COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010024-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 10, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MF..MO. Ar
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY iN
S 'CIt NGTHS AND
DIRECTORATE OF INTII,i
ARMY review(s) completed.
r t ;~t^i ayxi ft~iur,
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 Appi
V. Communist Political Developments: Hanoi's
difficulties in evacuating a large portion of the
populace from the major cities and populated re-
gions are highlighted in a party daily editorial
(Paras. 1-4). Diplomatic relations established
between North Vietnam and Syria (Para. 5).
ARMY review(s) completed.
10 August 1966
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 Aft- AW
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NORTH Dong Hot
/Savannakhet
'1' Saravane
a Vlnh Long
*ca.. r7+0
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
0 25 70 75 IOO l es
~) 25 SC J5 I 0 K,i.ometer<
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A company of South Korean infantrymen,
participating in Operation PAUL REVERE II in the
central highland provinces of Kontum and Pleiku,
established contact with an estimated company-
size enemy force about 30 miles southwest of
Pleiku town on 9 August. The Koreans, acting as a
flapk guard for US troops sweeping the rugged moun-
tain terrain near the Cambodian border, held of
the attackers until American armored units were
moved in to assist. Artillery and flareship air-
craft also supported the six-hour action which re-
sulted in 170 enemy troops killed. Korean casual-
ties~were seven killed and 43 wounded.
2. In another action in the same area, one
US company supported by tactical air strikes es-
tablished contact with an undetermined size Viet
Cong force. One American was killed and 15 wounded.
Communist casualties are unknown. A total of 375
enemy troops have been killed since this operation
began on 31 July.
3. One US Marine battalion, participating in
joint US - South Vietnamese Operation COLORADO/
LIEN KET 52, became heavily engaged today with a
Communist force estimated at several battalions.
The enemy force, armed with recoilless rifles and
mortars, was dug in behind trees, hedges, and
bunkers five miles west of Tam Ky in Quang Tin
Province. Preliminary reports indicate 15 US Ma-
rines have been killed and 78 wounded. Viet Cong
losses are not known; however, it is estimated
that as many as 150 may have been killed.
4. Three battalions of the US 173rd Airborne
Brigade began Operation TOLEDO, a search-and-
destroy operation in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy prov-
inces, on 10 August. The headquarters of the 5th
Viet Cong Division, its two component regiments--
the 274th and the 275th--and a Viet Cong artillery
battalion are reported to be in the area, with a
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combined strength of 4,450 men.
5. The Viet Cong attacked the Trai Bi Special
Forces Camp in Tay Ninh Province about 65 miles north-
west of Saigon yesterday. The two-and-one-half hour
action was supported by friendly artillery, tactical
air strikes, a flareship, and an armed helicopter.
Six South Vietnamese were wounded. Viet Cong casual-
ties are unknown. Trai Bi opened on 24 June 1966 and
has been subject to enemy probing attacks in an ef-
fort to test the camp's defenses.
6. Elements of a South Vietnamese regiment
fought an enemy force of unknown size for two hours
yesterday in an area about 30 miles southeast of Saigon.
in Bien Hoa Province. Four South Vietnamese soldiers
were killed and four wounded. Viet Cong losses in-
cluded 35 killed and three captured.
Attack on South Vietnamese Village by US Aircraft
7. A flight of two US F-100 Supersabre aircraft,
under the direction of a forward air controller, today
bombed a village about nine miles southwest of Can
Tho, as requested by the South Vietnamese province
chief. Ordnance expended on the target included CBU
antimateriel bomblets, 750-pound general purpose
bombs, and 20-mm. ammunition. Approximately 14 hours
after the strike, the Tactical Air Control Center
at the Bien Hoa Air Base was notified that friendly
civilians had been in the area. A total of 15 civil-
ians were killed and 182 wounded. The attack was ap-
parently provoked by two Viet Cong platoons which
took over the village and then fired at the forward
air controller's light aircraft. The guerrillas re-
portedly held the villages at gunpoint during the
air attack.
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Viet. Cong Concerned About Lower Quality of Cadre
8. The Viet Cong in the VC province of Can
Tho are reported to be concerned about the lower-
ing of the quality of cadres and party members in
the province. Viet Cong Can Tho Province is in the
Mekong Delta, and consists of the GVN province of
Phong Dinh, and parts of An Giang, Ba Xuyen, and
Chuong Thien provinces.
9. In a recently obtained and probably genuine
directive, Can Tho's party committee complained of
the party cadres' "inability to cope with hardship,"
and ascribed "the drop in quality ...(to) recent
heavy recruiting, which resulted in members' putting
too much stress on quantity...." The directive
stated that "at present we have a number of comrades
who have not been able to eradicate their bourgeois
mentality.... When the going gets rough, they drag
their feet."
10. According to available information, the
party waged an intensive recruiting campaign in the
delta provinces to offset losses caused by an upgrad-
ing in 1965 of hamlet and village cadres for new
Main Force units, most of them in III Corps.
11. The apparent deterioration in the quality
of cadres in the delta may partially account for
the gradually declining fortunes of the Viet Cong
there--a phenomenon upon which most American advis-
ers stationed there agree. At least one source,
the newly appointed South Vietnamese Army III Corps
commander, recently stated his belief that the
Viet Cong may move additional troops to IV Corps
to attempt to recoup their losses. If the judgments
of US advisers on the spot are correct, the Viet
Cong position in the delta may continue to decline
in the absence of reinforcements.
10 August 1966
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
that at least seven Chinese foremen of the American-
owned Vimytex Textile Plant had received threatening
letters from the Viet Cong prior to the 30 July
killing of another Chinese foreman. The seven
foremen were accused of being United States - Vimytex
"lackeys," and were served notice that they would be
punished. Li Hsiao, the man slain on 30 July, had
received a similar letter in March of this year.
All of the foremen who received letters are described
as pro-management and instrumental in preventing
Communist-inspired strikes in the plant.
two other Vimytex foremen received letters which,
in addition to personal threats, contained the claim
that Li Hsiao had been killed by the "People's Armed
Forces," a clear reference to the Viet Cong. The
parents of the two foremen also received Chinese-
language versions of the "black hand" letters which
contain internal characteristics suggestive of col-
laboration by Chinese Communist elements.
Prime Minister Ky to the Philippines
3. Prime Minister Ky, currently on a good-will
visit to the Philippines, indicated to reporters in
Manila that he was not ruling out a course of
winning the war by carrying out "a true social revolution
in the South to build a free and prosperous South
Vietnam." However, he explained that as a military
man, he was more favorably inclined toward a fast mili-
tary action, a course which would presumably include
invasion of North Vietnam. Ky's statement was in-
tended to represent a retrenchment of his position
of a few weeks ago when he appeared to favor in-
vasion of the North to bring about a quick military
end to the war. Ky also stated that he welcomed
Philippine President Marcos'recent call for an
All-Asian conference to resolve the Vietnam war.
10 August 1966
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4. Ky was received at the airport in Manila
by President Marcos, and a crowd, estimated at
about 300 persons. Minor anti-Ky picketing was
reported around the airport terminal, as well
by some 40 Philippine students at the presiden-
tial palace when Ky arrived there to attend an
official dinner in his honor.
Election Notes
5. The Central Election Review Council--
the final authority on approving assembly candi-
dates- has apparently finished its screening of
42 appeals, 23 submitted to it by local boards,
18 by individual candidates,and one by an individual
voter. Preliminary reports indicate that a total
of 739 candidates may be competing for the 108
seats in the national constitutional assembly in
the 11 September election. Final posting of
candidate lists will be on 12 August.
6. The Central Council in its screening
task appears to have been fair in dealing with
the cases it examined. Tran Van Tuyen, often
a critic of the present government and the elec-
tions, has stated that he believes that the
council did a "fair and reasonable job." In the
various categories, the council rejected candi-
dacies of three military aspirants and accepted
three others; it also rejected the candidacies
of two civil servants and accepted a similar
number. Of the seven persons who were chal-
lenged on the basis of nonfulfillment of mili-
tary service (draft), five were accepted as
candidates and two were rejected. In the
most controversial category,that of challenges
based on political unsuitability, six were ac-
cepted and six rejected.
10 August 1966
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port.
III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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port.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The difficulties faced by the Hanoi re-
gime in implementing its program of evacuating a
large portion of the urban population and creat-
ing some semblance of normal life among the dis-
placed people were highlighted in a 7 August
editorial in the party daily Nhan Dan. Stripped
of its propaganda content, the editorial also re-
vealed the regime's concern over possible civilian
casualties resulting from the intensified US air
strikes and strongly advised that civil defense
measures including evacuation, building shelters,
and relocating and reorganizing production
facilities be undertaken "satisfactorily and
urgently."
2. In the larger cities and populated re-
gions, the paper argued that evacuation must be
further accelerated in order to reduce human and
material loss to the enemy. Possibly reflecting
difficulties encountered in previous evacuation
plans, the editorial insisted that evacuation must
be positively planned, closely led, and that edu-
cational mobilization with concrete measures on
organization, administration, and economy be un-
dertaken.
3. To counter popular resistance to reset-
tlement which has been evident during the past
year, the paper called for the development in the
evacuees of a "spirit of overcoming difficulty" and
the promotion of a "spirit of unity and mutual as-
sistance among the people in the resettlement
areas." To preserve the "lasting character" of
the evacuation, Nhan Dan proposed that the reset-
tled people be restricted from returning to their
old homes and that they be made to undertake pro-
ductive tasks in the new areas as quickly as pos-
sible so that they might "adapt to the new circum-
stances."
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4. Outside of evacuation, the editorial
pointed out that the "foremost, important work
In preventing and fighting the enemy" was digging
shelters and communications trenches and strongly
recommended that "we should engage in production
and carry out work only after there are sufficient
shelters and communications trenches." All these
efforts, Nhan Dan claimed in closing, were di-
rected not only toward protecting the populace
but "to create more conditions for fighting and
achieving victories."
5. A North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry com-
munique on 9 August announced that on 21 July the
DRV Government and the government of Syria agreed
to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassa-
dorial level. This announcement was the culmina-
tion of several months of effort by Hanoi to gain
recognition from the new, leftist-leaning Syrian
Government which has also recently recognized the
North Korean regime. The establishment of a diplo-
matic post in Damascus brings to seven the number
of nonbloc nations recognizing North Vietnam at
the ambassadorial level. Hanoi's only other rep-
resentation in the Arab world had been in the UAR
following the closing of an economic and cultural
post in Iraq several months ago.
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDI_~ M
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THA 1i.,,A NN _ -L'
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS . ,
DIRECTORATE OF INTEL.L
S J~ j" r? ~etl asVim Vron
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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 'GRA
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 August'1966
Communist Insurgency in Thailand:
Strengths an ea nesses
Summary
The growth of the Communist movement in Thai-
land over the past two years has raised the specter
of another protracted insurgent struggle in South-
east Asia. At the present time, however, the
balance sheet in Thailand does not appear to favor
the insurgents. An essentially stable socioeconomic
situation and a long history of independent nation-
hood are key factors militating against Communist
efforts to win. popular support in the countryside.
In addition., the military oligarchy in Bangkok,
after a slow start, is n.ow coming to grips with the
insurgent problem and its counteroperations are
gathering momentum.
Nonetheless there are soft spots in. the Thai
internal situation which have favored the Communists
and which could prove to be increasingly troublesome
over the long haul. Despite the important progress
which has been. made, there are still substantial
underdeveloped and isolated areas which provide
favorable ground for the Communists. The govern-
men.t's political machinery throughout the country
remains extremely weak, and the military oligarchy
does not appear to appreciate the contribution that
govern.men.t-backed political movements could make in
fighting the insurgents.
In. Bangkok, the Thanom-Praphat government is
enjoying its third year of stable rule, but serious
factional infighting, during which the counterinsurgency
reparedby the Directorate of Intelligence and co-
ordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
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effort would almost certainly suffer, could flare
up with little warning. The present government's
greatest weakness in. meeting the insurgent challenge,
however, is simply that it does not command substan-
tial popular support.
The Communist movement in. Thailand is still in
the embryonic stage, despite the increasing number
of insurgent incidents. It does not, for example,
yet exhibit the tight discipline and effective struc-
ture that is characteristic of Communist organiza-
tions in the neighboring countries. The Communists
also suffer from a severe shortage of experienced
and dedicated cadres, which has limited their ability
to expand into new areas. Despite these weaknesses,
the insurgents are likely to step up recruiting,
propaganda, and terrorism in the coming months.
In. the final analysis, the insurgency will be
limited less by the action of the Bangkok govern-
ment than by the fundamental strength of the Thai
nation.
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Internal Situation: Strength and Weakness
1. No country in Southeast Asia seems, on the
surface, in a better position than Thailand to with-
stand the pressures of Communist terrorism and sub-
version. A combination of good fortune and astute
leadership has, to a great extent, saved Thailand
from the common economic and political maladies that
plague its neighbors. Thailand's most tangible asset
is its fundamental economic well-being--adequate land
and no serious land tenure problem. Furthermore,
spared colonization by a Western power, the Thais ex-
hibit few of the anti-Western biases of other Asian
peoples, and do not automatically give a sympathetic
ear to arguments that the US represents a new "im-
perialist" menace.
2. Thailand also has significant political
assets. For one thing, ethnic, linguistic, and re-
ligious differences are not paramount issues in the
political life of the country, although they do
exist. The few elements--Malay-Muslims in the four
southern provinces, and Shan, Karen, and small tribal
groups in the west and north--who are not in the
mainstream of Thai communal life could not provide
the basis for a Communist take-over. Moreover,
Thailand,an independent political entity since the
13th century, has grown. accustomed to running its
own affairs. Its sense of independence and nation-
hood rests not on Western ideas, but rather on its
own experience and history. A sense of Thai nation-
ality affects the thinking of the great majority of
the population, even in the traditionally isolated
and long-mistreated northeast.
3. The coterie of high-ranking military of-
ficers who have ruled Thailand since 1932 has pro-
vided general internal stability, continuity in
foreign policy, and unusually competent economic
guidance. Autocratic without being despotic, con-
servative without being reactionary, the ruling
oligarchy has held a firm grip on the governmental
apparatus while avoiding the doctrinaire mistakes
and crippling mismanagement which have been prevalent
in other Southeast Asian countries.
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4. Despite its over-all strengths, however,
Thailand does have significant problems and weak-
nesses which make it somewhat vulnerable to a Com-
munist-led insurgency movement. Despite rapid
economic progress, the country is still,substan-
tially underdeveloped. Large areas in the north,
northeast, and south of Thailand remain physically
isolated from Bangkok. Within these areas, communi-
cation. is poor, the road system rudimentary. There
are also deficiencies in the governmental apparatus
which hamper counterinsurgency activities. The
police, a key element in the security picture, have
been underpaid and undersupported by an unsympathetic
and politically jealous army leadership in Bangkok.
Police units have been forced to live off the
peasantry, leaving in their wake distrust and ill
will toward the government.
5. The political structure in the countryside
has been equally weak. Largely ignored by Bangkok,
lacking good local leadership and adequate financial
and moral support, some provinces in the northeast
have been. run in the past as the personal satrapies
of provincial officials. Below the provincial and
district level, government machinery is almost non-
existent. The relative ease with which the subver-
sives have been able to establish themselves in some
areas, and their ability to bring blocks of remote
villages under their control, suggest that the monthly
visit of district officers or the selection of headmen.
in individual villages is no substitute for a perma-
n.en.t and coherent governmental presence. Bangkok's
neglect and the absence of any government-inspired
political movement have left the Thai farmer in a
state of political ignorance. His identification with
the government is nonexistent, his nationalist senti-
ments unexploited.
6. This political passivity suited the leaders
in. Bangkok well enough until the Communists began
"educating" and--most importantly--organizing in the
countryside. Even then., however, the oligarchy did
not face the issue squarely. Its inclination. was to
assume that economic development would ensure resist-
ance to Communist blandishments. If more roads were
built, if more wells were dug, if, in short, the gov-
ernment did things for the people, they would be loyal.
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7. But the results of centuries of economic
neglect could not be corrected overnight. Moreover,
the assumption. that relief of economic deprivation.
is the key to counterinsurgency is open to some ques-
tion. in Thailand. The Communists have made some of
their most significant gains in the northeast in areas
where the economic situation is relatively good. While
the well-mean.in.g military leadership organized and
deployed development and propaganda units into the
countryside, while it brought village leaders into the
capital to get acquainted; the Communists were busy
doing. what Bangkok failed'to do. They went into the
villages and organized at the grass-roots level. They
set up a series of bogus labor, farmer, and youth fronts
designed to appeal to groups that had never received
systematic attention from the government. This was a
slow business, and not always very successful, but the
Communists made the effort. They understood, moreover,
what the government apparently did not: that people
could be motivated by ideas, that an ideology could be
a very persuasive force in. controlling people.
8. There are several areas of potential instabil-
ity and political dissidence that could seriously af-
fect Thailand's ability to meet the insurgent threat.
Although the military oligarchy has experienced several
years free of serious factional infighting, the present
government's stability rests on an alliance maintained
by Prime Minister Thanom and Deputy Prime Minister
Praphat. Both men. have quietly isolated and reduced
the power of rival generals, but rivalries and jealous-
ies among the military leaders are still important and
there is no institutional framework for an orderly
transfer of power. The coup as a device for political
change in Bangkok has not been exercised for nine years,
but it would be a mistake to assume that it has passed
from the Thai scene. The death of Thanom or Praphat,
the emergence of significant policy or personality dif-
ferences among the top leaders, or a grab for power by
junior officers could inaugurate a protracted period
of political dislocation during which the counterin-
surgency effort would inevitably suffer.
9. Another potential source of political unrest
involves civilian groups which are not satisfied with
the present government. Although the articulation. Of
political opinion in Thailand has been discouraged by
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the government, there seems to be a strong undercur-
rent of dissatisfaction with the military establish-
ment and its reluctance to prepare the way for orderly
political change. This attitude is especially pre-
valent among intellectual and student groups in. the
capital. The dissatisfaction probably also reflects
the influence of a somewhat left-of-center civilian
political movement which has competed unsuccessfully
with the military establishment since the 1932 revolu-
tion. Although the military government pays lip ser-
vice to notions of political representation and popular
consent, it has grown accustomed to running things
without interference. The oligarchy's unwillingness
to promote an, institutional framework for a more dem-
ocratic political structure--a "new" constitution
which provides for free elections has been in. the
writing for eight years--reflects its insensitivity
to the need to develop broader popular support and
participation.
The Developing Insurgency
10. The Communists opened their campaign in the
northeast, and on. a smaller scale in the south of
Thailand, in the early part of 1964. By the end of
the year, and coincident with stepped-up propaganda
from Peking, Hanoi, and the clandestine Voice of the
Thai People, politically inspired murders were being
carried out by the insurgents in Nakhon Phanom Prov-
ince. The assassinations were the keystone of the
Communist effort to build and extend small and iso-
lated bases in the northeast. Specifically targeted
against police informants, the murders were meant to
strengthen the security of the subversive operation
by limiting the intelligence available to the govern-
ment. At the same time, by intimidating villagers
and government representatives alike, by impressing
the villagers with the strength of the insurgents and
the impotence of the government's security apparatus,
the Communists hoped to create a favorable psycholog-
ical climate for the extension of their influence.
11. This tangible evidence that the Communists
were active in the countryside, coupled with the
scare propaganda out of Peking and Hanoi, motivated
Bangkok to mount its first major sweep operation in
early February 1965. Inadequately planned and poorly
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executed, the operation was most noteworthy in under-
lining deficiencies that must be overcome before a
suppression campaign could be effective. In mid-1965,
government security forces began for the first time
to mount businesslike patrols and security sweeps in
isolated areas. These sweeps precipitated a series
of small skirmishes as security forces began to flush
the insurgents from their camps. Although these
clashes did little more than keep the insurgents off
balance, they did convince Bangkok that the subversive
threat was important enough to warrant restructuring
the counterinsurgency apparatus.
12. The insurgents, however, were also busy.
There was a step-up in the assassination of govern-
ment officials in Nakhon Phanom Province and an up-
surge in other insurgent activity there. Moreover,
by mid-1965 the insurgency was spreading into adjacent
provinces. Much of the increase in insurgent activity
was actually a response to stepped-up government sweeps
which not only led to an increasing number of contacts
between. government and insurgent forces, but also
caused the Communists to conduct more terrorism against
villagers who had assisted the government. The in-
surgents may also have concluded that, for reasons of
morale and tactics, they had to take some of the initia-
tive from the government. In late 1965, the insurgents
mounted their first small attacks against government
armed police forces. These fledgling efforts were fol-
lowed up in 1966 by a series of better planned and
executed attacks against police patrols and, for the
first time, against Thai Army regulars.
13. Despite the increasing number and size of
insurgent attacks, however, the initiative is still
the government's. In. some ways, moreover, the insur-
gents may be in a weaker position. today than they were
a year ago. Their tenuous hold on the population has
been. seriously weakened by the increased government
physical presence in isolated areas. In addition, the
Communist internal apparatus has probably been. severely
disrupted by the capture of small but critical numbers
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Other Insurgent Problems
14. The Communist movement in Thailand is still
in an embryonic stage despite the bellicose statements
out of Peking and Hanoi and the increasing number of
incidents in the south and northeast of the country.
This can be seen in the movement's apparent lack of
adequate command structure and professionalism, both
of which are highly developed in the Communist move-
ments of neighboring countries. The Communists ap-
parently have not yet developed a mechanism for coor-
dinating activities in the field with what appears to
be the central party leadership in Bangkok.
doreover,
insurgent bands in separated areas are not yet work-
ing in unison, although some liaison among them does
occur.
15. The Communists also suffer from a severe
shortage of experienced and dedicated cadre. Not only
has this limited their ability to expand into new areas,
but important functions such as weapons training are
neglected because competent instructors are not avail-
able. One remedy, of course, would be an input of non-
Thai cadres, and there have been reports that the in-
surgents in the northeast were expecting help from
"Vietnamese friends" in early 1965. There has been no
subsequent information, however, to indicate whether
such help was received, or whether the Vietnamese were
to come from North Vietnam or from the Vietnamese com-
munity located in the northeast. Non-Thai cadres could
provide technical assistance, but they would be less
useful in performing political work. A better solution
would be to train more Thai cadres, and there is some
evidence that an increasing number of Thai are being
sent to Communist China and North Vietnam.
16. Another significant weakness of the Thai in-
surgency movement is that the Communists have thus far
been unable to generate large-scale popular support for
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their cause. One reason. is poor motivation and lack
of ideological fervor, even among the cadres. I
17. The insurgents do appear to have an adequate
source of supplies to meet their current needs. To
speak of "infiltration routes" in the present Thai
insurgency context, as various Thai leaders have done,
is to reveal either a faulty appreciation of the di-
mension and nature of the insurgency or a callous op-
portunism. At this stage in their development and
probably over the next several years, the insurgents
have no need of significant outside material assist-
ance. The insurgents have experienced some shortages
in training manuals and propaganda materials, but these
can be either produced locally or brought in with a
minimum of difficulty. The Communists are also em-
phasizing the utility of locally acquired weapons.
Cadres have been trained in Communist China in the use
of US weapons, and the brisk traffic in US weapons
across the Mekong from Laos could provide the insur-
gents with a significant source of arms.
Prospects
18. Despite significant weaknesses the insurgents
are likely to step up recruiting, propaganda, and ter-
rorism in the coming months. They will also continue
to resist government security sweeps, and an increase
in Communist-initiated attacks is probable as the in-
surgents attempt to take the initiative from the gov-
ernment.
19. Peking and Hanoi view the Thai insurgency in
the wider context of their Southeast Asian policies,
and they may substantially increase support for the
Thai insurgents in the coming months to demonstrate the
risks which cooperation with the US entails. Such sup-
port would probably involve training more Thais and
providing financial and material assistance, but North
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Vietnamese cadre might also be introduced to improve
the guerrilla capability of the insurgents.
20. The Communists' success in extending their
areas of influence, however, will depend to a great
extent on the government countereffort. US-supported
programs initiated over the past several years are
beginning to bear fruit. Better trained police re-
cruits are taking their places in field units. Im-
proved communications, feeder roads, and an expanded
use of helicopters are opening the countryside to
quick reaction by government forces.
21. The government in. Bangkok, moreover, is for
the first time genuinely aroused to the insurgent
threat. Effective measures have been taken to get
the counterinsurgency effort on a professional foot-
ing, even though the realities of Thai politics con-
tinue to impede a truly integrated effort among
various police and military units. The military
oligarchy also is becoming more sensitive to the po-
litical aspects of the insurgency problem, but progress
here continues to be slow. In the final analysis,
the insurgency will probably be limited less by the
action of the Bangkok government than by the funda-
mental strength of the Thai nation.
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 Approved Fo Relea
11 August 1966
The Memo on the Communist Insurgency in Thailand:
1. This paper discusses the Thai insurgency ques-
tion from a perspective which emphasizes the importance
of the Thai internal situation in meeting the Communist
challenge. The memorandum treats materials and develop-
ments beyond the scope of recent NIE on the same subject.
2. The memorandum points out:
a. the key role played by the relatively stable
Thai internal situation in combatting the insurgents;
b. Thailand's many assets which diminish the
threat of a strong insurgent movement;
c. the neglect of the countryside by the
ruling military oligarchy and deficiencies in the gov-
ernment's machinery and performance, which could prove
troublesome in coping with the insurgents;
d. the Communists will continue to make some
gains, but are not likely to pose a serious threat to
government control over significant areas in the near
future.
3. It is recommended that this memorandum be given
routine internal and external dissemination.
f~ ~~jja
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