THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010027-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: August 14, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For-Release 10073/O CIA=ICP79T00826A001100010027-4
103
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
14 August 1966
State Dept. review completed
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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1
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14 August 1966
There are continuing signs that a breakdown in
negotiations between the government and FULRO, the
dissident montagnard, autonomy group, may be nearing.
At least 11 North Vietnamese POL barges and three
gunboats were sunk this week end off Haiphong by
US Navy planes.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Only light and sporadic contact with Communist forces
was reported this week end (Paras. 1-3).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Premier Ky returned to Saigon on 13 August from his
three-day official visit to the Philippines (Paras.
1-2), Negotiations between the GVN and FULRO have
reached a critical juncture with the failure of Ky
to agree to certain demands of the dissident monta-
gnards (Paras. 3-4). FULRO negotiators are reported
preparing to leave South Vietnam (Para. 5). The
Buddhists are reported to be engaging in antigovernment
and antielection protests in Ninh Thuan (Para. 7).
Viet Cong are attempting to sabotage elections in
Chau Doc Province (Para. 8). Thich Tri Quang contin-
ues fasting despite the patriarch's plea to stop (Para.
9).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Several North Vietnamese POL barges and naval ves-
sels were sunk by US Navy planes on 12 and 13
August near an unidentified oil tanker anchored some
20 miles east of Haiphong (Paras. 1-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
. Communist Political Developments:
ports speculating that DRV Minister of e ense iap
has been losing influence continue to come in (Paras.
4-6).
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VI. Other Major Aspects: Prince Sihanouk is
apparently calling off Governor Harriman's early
September visit to Phnom Penh because of reports
emanating from Saigon and Washington that two vil-
lages recently attacked by US planes lie on the
South Vietnam side of the border (Paras. 1-4).
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14 Aug 1966
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Only light and sporadic contact with Com-
munist forces was reported over the week end in the
26 ground operations in which allied forces were
involved. In the I Corps area four battalions of
US Marines continued to engage the enemy in Opera-
tion PRAIRIE. The 11-day search-and-destroy effort,
covering the same ground near the DMZ as Operation
HASTINGS, has so far resulted in four US and 68 en-
emy dead.
2. In Operation COLORADO/LIEN KET 52 on the
border of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces, US air
strikes on 13 August killed 33 Communist troops. An
enemy force of more than 3,000 men, including seven
North Vietnamese battalions, is believed to be in
the area. The joint USMC/ARVN operation has ac-
counted for 514 VC/PAVN dead since its inception on
3 August 1966.
3. Other corps areas reported no significant
contact. In Operation PAUL REVERE nine North Viet-
namese soldiers were killed as US, ARVN, and ROK
units continued to search along the South Vietnam -
Cambodian border for enemy forces. US units have
lost 68 killed and 239 wounded in the 15-day campaign
while the enemy has lost 532. More than 300 air
sorties have been flown in support of the border
surveillance effort. On the coast in Phu Yen Prov-
ince, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES continued into its
fourth week with only light contact reported. The
US Army/ROK joint effort is providing security for
engineers repairing lines of communication near Tuy
Hoa. Five US and 161 enemy troops have been killed
thus far. In Ba Xuyen Province, ARVN Operation DAN
CHI 252 was terminated on 12 August. VC losses
were reported to have been 23 dead and 16 captured,
while the ARVN suffered only 5 wounded.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Premier Ky returned to Saigon on 13 Au-
gust, after completing his three-day official
visit to the Philippines, In a Saigon press
interview,Ky amplified remarks that he made in
the Philippines regarding the withdrawal of US
forces from South Vietnam. He explained that there
has been "much progress" in the military, political,
and economic areas since he has come to power, and
that if favorable trends continue it would be pos-
sible to look forward to the withdrawal of some US
troops in about two years.
2. Ky was also queried about his remarks sug-
gesting that some Asian nations were "dragging
their feet" in the anti-Communist effort in Asia.
He answered that although South Vietnam continued
to receive assistance from free Asian nations, what
is needed now is closer cooperation and coordina-
tion among such nations leading to a unified policy
against Communist expansion in Asia.
3. A recent embassy report again points up
the seriousness of a potential breakdown in nego-
tiations between FULRO, the dissident tribal auton-
omy movement, and the government stemming from the
failure of Premier Ky to sign a document agreeing
to conditions laid down by FULRO for returning to
the GVN side. Ky's signature had been expected be-
fore his visit to the Philippines. The document 25X1
itself I Iwas a more
palatable rendering ot the earlier LRO demands
and reportedly had the approval of the II Corps
commander, General Vinh Loc, and the minister of
revolutionary development, General Nguyen Duc Thang.
The main point of contention is whether FULRO mili-
tary units will be permitted to join ARVN and para-
military forces as separate units. Government
negotiators had earlier indicated that a viable
formula could be devised to overcome this difficulty.
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4. The mission indicates that it doubts that
there will be a more favorable time than now for an
accommodation between FULRO and the government. A
breakdown in negotiations at this juncture would be
particularly unfortunate, especially if it leads to
a FULRO boycott of the elections. Such a boycott
would seriously damage Saigon's argument that the
elections will be a free expression of the will of
all the peoples of South Vietnam.
5.
J_ I
the chie arm or FULRU, Y-Dhe Adran
g, will
return to Cambodia if Premier Ky does not reply to
FULRO's conditions by 15 August. Adrang's group
has been in South Vietnam since early July awaiting
a reply from the government. The FULRO negotiators
are reportedly planning an antigovernment demonstra-
tion before they depart.
6. Further complicating the confrontation
between FULRO and the government is the possibility
that the II Crops commander, General Vinh Loc, has
ordered that FULRO hostages be taken as a guarantee
that other dissidents will return to the government.
Such a unilateral action on the part of the govern-
ment could cause irreparable harm to the negotia-
tions.
Election Notes
7.
Buddhist elements have been engaging in antigovern-
ment activity in the town of Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan
Province. This activity seems, at least in part,
to be directed against the forthcoming elections.
At a 12 August antigovernment protest rally at the
provincial pagoda in Phan Rang, two Buddhist bonzes
promised that they would immolate th
emselves on 11
September to protest the elections. A hunger strike
of unspecified duration was commenced by approximately
150 members of the protesting group.
8. In Chau Doc Province, early this month, the
Viet Cong were reported to be attempting to gather
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up voter registration cards from local residents.
The Communists were apparently satisfied when they
were told that no cards had been issued yet. The
Viet Cong used this tactic to disrupt election
procedures, although with only limited success, in
the 1965 local council elections.
Buddhist Institute Developments
9. According to press accounts, the supreme
patriarch of the Buddhist church in South Vietnam,
Thich Tinh Khiet, flew from Hue to Saigon on 12
August in an attempt to persuade Thich Tri Quang
to end his antigovernment hunger strike However.
ri Quang wou
25X1 continue his fast despite the special plea.
12 August 1966
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NORTH VIETNAM - SITES OF NAVAL ACTIVITY
12-13 August 1966
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Several North Vietnamese POL barges and
naval vessels were sunk by US Navy aircraft on 12
and 13 August. During the night of the 12th two
A-4E Skyhawks using flares discovered an oil tanker
anchored north of Cac Ba Island about 20 miles
east of Haiphong. Further search revealed four
150-foot POL barges being pulled by a tug about two
miles away. A direct hit from the Skyhawks caused
one of the barges to explode, setting fire to the
others. Pilots flying over the carrier USS Oriskany,
120 miles away, reported that the flames were visi-
ble.
2. Poststrike photography showed that as many
as eight PT-type vessels--probably Swatow-class
motor gunboats--were near the tanker and the barges at
the time of the attack. The gunboats were firing
from beneath heavy netting used as camouflage. Air
attacks carried out on the following day sunk three
of the gunboats and at least seven additional POL
barges. An F-8E Crusader was shot down by gunfire
during the engagement, but the pilot was rescued.
3. The unusual concentration of DRV naval ships
about the off-loading tanker and the barges may be
indicative of the importance the North Vietnamese at-
tach to this method of bringing POL into the Hai-
phong area. The DRV Navy has now lost 11 of the 40
vessels estimated to remain in its order of battle
on 1 July.
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IV. OTHER-COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Giap's Status
4. Reports, speculating on the possibility that
DRV Minister of Defense Vo Nguyen Giap has suffered
a loss of influence in Hanoi because of policy dif-
ferences with other members of the regime, are con-
tinuing to come in.
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6. Despite the persistent rumors about Giap,
firm evidence of a decline in his influence is
still lacking. H has appeared in public in his
usual capacity
Moreover, his latest speeches give no impression
of any belief that the war should be damped down
in South Vietnam. Although there have been some
hints in recent articles by Nguyen Chi Thanh, the
DRV politburo member said to be in the South di-
recting the war, and others, of possible strategy
differences in the Hanoi hierarchy, the exact na-
ture of these differences and their real importance
in the present situation is still far from clear.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Prince Sihanouk is apparently calling off
Governor Harriman's early September visit to
Phnom Penh. In a 13 August press conference,
Sihanouk said that he would ask the Australian
Embassy in Phnom Penh to recommend that the Harri-
man visit be canceled because the "atmosphere
has become more and more troubled" as a result of
the 31 July and 2 August attacks on border vil-
lages by US planes.
2. Sihanouk's earlier reaction to the bomb-
ing incidents was relatively mild. He had voiced
displeasure that the US did not apologize for the
attacks, but indicated that the Harriman talks
would proceed nonetheless. His 13 August deci-
sion to cancel the visit was in reaction to re-
ports emanating from Saigon and Washington that
the attacked villages lie on the South Vietnam
side of the border. Sihanouk portrayed these re-
ports as a tacit refusal by the US to recognize
Cambodia's boundaries.
3. Sihanouk has been consistently hyper-
sensitive on the border issue. Recognition of
Cambodia's borders by neighboring countries and
the great powers has been the keystone of his for-
eign policy. He has taken an inflexible negotiat-
ing position with all sides. His recent state-
ments, for example, suggest that border talks with
the Vietnamese Communists, which apparently have
been under way in Phnom Penh, are not going smoothly.
4. Sihanouk's latest blowup comes at a time
when he has been genuinely seeking a lessening of
tensions with the US. References in the 13 August
press conference to the fact that talks with the US
are not possible "at the present time" suggest that
he has not ruled out another move toward better re-
lations.
14 August 1966
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