THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 4, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

4`011 SE CRS. T 10 3
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~artoran~n.
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
4 August 1966
State Dept. review completed
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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4 August 1966
HIGHLIGHTS
Premier Ky has apparently decided to modify
his recent public remarks on inv+ading-"NorthViet-
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Operation PAUL REVERE continues in the central
highlands where 6,000 North Vietnamese troops are
reported operating (Para. 1). Operation HASTINGS
concludes and is followed by Operation PRAIRIE in
the same area of Quang Tri Province -(Paras. 2-3).
Operation EL PASO III terminated without signifi-
cant contact (Para. 4).
II.. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The government's national election seminar ended
yesterday in Saigon, with appropriate appeals to lo-
cal officials for honesty, sincerity, and efficiency
in conducting the elections (Para. 1). Premier Ky
apparently has decided to modify his recent public
remarks on invading North Vietnam (Para. 2). In ad-.
dition, Ky reportedly stated within the past few
days that he could not remove Deputy Premier Co at
the present time because it would disturb the bal-
ance of military leadership (Para. 3). Militant Bud-
dhist Tri Quang is being subjected to increasingly
tighter controls by the government (Para. 4).
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V. Communist Political Developments: Status
of General Vo Nguyen Giap (Paras. 1-2).
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 AWN Aft
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VIETNAM
~(1FM 1UC-'~'IC~N ilr:f
Savanna khet
f Saravane
?Quang Tri
7 Sepone'
Ban Me
Th~ot
PHNOM
PENHO
N1iay Ninh ^rPhugC Vinh .,.
Bien
'.., SAIGON...-
+Vmh Long
Can Tho
IN'
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
J 25
1 25 5n
63307 - I
51_ 75 IJOMiles
75 160 NiIometerti
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Only light, sporadic contact with Communist
forces has been reported as Operation PAUL REVERE
continues in the jungles of the central highlands.
Three North Vietnamese Army regiments--the 32nd,
33rd, and 66th, each with an estimated 2,000 men--
are reported to be in the western portion of Pleiku
Province, where US troops encountered enemy resist-
ance earlier in the week.
2. Operation HASTINGS, the largest US Marine
offensive of the war, ended yesterday in northern-
most Quang Tri Province. In this operation 147
Americans were killed and 448 were wounded. Commu-
nist losses were 882 killed, 15 captured, and 254
weapons captured. Unofficial estimates indicate
that possibly 1,000 more enemy troops may have been
killed. American pilots flew 1,180 sorties in the
support of the operation, the highest number for
any operation to date.
3. Operation PRAIRIE was initiated by four
US Marine battalions immediately upon the termina-
tion of HASTINGS and will continue to sweep the
northern areas of Quang Tri Province in conjunction
with South Vietnamese Operation LAM SON 289, in
search of elements of the North Vietnamese 324B In-
fantry Division.
4. Elements of the US 1st Infantry Division
suspended operation EL PASO III in Binh Duong
Province on 1 August. No significant contact was
made with enemy forces. These units have joined
up with other 1st Infantry Division units partici-
pating in Operation CHEYENNE, a road security oper-
ation in an area approximately 30 miles north of
Saigon in Binh Duong Province. One American has
been killed and 10 wounded in this action to date.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The national election seminar for province
chiefs and other officials ended yesterday in Sai-
gon. Appropriate closing speeches by several minis-
ters expressed the government's determination to
demonstrate sincerity, honesty, and efficiency in
conducting the elections. Premier Ky also stated
again that he would return to full-time military duty
when the civilian government is established sometime
next year.
2.
Premier y wi make a care u retreat" from
his recent statements on the necessity of invading
North Vietnam in a speech which he plans to make
next week in Manila. Ky's decision to modify his
remarks on this issue came after discussions with
Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese ambassador to the United
States. Ky recalled Thai to Saigon temporaily after
Thai had made public statements contrary to the pre-
mier's earlier remarks. However, Thai apparently
convinced Ky that Ky's remarks on invading the north
had caused difficulty in Washington.
Early Removal of Deputy Premier General Co Reported
Unlikely,
3. Within the past few days, Premier Ky ex-
pressed the feeling that Deputy Premier and War Min-
ister Co could not be dismissed at the present time
because it would disturb the balance of military
leadership
y reportedly made his remarks as government action
was being taken to disapprove a moneymaking scheme
allegedly involving General Co. General Co himself
will soon begin a 17-day good-will tour through
Africa and Europe.
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Monk Tri Quang Now Under Full Government Restrictions
4. The US Embassy has reported that militant
Buddhist leader Tri Quang was prevented by police
from leaving the Saigon clinic where he is residing
in order to attend a meeting of the Buddhist Insti-
tute Council on 3 August. Controls on visitors to
Tri Quang, already very strict, reportedly have now
been tightened to the point where only medical per-
sonnel are allowed to see him.
4 August 1966
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
4. Moreover, recent photography has disclosed
DRV attempts at road improvement in this area, con-
sisting mainly of the widening, grading and
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IMPRO`VEMENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM
VA/ 1 X11. ,
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Construction Activity in the DMZ
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realignment of trails extending westward in the DMZ
toward Laos. Available photography, however, has
not yet disclosed any trail improvement or road
construction southward across the DMZ. The activ-
ity is similar to that observed last December on
a trail south of Route 103, with which this trail
connects. When completed, the construction now
under way will provide North Vietnam with an im-
proved system of routes for the infiltration of
personnel through the DMZ and Laos into South Viet-
nam.
5. I photography shows work under way on
an existing trail running through the DMZ, north
of the Demarcation Line, from the southern terminus
of Route 102 westward to the Laotian border. Some
sections now apparently are able to accommodate ve-
hicular traffic. The general alignment of this
trail is such that few bridges are required and it
is possible that some fair-weather vehicular capa-
bility could be provided from the end of Route 102
up to the Laotian border if current activity is ex-
tended westward.
6. In contrast, the trail leading south from
Route 103 has numerous bridges and stream crossings,
and construction activity observed last December
apparently resulted only in an improved foot trail.
7. The establishment of a VC/NVA base area in
Quang Tri Province, with its nearby sanctuary and
support area in the DRV--similar to the VC/NVA base
area in the central highlands near Cambodia--could
provide the flexibility the Communists need to be
able to tie down large numbers of allied troops
while leaving their own forces free to continue
their harassing activities and attempts at attrition
elsewhere in northern South Vietnam. The activity
seen to date makes it appear likely that Hanoi will
continue to commit its forces in this area in the
coming months.
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8. Bomb damage assessment photography of the
2 August strike on the Haiphong POL facility indi-
cates that the target is 88 percent destroyed. Two
previous missions had achieved
an 80-percent level o destruction of North Vietnam's
largest petroleum handling and storage site. Pre-
liminary analysis of the poststrike photography
indicates that two of the remaining storage tanks
were destroyed and four others received varying de-
grees of damage. Numerous support and packing build-
ings were destroyed by fire.
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1. Rumors continue to grow that North Viet-
namese General Vo Nguyen Giap's influence is de-
clining.
Giap reportedly
advocated a return to terrorism and guerrilla ac-
tivity in South Vietnam and was turned down by the
leadership.
2. Although speculation about Giap's eclipse
is still in the rumor category, it has been fanned
by Nguyen Chi Thanh's recent article on the war
which implies that differences of opinion exist in
the Hanoi high command over strategy and tactics
to be followed in the South. Giap's disappearance
from public view for about two months also provided
some support for these rumors. Giap, however, was
not the only official absent from the Hanoi scene.
Almost the entire North Vietnamese politburo was
conspicuously inactive throughout this period.
Moreover, Giap appeared on 31 July to attend the
Hanoi celebration of Chinese Army Day, in the role
of spokesman for the North Vietnamese Army. On
balance, although the number of rumors about Giap
is on the increase, definitive evidence of a de-
cline in his influence is still lacking.
4 August 1966
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