THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 11, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
::APWWLn---/
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Lnformar:ion as of 1600
.1L August 1966
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
ARMY review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
OPSECWET
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11 August 1966
A considerable body of evidence indicates
that North Vietnam is developing a heavy artil-
lery defense system along its coast. Such defen-
sive weapons would be useful to the DRV only in
the event of hostile naval operations within 20
miles of its coastline.
I. The Militar Situation in South Vietnam:
Operation COLORADO/LIEN KET 52 continues in the
coastal flatlands of Quang Tin and Quang Nam prov-
inces with sporadic contact reported (Para. 1).
The Cai Von training center 60 miles southwest of
Saigon was attacked by a two-platoon Viet Cong
force yesterday (Para. 2). The Duc Co Special
Forces Camp in Pleiku Province was attacked with
50 rounds of mortar fire (Para. 3). A total of
96 Viet Cong sampans were damaged or destroyed by
allied aircraft in the Mekong Delta (Para. 4). Two
US MPs were killed and 17 'wounded by an explosion
at a firing range near Saigon today (Para. 5).
Viet Cong ships are continuing the movement of sup-
plies from southern provinces to Vinh Binh Prov-
ince (Paras. 7-8
Weekly review of South Vietnam
battle statistics (Para. 14).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The acting chairman of the Bud-
dhist Institute has again asked the Ky-Thieu re-
gime to "try" the Buddhist "struggle" movement
leaders if the GVN considers the movement to have
been illegal (Para. 4).
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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
The developing DRV heavy coastal artillery defense
system is discussed in the light of photographic
evidence and prisoner reports (Paras. 1-7).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The
Soviets have been approaching Western European
countries in an effort to isolate the US on Viet-
nam (Para. 1).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Sihanouk is con-
tinuing to voice skepticism about the prospects of
negotiating a border agreement with the Vietnamese
Communists (Paras. 1-3).
South Vietnam Battle Statistics 31 July - 6. Aug
Total Personnel Losses
Cumulative US Combat Casualties
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
July - 6 Aug
Viet Cong Incidents
Viet Cong Attacks
Weapons Losses - GVN/VC
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avannakhet
I vIETNAM
rf' Saravane
R D4 I KU 52r
Pakse
-~.....~.. ~..~.......~,~ .1r' - `..f.. Kontum?
th&c;Qq pecial Forces Camp -
'Ban Me
Thuot
PHNOM
PENH,
CURRENT SITUATION
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1. US and South Vietnamese Marines report
sporadic contact with the enemy as multibattalion
Operation COLORADO/LIEN KET 52 continues in the
coastal flatlands of Quang Tin and Quang Nam prov-
inces. The present engagements are taking place
generally in the area of the Que Son Valley, a
broad, fertile valley with 30,000 inhabitants who
have been under the control of the Viet Cong since
last November. Cumulative friendly casualties in
this operation which began on 5 August now total
31 killed (16 US) and 154 wounded (88 US). Commu-
nist losses include 142 killed, 40 captured, and 21
weapons seized. The enemy casualty figure is ex-
pected to go much higher as the result of tactical
air strikes--now totaling 253--which have been sup-
porting the operation.
2. An estimated two-platoon-size Viet Cong
force attacked the Cai Von training center approx-
imately 60 miles southwest of Saigon in Vinh Long
Province yesterday. The center was defended by one
Regular'Force platoon which suffered losses of 14
killed, 9 wounded, 3 missing and 10 weapons cap-
tured. A total of five Viet Cong were reported
killed.
3. The Duc Co Special Forces Camp, located
about 30 miles southwest of Pleiku town, was at-
tacked by the Viet Cong yesterday. An estimated
50 rounds of 60-mm. mortar fire struck the base.
There were no reports of casualties. This camp
is located near Highway 19 in western Pleiku Prov-
ince and is responsible for surveillance of the
Cambodian border area.
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4. Heavy Viet Cong sampan traffic was sighted
near the coast of the delta province of Kien Hoa
about 50 miles south of Saigon yesterday. Tactical
air strikes were called for and under the direction
of a forward air controller, allied aircraft destroyed
or damaged 96 sampans, and five Viet Cong were
confirmed killed.
5. Two American military policemen were killed
and 17 wounded by an explosion at a small-arms firing
range near Saigon today. It has not been determined
if the explosion came from a mine. The range is lo-
cated at a military police installation in a sparsely
inhabited area south of Saigon.
6. No major sea infiltration into South Viet-
nam was detected by allied forces participating in
coastal surveillance operations during the month of July.
US and South Vietnamese naval personnel detected 119,859
junks and 2,200 merchant ships and inspected 55,706
junks and 51 ships. Of those inspected, 131 junks
and 1,777 persons were detained.
Movement of Viet Cong Supplies in the Delta
7. According to a report from Vinh Binh Prov-
ince, weapons and ammunition are believed to be
shipped from Viet Cong supply areas in southernmost
An Xuyen and Bac Lieu provinces to the Long Toan
area of Vinh Binh Province. The trip is reportedly
made four times each month to four off-loading points.
Vinh Binh provincial and local Viet Cong forces are
deployed to provide security for the off-loading op-
erations, which are reportedly completed within 24
hours. The material is then further dispersed to
jungle areas.
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8. The size of the force required for secu-
rity indicates that a considerable amount of
weapons and ammunition may be involved in each
shipment. Recent reports of small-arm6 fire
against friendly reconnaissance aircraft flying
in this area tends to confirm these reports.
the B-52 strikes "lower the morale of the troops"
but are not as effective as in the past. Now the
Viet Cong have adopted the countermeasure of dig-
ging shallow holes just deep enough to crouch in
until the strike is over.
10. A Viet Cong memorandum promulgating the
countermeasure was captured in late April by soldiers
of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The memo, dated 1
April 1966, laid down the rule that trenches should
be no more than 4.5 feet deep. It further instructed
that during the B-52 raids those in trenches "will
squat, and plug their ears with their fingers,"
and that they "must not lean against the side of
the trenches." Soldiers were enjoined from leaving
the trenches "even when the earth is strongly shak-
ing or the trenches are cracking."
11. The memorandum also stated that if recon-
naissance jets suspected of performing air photo mis-
sions were spotted, aircraft warning cells "will work
on a 24-hour duty basis." Several recent prisoners
have said their units have been warned well ahead of
time of forthcoming B-52 raids.
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
-~--+ Section of operable railroad
Section of inoperable road
Note: Routes are inoperable primarily
because of VietCong sabotage/
interdiction efforts.
Note: Bridges are still out alongNa-
tional Route 1 in Quang Horn,
Quang Tri, Ninh Thuan, and
Binh Thuan Provinces; how-
ever, bypasses are available.
SAIGON Xuan Lpc
o Duc
Rt. 1
Information as of 6 Aug 1966
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Status of Major Lines of Communications
13. The operational status of South Vietnam's major
highways was improved this week with the opening of Route
14 north of Kont'um town by establishing a bypass around a
destroyed bridge. The railroad was also opened between
Tan Vinh and Phu Cat in Binh Dinh Province.
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
14. The week of 31 July - 6 August compared with the
week of 24-30 July.
I. Viet Cong Incidents
Time At- Regimental Battalion C
ompany
Period tacks size size
size
24-30 July 20 0 0
31 July-6 Aug 10 0 0
1
Time Harass- Terror-
Period ment ism Sabotage
24-30 July 487 20 34
31 July-6 Aug 443 12 23
Time Anti- Total
Period Propaganda Aircraft Incidents
24-30 July 13 102 676
31 July-6 Aug 11 35 534
11 August
1966
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II. Casualties
VC/PAVN GVN
30 July 31 July-66_ Aug 2 -30 July 31 Ju y- Aug
Killed 1,153 649 200 130
Wounded ----- --- 426 229
Missing/Captured 89 '75 31 54
TOTALS 1,242
US FREE WORLD
2424-30 July ~31 July-6 Aug 2 -30 Ju y 31 July-6 Aug
Killed 99 71 12 0
Wounded 531 615 16 6
Missing/Captured 20 28 0 0
III, Weapons Captured
VC/PAVN GVN
24-30 July 31 July-6 Aug 24-30 July 31 July-6 Aug
Individual 362 Not 186 114
Crew-served 33 Reported 3 5
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Buddhist Developments
4. According to a South Vietnamese newspaper,
the venerable Thien Hoa, the Buddhist Institute's act-
ing chairman, on 9 August challenged "Generals" Ky
and Thieu to try the ."main culprits" among the Bud-
dhists who led the "struggle" movement and to release
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the "senselessly" involved Buddhist accomplices, whom
he numbers in the hundreds. Thien Hoa, speaking of-
ficially for the Buddhist clerical hierarchy, has
made similar appeals in the past week to the govern-
ment and the United Nations in an apparent attempt to
rekindle the Buddhist cause and probably to demon-
strate once again that there is unanimity among the
church's leaders.
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PROBABLE COASTAL DEFENSE GUN SITES
Kc i
CIAINA
IL
I
J Dien Bien Phu ?
Hon
uang Yen? Gaitson Gal
Hai Kien Naiphong 'banhDoLa
Duong An ? I Island
Hung Yen Cat Ba
Phu Ly ? Do Son Island
L A 0 S Samneua?
hf~?. 1Dong Van
J 1
Coo Bang
Boo Lac? ~,?.J"'-1 _,~ CHINA
"Thai Nguyen V ?-~""?
Phu Tho } Mong Cal
1
P8acGiang
Phuc Yen y, f , Bac Ninh
Son Tay*
HANOI
?Thai Binh
Nam D~i?Ih
Ninh Binh
!'l
Thank Hoa)
*Sam Son
Z
.Ba Long
-S Hon Me
Phu Qui ? Island
D
Muang Nakhon Phanon ?Khammouane
Vinh Linh
? ` 1. DEMARCATION LINE
o~ -.---, ' Dong He
NORTH VIETNAM
'Dong Khe
?
Vin ??Vinh
Linh
Cam
s'Ha Tinh
~Quang Khe
r g Hot
SOUTH
?
M uong ong ?--., VIETNAM
N
LAOS
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1. Photography and prisoner reports have pro-
vided a considerable body of evidence which indicates
that the DRV is developing a heavy artillery defense
system along the North Vietnamese coast. Most of
the batteries so far detected are grouped about port
areas and apparently are equipped with guns of vary-
ing calibers and origins. Defense weapons of this
sort could be useful to the DRV only in the event
of hostile naval operations within 20 miles of its
coast. There is no evidence thus far that the coastal
defense system includes either guided or free-flight
missiles.
2. Operational use of one of these coastal de-
fense batteries came on 4 April 1966 when US destroy-
ers operating 17 miles offshore to provide search
and rescue (SAR) support for aircraft striking Vinh
received a single salvo from what was believed to
be a large-caliber coastal defense gun. An hour
and a half later the same ships observed six addi-
tional air bursts about 5,000 yards dead ahead of
their course. Moments thereafter a helicopter op-
erating with the destroyers reported that he was
under heavy artillery fire. The pilot described
the shell bursts as "bigger than 155-mm." and stated
that they continued until he had flown 25 miles
from the coast
the fire could have emanated from
any one of five known gun positions located north
and south of the Song Ca River at Vinh.
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the Soviet Union had provided the DRV with a
battalion of twelve 130-mm. guns and accompanying
radar fire-control equipment. While photography
now available cannot confirm the presence of guns
of this specific caliber, there are a number of
photographs of coastal defense sites capable of
handling weapons of this general size.
4. Along the southern coast of the DRV at Quang
Khe, photography has revealed two occupied and cam-
ouflaged positions containing one probable 100-mm.
field gun and a second weapon believed to be either
a 122-mm. corps gun or a 152-mm. howitzer. At Dong
Khe. 22 miles north of Vinh, photography
emplacements. Farther north, at Ba Long,oneof1the
captured DRV naval sources reported that 130-mm. ar-
tillery pieces were bein installed. Photography
of this location did not
show firm evidence of coastal defense positions but
did reveal considerable bunkering activity.
5. Off the coast on Hon Me Tsland
ere hidden from view in tun-
nel emplacements and were brought out only upon re-
ceipt of orders to fire. There was no fire-control
radar at the site
At Sam Son, near the river entrance
o T anh Hoa, a photo mission showed
a well-developed site with eight gun positions
cu
into the pills and a number of command and communi-
cations buildings.
6. Along the northern coast of the DRV the
known gun defenses begin at Do Son, the peninsula
which protects the entrance to Haiphong harbor.
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an artillery battalion equipped with
twelve 100-mm. guns, a mobile radar site, and a fire
direction control center defend this key position.
Photography tends to confirm this in-
formation. At least eight concrete revetments,
bunkered ammunition storage pits, and numerous AAA
positions dot the area. East of Haiphong on Cac Ba
island, photography shows three coastal
defense sites.
a Chinese engineering regiment had been involved
in constructing a variety of underground fortifica-
tions there, including a coastal defense installation
with four tunneled positions. The photographs clearly
show these sites but fail to reveal what guns may
be emplaced there.
7. Other key points east of Haiphong at which
coastal defense positions may have been developed
include the port of Hon Gay, Phung Hoang Island and Dia.nh
Do La Island. Photography of the latter site 0
shows a six-bunker,- mountain installa-
tion similar to the positions on Cac Ba island.
25X1
25X1
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Soviets have approached several French
embassies and various Foreign Ministry officials to
solicit French collaboration in Moscow's campaign
to isolate the US on Vietnam. These behind-the-
scenes moves are part of a stepped-up effort by
the Soviets to persuade nonparticipation in the
Vietnam war to urge restraint on the US. Moscow
in recent weeks has sought to bring diplomatic pres-
sure on the US through several non-Communist third
parties including Sweden, Denmark, India, Britain,
and UN Secretary General U Thant.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Cambodian Prince Sihanouk is continuing
to voice skepticism about the prospects of nego-
tiating a border agreement with the Vietnamese Com-
munists. At an 8 August press conference in Phnom
Penh, Sihanouk maintained that such an agreement
was "far from being concluded." He reminded his
audience that the 1964 attempt to strike an accord
with Hanoi and the Viet Cong had been unsuccessful,
and emphasized that he is not optimistic about the
chances this time.
2. Sihanouk did not spell out what points
were at issue with the Communists. In statements
on the problem last month, he asserted that the Com-
munists might find it difficult to accept his version
of the Cambodia - South Vietnam border. There is
no indication that this was a problem in the 1964
negotiations, and by raising it in the current context
Sihanouk may have been indicating that this time
Cambodia would press for more favorable terms. His
ambiguous reference to signing an agreement with
the "true Vietnam" also raises the possibility that
Phnom Penh is again pushing for a single agreement
signed both by Hanoi and the Viet Cong. North Viet-
nam held out for separate agreements during the
1964 talks.
3. Contrary to earlier reports, Sihanouk did
not say that Cambodia would assist the Vietnamese
Communists in the war as a quid pro quo for a border
agreement. He reasserted the position that the bor-
der agreement would not affect Cambodia's "neutral-
ity" or its desire to keep out of the war. He
strenuously asserted, however, that he would not be
deterred in concluding an agreement by threats of
punitive action by Saigon, and indicated that Cam-
bodia was prepared to fight if it were attacked by
the South Vietnamese.
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SOUTH VIETNAM"eBATTLE STATISTICS
``'`PORT 31 JULY-6 AUGUST 1966
Total Personnel Losses
(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)
GVN /US/other Free World
- Viet Cong/PAVN
US only
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam
(including North Vietnam)
LFatalities
Non-fatal Wounds
Captured
I Missing
Cumulative, 1961-1964
255
1524
10
12
Cumulative, 1965
1365
6110
15
136
Cumulative, 1966 to date
2990
17869
TOTAL
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GVN/Other Free World)
4610 25503
201
I OCT I NOV I DEC I JAN I FES I MAR I APR I MAY IJUNE I JULY I AUG I
Killed in action E Missing or Captured in action E Wounded in action
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SOUTH VIETNAM BILE STAIISIILS
31 JULY- 6 AUGUST 1966
Viet Cong Incidents 25X1
Antiaircraft
Propaganda
Terrorism
Attacks
Viet Cong Attacks
Company and battalion sized attacks
-~ - -~ Battalion sized (and larger) attacks only
Weapons Losses
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TOP SECRET
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