THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE IAPF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 29, 1966
• Content Type: IM

NO FOti.ff6 ll1g?EM ase 2006/03/17: C4- IdP99T00826A001200010003-9
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AFTER THE
DEPARTURE OF THE IAPF
MORI pages 1-9 and 13-18
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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29 August 1966
No. 1597/66
Copy No.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 August 1966
The Dominican Republic After the Departure
of the IAPF
Summary
The withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace
Force (IAPF) in late September will remove the pri-
mary element that has ensured Dominican stability
during the past 16 months. Although there is pres-
ently no evidence that the IAPF's departure in it-
self will serve as the immediate trigger for a coup
or insurgency, the chances for a confrontation
between Balaguer and dissatisfied elements are likely
to increase appreciably over the ensuing months.
Balaguer has not developed a political base
strong enough to withstand severe reactions to his
reforms, particularly those affecting right-wing
military elements. He will have to balance care-
fully the opposing political forces if he is to
implement his program without the backing of
something like the IAPF. If the President suc-
ceeds in implementing those reforms through which
he seeks to curb the power of right-wing military
elements prior to the IAPF's departure--and then
can make them stick--his chances for retaining
power will be improved. It is by no means certain,
however, that he can successfully negotiate this
Dominican tightrope.
NOTE: This memorandum has been produced solely by
CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the Office
of National Estimates.
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1. The scheduled withdrawal of the Inter-
American Peace Force in late September will remove
the primary element that has ensured Dominican
stability during the past 16 months. Without the
IAPF, the civil war would have been protracted, a
provisional government might not have been in-
stalled, Garcia Godoy would have been ousted by
the military on one of at least three occasions,
and recent elections could not have been held so
successfully. The structure of Dominican politi-
cal life has undergone little appreciable change
since the end of Trujillo's era, and the latent
forces that have promoted continual instability
since that time can be expected to resume their
"normal" role when the IAPF leaves. Thus, the
chances that Balaguer's regime will survive for
four years are not encouraging.
2. Despite this gloomy prospect, there is
presently no firm indication that the IAPF's de-
parture in itself will serve as the immediate
trigger for a coup or insurgency. The US Embassy
feels that conspiratorial plans are not yet be-
yond the talking stage. Over the ensuing months,
however, the departure of the IAPF is likely to
increase appreciably the chances for a confronta-
tion between Balaguer and dissatisfied elements.
There probably will be some upsurge in violence,
as vendettas that were an outgrowth of the revolt
are settled. Elements of both the extreme left
and right may believe they can engage in terrorism
and reprisal with less chance of being checked.
There will remain the ever-present possibility that
a dedicated band or individual will assassinate
the President, which would upset any prospects for
stability and reform. In. addition, there is a
distinct danger that elements in the military and
other security services, who remain incapable of
distinguishing the moderate non-Communist from the
extremist, will overreact to leftist actions or
engage in indiscriminate repression. This could
in turn lead to a coalescence of the entire left.
3. Although Balaguer has gained a good measure
of control over the government bureaucracy, has
dominated the congress, sacked leftist judges, and
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installed his own police chief, he has still failed
to establish the firm, organized political base
needed to ensure the stability of his regime. He
has not only failed to build up his Reformist Party,
but has even antagonized some followers by restrict-
ing patronage and by pursuing policies some regard
as too liberal. Balaguer has not attempted to
mobilize his rural political following to make its
weight felt in Santo Domingo. Moreover, mutual
suspicion exists between Balaguer and the non-Com-
munist left, and the President is dependent on. the
tolerance of the military.
4. Balaguer seems conscious of this lack of
a firm political footing and has commented that he
must rely on his election mandate to provide a
psychological impetus that will overcome discontent.
So far, the magnitude of Balaguer's election victory
and the resulting aura of legitimacy that surrounds
him has provided the President with his strongest
political asset. At present there is widespread
popular reluctance to agitate or conspire against
a government that many regard as the n.ation's last
chance to establish a sane and sensible political
system. Nevertheless, democratic political institu-
tions and traditions are almost nonexistent, and
continuation of Balaguer's broad public support is
largely dependent on fulfillment of his sweeping
campaign promises, particularly in the economic
sphere. The public's fickleness was demonstrated
by the apathy that greeted Bosch's ouster in 1963,
barely nine months after he was elected by an even
larger margin than that achieved by Balaguer.
5. The major factor determining the stability
of the regime will be Balaguer's relations with the
military. With the departure of the IAPF, the mili-
tary will resume its traditional role as the arbiter
of Dominican politics. Although no serious intrigue
within the military has been reported so far, some
officers probably are discontented. Balaguer's re-
tention of an ambitious military aide, Colonel Nivar,
has unsettled the military chiefs, who have indi-
cated to the President that they fear Nivar is
undercutting their authority. In turn, there is
some suspicion that the President is carefully
watching them to check on their loyalty. Balaguer's
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failure to remove some of Garcia Godoy's top-level
military appointees may have irritated conservative
officers. Balaguer's austerity program has stirred
some grumblings, and his failure to permit the
honorable return of General Wessin has probably
created disgruntlement among Wessin's former subordi-
nates.
6. The most serious potential impediment to
civil-military harmony, however, is Balaguer's
determination to press ambitious military reforms
designed primarily to consolidate his control over
the armed forces and to curb the power of right-wing
officers. The President wants to break up Wessin's
old unit and shift air force ground combat troops
to the army. Although Balaguer realizes that some
risk is involved--as shown by his insistence that
these reforms be implemented while the IAPF is
still there--he may be underestimating it. If the
President succeeds in implementing the reforms
through which he seeks to curb the power of right-
wing military elements prior to the IAPF's de-
parture four weeks from now--and can make them
stick--his chances for retaining power will be im-
proved. No Dominican ruler since Trujillo has been
able to impose his will on the military; those who
have taken even tentative steps to do so, as did
Reid in early 1965, soon faced the military's pro-
nounced displeasure.
7. The apparently widespread relief within the
military that Bosch was not elected will work to
curb discontent for a while. In addition, the mili-
tary will carefully eye foreign support for Bala-
guer. Nevertheless, the reaction to Balaguer's
reform plans remains a major question. Some offi-
cers are bound to become restive as they see plans
developed to cut back not only their numbers,
privileges, and prerogatives, but also their power.
This could lead to a split in the military that not
only could upset the government but impair the mili-
tary's capability to combat insurgency. The left
would rapidly move to exploit any such division, as
it did in April 1965.
8. Perennial right-wing plotters and power
seekers such as Antonio Imbert and Rafael Bonnelly
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