THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS' WILL TO PERSIST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010052-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 315
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: August 26, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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THE
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS'
WILL
State Dept. review completed TO PERSIST
ARMY review(s) completed.
DIA and PACOM review(s) completed.
D I R E C T O R A T E O F I N T E L L I G E N C E
R011P I
25X1
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1w
7 September 1966
Me.ra,
so to a request by ecretax7 MCIl
behalf of the Director, I as sending
you a CIA study of elements underlying the
Viet se Communists' determination to con-
tinue the war in South Viet. The principal
findings of this study, which was prepared in
'
Page 19.
The Honorable W. Avere l l Harriman
,!lmb s odor at Large
Department of State
/s/
H. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence
25X1
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An Analysis of the Vietnamese Communists'
Strengths, Capabilities, and Will to Persist in Their
Present Strategy in Vietnam.
26 AUGUST 1966
This memorandum has been produced by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central
Intelligence Agency. It was jointly prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the
Office of Research and Reports, the Office of National Estimates, and the Special Assis-
tant for Vietnamese Affairs in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
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L Introduction . . . . . . . , , , . . . , . . . . 1
II, The Vietnamese Communists' Investment in the
Struggle . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. Vietnamese Communist Capabilities for Persisting
in Their Present Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
IV. The Vietnamese Communists' Probable Estimate
of the Current State of the Struggle . . . . 6
V. Probable Communist Near-Term Military and Political
Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
VL Key Trends and Factors . . . . . . . . . . 17
VIL The Day of Decision . . . . . . . . . . . 17
VIIL Alternate Communist Strategic Options . . . . . . . 18
THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES
AND CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE
COMMUNISTS
A. Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1
B. Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program ? . . . . 1-6
C. The State of Civilian Morale . , . . , . . . . . 1-12
IL The Significance of Laos and Cambodia . , . . 1-16
Appendix A. Recuperability of the Transportation System
in North Vietnam . , . o
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I-1. Estimated Manpower Available for Military Se:i vice
in North Vietnam, 1 January 1966 . . . . . . . . . I-1
1-2. Civilian Labor Force of North Vietnam with Sex
Breakdown, 1 January 1966 following page , .
1-3. Selected Recuperation Times on Repair Work in
Military Region IV following page . . . . . . . . . 1-33
1-4. North Vietnam: Transport Performance, 1964-1965,
and First Half 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 35
Figure I-1. Military and Economic Damage Resulting
from Air Attacks Against North Vietnam,
M
Ju
arch 1965 - June 1966 and Projected
ly 1966 - June 1967 ( chart) following page .
1-6
Figure 1-2. S
up
La
Dr
plies Trucked from North Vietnam into the
otian Panhandle During the 1965 and 1966
y Seasons (chart) following page . . . . .
1-17
Figure 1-3. L
ao
De
s Panhandle Area: Communist Roadnet
velopment (map) following page . . . . .
1-19
Figure 1-4. L
ao
De
s Panhandle: Road Capacities and
velopment (map) following page . . . . .
1-19
Figure 1-5. S
ch
19
edule of Road Construction in Laos, August
65 - April 1966 (chart) following page . . .
1-21
Figure 1-6. N
or
Co
theast Cambodia: Road Improvements and
mmunist Activity, 1965-66 (map) following
pa
ge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1-22
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Figure 1-7. North Vietnam: Destruction of Bridges Versus
Repair, 1 November 1965 - 1 June 1966
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29
Figure 1-8. North Vietnam: Status of Highway Bridges,
1 November 1965 - 1 June 1966 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29
THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE INVOLVEMENT
IN THE WAR ON THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. The Significance of Economic and Military Aid . . . .
A. General Level of Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1-1
B. Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-2
C. Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
D. Bloc Aid as a Critical Factor in Continuing
the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
III. The Rationale for Chinese Support . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Vietnamese View of Soviet Support . . . . . . . . . .
II-1. Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam,
1955-64 following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
11-2. Estimated Soviet and Chinese Deliveries of Military
Equipment to North Vietnam, 1953 - June 1966
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
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THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITY FOR
POLITICAL SUBVERSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. Communist Concepts of Political Subversion III-1
II. The Apparatus for Subversion ., . . . . ? III-1
A. Party Organization and Role 111-2
B., Party Numerical Strength . . . . . . . . . , , 111-5
C. Numerical Strength of the Party Youth Group 111-8
D. Numerical and Other Limitations on Party
Effectiveness . . ,> . ~ . ? , . 111-9
The National Liberation Front , . . . , . . . III-10
F. Numerica' Strength of the Front . , . . , . . "-r 12
III, Numerical Strength of the Communist Political
Apparatus in Urban Areas . . . III-14
A. General Position . r . . . . . , , , ? . , . . . 111-14
B. Numerical Strength in Saigon and Environs o a . 111-15
IV. Strength of the Political Apparatus in Rural Areas;
A Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-17
V. The Communist Propaganda Apparatus and Its
Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , 111-18
A. Propaganda Apparatus . . . . , , . . . . 111-19
B. Effectiveness of the Propaganda 0 . . , . . , . . 111-20
VI. The Overall Effectiveness of the Political Subversive
Apparatus . . . . . . . 111-22
A. With the Rural Vietnamese . n . . . , . . , 111-22
B. In the Cities: Saigon in Particular I > , c . ~ . 111-24
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Figure 111- 1. Communist Command Structure in South
Vietnam and Organization of the Viet Cong
Logistics System (chart) following page . . 111-3
Figure 111-2. South Vietnam: Population and Area Control
(chart) following page . . . . . . . ... . 111-24
ANNEX IV
THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. The Build-Up of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-1
II. Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-2
Appendix A. The Ground War in South Vietnam . . . . . . IV-5
IV-1. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Growth of
Total US/Third Nation Forces, December 1964 -
June 1967 following page . . . . . . . . . . . IV-5
IV-2. South Vietnam: Comparative Actual and Projected
Regular Allied Troop Strength, December 1964 -
June 1967 following page . . . . . . . . . . . IV-5
IV-3. Total South Vietnamese Armed Strength, December
1964 - June 1967 following page . . . . . . . IV-5
IV-4. Major South Vietnamese Ground Force Deployments
by Corps Area, Mid-1966 . . . . . . . . . . . IV-6
IV-5. South Vietnam: Estimated NVA/VC Forces,
December 1964 - Mid-1967 . . . . . . . . . . . IV-7
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IV-6. South Vietnam: Estimated Strength, Composition
and Deployment of NVA/VC Main Force Elements
by Corps Area, Mid-1966. . . . . . . . . . . . IV-8
IV-7. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment
of US/Third Nation Forces, by Function,
July 1965 - June 1967 following page . . . . . . . IV-10
IV-8. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment
of US/Third Nation Maneuver Battalions, by
Service and Corps Area, February 1965 -
June 1967 following page . . , . . . . . IV-10
IV-9. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment
of ARVN Maneuver Battalions, by Corps Area,
February 1965 - June 1967 following page IV-11
IV-10. South Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuver Battalion
Strength to Estimated NVA/VC Main Force Troop
Strength, July 1965 - June 1967 following page . . IV-12
IV-11. South Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuver Battalion
Strength to Estimated NVA/VC Main Force Troop
Strength, by Corps Area, Mid-1966 . . . . . . . IV-13
IV-12. South Vietnam: Projected Critical Troop Ratios:
Allied Maneuver Battalion Strength to Estimated
NVA and VC Main Force Strengths . . . . .
IV-13. South Vietnam: Absolute Indicators of Communist
Performance in Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-18
IV-14. Relative Indicators of Communist Motivations in
Battle, Expressed in Terms of the Scale of Combat,
1964-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-18
IV-15, South Vietnam: Estimate of Communist Losses,
1965 - June 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-22
IV-16. Selected Wounded to Killed Ratios . . . . . . . . IV-23
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Figure IV-1. South Vietnam: Major Allied Deployments
of Regular Troops, by Corps, Mid-1966
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . IV-5
Figure IV-2. South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Growth
in US/GVN/Third Nation Forces and Com-
munist Forces, December 1964 - June 1967
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . IV-8
Figure IV-3. South Vietnam: Approximate Composition of
Actual and Projected Growth in Regular
Allied Forces (US, TN, and RVNAF),
December 1964 - June 1967 (chart) follow-
ing page . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . IV-8
Figure IV-4. South Vietnam: Approximate and Projected
Growth in Communist Forces, December
1964 - June 1967 (chart) following page . . IV-8
Figure IV-5. Composition of US Maneuver Battalion and
Artillery Battalion Strength to Total US
Army and USMC Troop Strength, July
1965 - June 1967 (chart) following page . . IV-10
Figure IV-6. Approximate Composition of ARVN Maneuver
Battalion Strength to Total ARVN Troop
Strength, 1964 - June 1967 (chart) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-11
Figure IV-7. South Vietnam: Troop Disposition, by Corps
of Allied Maneuver Battalions and Estimated
VC/NVA Main Forces (MF), June 1966
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . IV-11
Figure IV-8. Comparative, Actual, and Projected Allied
and US/Third Nation Maneuver Battalion
Strength to VC/NVA Main Force Strength,
July 1965 - June 1966 and Projected for
December 1966 and June 1967 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-14
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Figure IV- 9. Approximate Communist KIA, by Inflicting
Force, 1965 - May 1966 (chart), following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV- 16
Figure IV-10. Relationship of Communist and US/Third
Nation KIA to Build-Up of US/Third Nation
Maneuver Battalion Strength, July 1965 -
May 1966 (chart) following page . . . . . IV-16
Figure IV-11. Composition of Reported VC/NVA KIA, by
Inflicting Force, July 1965 - May 1966
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . IV-16
Figure IV-12. Approximate Distribution of Reported VC/
NVA KIA, by Corps Area, July 1965 - May
1966 (chart) following page . . . . . . . IV-16
Figure IV-13. Relationship of Communist and GVN KIA,
to Build-Up of GVN Maneuver Battalions,
July 1965 - May 1966 (chart) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-17
THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES
OF THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I. The Viet Cong Economy and Its Manpower . . . .
. .
V-1
A. The Viet Cong Economy . . . . . . . . . .
. .
V-1
B. The Economic Impact of Increased Military
Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
V-2
C. The Manpower Situation . . . . . . . . . .
. .
V-4
II. Communist Logistic Operations in South Vietnam .
. .
V-5
Appendix A. The Communist Logistics System in South
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
V-8
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Figure V-1. South Vietnam: Communist Logistic Support,
June 1966 (map) following page . . . . . . . V-11
Figure V-2. South Vietnam: Daily VC/NVA Logistic
Requirements, as of Mid-Year 1966, by
Class and Source of Supply (chart) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V-13
Figure V-3. South Vietnam: Disposition of VC/NVA Regular
Forces, by Corps Area, Mid-1966 (map)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V-18
Figure V-4. South Vietnam: Daily VC/NVA Logistic
Requirements, as of Mid-Year 1966, by
Corps Area (chart) following page . .
Figure V-5. South Vietnam: Daily Logistic Requirements
of VC/NVA Forces at Varying Levels of
Combat, June 1966 and Projected June 1967
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . V-19
THE MORALE OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES
A. The V
i
et Cong View of Morale . . . . . . . .
.
.
VI-2
B. Mora
le
of the Cadres . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
VI-4
C. Mora
le
of the Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
VI-6
D. Gauge
s
of Military Morale . . . . . . . . .
.
.
VI-13
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MORALE AMONG THE PEOPLE IN VIET CONG AREAS VII-1
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON THE LIKELY
LENGTH OF THE WAR
I.
The Anticipated Timing of Victory in 1955 and 1956
.
.
VIII-1
II.
Victory Timing in the Period 1956-1959 . . . . .
.
.
VIII-2
III.
The Time Frame and Goals in 1959 . . . . . . .
.
.
VIII-3
IV.
The Initial Deferral of Victory Anticipations . . .
.
.
VIII-4
V.
The Growth of Communist Optimism in 1964
and Early 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
VIII-6
VI.
The Communist Reassessment in Mid-1965 . . . .
.
.
VIII-8
THE COMMUNIST VIEW AND APPLICATION OF LESSONS
LEARNED IN FIGHTING THE FRENCH
I.
The Three Phased War . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IX-1
II.
Tactical Military Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IX-4
III.
Political Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IX-5
THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
CLIMATE ON VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PLANS
AND CAPABILITIES
I. World Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
X-1
II. Domestic Opposition in the United States . . . . . . .
X-2
FTII. Cambodian Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
X-5
IV. The Effect of Links with Western Leaders . . . . . .
X-6
V. The Public Posture of the National Liberation Front
(NFLSV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
X-7
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THE PROBABLE NEAR TERM MILITARY AND POLITICAL
STRATEGY OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
I. General Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-1
II. Probable Areas of Communist Operi:.tions . . . . . . XI-3
A. The Highlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-3
B. Coastal Areas of II Corps ? . . . . . . . . . . . XI-4
C. I Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-5
D. III Corps . w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-6
E. IV Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-7
III. Prospects and Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-8
IV. The Near Term Political Strategy of the Vietnamese
Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-8
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ASIAN COMMUNIST
EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLITICAL TACTIC
OF NEGOTIATIONS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XII-1
A. The CCP-KMT Civil War (1937 to 1949) . . . . . XII-5
B. The Korean War (1950 to 1953) . . . . . . . . . XII-13
C. Vietnam (1953 to 1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . XII-27
D. Implications for Vietnam Today . . . . . . . . . XII-49
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