DISSENSION AMONG SOUTH VIETNAM'S GENERALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 2, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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2 August 1966
No. Ir94, 66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DISSENSION AMONG SOUTH VIETNAM'S GENERALS
L)IRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
MORI
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 August 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Dissension Among South Vietnam's Generals
Summary
Underlying rifts in the unity of South Vietnam's
military leadership have begun to surface again now that a
serious threat from the Buddhists and their supporters
has been overcome. Current dissension stems primarily
from the apparent desire of Premier Ky to replace
Deputy Premier and War Minister Co and Co's counter-
maneuvers to prevent his dismissal.
Although Ky does not appear concerned about a
serious threat to his position at this time, he is
still weighing the advantages and disadvantages of
taking action against Co. allegedly involved in prof-
iteering. In the background are pressures on Ky from
reform-minded middle-grade officers, long-standing
problems with at least two independent corps com-
manders, and alleged suspicions on the part of some
Directorate members that Ky may be moving to assume
greater personal power.
The repercussions should Co be ousted cannot be
accurately foreseen, but he appears to have no sig-
nificant popular or troop support. Whether or not
Co is retained, however, the growing assertiveness
of the younger field-grade officers, known as the
"Baby Turks", on such issues as Co's status may
become a serious problem for Ky.
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
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1. After several months of relative unity in
the military, reports of friction among South Viet-
nam's military leaders are once more increasing. So
far, this friction seems to center on efforts by
Premier Ky or his supporters, to remove Deputy Premier
Nguyen Huu Co, as well as IV Corps commander Dang Van
Quang, and the maneuvers of the latter two to circum-
vent this. Rumors of plotting by Co and Quang seem
to stem principally from sources close to the so-
called "Baby Turks"--a loose association of energetic
field-grade officers---who are applying pressure on Ky
to oust the two generals because of their widely re-
ported involvement in financial profiteering.
2. Ky has so far refrained from taking any firm
action against Co and Quang, allegedly because he
fears such a move would touch off charges of dis-
crimination based on regionalism. Ky is a northerner;
Co and Quang are southerners. Ky's hesitation, however,
is probably based on other factors as well. He prob-
ably does not anticipate repercussions of the pro-
portions which followed General. Thi's removal in I
Corps last March. However, he may prefer to avoid
the disruption caused by the dismissal of a major
military figure which is inevitably followed by wide-
spread personnel changes among his subordinates, such
as are still occurring in I. Corps.
3. Moreover, some sources--probably sympathetic
to General Co and Chief of State Thieu--have alleged
that Ky is becoming careless in disregarding the au-
thority of the ruling Directorate. Hence a move
against Co and Quang might also be interpreted by
other generals as a major bid for absolute power by
Ky, rather than as a step toward more honest and
efficient government.
Background
4. Rumors of the impending dismissals of Gen-
erals Co, Quang, and even of 11 Corps commander Loc,
date at least as far back as the ousting of I Corps
commander Thi in March 1966. The Buddhist-led po-
litical challenge following Thi's dismissal, however,
forced a postponement of any such action, and under-
scored the need for the utmost: degree of military
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unity. With the crushing of the Buddhist "struggle"
movement, pressure against the government relaxed,
and the long-standing differences among the military
leaders again rose to the surface.
5. More recently, the major changes in Premier
Ky's cabinet--the announcement of which was postponed
several times reportedly because of objections raised
by General Co--resulted among other things in a net
loss of administrative authority for General Co. An-
other factor which contributed to the current fric-
tion was the arrest of General Thi and the possibility
of his being publicly disgraced by court-martial
earlier this month. Although a decision to send Thi
abroad has for the present resolved this issue to the
satisfaction of all concerned, the idea of Thi and
his future being used as political issues by the ruling
generals apparently aroused some of the "Baby Turks",
who had more respect for Thi in a purely military sense
than they did for some of the other junta generals
such as Co.
6. As war minister and, until recently, as the
supervisor of other key government ministries, Deputy
Premier Co has been in a position to wield consider-
able influence in the distribution of government funds
and in the appointment and promotion of civilian and
military officials. Rumors and reports have con-
sistently alleged that Co and his wife have used his
position to engage in widespread corruption since
last year. Recently, sources who are probably close
to Premier Ky have reported in some detail on two of
General Co's current illicit activities. Aside from
IV Corps Commander Quang, Co appears to have little
support among military leaders or lower ranking of-
ficers. Moreover, Co has been criticized not only by
the "Baby Turks," but by certain Catholic and Bud-
dhist figures as well.
7. General Co has been well aware of the grow-
ing precariousness of his position and has recently
been maneuvering to create alliances which would act
as checks on Premier Ky's ability to remove him.
Various sources have reported that Co has been at-
tempting to remove officers of central Vietnamese
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origin from responsible command positions in II and
III Corps and that Co repeatedly objected to the re-
cent changes in the cabinet. Reports that Co has
been in contact with militant Buddhist monk Thich
Phap Tri and even with Thi also suggest that Co may
be sounding out Ky's opponents in various quarters
in an effort to gain support. It appears that Co's
main efforts have been defensive, and directed to-
ward maintaining his position by making his dis-
missal too costly for Premier Ky, rather than to-
ward mounting a coup to remove Ky as premier, as
some reports have alleged.
c. Although Co profited generally in the po-
litical struggles which followed the Diem govern-
ment's overthrow, he was never in the forefront and
has never indicated a desire for a top political
role. He has, however, previously demonstrated ex-
treme jealousy of his prerogatives; he has been a
source of contention since the early months of the
present regime, partly because of his pique at being
forced to trade an appointment as chief of the Gen-
eral Staff for a quasi-political role in the cabinet.
Co appears well aware that his usefullness to the
Directorate is as a native southerner in a military
leadership heavily dominated by northerners, and he
has sought, without apparent spectacular success, to
build up his southern support.
Premier Ky
9. Premier Ky's major sources of power cur-
rently rest upon assumptions within the government
that he has firm US support; upon several key sup-
porters who head the government's police and se--
curity services and who control troops in the Saigon
area; and upon Ky's personal command of the air force.
10. Ky's strength has been increased considerably
by a number of recent events, including the repelling
of the Buddhist bid for power, and by the removal of
General Thi, long considered Ky's primary political
rival. During the crisis in the spring of 1966, Ky
installed his trusted supporter, Colonel Loan, as
national police director in addition to Loan's duties
as head of the military security service. Another
close associate, General Khang, was recently ap-
pointed commander of III Corps, which surrounds
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Saigon, while retaining over-all military command of
the capital itself. Barring any change of loyalty
by General Khang, a successful military coup against
Premier Ky appears rather remote.
11. Expressions of dissatisfaction with Ky by
various figures within and outside the government
are almost certainly due in part to political Jealousy
and to suspicions that Ky may attempt to make himself
all powerful. The prevalence or depth of such feel-
ings is hard to ,judge, but they could provide General
Co with reasonably -fertile grounds to develop oppo-
sition to Ky.
Other Military Leaders
12. Various sources have alleged that Chief of
State Thieu is involved in maneuvering with Co and
Quang to try to undercut Ky's authority, or at least
his supposed tendency to bypass the Directorate.
Sophisticated and ambitious, Thieu has managed to
date to survive political shakeups as well. as sharp
Buddhist attacks, and has avoided any visible signs
of personal dissatisfaction with Ky.
13. Thieu may have been disquieted by the re-
placement of General. Tri--a fellow Catholic and
close associate on the Directorate--by Premier Ky's
supporter, General Khang, as III Corps commander.
14. The positions of II Corps commander Minh
Loc and IV corps commander Quang are influenced by
the fact that both have been rumored for possible
replacement ever since General Thi's ouster. Like
Thi, both have been accused of tendencies toward
"warlordism," if on a lesser scale. Such accusa-
tions stem in part from the existing governmental
practice which allows corps commanders generally a
considerable degree of authority and responsibility.
However, the example of General Thi may serve to
keep Loc and Quang from overstepping the bounds of
military authority; both appear to have been more
circumspect in recent months and to have supported
government action against Thi. Reports linking
Quang with Co, however, make Quang's immediate po-
sition more uncertain than that of Loc, for whom Ky
is said to retain a high personal regard.
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l_b. Other generals in a position to influence
the political scene in Saigon include Pham Xuan Chieu,
the Directorate secretary general; Cao Van Vien,
chief of the Joint General Staff; and Le Nguyen Khang,
concurrently commander of III Corps and the capital
region. Chieu has been mentioned in the past as a
possible successor to Ky,but he has no power in the
form of troop command, and some of his closest po-
litical associates have recently lost positions of
influence. In general, he has exercised extreme cau-
tion in his official political duties. Viers, a strong
advocate of firm action against the dissident "struggle
movement" in I Corps, appears 3enerally content to
implement strictly military policies. Khang, apo-
litical in the past although presently close to many
of the "Baby Tr.rk" officers in the Saigon area, cur-
rently professes firm loyalty to Premier Ky.
Baby Turns
Q. This rather vague association of energetic
field-grade officers within various specialized mili-
tary commands appears in some respects to be follow-
ing in the footsteps of the current ruling generals,
who themselves were described only a short time ago
as the "Young Turks." The "Baby Turks" have had an
increasingly significant influence on major develop-
ments. During April and May, they expressed a strong
desire to take forceful action against the "struggle"
movement in central Vietnam, and provided Premier Ky
with essential backing in quelling the antigovernment
movement. At present, they apparently are pressing
Premier Ky to remove General Co, although the extent
of their deteruination on this issue is unknown,
17. The "Baby Turks'" degree of organization
and their ability to act as a unified force are un-
clear, and they have consistently denied loyalty to
any one leader. Instead, they profess strong ideals
regarding the integrity and honesty of the armed
forces which would allow the military to act as the
true rallying point for all anti-Communist elements
13. Thus far, the "Eany lurks" apparently have
had no serious differences with Premier Ky's policies.
Most of their "spokesmen," such as Colonel Loan,
Saigon mayor Lt. Colonel Cua, and General Khang, are
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closely identified with Ky, and at least one group
of "Baby Turks" recently expressed approval of Ky's
policies over the past few months.
15. The fact that the "Baby Turks" are in
direct control of troops, cutting across the mili-
tary chain of command at the operating level, how-
ever, does inject an element of uncertainty into any
assessment of military loyalties. This uncertainty,
combined with their professed loyalty to principles
rather than to any one leader, could lead to a colli-
sion between the "Baby Turks" and Premier Ky in the
future. According to one report, Ky has been some-
what concerned by the influence of the "Baby Turk,''
and, uncertain whether he s!_.cvii promote them or
attempt to dilute their influence. It is thus con-
ceivable that Premier Ky may be reiraining from
moving against Co--despite Co's unsavory reputation
and his machinations--because of a desire to maintain
some kind of check on the increasing influence of the
"Baby Turks."
20. The location of many of the "Baby Turks,"
in key armored and guard units in the Saigon area,
plus their growing interest in military volitics
and government policies, suggest that they may be-
come an even more important factor in the future.
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1 August 1966
Note for D/OCI
Subject: The Memorandum DISSENSION AMONG
SOUTH VIETNAM'S GENERALS
1. This memorandum was prepared in, response to
the Acting DDI's request for a comprehensive analysis
of current frictions within South Vietnam's military
leadership.
2. Points made in the memorandum are:
(a) the main cause of the present friction.
is the pressure of middle-grade officers
on Premier Ky to remove allegedly corrupt
generals from their field positions and
from the ruling junta;
(b) the present dissension probably poses no
serious threat at this time to Kyle posi-
tion; but
(c) the basis is being laid for possible power
struggles among the military in the future.
3. We recommend this memorandum be given routine
internal and external dissemination..
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