolen by the Viet Cong.
13. According to a US Embassy report, there
have already been hundreds of incidents of Viet Cong
terrorism directed against the elections. The em-
bassy cited several instances of polling places
that have been bombed. In Binh Duong province, for
example, a group of Viet Cong exploded a mine in a
voting office after they had requested information
on voting procedures. Eight Vietnamese were wounded.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. US aircraft flew over 1,200 sorties against
targets in North Vietnam over the weekend. Pri-
mary emphasis was placed on POL targets and return-
ing pilots reported many secondary explosions and
large fires. In addition, at least two surface-to-
air missile sites were reported destroyed or
heavily damaged.
2. Six US aircraft were lost during this pe-
riod, one to a SAM, three by ground fire and two
to unknown causes. These included four Air Force
F-105s and an F-4C as well as a Navy F-8E. Two of
the seven crew members involved in these losses
were rescued, two were apparently killed when the
F-4C was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile
and the remainder are listed as missing in action.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. On 5 September Communist China charged
that US jets sank a Chinese coastal freighter and
damaged another in the Gulf of Tonkin on 29 Au-
gust. Peking radio claimed that nine crew mem-
bers were killed and seven others wounded in the
attack. The Chinese protest concluded with the
standard threat that the "blood debt must be
paid in blood," and that the Chinese people,
"armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, abso-
lutely will not permit US imperialism to carry
out any unscrupulous act." It also repeated the
usual warning that "if US imperialism dares to
impose war upon us," the Chinese will "completely
wipe them out."
2. Chinese Communist coastal freighters
move in substantial numbers between North Vietnam
and south China ports, carrying much needed sup-
plies to the Vietnamese. Many of them are armed,
and they frequently fire at US aircraft. Peking's
tardy response to the alleged incident reflects
the pro forma character of these Chinese com-
plaints.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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The Situation in Hanoi
some unspecified
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shortages exist in Hanoi, but that supplies are
moving from Haiphong to the capital. There is
some queuin for rationed items such as meat and
rice, andi pork and poultry are very
expensive. The evacuation of the city of Hanoi
is moving very slowly despite pressure from the
authorities. Many people leave the city during
the day but return at night. One problem is the
absence of accommodations in the countryside
the 17 July partial mobili-
zation order has had no visible effect on Hanoi.
5. The issue of the trial of American prison-
ers has died down.
are being we treated. ey navE ies and bet
r- -I
ter food than the ordinary citizens.
The regime is considering the provision
mail facilities
New Communist Aid for North Vietnam
6. Hanoi now has concluded new economic aid
pacts with both Peking and Pyongyang. The North
Vietnamese mission led by Le Thanh Nghi signed two
economic pacts with North Korea prior to its de-
parture on 4 September. One agreement covers the
delivery of North Korean grant aid, the other an
arrangement governing trade exchanges during 1967.
7. The aid talks in North Korea followed the
conclusion of similar discussions in Peking last
week, at which time China agreed to put assistance
to North Vietnam on a grant basis. The Nghi mis-
sion arrived in Moscow on 5 September, its first
stop on a tour of the Eastern European capitals,
according to a Moscow press announcement.
8. The switch to grant aid reflects Commu-
nist recognition of the inability of Hanoi to fi-
nance its growing need for economic and military
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aid materials. It is likely the aid agreements
also encompass deliveries formerly made under
trade pacts. The inflow of bloc goods has grown
during the past 18 months,but the decline in North
Vietnamese exports is likely to become more se-
vere as the North Vietnamese economy deteriorates.
9. The composition of aid also will change
this year. Agreements in 1965 reflected stepped
up assistance for North Vietnam's economic devel-
opment plan, but the program is being de-emphasized
as Hanoi increases resources devoted to reconstruc-
tion, rehabilitation, and maintenance of essential
economic output and services.
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